

Overheard in Seville

*Bulletin of the
Santayana
Society*

No. 15
Fall 1997



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ANNOUNCEMENT

SANTAYANA SOCIETY

1997
ANNUAL MEETING

“Ultimate Religion”
James Gouinlock
Emory University

Commentary
Henry Samuel Levinson
University of North Carolina

7:30 - 10:30 P.M. 28 December
Room 403
Philadelphia Marriott Hotel

The Society's annual meeting will be held in conjunction with the December meetings of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) in Philadelphia.

The Place of Santayana In Modern Philosophy¹

“I came to Athens, and nobody knew me”
attributed to Democritus.

The Non-sectarian Character of Santayana's Philosophy

In the Preface to *Scepticism and Animal Faith*,² Santayana wrote that his philosophy was “*no phase of any current movement*” [italics in original] and that he could only take the contemporary schools more seriously if they took each other more seriously. The state-of-the-art in present day academia remains pretty much just as he found it when this was written in 1923. In the main, “Doing philosophy” today consists in rival factions functioning in wholesale neglect of one another. There are the skeptically positivistic schools “doing epistemology” associated with the Analytical Style, the hermeneutically and deconstructively orientated strains of the Continental Style, advocates of American or Asian thought, and so on. My experience is that Santayana's writings remain largely irrelevant to these special interests groups. In actual fact, I find that most academicians have not read Santayana or have not grasped his thought in any depth.³

This scandal of denominationalism in the politicized academy today suggests an immediate problem which should be dealt with up front. Was Santayana a “classical American philosopher”? Santayana flourished at Harvard, where he was associated with such luminaries as James and Royce, and commented widely on the American intellectual scene — conspicuously, on the thought of Emerson, Whitman, James, Royce, and Dewey. Therefore it remains common practice to include him in the ranks of the American philosophers. Scholarly interest in Santayana has also come mainly from these quarters. Yet Santayana remains at best a marginal figure in the mainstream of American transcendental and pragmatist thought. If anything, the legacy of his writings contains a sustained critique of the several strains of classical American thought. These are often warmly written, but they are truly devastating.

That Santayana resigned from Harvard in mid-career, never returning to the shores of the United States during his remaining forty years, offers a telling sign that his philosophy was no phase of any current *American* movement. He also left an explicit statement to this effect in “My Americanism,” the penultimate section of his “Apologia pro Mente Sua” in PGS.

¹ This paper was read to the Santayana Society at its annual meeting in Atlanta on December 28, 1996.

² See page viii of the Preface to George Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, (London: Constable, 1923), which will be referred to henceforth as SAF.

³ This pattern of incompetence in understanding of Santayana's thought was something he experienced in his own lifetime. See, for example, the generally ludicrously myopic responses to his thought in the Library of Living Philosophers volume dedicated to him, *The Philosophy of George Santayana*, ed. Paul Schilpp, La Salle, Ill., The Open Court Publishing Co., 1951, to be referred to as PGS. See also Santayana's unpublished letter to Paul Schilpp dated October 21, 1940 which is included in an Appendix below.

While his writings should continue to be read in association with the textbook American philosophers — as for instance in John Stuhr's sourcebook, *Classical American Philosophy*, with its excellent introduction to Santayana by John Lachs⁴ — I think it is high time to take the measure of the legacy of Santayana's thought in broader perspective. One of my theses will be that in such an analysis Santayana turns out not to be an "American philosopher" at all and, accordingly, that an injustice is done by continuing to classify him in this procrustean fashion.

When we take seriously that he explicitly "dropped out" of the American philosophical scene, Santayana's thought becomes — for the present writer at least — a most interesting enigma. If he was not an "American philosopher," was he an "Anglo-American" or a "Continental" philosopher? Granted that these present-day designations are a bit anachronistic for Santayana's career. But the rhetorical question serves the purpose of answering itself. While he was eminently conversant with the schools of British and continental European philosophy of his day, Santayana's relation to them is no different than to American Pragmatism or Idealism. Again, he looms as a most articulate critic of those schools; but most certainly, his philosophy was "no phase of any current movement" of European thought, either.

Such considerations as these have often led me to ponder the question of Santayana's elusive place in "modern" philosophy. The exercise has had the salutary effect of getting me to reflect further on the state of philosophy today which, very much like Santayana's description of it, remains polarized into a variety of rival camps. In comparison, Santayana seems a freer philosophic spirit who, in his contribution to philosophy, deserves a place on the eternal lawns of Limbo in company with greatest of the classical philosophers. In my way of thinking Santayana was, more than anything, the modern Democritus whom he chose to feature as the chief interlocutor in his *Dialogues in Limbo*.⁵

Three Templates of Santayana's System

I have written elsewhere on how the ancient philosophers such as Democritus produced world-views, or systematic interpretations of the world, that gained historical recognition and influenced the development of thought. The reverse side of this coin is that much of the subsequent medieval and modern, including contemporary, schools of thought consists in reenactment of the ancient paradigms — often in hybrid, and attenuated, forms. Santayana's system, I now hold, combines two such paradigms of ancient thought. It blends together the Democritean and Lucretian strains of reductive materialism, on the one hand, and the psychological relativism of the schools of

⁴ See pages 268-276 of John J. Stuhr, ed., *Classical American Philosophy* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). References to Lachs' "Introduction to George Santayana," will simply be marked "Lachs."

⁵ See George Santayana, *Dialogues in Limbo*, (London: Constable, 1925). On page 600 of "Apologia Pro Mente Sua," Santayana's response in PGS to his critics, he states that he consciously drew his cosmological naturalism or materialism "from Democritus, Lucretius and Spinoza." See David A. Dilworth, "Santayana and Democritus: Two Mutually Interpreting Philosophical Poets," *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society*, 7 (Fall 1989), 9-19.

Hellenistic Skepticism, on the other. Santayana's Platonism — conspicuous in his doctrine of an infinite realm of essences which do not exist — is a function of this confluence of the two paradigms in his thought. Santayana established his system on these principles, and positioned himself in relation to the modern and contemporary schools on the same “archic” basis.⁶

But such considerations involve principles of reinterpretation of Santayana's thought in the framework of a comparative hermeneutic of the major philosophic theories. For present purposes let us address Santayana's system in its own terms. In addition to its remarkable literary quality, the systemicity of Santayana's thought is attested to by such scholars John Lachs and Timothy Sprigge. “Santayana's brilliant grasp of the history of philosophy,” Lachs writes, “enabled him to draw extensively on a wide variety of sources. His most remarkable achievement is to have forged a unified and novel system out of such disparate elements” (Lachs 268). Sprigge writes in the same vein when he states: “[Santayana] developed one of the most perfectly worked out complex philosophical systems there is, and is a mine of subtle reasoning and distinctions and of insight into the major problems of philosophy”; and, again, more explicitly: “Upon the whole I would say that it is the most convincing, carefully worked out and comprehensive version of materialism or naturalism that there has been. At a time when so many philosophers are materialists, it is a pity that they do not attend to the one version of materialism which has really found a satisfactory way of dealing with spiritual values and with ethics, and of accounting for mind in a non-reductive way.”⁷

When we address Santayana's system on in its own terms, I shall now suggest, we find the recurrence of three infrastructural patterns of consistent conceptual articulations in his writings. I shall refer to these as the three templates of this thought:

- (1) The “three philosophical poets” template: this refers to Santayana's discernment of the paradigm shifts, if you will, entailed in the historical and conceptual transitions symbolized by the three philosophical poets, Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe's *Faust*, and by other variations on the same theme.
- (2) The “three types of morality” template: this refers to his discernment of another set of paradigm shifts identified as types of “prerational morality, rational ethics, and post-rational morality.”
- (3) His “four realms of being” template.

This third template — featuring the hard categories of essence, matter, truth, and spirit — is a product of his later years; it grows out of, but does not entirely supplant, the former two. In a sense the first two almost dovetail, since post-rational morality is exemplified by Lucretius, rational ethics by Dante, and prerational morality by Goethe's *Faust*. There are also differences that need to be addressed. This point need not detain us here. What is important to notice is that both templates — of the three philosophical poets and the three types of morality — involve diachronic, or historical, considerations,

⁶ David A. Dilworth, *Philosophy in World Perspective: A Comparative Hermeneutic of the Major Theories* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

⁷ See page 117 and page 118, respectively, of Timothy Sprigge, “The Philosophy of Santayana,” in *American Philosophy*, Ed. Marcus Singer (Cambridge, 1985) to be cited below as “Sprigge.”

whereas the ontological categories employed in the four "realms of being" do not. And while the first two templates do contain diachronic insights, they can also be employed synchronically as distinguishable paradigms of philosophic thought. My thesis here is that Santayana consistently employed all three infrastructural templates, often weaving them together.

In *Three Philosophical Poets*⁸ Santayana articulated the differences involved in Lucretius's classical materialism or naturalism, Dante's medieval supernaturalism, and Faust's modern subjective psychologism. These distinctions are already prefigured in his treatment of the philosophical principles subtending the contrasting world-views of Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare in *Interpretations of Philosophy and Religion*.⁹ The distinctions recur again in such an essay as "The Progress of Philosophy" in his *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*.¹⁰ As Santayana saw it, Lucretius represented a final articulation of the ancient, and mainstream, naturalistic world-view going back to Homer, the Greek tragedians, the pre-Socratic *physis* philosophers, Democritus, and Epicurus. Dante stood for the culmination of Socratism — various strains of teleology of the perfectible human soul — that were expressed in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and the Church Fathers. The writings of Shakespeare and Goethe's Faust symbolically encompassed the main strains of philosophic psychologism or transcendentalism — which for Santayana included practically all the schools of modern philosophy, with the possible exception of Spinoza.

Santayana thought and wrote consistently in the terms of this "three philosophical poets" template. It is crucial to note that his ubiquitous critiques of the two strains of modern psychologism or transcendentalism — the strain of skeptical positivism or speculative empiricism and the strain of romantic idealism — always presupposes this historical template. The two strains are really versions of one school — that of modernity — and their disputes seem like small potatoes when viewed in the light of the impoverishment of the possibilities of philosophy involved in their skeptical replacement of the naturalistic and teleological world-views. Even when discussing the priorities of modern psychologism, Santayana never forgot the rich legacies of ancient and medieval traditions, and understood the former as attenuated versions of the latter.

The second template of Santayana's writings is that of the three forms of morality. The type of "prerational morality," which grounds its view of life and conduct in the vagaries of instinct, passion, and appetite, was championed by the Athenian Sophists, and recurs in almost all the forms of modern psychologism and transcendentalism. The type of "rational ethics," which speaks of the perfection of the soul and society, corresponds to the forms of Socratism mentioned above. The type of "post-rational morality," whose keynote is despair of the ethical resolutions of the first two types, is found in the Hellenistic Schools (the Skeptics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics). Santayana developed insightful analyses of the religions of the world in the terms of the same template, and he also combined these with analyses stemming from the first

⁸ George Santayana, *Three Philosophical Poets*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), which will be referred to as TPP.

⁹ George Santayana, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, edited by William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., (Boston: MIT Press: 1988), to be cited as IPR.

¹⁰ *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*, (London: Constable, 1922), which will be referred to as SE.

template. The crucial example of this is his habit of distinguishing northern European from southern European Christianity. He further linked the northern European — or Protestant — world-view to the Hebraic world-view and to the two strains of philosophic modernity. Variations on these themes recur well into his later writings — as, for example, in *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* and *Dominations and Powers*.¹¹

As a first approximation to appreciating the intent and force of Santayana's writings it is possible to say that he preferred Dante to Shakespeare or Faust or Walt Whitman, but Homer or Lucretius to Dante. Again, he preferred the principles of rational ethics to those of the various prerational ethical systems, but, finally, the principles of post-rational ethics over those of rational ethics. Santayana's own "ethics of cheerfulness" — his frequent mood of tranquil, disillusioned, detached, even humorous, spirituality — expressed his own form of post-rational ethics. However, while such an approach opens up many vistas within Santayana's writings, it does not account for the more equitable distribution of the ontological values inscribed in his four realms of being.

The third template running throughout Santayana's writings is his "realms of being." Essence, matter, truth, and spirit are the hard categories of his later system, but they are already discernible in his early writings — for example, in the five volumes of *The Life of Reason*.¹² The discrimination and nuanced articulation of these categories provides the basis of the evaluations of Lachs, Sprigge, and others as to the systematic character of Santayana's thought. But, as I have emphasized above, they run in tandem with the templates of the three philosophical poets and the three types of moralities, producing the rich warp and woof of his many writings.

