

Overheard in Seville

*Bulletin of the
Santayana
Society*

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ANNOUNCEMENT

The George Santayana Society

2006
ANNUAL MEETING

The Society's annual meeting will be held in conjunction with the December meetings of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) in Washington, D. C.

- Report on the *Santayana Edition*
- Business Meeting: See entry below on George Santayana Society

Topic

Santayana's Critique of Modern Philosophy

Speakers

Jessica Wahman

Dickinson College
"Corpulent or a Train of Ideas?
Santayana's Critique of Hume"

Matthew Flamm

Rockford College
"Hegel as Alienist: Santayana, Absolute Idealism,
and the Normal Madness of Materialism"

Chair

Angus Kerr-Lawson

University of Waterloo

7:00 - 10:00 P.M. 29 December
Hoover (Mezzanine Level)
Marriott Wardman Park Hotel

Royce, Santayana, and “The Relational Form of the Ontological Argument”

We don't substitute for [essences and existents] private or romantic views of what it is to Be. We first accept [Santayana's] view of what it is to Be, if only he can make clear to us *what that view means*. This difficulty was to comprehend the sense in which the essences *are*, apart from the existents; the sense in which essence is different from existence; the sense in which you cannot determine from the essence of a thing whether it exists or no.

Josiah Royce, “The Fourth Conception of Being”

Is there anything whatever in the sort of reasoning which is represented by the ontological proof? I suppose this question to be of very critical importance for your whole view of the method of metaphysics. The fact that Anselm was using that proof in reference to the God of Christianity is a historical accident.

Josiah Royce, “The Relational Form of the Ontological Argument”

I

During his final years, Josiah Royce (1865-1916) shifted from defending an absolute idealism that features a universal consciousness to working out a social metaphysic that adapts for its own ends some elements of C. S. Peirce's social hermeneutic theory.¹ This is how Royce summarized his still-developing metaphysical doctrine in 1913—the passage clearly sets the stage for his ultimate effort logically to ground his “social approach to metaphysics” upon a hermeneutically cast “relational” form of the Ontological Argument:

The universe, if my thesis is right, is a realm which is through and through dominated by social categories. Time, for instance, expresses a system of essentially social relations. The present *interprets* the past to the future. At each moment of time the results of the whole world's history up to that moment are, so to speak, summed up [in what Thoreau called the “nick of time”] and passed over to the future for its new deeds of creation and of