My discrimination of these three templates of Santayana's thought opens up many ramifications which cannot occupy us here. But an obvious implication for the present paper is that their coexistence and, indeed, co-determination in his writings is explanatory of how his thought seems like a receding galaxy from the perspective of the systems of modernity. Such systems are myopic in principle, forms of prerational ethics and of Faustian psychologism. They are categorially impoverished, particularly lacking in Santayana's sense of matter and of truth. They do not adequately distinguish the realm of material psyche from the realm of spirit, involving the latter in the folly of psychologistic or transcendental constitution of the appearances of the world.

Santayana's Non-reductive Materialism and Critique of Modernity

Santayana's far-ranging, culturally saturated, non-reductive materialism is precisely what is perplexing to the retrenched, psychologistic "modern mind" which has by and large bought the Western Enlightenment myth of secular progress (through "prerational" competition ... , the competition among individuals and nations ... , colonialism ... , imperialism ... , consumerism ... , and in academic circles, the rivalry of technocratic methods). In his aforementioned essay, "The Progress of Philosophy" in SE, he offers the cogent counter-thesis that the history of philosophy has in fact been a *regress*

¹¹ *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels or God in Man*, (New York: Scribner's, 1946), and *Dominations and Powers*, (New York: Scribner's, 1951)

¹² George Santayana, *The Life of Reason*, (New York: Scribner's, 1905-06), to be cited as LR..

— from the first physical speculations of the Presocratics (who, he says, were the best philosophers), to the waves of Socratism, to the Moderns (who starting with Descartes have recentered philosophy on a transcendental, or psychological, basis).

To Santayana, philosophical modernity has explored the implications of transcendental analysis at the cost of spiritual impoverishment. This was a consistent theme from Santayana's early writings which had as their subtext a critique of the presuppositions of the Yankee establishment. Throughout his career he continued to remind his readers that the medieval Christianity of his forefathers was not literally true but had its unforgettable symbolic appeal and presence. It had lasted for a millennium as a "combination of superstition and policy, well adapted to the lying and lascivious habits of Mediterranean peoples"¹³ (LR, vol. 5, 1983 Dover paperback ed., p. 213). It was supplanted by the four Rs of Renaissance, Reformation, Revolution, and Romanticism which, if anything, shrunk the mythical and symbolic resources of the classical and medieval traditions.

But again, in Santayana's historical view, first Socratism (Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Neo-Platonism) and then the medieval supernaturalist release from the efficacious and formative causalities of physical existence contributed in their own ways to the emergence of Protestant modernity, with its Faustian drive for ever reforming knowledge and new experience along the horizontal, radically immanent, surface of human subjectivity. Cut loose from the finite limitations and fulfilments of the natural order, the modern transcendentalist, in romantic soliloquies of knowledge, feeling and will, now constitutes the natural and the supernatural orders as functions of his or her own unlimited aspiration!

The "modern" or Faustian quest for reformed knowledge and new experience, Santayana shrewdly observes, has its own substrative compulsions (including competitive compulsions for the novel and the unique which subtend both its work and its consumer ethic). And there is the reverse side of this coin. Although each transcendentalist must start afresh, if he is honest (and if he is looking over his shoulder), he will sense that somebody else is on his heels, ready to sweep his starting point and interpretation aside, replacing it with a more radical theory. "The beauty and the torment of Protestantism," he wrote, "is that it opens the door so wide for what lies beyond it. . . [It] is not a cumulative science that can be transmitted ready made. It is essentially a reform, a revision of traditional knowledge, which each neophyte must make for himself, under pain of rendering only lip-service to transcendental truth, and remaining at heart unregenerate".¹⁴

¹³ See page 213 of the paperback edition of the fifth volume of LR (New York: Dover, 1983).

¹⁴ See pages 13-14 of *Egotism in German Philosophy*, (New York: Scribner's, 1915), to be cited as EGP. This view also informed, among other things, Santayana's reading of "young America," the writings of Emerson and Whitman, and the mainstream American Pragmatist tradition. His views on "young America" are contained in "Philosophical Opinion in America," "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy," *Character and Opinion in the United States*, and other places.

Santayana's Integrative Paradigm

Now what of Santayana's own "integrative paradigm" in the light of all this? Santayana can perhaps be seen announcing his own kind of integrative paradigm in envisioning the arrival of a new philosophical poet who could combine the insights of Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe's Faust. "It is time some genius should appear to reconstitute the shattered picture of the world," he wrote in 1910. "He should live in the continual presence of all experience, and respect it [as in Goethe's Faust]; he should at the same time understand nature, the ground of that experience [as in Lucretius]; and he should also have a delicate sense for the ideal echoes of his own passions, and for all the colours of his possible happiness [as in Dante]. All that can inspire a poet is contained in this task, and nothing less than this task would exhaust a poet's inspiration" (TPP 214-15). In many ways this description of the ideal poet describes Santayana's own career-long philosophical project.

There is no question that Santayana's writings, amounting to many volumes over a long career, consistently express a comprehensive — and indeed by today's standards, ambitious — core philosophy. It systematically unfolds in various articulations and amplifications, while scanning and rescanning the historical resources of spiritual insight. Though he drew often from the resources of British philosophy — especially from Berkeley and even Hume for "the discovery of essences" in his sceptical moment — the center of gravity of Santayana's philosophy can be said to have remained in southern Europe. Thus he came deliberately to "leave Boston," returning symbolically as well as physically via England to his southern continental roots. Spiritually and culturally, he said, all roads lead to Rome, with its confluence of Greek, Roman, southern European Christian, Renaissance, and modern cultures. Also salubrious for his failing health, Rome seems to have afforded Santayana the site most congenial to his intellectual vocation, which increasingly took the form of re-cultivation of ancient forms of the philosophic spirit.

Symbolically, then, I would interpret Santayana as a southern European "Continental" philosopher (the only one, in contrast to the waves of "Continental philosophers" of today who, in Santayana's own estimation, are no longer true to the French tradition and have gone over to the German camp). In some of his literary peregrinations Santayana poses as a Catholic who wonders at the confusions of a Protestant or an Unbeliever, and who is silently grateful for the faith he has, tragically hellish or purgatorial though it may be. But his strength of mind comes from his "pagan" animal faith which had its justification through natural piety and reasonableness, supported by the enduring tropes and the finite stabilities of the natural order. As Santayana insisted, myth has its symbolic place, though not in the common-sensical factual realm, which is the realm of animal faith, or of action. At the same time, the realm of matter supported the overtones and fruitions of spirit in the realms of philosophy, poetry, and other refinements of human life. That is why he wrote as follows:

I want my metaphysics and religion to be good poetry, not bad and inadequate poetry. And I am not eager to smuggle it into the dark corners and fine interstices of reality (like our transcendental friends.) I am glad to have it as full and interesting as possible, a real counterpart and idealization of life. Therefore I prefer Catholic ideas to Protestant, and Pagan ideas to Catholic: or, if you like, I would only accept Christianity as a form of Paganism. For in Paganism I see the only religion that tried to do justice to all life, and at

the same time retained the consciousness that it was a kind of poetry. (Unpublished letter, 29 May 1900, to William Roscoe Thayer, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MS: Houghton.)¹⁵

Non-sectarian and cosmopolitan, Santayana remained faithful to and finally returned to his roots in the "pagan" substrate of Rome, which still contained the confluence of Greek, Roman, and Catholic heritages of the West. This "Rome" was his "place" in modern philosophy.¹⁶

To be sure, Santayana appreciated that "Protestant modernity" has its own *reformatory* and expansive spiritual insights in its trajectories of pure experience and radical empiricism. In TPP, for example, he makes this link between the Faustian spirit and the philosophy of William James: "*Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben*; each sense has its arbitrary quality, each language its arbitrary euphony and prosody; every game has its creative laws, every soul its tender reverberations and secret dreams. Life has a margin of play which might grow broader, if the sustaining nucleus were more firmly established in the world" (TPP 214). But, to Santayana, the modern Faustian spirit has retrenched the full gamut of spiritual nuances discovered in the multi-sedimented pagan and medieval Christian worlds by pursuing the possibilities of positivistic/empirical and transcendental/romantic forms of "experience" on a predominantly horizontal and diachronic trajectory of human subjectivity. "Thus we have just seen that Goethe, in his *Faust*, presents experience in its immediacy, variety, and apparent groundlessness; and that he presents it as an episode, before and after which other episodes, differing from it more and more as you recede, may be conceived to come. There is no possible totality in this, for there is no known ground." (TPP 203)¹⁷

¹⁵ "In his [Santayana's] eventual philosophy, religion, at its deepest, was described as a system of symbols which enriched and deepened the experience of living, and which had a certain aptness as a way of adjusting to the world in its true character, but which entirely lacked literal truth. In the light of this Catholicism could be regarded as better than Protestantism, since its symbols were richer and more flexible, and more in tune with nature than Protestantism which, in an attempt to find literal truth, simply impoverished the symbols of Christianity without discarding its falsehoods. Thus Santayana thought that Catholicism provided a better way of life, more spiritually fulfilling for the saintly, and more enriching of natural life for the majority, than Protestantism and since to do this, and not to be true, is the function which reason ascribes to religion, it is to be judged the better type of Christianity. It was this attitude which evoked Bertrand Russell's quip that Santayana believes there is no God, and that Mary is his mother" (Sprigge, 117).

¹⁶ In connection with his critique of Protestantism, which already is prominent from the time of IPR and LR (esp. volume 3), it is important to note Santayana's attendant pervasive theme that modern Protestantism contrasts radically with the Indian world-view on the one hand, but has strong affinity with the Hebrew — as distinct again from southern European Catholic — world-view, on the other. For this theme see, for example, EGP's "The Nature of Egotism and of the Moral Conflicts that Disturb the World," a Postscript appearing on pages 151-73 of the Haskell House edition, New York, 1971; another aspect of this frequently appears in Santayana's remarks on the legalistic side of Spinoza.

¹⁷ Thus in a letter from Santayana to James: "I wonder if you realize the years of suppressed irritation which I have past [*sic*] in the midst of an unintelligible sanctimonious and often disingenuous Protestantism, which is thoroughly alien and repulsive to me, and the need I have of joining hands with something far away from it and far above it. My Catholic sympathies didn't justify me in speaking out because I felt them to be merely sympathies and not to have a rational and human backing; but the study of Plato and Aristotle has given me confidence and, backed by such an authority as they and all who have accepted them represent, I have the right to be sincere, to be

But to the mature Santayana of *Realms of Being*, the entire modernist repertory of retrenching positivist empiricism, as well as of progressively triumphant world-pictures or of angst-ridden, morally indignant world-ending-narratives of Romanticism, are so many “reformist” discriminations of epiphenomenal consciousness. They are just special — and errant — effects that are produced when the older strata of philosophical culture, particularly the materialist strata of the pre-Socratics, Democritus, and Lucretius, have been programmatically eliminated.

Santayana systematically reiterates this central position. It is built into the title of SAF. He elsewhere describes his essential frame of mind as a constant oscillation “between a radical transcendentalism, frankly reduced to the solipsism of the living moment,” and “a materialism posited as a presupposition of conventional sanity.” This was his honest claim to normal madness and natural piety. But in this theoretical framework, at once culture-laden and comprehensive, Santayana waged a systematic war against the extremes of speculative empiricism and of speculative idealism within northern European modernity.

Physically and spiritually, then, Santayana returned to “Rome,” i.e. to Europe’s classical “roots.” So thoroughgoing was this symbolic return that he succeeded in combining the physical cosmology of the Ionians and the speculative materialism of Democritus and Lucretius with the moderate skepticism of the Hellenistic Middle Academy, and all of these again with Dante’s and Spinoza’s imaginative realms of essences and the insights of ultimate enlightenment of the Hindus and Buddhists. No wonder he claimed his system belonged to no single school of contemporary philosophy!¹⁸

absolutely objective and unapologetic, because it is not I that speak but human reason that speaks in me.” (Cited from Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, in Ruth Anna Putnam and Hilary Putnam, “The Quarrel Between Poetry and Philosophy,” *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society*, 14: Fall 1996, 4. The Putnams’ article, incidentally, reaches the disingenuous conclusion that Santayana himself was “a last Puritan”: this is way off the true mark, not appreciating the form of “spirituality” — the ancient Democritean (and Taoist) “ethics of cheerfulness” paradigm — which Santayana’s thought exhibits.

¹⁸ It would go beyond the scope of this paper to spell out how the doctrinal form of Santayana’s integrative philosophical paradigm was a manifold syncretic accomplishment. While explicitly materialistic in the cosmological sense of the supporting basis of physical existence, his *Realms of Being* provides for a non-reductive ontology which in its own terms succeeds in expressing various key features of philosophical modernity. For example, Santayana’s realm of *essence* draws explicitly on Spinoza and Leibniz and again on the “immediate appearance” doctrines of such skeptical empiricists or agnostics as Berkeley, Hume, and James. Except for his doctrine of the impotency of spirit, his realm of *spirit* is affine with some aspects of the “immediate experience” positions of the radical empiricists, idealists, and voluntarists, and also of F. H. Bradley and Whitehead; his realm of *matter* — not merely of so-called “experience” — repossesses the essential gist of the action-orientation of the pragmatists and Marxists; his realm of *truth* harkens back especially to Spinoza and Freud. At the same time, his realms of being repossess the live-and-well legacies of ancient systems: the Socratic/Platonic idealism and its imaginative extension in Dante’s worldview; Spinoza’s sense of the objectivity of nature; Leibniz’s sense of the omnimodality of essence and spirit; the existential skepticism of the Hellenistic school and Hume’s “modern” revival, to say nothing of post-modernism’s off-beat version, of it; and his appreciation of “pure spirit” or “spirituality” in the ancients (of West and East) in contrast with the “impure spirit” in Hegelianism and its derivatives in the European existentialists and in the American Pragmatists.

It is fair to say that Santayana revisited most, if not all, of the major sites of the history of modern philosophy and — without falling prey to the contemporary and post-modern penchant for technocratic specialization and partisan agenda — incisively rethought these various legacies. Compared with the substantial contrast his thought has drawn between the ancients and the moderns, the intramural debates among the moderns seem like small potatoes indeed. This is the ultimate basis of Santayana's contention that his system "is no phase of any current movement." On an ancient materialistic basis in terms of which he simultaneously clarified the meanings of essence, spirit, and truth, Santayana produced probably the most critical and syncretic system of 20th century philosophy. And that, in a nutshell, is his place in modern philosophy!

Appendix

A letter from Santayana to Paul Arthur Schilpp concerns the Editor's review of *The Realm of Spirit*.

Grand Hotel, Rome
October 21, 1940

Dear Professor Schilpp,

Your review of *The Realm of Spirit* arrived yesterday. It is at once friendly and remote, and I think it was as well to have decided beforehand not to attempt to reply to it. You have more than carried out my idea of quoting from the book, and the Glossary of Terms alone makes, to my mind, an amply reply to your chief criticism. Would anyone not immersed in a particular contemporary movement think my terms not clear? This is the first time I have heard that allegation. Certainly they are much clearer than the scraps of Logical Realism that I have read, that needed to be translated into ordinary language to be at all intelligible. You yourself indicate the cause of this divergence in criteria, but perhaps without seeing how deep it runs. It was in the second part of your paper that I was confirmed in thinking that you are interested only in *concepts*, not in *things*; for you select transcendence as the chief character of spirit, actuality and moral intensity seeming to you meaningless. Now transcendence is proper to intent; intuition does not transcend the given; it is not faith but sight. And transcendence, intent, and intelligence (all names for the same *thing*) is inconceivable except in spirit; so that there you find a trait of spirit that begins to give you a notion of what the *concept* of spirit might be. But the *concept* of spirit does not interest me, except as a technicality: it is the *life* of spirit that I am talking about, the question what good, if any, there is in living, and where our treasure, if any, is to be laid up. It is a religious question. It is not a question of words. You seem to feel this, yet it takes you a long time to discover it. — I hope the rest of my *Apologia* has reached you safely.

Yours sincerely, G. Santayana.

DAVID A. DILWORTH

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Sensibility, Pragmatism, and Modernity¹

Professor Dilworth has argued persuasively that Santayana is, in a certain sense, not to be understood as a “modern philosopher” at all. Rather we must see him as continuing and deepening certain ancient themes. He contends that one of the most powerful sensibilities to be found in Santayana’s thought is that of southern European Catholicism with its rich and explicitly symbolic interpretation of the human situation.. All this, of course, is grounded in a materialism that is not the materialism of contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind but the materialism of Democritus and Lucretius.

I am in much sympathy with this as a reading of Santayana and in fact argued along with John Lachs at this very meeting two years ago that it is Santayana’s European sensibility that really sets him outside the mainstream of American thought. Therefore I will not take on the main thrust of Dilworth’s discussion. I do not so much want to disagree with Dilworth as to attempt to bring out elements of Santayana’s thought that he chooses not to stress. In this light I want to develop three different sides of Santayana. First, the stress on ancient themes may make us forget the extensive dialogue which Santayana had with his contemporaries and the contributions he made to ongoing discussions. Second, I will examine the nature of the difference between Santayana and others in the American tradition, particularly Dewey. Here I will argue that Santayana is, after all, a philosophical pragmatist although he does not share Dewey’s optimistic spirit. Finally I will try briefly to call attention to the distinctively modern, even contemporary, context in which Santayana’s philosophy is situated.

As Professor Dilworth points out, much of Santayana’s writing is explicit commentary on and discussion of the views of others. For example, in his chapter “Hypostatic Ethics,” in *Winds of Doctrine*,² Santayana makes Bertrand Russell his explicit target, and by implication he also intends to attack G. E. Moore. There he argues that the irreducibility of good does not imply its unconditionality. Of course, good cannot be defined, but a mature naturalism does not seek definition. It rather seeks to lay bare the natural conditions under which that quality attaches to objects. This is, of course, a devastating criticism that exposes the shallowness of the whole Moorean project.

In the theory of perception it must be remembered that Santayana contributed an essay to the volume of the so-called Critical Realists and thus, at least for a moment, became a member of a “current movement.” There he develops his doctrine of essences in the direction of a theory of perception that is dualistic but not representational. While the immediate content of consciousness is never the object perceived this does not stand in the way of knowledge so long as the relation between content and object is interpreted as symbolic. Here he puts his views at the service of a raging debate of his own day. And even when Santayana does not bother to name those in response to whom he is

¹ These comments were presented in response to the above paper of David Dilworth at the annual meeting of the Santayana Society in Atlanta on December 28, 1996.

² George Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine and Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957).

writing it is nonetheless clear who he has in mind. For example, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*³ is aimed at undercutting the whole idea of a foundationalist epistemology, a presupposition of any number of his contemporaries and of many even today. I certainly agree with Dilworth that many contemporary epistemologists do not give that work the attention it deserves. In my view it is the most rigorous development of the possibilities of skepticism and its power is to show that skepticism reduces itself to silence.

Professor Dilworth calls attention to Santayana's critique of Dewey's philosophy as a metaphysics of the foreground by which he means that Dewey does not take seriously enough the realm of matter. In Dilworth's own words Dewey was "neglectful of the deep and dark background of our material existence." Let us for a moment reflect on this criticism to see how deep a form of pragmatism goes in Santayana's own thought. I have already conceded — in fact argued for — the thesis that there is a fundamental difference in attitude between Santayana and the mainstream of the pragmatic tradition.⁴ However, is that difference of the sort that Dilworth suggests, namely a metaphysical difference over the status of matter? In two places in his discussion Professor Dilworth refers to Santayana's "ontological categories" as "hard." Unfortunately he does not give us any guidance to understanding what he means here. They certainly represent certain irreducibly different aspects of our experience. Thus by "hard" Dilworth may mean to call attention to this radical difference which cannot be negotiated. Or perhaps Dilworth means to suggest that these are the fundamental categories which finally must be taken with metaphysical seriousness. If it is this latter then at the deepest level I don't think that Santayana has any "hard" categories because Santayana tells us — and Dilworth seems to be aware of this—that we cannot take his categories with ultimate metaphysical seriousness. They are merely the categories that he chooses to clean the windows of his soul (SAF, preface vi) and he encourages us to find others that might serve our purposes. He says, "I do not ask anyone to think in my terms if he prefers others. Let him clean better, if he can, the windows of his soul, that the variety and beauty of the prospect may spread more brightly before him." Here he seems to allow "usefulness" in a very broad sense, to be the final arbiter of philosophical truth. As I said, it seems that Dilworth is aware of this when he identifies Santayana as a new "philosophical poet" (p. 13). In a longer version of the paper, he says: "all philosophies have a mythological character ... The bad mythologies are too narrow and restrictive of insight and imagination; the good ones positively illumine certain fruitions and resources of the human spirit" (p. 4). This contention must apply to Santayana's own philosophy and so the "realm of matter" together with the rest of the realms must be taken as mythologies that "illumine certain fruitions and resources of the human spirit."⁵ The very project of metaphysical speculation is understood as subservient to the human good. This I take to be pragmatism *par excellence*. It is a pragmatism that is tinged with a deep sense of irony which I will discuss below but it is a pragmatism nonetheless. To put the point directly, it is Santayana's sensibilities that set him apart from the American tradition and

³ George Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, (Constable, London, 1923), cited as SAF.

⁴ How this might work out in detail is the subject of a forthcoming study by myself and John Lachs which is an extended examination of the relations between Santayana and Wittgenstein.

⁵ See "Thinking in the Ruins: Two Overlooked Responses to Contingency," by Michael Hodges and John Lachs in *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society*, 13: Fall 1995, 1-7.

especially Dewey. There is the European sense that we have done all this before, that empires come and go, that progress if it happens at all is merely local and piecemeal. All this is in sharp contrast with the sense of newness and optimism that pervades much of American thought. Of course, Santayana gives elegant philosophical voice to his sensibilities in his work and in so doing much becomes clearer and focussed — as the windows are cleaned — but all this is in the service of a sense of what the possibilities of life might be. In this fundamental way he seems to share a project with James and Dewey even if his final assessment is more guarded.

It was the thrust of the argument of “Thinking in the Ruins” that Santayana along with Wittgenstein should be seen as responding to what might be called the quintessential problem of 20th century philosophy — the problem of contingency. Santayana shared with a number of philosophers the experience of disintegration and chaos that was the intellectual aftermath of the First World War out of which grew a sense of the contingency of all things. Once the contingency of human practices — our practices as believers, knowers, agents both practical and moral — becomes apparent a number of responses can be found in 20th century thought. Two of those — the post-modern and that of Dewey’s pragmatism — are well known and I will not treat them here. Nor will I develop Wittgenstein’s own response to this defining problem. What we argued in the paper and what I want to reiterate here is that Santayana was very much a part of this distinctively 20th century debate. Santayana’s sensibilities and his explicit philosophy can be profitably seen in relation to this problematic. In this context Santayana’s materialism and focus on the realm of essence with his appreciation for the spiritual life come into complete focus. On the one hand from the perspective of the contemplation of essence, the values of the embodied animal must be seen as utterly fleeting and partisan. At the same time, the infinity of such essences insures that they can play no role in shaping our decisions. There is simply no practical guidance to be found in this “dizzying multiplicity.” In fact, in one sense the realm of essence is simply Santayana’s way of expressing the infinite possibility of redescription which undercuts any attempt to achieve philosophical or intellectual closure. In the end, nothing but a sort of ironic detachment is possible from this perspective but of course such an attitude can only be maintained so long as the material body cooperates. We are soon pulled back into the rush of engaged life from the perspective of which the spiritual life seems a distant and useless excess. In a certain sense these two attitudes cancel each other out leaving only a tragic sense of life and a sadness at the fleeting character of all things.

This we contend is a distinctive response to the problem of contingency quite different from the mainline pragmatic view or the post-modern. My purpose here is not to develop in detail Santayana’s view or to defend it. Rather my aim is to bring into focus the distinctively modern context in which his philosophy is situated for while it is no doubt true that Santayana thinks out of ancient materials he thinks in a modern context .

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Conversations in Rome

The following is a selection from "Mis conversaciones con Santayana," written by Julio Irazusta, and translated from the Spanish by Charles Padrón. The original article appeared in 1954, two years after Santayana's death, in the short-lived Argentinian journal *Diálogo*.¹ The selection translated below is the second of three sections:

I. *Encuentro con el filósofo.*

II. *Conversaciones en Roma.*

III. *Últimas entrevistas con el maestro en París y Florencia.*

Charles Padrón is a doctoral student at Vanderbilt University. Irazusta was an Argentinian cultural and political critic interested in philosophy; from his mid twenties onwards, he was captivated by Santayana, by both the man and his writings. He is well known in his own country for such works as *Autores y espectadores* and *Tito Livio, O Del imperialismo en relación con las formas de gobierno y la evolución histórica*. He wrote the article here translated in the year following Santayana's death in 1952.

The remarkable friendship between Santayana and Irazusta in the late twenties is itself of interest, and is scarcely known to Santayana scholars, at least English speaking ones. The voluminous index in the critical edition of *Persons and Places* contains a single reference to Irazusta; in a passage on page 37. In a discussion of names, Santayana says: "I have known South Americans of distinction who bore the names of Irazusta and Irrarrázabal." Nevertheless, it is clear from letters quoted below that Santayana felt a friendship for Irazusta and took pleasure in his company. In order to underscore the depth of Irazusta's friendship and respect, I cite dedications found in two books he had sent to Santayana.

In a copy of *Autores y espectadores*, he wrote: "To Jorge Santayana, incomparable master, your admirer and friend. Julio Irazusta 1/25/38."

In a copy of *Tito Livio*, he wrote: "To Jorge Santayana, your admirer, disciple, friend. Julio Irazusta 5/4/52."

These two volumes belong to the University of Waterloo Santayana collection. My sincere thanks go to Susan Bellingham, Head, Special Collections Department, University of Waterloo Library, for her kindness and help in accessing these books.

An earlier translation of the entire paper already exists, in the 1993 book *Santayana Abroad: Selected Translations of George Santayana*, edited by David Wapinsky and Zechariah Switsky, Publications Philanthropica for Public Libraries, printed and bound by Courier Companies, New York. In this anthology are found translations of papers originally published in a number of different languages, in many of the countries of Europe, Spanish Latin America, and others. It also contains a brief description of Irazusta's life. For further information on the book, contact David Wapinsky, 2160 Holland Avenue, Apt. F-8, New York City, NY10462.

The existence of this previous translation came to our attention only when this present one was in the late editing stage. We feel that another rendering of a part of the text will be of interest to readers of *Overheard in Seville*. Especially in the middle section, this article is full of revealing passages aiming to be verbatim statements of Santayana, and having some plausibility as such.

Charles Padrón

¹ *Diálogo*, No. 1 (1954) pages 65-85.

With the fearless indiscretion of youth, I remember having questioned him about his philosophy from our first visit onwards. Until then, I had read him as a critic and essayist. But there had been moments when, in his commentaries on other thinkers and writers, it interested me more to know what he himself thought, than to hear his criticisms of other authors. Without any hesitation, [Santayana] explained to me:

I call myself a materialist. But it so happens that I'm also a Platonist, even though that might seem to be a contradiction. My materialism is in natural philosophy, while my logic is Platonic. But, contrary to Plato, I don't have a metaphysics, nor do I want to have one. I don't want to have anything to do with it. Plato attributed a power to ideas, of their even being capable of shaping material things; I do not. The idea of a thing, for me, expresses the thing, but it has not had any participation in the process of its creation. Material existences do not owe that existence to the spirit, but to God, to causality, or to whatever you would want to name that which exists. For me, the world of the spirit is a world apart from the natural, and comes afterwards. I believe it is an excrescence, or if you like, a fruit, and not the original source.

To this theme of the relation of ideas and material things, which is of vital importance in his philosophy (as it should be in all thinkers), he returned continually. As he saw it, the intelligence can know the truth of human things; a man can know absolutely, given the best circumstances, the experience of another man. But with regard to the natural world, the intelligence can grasp only what suffices for action, and not the ultimate truth. "Our knowledge of the physical world," [*sic*]² he told me, sensing the rustiness of his Spanish and falling back into English, "is true enough. I like to say: A knowledge true enough." Or, translated: "that our knowledge of the physical world is very certain. I like to say: knowledge is very certain." But nothing more. According to him, intelligence does not reproduce material things, but rather symbolizes them very well through the names that designate them and distinguishes them from each other. It does not know them completely. Concerning the Platonic idealists, among whom he included himself with regard to his logic, he told me that their error consisted in considering idealism as a complete reality, when actually it is only one of its parts, as he demonstrated in his *Three Philosophical Poets*.

On another day, explaining to me the objections he had against Plato, he told me:

If everything is created by rays which radiate from the *One*, the rays will nevertheless fall in places determined by the disposition of raw matter. My idealism is passive inasmuch as I accept final causes, not as causes that have the power to fashion matter, but rather as expressions of that which does arise. The *One*, the spirit, discharges rays which ground everything,

² Phrases or words which are in English in Irazusta's text are marked '*sic*'.

but matter distributes their incidences with complete freedom, and in accordance with a mechanism which is very complicated and marvelous.

And, discussing the similarities between the Catholic Trinity and Platonism, he said to me:

Plato's demiurge is not a creator but a laborer who works the matter that is given to it, but which it doesn't create. Besides, it works the design of an architect, the ideas of whom are of a hierarchy superior to the demiurge. And in turn these ideas in Plotinus are of an inferior quality to the *One*, which would come to be the God, the Father of orthodox theology.

With the zeal of all youths to validate their own tastes and appreciations, I asked him his opinion of Walter Pater's *Plato and Platonism*, which (like the entirety of Wilde's work) filled me with enthusiasm:

Yes, it is a very good book. And its last chapter on Plato's aesthetics is the best there is. The one thing though that Pater didn't understand, something hardly any of the commentators have understood, is the rigorous negation of art in *The Republic*. Pater, like the others, finds it contradictory, if not incomprehensible, that Plato, being the supreme artist that he was, negated

Socrates no es una puerta de entrada
a la física, sino más bien de salida.

the rights of art in his ideal city. I don't believe, for my part, that he would have such a contradiction. The rigorous negation confronts the individual independence of artists in their particular

work. It has been done in virtue of the principle that all cannot form part of a harmonious group without making some sacrifices themselves, in order to arrive at a perfection which has the general good in mind. After the necessary sacrifice of the individual, a greater beauty emerges which is merged into the good. It is what one could call the aesthetics of asceticism. I believe that when artists produce under the impulse of a collective ideal, they produce better work. The supremacy of the general good over the individual interest in Plato's *The Republic*, seems to me excellent in the same way. What I don't accept is that this good be in all parts the same, and that therefore, all parts of the ideal city must organize themselves in identical fashion. I think that this absence of relativity in morals came to Plato from his faulty physics. The Forms which, for him, reality is pleased to take on here and there are not always the same; but Plato thought they were. For this reason, he conceived of a general good identical in all its parts, in correspondence with the uniformity of the aspects presented by reality in the realm of his physics.

This was not a paradox destined to enliven the conversation but rather a deep-rooted conviction ingrained in Santayana — it arises in his praise for unanimity, as the

basis of freedom in the Church, which he had written about in the last chapter of his work *Character and Opinion in the United States*. And in another of our chats, I asked him his opinion of Croce's concept of the practical nature of the theoretical error, along with his defense in the abstract of the Inquisition and the caning done by schoolmasters. Santayana reiterated the defence that some parts must be suppressed for the good of the whole. He did not say anything about the Neapolitan philosopher's ideas; but concerning the Inquisition he told me that, yes, corporal punishment and the massacre of heretics was an absurd process which would only serve to place distrust in people's hearts as to the goodness of religion. However, the community has a right to preserve its spiritual unity; Philip II's expulsion of the Jews and that of the Huguenots by Louis XIV had been beneficial overall. What Spain and France lost materially was compensated for by their growth in the spiritual domain.

On one occasion, when I met Santayana at the Pincio without prior arrangement, I found him reading the proofs of his *Dialogues in Limbo*. The part which he had in his hands was related to an episode from the life of Avicenna, which had been revealed to him through a work by Baron Carra de Vaux, and which according to him was superb. In a work by Grousset on the history of Oriental philosophy, other works by the bookish Frenchman had been mentioned, but Santayana had not been able to obtain them. At this meeting, he explained that when correcting proofs he made as few changes as possible, only the indispensable ones, and that he attempted to place the new expression in the same place as the deleted one: "For me this is like writing poetry. I always think of a comment of Byron, that a worker should never be the enemy of his tools — *should never quarrel with his tools.*"

Socrates is not a door of entry into physics, but rather an exit.

In order to save himself the trouble of a visit to the public libraries, he asked me to look up a fragment of Lucretius that he wanted to place in a general epigraph to his *Dialogues*.³ This I did with pleasure, afterwards sending him the text and its location in the poem by mail, for which he thanked me as soon as we saw each other again. This time he told me that in this book he attributed Buddhist ideas to Democritus, suggesting that these doctrines were very similar to those of the Greeks. Santayana was influenced by the surviving fragments of Democritus, and on the account of the earlier philosophers found in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, he commented:

But Aristotle didn't understand Democritus' physics. Aristotle's physics was Platonic. He had arrived at it through Socrates; and Socrates is not a door of entry into physics, but rather an exit.

He added that his general goal in the *Dialogues* was to view the ancients as they viewed themselves: "It is not an easy task," he said, "but it is not impossible. One has to make an effort with the imagination. We'll see how the public receives it."

When the first bibliographic commentaries began to arrive in Rome on the *Dialogues in Limbo*, he told me that his friend Lowes Dickinson had seemed to him to

³ When Irazusta speaks of *Dialogues*, he is referring to *Dialogues in Limbo*.

be lacking in self-confidence: "He is already so old, like me," he added, smiling, "that he cannot afford to lose time in becoming acquainted with new things." I insinuated a timid protest, telling him that I considered the author of *Modern Symposium* and *Letters from John Chinaman* an elegant and fine writer. To which Santayana retorted:

Yes, so fine that he loses himself in the air, fading away into oblivion. Besides, he is lost in sentimental sociology. He thinks that the supreme criterion in judging reality is goodness. But wherever there is a being who suffers, this will be an evil for him, even though that suffering is inevitable, since it is subject to the very laws of life. Because of this, the place in which he found himself most at home was China, where more or less everyone lives in an incorrigible elegance, in a delicious and lazy Epicureanism, without suffering but also without movement or life.

"An article on the *Dialogues* which seems much better to me," he added "is that of Lindsay, Warden of Balliol, whom you know. He says that the best of the dialogues, as you wrote in your letter, is 'The Philanthropist'. I also think that this is the case."

Concerning the letter that I sent him with my opinion of the *Dialogues*, I didn't have any recollection of it until I reread my notes on the conversation in which he mentioned it. But it didn't surprise me that I had fallen into impudence in revealing to

him my preferences for one of the chapters above all the others. For I had made my first foray into the world of letters as a literary critic, and my boyish infatuation drove me to counsel him on certain readings, as for example, that of Maurras. Not only did he not take this badly, but rather followed my lead and began to read the principal book of the

Todos sentimos la necesidad interna de tener razón en lo que pensamos.

great French monarchist in the 1926 edition, so much augmented with the first Discourse and various appendices that the small edition had transformed itself into a tome of large format. It didn't take long for the master to give me his opinion, in these terms: "Here I am with the *Enquête sur la monarchie*, which happens to be a big, fat book. I read a little of it every day. I still don't know myself what it is that I think of Maurras' thought. There's something in him which shocks me, but of course, many things are well thought-out and well put." I admitted that one of the inconveniences of Maurras' style was that he always wanted to be right. But Santayana exclaimed: "Ah! That's inevitable. We all feel the internal necessity of being right in what we think, because if we didn't we would all begin to think in a different manner, introducing once again the same difficulty — and so on *ad infinitum*. Nature has been very malicious with us, obliging us to be ignorant under pain of denying our own selves." On the unavoidable subjectivism of life, he told me on another occasion:

If each one of us didn't believe that he was the center of the world, life would be impossible. This is an absurd belief, because our present is nothing more than a convention. The year in which we live is no more real than the previous ones or those which will come. But in conceiving of

eternal existence without subjectivism, time becomes impossible. Thus, it's good that we think ourselves the center of the world, in order to organize our action in the most humanly way possible.

At one point, when he had repeated several times that these were the very problems examined in the book that he was then writing, *The Realm of Essence*, he asked me that I forgive him, for his mind was then full of this theme. I answered sincerely that, far from annoying me, the point obsessing him interested me a great deal. It had been one year since George had ready for publication the second part of his great philosophical work.⁴ In the spring of 1925 he had told me that everything was written, but that it was not well organized; moreover, he was aware of much rehashed rubbish.

"A Frenchman pointed out to me as my principal defect the *répétés*, the repetitions," Santayana told me with a singular modesty; "he was right." At the end of this same year he was in doubt about whether he would ever finish this philosophical work. He said that he was getting too old, and was passing through a period of laziness and a lack of willpower. He sometimes became confused, and could not grasp concepts well. Halfway through 1926, he resumed his work on *The Realm of Essence*. One afternoon in May in which I went to see him in the Bristol Hotel, he told me that in the summer he thought of terminating the first half of the volume, in order to send it immediately to Constable, his editor. He promised to give me the proofs to read in the winter and to point out any repetitions. This I didn't do, because no doubt it was unnecessary. At this

We all feel the internal necessity of
being right in what we think

point, he told me that he was distracted and could no longer continue the work, that he became muddled and couldn't concentrate, and that maybe he was unable to do any further work on it, thus leaving unfinished this philosophical work of his old age. The emotional state could have been in part due to the most diverse readings, and by his persistent reference to this or that book of the most wide-ranging authors. I observed that he took pleasure in these books, as does any writer who undergoes the nausea of his own gestational effort, and seeks relief in the contemplation of somebody else's success. But besides that, and primarily, it was doubtless due to something else which was already in preparation, his novel, *The Last Puritan*, which he was to publish ten years later. From the first time I had met him, he had talked a great deal about this projected work of the imagination, always including with his comments a smile. The novel seemed always to be in the background, whereas the current philosophical project would be in the forefront. I would not have dared to ask whether his rôle as a novelist depended on an actual vocation on his part, or whether it was a reaction to his critics — those who praised his style in order to deny his ideas. What is certain is that, as he pursued his philosophical work amidst the agonies of speculation, artistic creation served

⁴ The second volume of *Realms of Being* is in fact *The Realm of Matter*, and the content of the citation would suggest that this was the book in question. However, the dates make this impossible. It is likely that Irazusta was thinking of *Scepticism and Animal Faith* as the first part of the "great philosophical work" in question. This would be quite understandable, since Santayana thought of the latter as an introduction to *Realms of Being*.

him as spare time work, allowing him to rest from the fatigue and sacrifices that the other caused him.

I suspect that at that time he was also thinking about his admirable *Memoirs [Persons and Places]*; the public at large may dispute which occupies the central position in his works, that or *The Last Puritan*. Although he never put up the slightest resistance to my inquiries about his ideas and books, what he spoke about with the greatest spontaneity was his personal memories. Indeed, he had already recounted to me the majority of the anecdotes which figure in *Persons and Places* and *The Middle Span*, to the point of leaving me nothing new to recount here; it was as if there should be no details which, in honor of sobriety and modesty, he left out of his books. For example, Don Pelayo, the clerical friend of his father, had asked him how one could say that the earth was suspended in the middle of space, since, being so, it would fall. The young Santayana actually responded with another question: "And who told you that it was not falling now?" This constant returning back to the years of his youth was no doubt the colloquial elaboration which writers are in the habit of making of their material before giving it a final form.

Evidently his reading distracted him from his work. He wasn't a bibliophile, he wasn't a bibliomaniac. He didn't have a library, nor did he keep the books that he read, even though they were annotated in his own handwriting. But he knew how to go right to the heart of a book. There were many which he bought on his own initiative, and in

addition, he didn't refuse flatly to read those that a friend would point out to him. He welcomed with the utmost kindness the daily increasing number of books that people would send because of his fame. One time he told me of receiving the maxims of St.

Tantos intereses, un saber tan universal,
tanta claridad mental, eran algo milagroso
erunidos en un solo hombre.. [Leibnitz]

John of the Cross, published in French, from a translator whose name he didn't remember. This led him to make the following comment:

The maxims of St. John of the Cross teach us that one must detach oneself from everything. This is the general conclusion to which mystics and philosophers arrive, and I'm already aware of it. Yet it is very hard to live it. The desire of arriving at perfection is almost the same as the desire to die. All philosophers hurry to die before becoming aware of it. All of them are afraid of the truth. The Buddhists, the Greek philosophers, the mystics — they all aspire to the perfection of nothingness, to the dissolution of being. The wish to liberate the self from illusion, and to embrace the entirety of substance, I believe, is an idolatry. I accept the illusions, and attempt to live in their company as best I can. My philosophy is a method of rational life, and I try to instruct men on the best way of embracing that which is congenital to them. If illusion is inextricably a part of life, the preoccupation of the self with it should be left to those who are interested in substance; let them concern themselves with it.

At the end of that conversation he didn't find it inconvenient to fall into agreement with me as to the astonishing intelligence of Leibniz. This was done in order to dampen my ardor and my youthful enthusiasm with a cold shower:

So many interests, a knowledge so universal, such mental clarity; they were miraculous in one man alone. The only thing that I miss in Leibniz is a complete sincerity. It seems to me that he was something of a charlatan. Well, he loved to show off. He was a politician and a religious diplomat. He visited princesses and any minor German principality which solicited his presence. As Christianity was in fashion in the courts, he kept it more in mind than he would have done, had he not been such a public man of the world.

Of Spinoza, on the other hand, I always heard him speak with the greatest respect. Never did he forget his debt of gratitude for having learned from his writings, since a very early age, the ethical relativism that he had adopted in his mature philosophy. The only reservations that I ever heard him mention were: once, that the well-known *Ethics* of the Jewish philosopher was an anthropology, a simple transcription of the habits and passions of men, rather than a morality; and on another occasion, that the Spinozistic vision of reality *sub specie aeternitatis* was an idolatry of substance. But one need only

recall the most beautiful paper on Spinoza ["Ultimate Religion"] he delivered in Holland. (Marichalar translated and published this address in *La Revista de Occidente*.) This alone will convince one that the author of *Ethics* and *A Theologico-Political Treatise*

So many interests, a knowledge so universal, such mental clarity; they were miraculous in one man alone. [Leibniz]

was doubtless, of all the thinkers of the past, the one who inspires the most respect.

With regard to contemporary German philosophical thought, he said he was little informed. He had only read Vaihinger, the originator of the philosophy *as if*, and a few others. According to him, the hundred pages of Kant which Vaihinger chose, present one conception among many others that one can discover in the Konigsberg philosopher. But Vaihinger believes it to be the only true one: namely, that the phenomenal world is a creation of our fantasy, and that the reality to which it appears to correspond doesn't exist, obliging us to proceed *as if* it existed. Santayana knew his Kant and the thesis in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, according to which the reality to which phenomena corresponds, even though imperceptible, exists.

It's simply good sense to believe in that. Why not believe that there is something behind phenomena, something which the senses proclaim to us and which experience confirms? What I call animal faith is more powerful than all skepticisms, however sophisticated they might be. One could ask Vaihinger what it is that obliges us to proceed *as if* this reality, which the phenomenon reflects and which we know doesn't exist, might exist. It is

because something must compel us to give ourselves over to such a game.

On another occasion, with regard to the same topic, he told me that he didn't entertain any prejudice against or in favor of any matter or reality exterior to us; that nothing whatever could guarantee either that something exists or doesn't exist.

As we spoke of his own philosophical work in progress, he referred to the way in which idealistic systems, Platonism or German philosophy, shape nature. As he saw it, they have no other recourse than to return to materialism; that the examination they make of nature, wherever it might be that the examination stops, is a materialistic one. But he added that he couldn't reduce to the same category Anglo-Saxon psychologism. From each one of the perceptions (provoked through sense data by the solicitations of matter), it creates an autonomous world, with no common tie to any other perceptions. It creates a minced meat dish of idealism, in Santayana's own expression. He enjoyed a certain humorous twist in his definitions here, but I observed that it was his attempt to make these same concepts precise which caused him so much vexation, as he had confessed to me on another occasion.

He did not talk about his North American colleague Dewey unless he was asked to. He said that Dewey's philosophy was a system up in the air, because, having abandoned Hegelianism, he had yet to arrive at a definitive realism. Since Deweyan ethics maintains social life as the pre-eminent principle, and condemns isolation, I told

him that he would be the first victim of ostracism in a community founded on such a base. He nodded his head and smiled. Santayana was quite critical of Dewey's style, insisting that he didn't arrive at what he proposed for himself. At the beginning of 1926, Santayana wrote an article on him which

... todos los pragmatistas ... tenían el voluntarismo de Nietzsche y otros alemanes, pero sin la poesía.

appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy* in New York, a copy of which he lent me. Another time, after praising Dewey's work, above all the latest part on the subjectivity of the *foreground* [sic.] in philosophy, he confided to me that he had written a passage maintaining that philosophy was the contrary of this foreground to which Dewey assigned primordial importance. He commented:

It is a fact that our condition is largely unappreciated; that we all see things necessarily from a partial point of view. But even though man does well not to trouble himself with the insufficiency of his cognitive means, philosophy must attempt to overcome the adversity of this limitation in the restraint of the possible. He couldn't live without considering nature from a point of view; but this need not lead us to believe that our subjective point of view is the only possible and true one. But as it was very hard to say that philosophy was the opposite of what Dewey does, I left out that passage.

On another occasion he told me that all of the pragmatists possess the voluntarism of Nietzsche and other Germans, but lacked the poetry.

When the conversation brought up the name of Bertrand Russell, I would accuse him of being fond of novelty in a fanaticism which each day maintains a new idea, readily abandoning previous ones. Santayana told me: "It is just that today's philosophers in their doctrines see merit in novelty, and in their speculations worship change. One is required to be sensitive to movements of opinion, to the *winds of doctrine* [*sic.*] which agitate the contemporary world. They are not going to advance if they fail to notice the last silly idea in fashion! As I understand it, the philosopher should aspire to a more enduring truth, even if it is only true to him and illusion to all others."

Of the Parisian philosophers, Santayana had met Boutroux, author of a "Prologue" to the French translation of his *Egotism in German Philosophy*. He didn't share with me anything interesting about Boutroux' philosophical work. But when I mentioned to him the definition Paul Valéry had given of Boutroux (a priest for the Church of Protestants who had ceased believing), Santayana initiated a comparative patristic disquisition:

The Greeks were more extravagant and crazier than the Latins. They didn't have the juridical sense. Discipline, the subordination to one central power, was not easily comprehensible to the Greeks. The Church had to be a Roman institution. Origen was, frankly, a heretic. His theory of Hell was expressed as a special form of purgatory, so that he presented the possibility of salvation for everyone, and said that condemnation was carried out through cycles of time, not for all eternity.

... all of the pragmatists possess the voluntarism of Nietzsche and other Germans, but lack the poetry.

Returning to Paul Valéry, I had lent him a book that Frederic Lefèvre wrote about his conversations with the great French writer. A few days later, Santayana told me that the verses reproduced at the end of the volume had not strengthened any conviction on his part regarding the greatness of the poetry of the author of *The Graveyard by the Sea*. At the age of twenty-five, I tried to give the best defence that I could, face to face with a master of style and of ideas like Santayana. With this theme in mind, he then launched into a digression on Hegel, for whom the spirit was very purposeful, and who had indifferent ears and a large, hooked nose. As Santayana understood it, the Germans tend to find the rational behind everything that exists or takes place; they bring to this a spirit of loyalty verging on the universal, something they share with the Jews. Protestantism is nothing more than a heresy of Judaism, not of Catholicism, he told me. Still, he didn't appear to have forgiven the Germans for the anxieties they caused in World War I, during which he spent in England. To this same motive I attributed his opinion, semi-eulogistic, semi-pejorative, of Keyserling and his *Travel Diary of a Philosopher*: "He is a man who writes well, and this in spite of being a German. But like all German philosophers, Keyserling makes all of Hindu philosophy result, *aboutir*, in a German philosophy. This lack of objectivity is so characteristic of all of them."

One will have noticed that the names of Spanish writers didn't figure in any of our conversations. It's just that Santayana never read their books. He told me that he wouldn't have known about Cervantes, except for the times his little sister Susana read

to him when he was a boy in Boston; and that once, committed to write an article on Cervantes for an American encyclopedia, he completed the article by recalling what his sister had read to him, and read *Persiles*, which he really liked. It appeared to me that he had not read *Exemplary Novels* and wasn't sure if *The Conversation of the Dogs* was one of them or not. On one of my last occasions with him, he spoke of Unamuno, whom he had seen in Salamanca, in the small restaurant where both had lunch. He told me that perhaps Unamuno had remembered him, because he had sent a copy of *The Tragic Sense of Life* to him; but he did not make himself known, due to a lack of sympathy for him. He told me that don Miguel [Unamuno] was followed by many young people, who appeared to be inexperienced professors rather than students. "Or perhaps politicians," I suggested. "Have you not seen how stirred up he gets? He has proposed overthrowing the king." "Then he must 'hurry up'," Santayana told me. "He gave me the appearance of having aged much. He seemed to suffer from early senility. During the entire time that he was seated at his table, when he wasn't occupied with actually eating, he didn't do anything but gather together all the bread crumbs within reach and amass them behind his back until they formed a ball, slowly getting larger. I don't know what he did with it."

But this occurred some years after my frequent intercourse with Santayana, which had taken place between 1925 and 1927. I had left Europe definitively, and the trip I made there in 1930 was a short one of nine months. Santayana had lost his favorite sister, Susana, his remaining attachment to Avila. And as he recounted in his *Memoirs*, he visited Spain in the summer of 1930, but did not want to go to the house of his brother-in-law, going instead as a guest to his friend Mercedes in Galicia. It was during his return to France that he stopped in various Spanish cities, among them Salamanca, where he saw Unamuno at lunch.

At that time, having hardly unpacked, I wrote to the master announcing my arrival in Europe. He acknowledged receipt of it with this little note:

c/o Brown Shipley & Co.
123 Pal Mall, London, S.W.1.

Rome, 14 May, 1930

Dear friend: you have no idea with what pleasure I received the notice of your trip, all the more so as I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you before long. I leave on the 20th of May for Paris, *en route* to Spain, and I will be for a few days at the Hotel Royal Haussmann. At a later date I hope to return and it's probable that I'll spend a part of the summer at Versailles; if you come there, *paulo majora canamus*.⁵

Your most affectionate,
George Santayana

JULIO IRAZUSTA

⁵ "Then we will sing all the louder," would be a rough translation of this Latin phrase. The third section of this paper, entitled "*Últimas entrevistas con el maestro en París y Florencia*," begins after this letter.

Rudiments of a Speculative Naturalist Philosophy

Few philosophers today will deny that there is an external world; yet according to tradition, we are constrained, by intellectual rigour, to talk of substances, things, and events only at a certain remove (by the empiricist school) or not at all (by the idealist and phenomenology schools). We are expected instead to deal with some kind of reductive substitute, an idea or a sentence or a theory. However, a naturalist philosophy, as understood here, ought before anything else to deal freely with material things, and to refer to them explicitly.

A second point; it has become clear, through relativity and other modern physical theories, that our grasp of this external reality is most curious. Many of our most cherished concepts, which were thought to be well understood since antiquity, have come in the twentieth century under a devastating attack. The idea of simultaneity makes sense only within a chosen frame of reference. One may return to one's original position by following a straight line — or is there such a thing as a straight line? The notion of causality disintegrates. And so on. I think that physicists have taken to heart, from these discoveries, a profound lesson about the nature of knowledge. This is less so for philosophers, who tend to retain a doctrinaire position regarding the relation between our knowledge and the truth. Conceptual difficulties such as the above receive considerable attention as puzzles in the philosophy of science, but the overall theory of knowledge continues by and large to be what logicians would like it to be.

A serious conflict has been assumed, between the strong realism suggested by the first observation above, and the anti-realism apparently displayed by doubts of the second kind. Here, however, it is held that these two thoroughly convincing views are mutually consistent; neither should be relinquished or watered down. On the one hand is the overwhelming presence of a physical cosmos, not just external to us, but in which we participate as a part. We are in immanent contact with this reality at all times, and refer to it in our thought constantly. What is at a certain remove, however, is our intellectual grasp of what that reality is, since our concepts of it fail us so radically. The former intimate contact with the world is through animal faith; the latter ideal reconstruction of that reality cannot disclose to us its innermost nature.

Philosophers often respond to difficulties with ever more exacting definitions; but this approach is not helpful when dealing with substances whose nature is hidden from us. In the setting here, such definitions are rendered somewhat implausible by their precision alone. It is balanced judgement which is called for, and not ever further refinement. The philosophical challenge is rather to cope with less precise notions, and to be more concerned to unearth the ultimate assumptions of theories. A place cannot be refused in philosophical discourse for arguments appealing to the weaknesses of human psychology, to the influence of dominant inherited ways of thinking, and to the scope of common illusions. Thus a change is forced on us in the kinds of argument which are philosophically acceptable.

1. Naturalism

The basic assumption of naturalism used here is very simple:

- 1.1 *There exists a physical cosmos containing living organisms having preferences and needs. Interacting as participants within it are humans, who are conscious, have passions, and are capable of happiness. (NAT)*

All of this is obvious. What sets the assumption NAT apart is that the existential status of the external world and its constituents is not to be weakened or attenuated, come what may. NAT makes no claims about our knowledge of the world or its participants, it is only their existence which goes unquestioned. In this treatment, two traditional kinds of sceptical doubt will be kept separate: those about the *existence* of things; and those about the veracity of our *knowledge* of existing things. Both of these are formidable challenges. The former doubts cannot be resolved by logical means, and require a naturalistic assumption, such as, for example, NAT. Doubts of this type are not incoherent, but so long as they are unsettled through an assumption, there can be no genuine discussion of knowledge — for knowledge requires belief. One must *begin* with some sort of assumption such as the above, if one wishes a significant epistemology. Doubts of the second type concerning the literalness and accuracy of our knowledge of external existences are never dispelled. A sceptical position on this point, although difficult to accept and even to formulate, is not at all debilitating in regard to effective action by the naturalist.

Current philosophical practice, insofar as it ties together the two kinds of scepticism here distinguished, tends to accept implicitly something like NAT, but then to weaken it in various ways in light of deficiencies in knowledge; here no such compromise is made.

That we may be sceptical about our knowledge of things whose existence is not questioned is suggested by simple common sense arguments requiring no embellishment. Suppose we envisage, informally and from the outside, sentient and intelligent beings interacting with their surroundings, but having no *a priori* access to knowledge of those surroundings. These beings surely possess some sort of knowledge of those surroundings, as displayed by their successful interactions. However, such knowledge will be dependent upon sensory inputs and on the novel conscious representations made from these. This knowledge is advantageous, but there is every reason to doubt that constructions presented in its subjective terms will correspond exactly to the real constitution of those external surroundings; they must always reflect the subjective sensory mechanisms for representation, and must always be couched in ideas originating in the mind.

Philosophers tend to distrust any reference to or forthright discussion of a world which has a real constitution with definite characteristics, but which may never be known. They doubt the logical possibility of dealing coherently with a thing-in-itself, and argue that even scientists restrict themselves to their doctrines and theories. This is false; scientists talk all the time about the latent, hidden, unfathomed realities their theories are meant to deal with. Indeed everybody else does too, including philosophers in their less guarded moments. In any case, from the basic assumption above, which *starts* with this external reality, we are forced to refer to and cope with this reality in our philosophy, and to deal with the logical difficulties as best we can.

We are led to a doctrine that we have knowledge of things which is functional but which is not true in the literal sense. The notion of knowledge bifurcates into a symbolic, non-literal knowledge accessible to us, and an ideal knowledge or truth which may never be accessible in the case of external things and events. Such a dichotomy leads to difficulties in logic and language. But it seems to be forced on us by our tenacious acceptance of realism about things and our doubts about knowledge of those things.

1.2 *Knowledge of physical reality fails to be literally true, but is genuine and useful. It is symbolic or non-literal knowledge. (NLK)*

The notion of non-literal knowledge has no practical importance, but it will offer speculative insight into a number of difficult philosophical issues.

In common philosophical usage, everything seems to hinge on the *truth* of a knowledge claim. But nothing can be *known* without being believed. Here belief is restored as a chief constituent of knowledge; knowledge is prosperous animal faith.

The term “naturalism” is frequently used in philosophy to mean an exclusive reliance on the methods and results of science to deal with epistemological and other problems. As understood here, NAT makes no such appeal. The part of naturalism which is faithful to scientific practice here is the thorough-going acceptance of material substance — an admittedly dogmatic assumption — and not an appeal to science for answers to philosophical questions. Equally, the aims of epistemology are different here. The principles permitting a separation of valid knowledge claims from invalid ones is left to scientists, who are the experts on particular knowledge claims. Here the theory of knowledge will deal with general principles about the kinds of knowledge accessible to humans, and how reliable science might be.

2. Epistemology

In adopting NAT, we clearly bypass the usual requirements of a standard epistemology; the critic will complain that we have assumed everything which epistemology usually tries to justify. One response is that this treatment has considerably more philosophical modesty than may appear. While the world is assumed, an absolute minimum knowledge of the nature of this world is allowed. The characteristic doubts of NLK, in their own way, are more radical than the final results of most criticisms of knowledge.

Beyond this, one may argue that the transcendental methodology of a more standard epistemology is unable to offer any less arbitrary results, and is also driven to make sweeping dogmatic assumptions. We call an epistemology transcendental, when it is critical and rejects anything not justified by an obvious validity, whether through privileged representations given to the mind, or in the certainties of introspection. Such an approach purges from philosophy all opinions which cannot be justified when seen from the transcendental station of a critical mind. We argue that this methodology is inherently sceptical; once one accepts it, one is logically required to press it to its conclusion — an ultimate scepticism — unless existential assumptions are made. What frequently happens is that implicit existential assumptions slip unnoticed into the argument: the assumption of a conventional society, or of the investigating person, or of a transcendental ego. Since some prior existential assumption is essential, if there is to be any genuine knowledge, there is good reason to do this systematically. The assumption NAT serves this purpose.

2.1 *Transcendental methods, when carried out rigorously, yield no secure knowledge of the world, but only solipsism. Whenever knowledge claims are made, an hypothesis of the existence of that world is made. Such an assumption should be forthright, and not introduced in a clandestine and piecemeal fashion.*

3. Ontology

The existential realm, postulated in NAT, will be called the realm of *matter*. By hypothesis, it is the source of all change, and the underlying cause of everything that happens. By dint of being anxious living organisms forced to perform within it, we accept without thought this postulate in our actions. NAT is confirmed in a sense, after the fact, by our success in dealing with it.

Our conscious awareness is actual in a more immediate sense, and is not questioned here. That persons are conscious and take a transcendental perspective is evident to those persons, and needs neither hypothesis nor proof. The existence of other minds, of course, does require an assumption, one which has been included in NAT. Consciousness in general is called *spirit*, but this notion is detached from all of the difficult questions about its origins, and stripped of any reference to brain activity. It is merely the awareness itself.

In each thing or event in the realm of matter, existence takes on some determinate form; and it is convenient, for discourse, to consider the forms apart from the existences. These are called *essences*. Being purely ideal and non-existential, there is no reason to limit the scope of the realm of essence, which will include the forms of things which exist or might exist at some time, which have been intuited or might be intuited. Every shape or form or determination is an essence. A thorough going sceptical reduction ends with the pure intuition of essence. .

The existence of a determinate cosmos — dispersed in space, advancing in time, and characterized by manifold events — carries with it the implicit notion of a *truth* which records these events. No further existence assumptions are needed, beyond the assumption of the realm of matter in NAT. The notion of truth is an ideal one, and not to be confused with knowledge. Truth is essential to discourse about action in order to act intelligently, and serves this purpose only when it is understood as an absolute eternal record of events. The truth is assumed to be the collection of essences which are realized in all things and events at all times.

When a realm of matter is frankly posited and given a clear demarcation, empiricist fears about admitting essences or truth are allayed; discourse requires some place for non-existential essences which allow us to describe that realm, and for truth as an ideal record of its progress. These two further realms make no existential claims, and require no additional assumptions.

Ontology, as understood here, goes beyond the simple question of what there is, and it might therefore be preferable to speak of a conceptual scheme rather than an ontology. However, this also is misleading, for it is not a matter of providing formal definitions of significant categories and concepts. Definitions seem too often to lead away from the deeper sense of these fundamental concepts, especially when the perceived goal is a definition of the three other realms in terms of material things. Rather the goal here is a clarification of basic categories by using them and bringing out their differences. Important also are the aspects of experience properly associated with them; it is a question of clarifying these experiences and applying them to genuine problems. Matter calls forth animal faith, with connotations of dread and hope. Neither of these emotions is tied to pure essences, which may lead instead to a more aesthetic spiritual response. Truth is directly tied to the welfare of people, and in this manner is closer to matter than to essence, since truth is the record of material change. However, truth shares with essence its eternal, unchanging character, whereas matter is change

itself. And spirit is consciousness or experience. Although this is entangled in the preoccupations of animal life, its origins are in a quest for objectivity and aesthetic appreciation, and hence pure spirit is associated with contemplation and detachment from individual concerns.

4. Matter

At some point in the distant past, the double experience of natural mutation and recurrence led to the important thought "that all we observe about us, and ourselves also, may be so many passing forms of a permanent substance" (TPP 23).¹ We cannot avoid positing a field of events for our actions; but it is a major advance to extend this field to the entire cosmos, assign substantiality to it, and through science begin to describe it accurately.

4.1 *Underlying all natural knowledge is the postulate that there are things and events prior to their discovery and independent of them. The postulated substance is called matter, and the existential cosmos is called the Realm of Matter (RM).*

One must make minimal assumptions about the indispensable properties of matter. Indispensable to science and to action are space and time; one may even say that RM constitutes a physical space and a physical time. These are existing realities, but they have no existence apart from matter, and do not admit any a priori definition. *Mathematical* space and time are scientific figments. The antinomies of the very large and the very small, of the remote past and distant future, would suggest this. *Pictorial* space and *sentimental* time are no less human creations, and reflect the human perspective from some transcendental focus. The evident inadequacy of our notions of space and time may lead the literalist to draw the misguided conclusion that they are unreal, and turn from them to their representations; they are, however, real physical entities, just as is substance, despite their accessibility only through concepts of our own creation.

4.2 *Through space and time, substance is dispersed into parts external to one another, each a focus for existence.*

Uniformity and recurrence are everywhere evident in nature, and through science have inspired the formulation of numerous physical laws. These uniformities, which we call *tropes*, are rendered into science as laws; however, the law should not be confused with the trope. The former is a statement made by scientists, while the latter is the form of actual change. This confusion is similar to the replacement of things by their descriptions, and arises in like fashion. The thing or the trope is not clearly defined or identified, and there is a temptation to deal only with the description, which is precise and more conducive to logical treatment. However, the confusion is more serious with laws, there being no widely used term which refers to the form of a recurring event for which the law is substituted — to the trope.

Various symptoms reveal this confusion of trope with law. One is a tendency to enshrine tropes, which are mere habits of nature, from contingencies into necessary truths. But nobody can demonstrate that a law holds in all places and at all times. The

¹ TPP stands for Santayana's *Three Philosophical Poets* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1910). In several brief citations to follow, we use the standard abbreviations found in *Santayana*, Timothy Sprigge (London and New York: Routledge 1995) pp. xxii-xxiii.

widespread harmony and uniformity in nature is sufficient to ensure that forms of life may thrive for a day, without requiring necessity. More subtle is a tendency to accept prevailing theory as an sweeping description of everything happening in the universe. Theories, when they remain unchallenged for some time, tend to exert a certain tyranny over the mind. By its nature, a theory excludes everything not within its purview, and when the laws of the theory are accepted as necessary, there is a strong tendency for the mind to accept this exclusivity: an extensional logician finds no space for modalities; the positivist sees moral statements as meaningless. The problems arising from the tyranny of scientific theory become acute in the thought of those who deny substance, for they admit nothing beyond theory and data to the discussion. However, natural tropes have no such constraints: "No trope is exclusive, as if it could prevent the parallel, higher, lower, or intertwined development of other tropes; however, some tropes are repeated" (RM 106). Of course one cannot assert as dogma that natural tropes are either necessary or contingent at the deepest levels. The assertion that laws are neither necessarily true nor comprehensive, however, serves to deflate the universal pretensions which theorists may give to particular well-received laws, in the belief that some master trope has been discovered.

Some will further succumb to the tyranny of theory, and imagine that law is a causal force bringing about the events it deals with. But it is the internal dynamism of the flux which creates change spontaneously, and at the same time gives to laws whatever truth they may describe. The cosmos is radically and inherently dispersed in space and time. Events in each locus are spontaneous, and are independent of the existence of repetitions elsewhere. "Whatsoever happens anywhere, happens there spontaneously, as if it had never occurred before and would never happen again" (RM 109). It is the tendency to magnify the scope and validity of particular laws and theories which can lead to the notion that the law is an active force for change.

4.3 *Physical laws are contingent. The tropes of nature run beyond the scope of any theoretical law. Events are spontaneous locally, whether or not they are repeated elsewhere.*

Modern physics has thrived by insisting on objective experimentation, and rejecting any Aristotelian appeal to moral notions. This is a standard analysis, and a correct one, but it must be pressed further. In the empiricist tradition, the need for empirical data has been distorted into a belief that sensory inputs stand in some kind of intimate *descriptive* relation to physical events. But empirical data, as employed in discourse, are subjective, as must be the laws drawn from them; the confusion of the laws with the tropes of real physical change leads to a muddle. The point about experimentation is that tropes, changes in actual things, are measured in terms of other actual things, with no intrusion of the mental in any form; the categories of empiricist philosophy of science — where laws are confirmed by data — are inadequate here, because the notion of a substance subject to real change has been discarded.

Of course, ideas must play a part in the *formulation* of experimental results. But modern science is surely successful because the experiment itself is entirely independent of treacherous mind. Fruitful experimentation remains a permanent achievement, so long as we do not confuse (in the empiricist way) the physical occurrence with our account of it. The actual sequence of events obtained through experiment remains obtainable, and in this sense, science can only grow in precision and scope; experimental

results are impervious both to variations in the account given them, and to drastic changes in theory.

- 4.4 *“Physical space and time are measured only by the material processes which traverse them” (RM 48). Actual physical measuring sticks are used to record physical events. There is genuine progress in science.*

Physical theory is strongly mathematical, and makes the world seem gross and dead. It has so far given us little conception of how life and none of how consciousness might have arisen from matter. This is less of an enigma when one abandons the view that scientific theory yields absolute truth, and hold instead that even our best depiction of nature may fail radically to be literally true, for all its accuracy and practical results.

The material principles and dynamic organization of a living animal will be called the *psyche* of that animal. It is the psyche which initiates all its actions and generates all its passions. In particular, consciousness, which we call spirit, arises through the psyche. Because all variable aspects of the world have by hypothesis their origins in the realm of matter, the organ for spirit must be the psyche. More specifically, it must be some part of the psyche, which is itself a part of the realm of matter. We use the term ‘will’ to refer to conscious human inclination, and use ‘Will’ with upper case ‘W’ to refer metaphorically to “the observable endeavour in things of any sort to develop a specific form and to preserve it” (RS 53). In these terms, each psyche enacts a small part of the universal Will, while also generating a conscious will which reflects more or less well that part. Since matter is dispersed in space and time, and generates in each locus spontaneous change, one might speculate that the animal psyche, a material configuration with its own locus, is to some extent free — free to pursue its interests. In order to discover the actual direction in which the psyche is steering us, however, self-knowledge is required. This is not readily available; since the psyche is a focus of material forces, any knowledge of it would be non-literal and suspect, and perhaps entirely different from the fickle messages coming from spirit. Self-knowledge is impossible without self-discipline and reasonableness. Although we have psychic freedom, then, this does not mean that we are able to control it easily.

- 4.5 *Through psychic freedom, humans enjoy a measure of autonomy. Because tropes are mere habits in nature and are contingent, there may be a measure of indeterminacy. Autonomy does not depend on indeterminacy, however, but on the spontaneity of matter in which the psyche dwells.*

5. Spirit

“Spirit is an awareness, revealing the world and [us] in it. Other names for spirit are consciousness, attention, feeling, thought, or any word that marks the total inner difference between being awake or asleep, dead or alive” (RS 18). Spirit is epiphenomenal; it does not exert force and initiate action. This doctrine will be surprising, but it follows from the meaning assigned to the term ‘spirit’. It is customary to discuss mind in terms of mental states and mental events, which quite explicitly merge material notions like that of an event with the sheer felt experience of that event. The dynamic component is stripped away from the notion of spirit, and is assigned to psyche, leaving spirit as mere consciousness or pure sentience. This does not mean that we are unable to act intelligently. It is our psyche which initiates actions, as well as generating spirit. Cognitive science and the study of mental events would not be

changed here, but would be carried out in the context of the psyche. What the narrow sense of spirit allows, however, is an entirely different study of the *life of spirit*. Much can be said about the travails and glories of spirit without broaching the causal question. This will be considered briefly in a final section below.

Spirit is variable — even capricious — in its preoccupations; whereas the psyche is more stable. For effective action, it is required that one has self-knowledge, and confirmation that the ideals adopted by spirit have support at the deeper level of psyche. An exterior knowledge of psyche, however, has the shortcomings of all knowledge of material things; whereas coming internally to terms with one's psyche seems impossible without spiritual discipline, or what the ancients called mastery of the passions.

5.1 *Spirit is ephemeral but irrepressible. It is epiphenomenal and its supposed effects are the effects of its causes within the psyche. Through discipline, a well unified psyche may attain a functional self-knowledge.*

Scientists are actively studying physiological correlates of conscious choices and mental states, and are making interesting scientific observations of the location and timing of associated brain activity. But there appears little likelihood that an explanation of mind which goes beyond material correlations is forthcoming. The nature and origins of consciousness are open to speculation, both scientific and philosophical. In the philosophical case, anything more than a common sense, non-technical account would be inappropriate. Here we speculate on how spirit might have evolved in mobile organisms. Intelligence is clearly selected — an ability to size up a situation objectively, and to discover genuine opportunities or dangers. Emphasis falls on the need for objectivity, an ability to rise above illusions towards a balanced view of the truth and an objective assessment of the world.

It may be that the organic function thus selected is in fact that which generates spirit. If this were the case, then we might expect pure spirit, if undistracted by pressing external needs and internal conflict, to display a love of truth, and even aspire to an unattainable objective truth. As well we might expect, from a spirit which is not distracted, that its objectivity would recognize that goods preferred by others have a claim equal to those preferred by one's own psyche. Spirit lives through the intuition of essences, and pure spirit might aspire to an aesthetic appreciation of all ideals, going beyond those favoured by one's own self.

5.2 *The goal of pure spirit is universal knowledge of the truth and universal appreciation of the ideal, although these may only be approached. Spirit in the larger sense is concerned, sometimes painfully, with the particular interests of the psyche.*

It is wonderful that animal life has generated a spirit capable in imagination of conceiving itself in its material setting, along with other spirits in a complex physical manifold. That this conception might not render the world in strictly true colours is insignificant, when compared with the momentous fact that there is such a rendering, and that a realm of spirit has arisen. Spirit is the organ of understanding, not of action. We are of course conscious of our will; but here also, spirit serves to attain self-knowledge and tries to comprehend the deeper and more stable psychic Will which conscious will imperfectly reflects.

- 5.3 “*Spirit endures change but, as far as possible, synthesises it into the truth about it*” (RM 77). *Spirit drops things, in order to retain only their essences. It is the organ of understanding; the driving force for action comes from the psyche.*

One of the weaknesses of the spirit is a tendency to see itself as autonomous. Oblivious of its hidden psychic origins, spirit then imagines it is the source of action and the locus of freedom. It is easy to fall into an egotism which takes our knowledge to be absolute truth, and our will to be the absolutely free cause of our actions. It may fail to see the relativity of knowledge to its imaginative powers. Here a feeling for the strength of sceptical arguments is helpful. But the important thing is to recognize that there is a real material world and that our psyche, although hidden from us, is a part of that world. “Left to itself spirit would be omniscient, or would think itself so” (RS 91). This subjectivity, encouraged by a denial of substance, will take spirit to be self-reliant and causally potent. Indeed, the pretensions of a spirit ignorant of its dependent status sometimes lead to a grotesque vision of the cosmic importance of one's self, one's society, or one's race. Distortions such as this ignore the importance to happiness of a just appreciation of one's place in this world.

- 5.4 *A characteristic danger for the life of spirit is the egotism which overestimates its knowledge, importance, powers, and freedom..*

Humans exert causal powers, and have the freedom to act, for there is a freedom residing deep in the psyche. Those who see consciousness as self sufficient, however, and do not note the dominance of the material psyche over spirit, can neither account for that freedom nor exercise it. Psychic freedom may be enjoyed, but only with a true understanding of the place of spirit in a realm of matter, a self knowledge of the direction in which the psyche is pointing, and a measure of spiritual discipline. When a psyche is guided by reason, and succeeds in unifying itself and liberating its spirit, there arises *spiritual freedom*.

6. The Life of Reason

The good life is a Life of Reason — a life of adaptation which brings into harmony one's goals and desires, in such a manner as to realize as many of them as fully as possible, while resolving conflicts among them, in some cases by renouncing certain ambitions. Adaptation is reasonable and indeed reason is characterized by the harmonization of a variety of perhaps conflicting impulses and goals into a coherent whole. We note that an action may be reasonable, according to this reading, whether or not it is accompanied by argument and conscious decision. The life of reason, however, is articulated and formulated as a moral position and constitutes *rational ethics*. Such an ideal was conceived and approached in classical Greece; the criterion of success there, that of happiness, remains the only viable criterion of a naturalist ethics.

In order to follow the life of reason, it is essential that the psyche be “well-knit,” and capable of retaining its stance through the many vicissitudes of life. As well, valid knowledge is essential — knowledge of the opportunities and risks facing one, and knowledge of one's self. These demands for knowledge do not at all require that the knowledge be the literal truth; all that is required is the sort of symbolic knowledge which is in fact available to struggling humans. What is required is an understanding of the reaction to be expected to a range of possible actions, of what is to be sought and what avoided, and of what options might be open for realizing the good. It is just these

which non-literal knowledge offers. Indeed, if the full and precise knowledge of the constitution of things were accessible, it would not be more helpful, and might be so voluminous as to be of no use at all. No less important than knowledge is self-control; one may, notoriously, know that some action is right, and still do something else. Condemnation and self-reproach are less helpful here than is a mastery of the passions, as argued by Spinoza and the ancients. Through education, one can to some extent unify the psyche.

6.1 *Morality depends on knowledge — of the self to judge what is good, and in general to judge what is attainable. As well it is based on a discipline of the passions. Even though we must be sceptical about the correctness of our knowledge of the world, the non-literal knowledge we do have is entirely adequate to our moral needs.*

In *prerational*, intuitive morality, imperatives are adopted as absolute, with little regard for their consequences and their relation to the overall goods involved. However, the various imperatives soon lead to conflict with one another, and as soon as comparative evaluations begin, a start has been made in rational ethics. It becomes clear that moral claims cannot be unrestrained and absolute; they must counterbalance each other. Rational ethics subjects the whole range of moral demands to cool consideration, requiring in Socratic fashion that each part be justified, and that those with genuine merit be harmonized together into a life of reason. Thus particular moral beliefs are merged into a general ethics, to the extent that they form a compatible combination of beneficial principles. Rational ethics lacks the zeal of the individual prerational maxims it has assessed and combined. It is a kind of sober politics or wisdom. “With maturity comes the recognition that the authorized precepts of morality were essentially not arbitrary; that they expressed the genuine aims of a practised will; that their alleged alien and supernatural basis ... was but a mythical cover for their forgotten natural springs” (LR5 218).

6.2 *When the supernatural basis is stripped from them, many of the moral principles of society and religion are nevertheless seen to have a natural authority:*

An enormous variety of ideals have been brought into being by the fertile human imagination. The capacity of spirit to create ideals, and to accept them as goals, takes persons and societies beyond the shared animal goods of nutriment, shelter and procreation. Additional goods arising in this manner through spirit are particular to persons or groups, and of vastly different kinds. Ideals arise within races and societies of like minded individuals, and are adapted to their special genius and experience. The list of ideals which have been significant is endless: the ideal of medieval chivalry, that of military prowess, of motherly love, of Nietzschean power, of meditative peace — and so on.

6.3 *“Everything ideal has a natural basis and everything natural has an ideal development” (LR1 21).*

Of course ideals must have, through spirit, their origins in matter. For Aristotle, the standard of excellence for humans is naturally determined, and it is fixed since it hangs upon the essential properties common to all. Basic goods required for survival are indeed determined by human nature, and swift sanctions force us to stay within the narrow bounds they set. In Aristotle’s eyes, all human virtues attach to these essential properties, and are no less determinate. However, his doctrine that there is a unique

ideal humanity determining the good for all must be revised. The Greek city state is not the only alternative to barbarism. Insofar as humans share the same constitution, and find themselves in similar circumstances, there is an Aristotelian ideal end or good shared by them. However, there are significant differences between persons, and their ideals will run in divergent directions. The ideal development proper to humans, then, will vary quite considerably according to the natural preferences of different individuals, societies, and races. Our legacy from the Greeks, the ideal of a rational ethics, remains valid even though its partial relativity must be acknowledged.

The naturalistic assumption admits desires and needs — preference — as the only determinants of a moral position. Although the benefits to and preferences of the individual must be basic, there are several reasons why this does not entail a crass egoism. There are biological motives to self-sacrifice towards one's close kin, verifiably traceable to genetic causes. Likewise, we are social animals, and surely were never otherwise, so that something similar seems to operate on the level of tribe or race or nation. Indeed, societies adopt and impose as an ideal that of self-sacrifice, correctly based on the premise that all members benefit from the survival and welfare of that society. In the final section, we consider impulses, tied to pure spirit, which encourage a generalization of these altruistic preferences to a wider, perhaps universal scope; through spirit, there may be compassion and charity towards all humans, or indeed to all conscious organisms.

A morality which is based exclusively upon the altruistic ideal, upon doing good for others and by omission condemning any selfish motives, is deficient from the standpoint of rational ethics. Self-interest exists as a powerful psychic force, whether or not it is recognized in the moral theory. And if it is not, distortions in action, self-deception, and hypocrisy must result. That this approach is faulty has been noticed, for example, by Nietzsche. However, he fails to see that the best people retain a balance between self interest and charity precisely because enlightened self-interest generates charity; instead he espouses romantic cruelty and a desire for domination, which are unlikely to lead anyone to happiness.

6.4 *Preference is the nerve of morality, self-knowledge its requirement, and happiness its criterion.*

In politics, the agent is the psyche; the notion that society is a single organism is a myth. The happiness and spiritual freedom of the individuals within society is what that society serves. By dealing with underlying forces, and not substituting ideas for them, we may perhaps counteract some of the superficiality of ideology, and avoid the disastrous consequences of its acceptance. In politics, as elsewhere, we tend to take too seriously our ideas and to underestimate their hidden springs. Society is driven by powerful natural forces, both within the psyches of its members and through their environment. Such forces lie deeper than the all-too-human ideologies, party positions, and philosophies of history which sometimes dominate the thinking of its politicians. It may be useful, therefore, to adopt terminology which recognizes these forces or *powers*. From the moral point of view, a power might be destructive of the interests of a person or group, and such a power will be called a *domination*. It may be useful further to classify certain orders into which these powers fall. The *generative order* contains powers upon which we are most radically dependent, and which are most deeply formative. These are prominent in the growth of primitive societies and their political economies, and give rise to liberal arts. The positive generative powers occur in all

societies, and are in all cases faced with conflicts. The *militant order* of society consists of outright war, of faction, and of other more subtle forms of coercion and domination, including militant religions. The *rational order* of society, insofar as it develops, seeks to harmonize the discordant elements of that society, and to mediate the antagonism. Insofar as this rational order can prosper, so also will there be occasion for the spirit to thrive.

6.5 “*Everything gently impels us to view human affairs scientifically, realistically, biologically, as events that arise, with all their spiritual overtones, in the realm of matter*” (DP vii).

Nothing about reason is compulsory, and there is no absolute imperative to follow it. The life of reason is basically a social ideal, and it will prosper in a community only to the extent that its authority is accepted there. By and large, societies are driven by preferences different from rationality. Without a consensus in favour of reason, individuals have little scope for advancing the ideal by themselves. What may happen is that society as a whole or individuals in it will despair of achieving a rational order; they will retrench and adopt a *postrational* stance, in which they renounce the full development of their potentialities, without reverting to the chaos of prerational morality. In this case, morals may take a religious turn, and renounce the vigorous natural quest for happiness, in favour of a more narrow set of practices and beliefs. Such a position is found in several Hellenistic philosophies, and often in mature religions.

7. Religion

Religious myths may contribute to a life of reason, but to do so they must be understood as myths; they are poetic and instructive, but are not true. It is science which best describes the cosmos, to the extent that we can know it. But all our knowledge is non-literal and in a sense mythical, so that religious myth too may be important without being true. Or it might be called dramatic truth. Many who see science as literal truth will dismiss any non-scientific myths, displaying a kind of positivism which is only bolstered by the stunning success of today's science. In contrast, ancient Greek mythology served a rational function without being marred by dogmatic material claims.

Thus religions record many of the lessons of experience, and inspire *piety*; on the spiritual side, in addition, religions offer eternal themes for contemplation and *worship*. Christianity begins with the old testament God and Hebrew piety, and adds to this Platonism and the spirituality of Christ. Only by reaching beyond themselves towards the eternal can humans realize their potentialities; and when religion is replaced in Western society by secular doctrines glorifying humanity, humanity is cheated.

A sort of lay religion based on an ideal of spirituality is open to everyone, independent of political and material circumstances. This point of view, which is that of spirit, is religious rather than psychological or historical. The perspective is more personal, and deals with intimate questions of liberation and salvation; it is what the ancients would have called philosophy. The concern is not with the definition of spirit, nor with the origins of spirit within the psyche, but with the *life* of spirit. Because of the intellectual nature of spirit, universal understanding and not individual will constitutes this life. The transcendental reflection and pure intuition of essence induced by a thorough sceptical reduction, although of no proper function in dealing with questions of knowledge in the absence of material assumptions, is nevertheless of importance to the spirit in contemplation

The objective nature of pure spirit leads to charity towards others, springing from a spiritual understanding of their suffering and the ideals they embrace. However, this charity takes on a detached form. Not being directed to an improvement in one's own situation, it may be more a sympathy with other spirits than a call for improvement in their well-being. Such is the nature of pure spirit, which turns to eternal themes, away not just from the self but from other selves as well.

7.1 *"Without in the least quarrelling with nature, spirit is in its interests somewhat withdrawn from nature ... ; the very study of nature questioning nature and even in loving and praising nature loving and praising it only for being friendly to the spirit. ... A study of the realm of spirit is therefore an exercise in self-knowledge, and effort on the part of spirit to clarify and discipline itself"* (RS viii-ix).

Only a few exceptional persons are disposed to adopt a spiritual ideal. Even with those few, the spiritual bliss they describe cannot be more than occasional, although it is a genuine one. "Spiritual insight is possible only at the top of life" (RS xi). Psyche has urgent concerns beyond those of pure spirit, even though mystics might wish to purge themselves of personal worries through meditation.

7.2 *"However much a naturalist may celebrate or even share the free life of spirit, he cannot consistently assign to it more than a relative importance. Salvation and enlightenment may be all-important from the spiritual point of view, but this point of view has no absolute pre-eminence in the universe"* (RS xi-xii).

For all persons, even those who do not adopt spirituality as an ideal, life is enriched by spirit. Their attitude to life will be changed by contemplation, without perhaps any major change in the external activities pursued. They may benefit from a spiritual ideal, without detriment to psychic integrity. One can be firm in defending one's own interests, with a good conscience, while being charitable towards others.

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The Santayana Edition

The Santayana Edition received a two-year grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities supporting our work through June 1999. Compared to our previous grants, NEH funding was reduced and caused a realignment of editorial staff. The principal result was that our Assistant Editor, Brenda Bridges, was "down sized" to a half-time position. Although the reduction in funding is not a simple matter, receiving any funding at all is a remarkable accomplishment. The U.S. Congress cut NEH by forty percent, and internal restructuring at the endowment led to a 70% reduction in funding for scholarly editions. Large numbers of projects, some with a long legacy of distinguished work, did not receive funding and are now struggling to exist. Last fall, I was elected President of the Association for Documentary Editing, an international organization representing almost all scholarly editions underway. Without question, this year is a difficult one for

most editions, and many will not survive. We are fortunate to have a two-year reprieve, and I expect we will be able to accomplish much during that period, even with the reduction in staff time.

The Letters of George Santayana (five books) are on schedule for publication. They will be published one book at a time. In order to alleviate costs and to assure continuity and consistency between the multiple books, we will not publish the first book until all are completed. *The Marginalia of George Santayana* is ahead of our projected schedule, and we are now working on proofing material prepared for electronic publishing. We are continuing work in preparation for the five books of *The Life of Reason*.

The CD-ROM version of *The Works of George Santayana* was published in December 1996 by InteLex Corporation and is being advertised in the PAST MASTERS series catalogue as well as on the Internet (<http://www.nlx.com/>). The contents include the four previously released volumes, and as new volumes are completed, they will be added. This publication provides immediate access to texts as well as sophisticated search mechanisms for finding material in the volumes. I find it invaluable in doing research on Santayana. Other websites of interest to Santayana scholars include:

- The Santayana Edition:
<http://www-phil.tamu.edu/Philosophy/Santayana/>
- The Santayana Bulletin:
<http://math.uwaterloo.ca/~kerrlaws/Santayana/Bulletin/seville.html>
- A Santayana discussion page:
<http://members.aol.com/santayana/index.html>

Publishing subvention is a problem we have not resolved. NEH no longer provides publishing subvention for its editorial projects. As a result, we will need to find publishing subvention support for each of the books we publish in the future. Normally, subvention costs range from five to ten thousand dollars per book, and I will need the assistance of members of the Santayana Society to help raise these funds.

Bill Holzberger, Textual Editor, retired from his teaching position in the Department of English at Bucknell University at the end of the 1997 spring term. Fortunately, Bill has not retired from his work on the Santayana Edition, and he will be able to spend more uninterrupted time working on the *Letters* and other volumes. Congratulations to Bill on his retirement and for his distinguished career as a university professor.

Last fall I took a new administrative position. I am now the Head of the Department of Humanities in Medicine in the College of Medicine. This move follows several years of research and teaching in the area of genetic explanations of complex human behavior (aggression, sexuality, etc.). Santayana's naturalism was the springboard for my interest, and recent developments in cloning certainly have brought developments in genetic research to international attention. At present, my time is divided fifty/fifty between the Santayana project and the administrative position, which is the same amount of time as previously allotted for the Santayana project.

HERMAN J. SAATKAMP JR.
General Editor, Santayana Edition

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CHECKLIST

THIRTEENTH UPDATE

The items below will supplement the references given in *George Santayana: A Bibliographical Checklist, 1880-1980* (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982) prepared by Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., and John Jones. These references are divided into primary and secondary sources. Except for the book reviews, the following articles and books are classified according to their years of publication. Readers with additions or corrections are invited to send these to Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., Santayana Edition, Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843-4237.

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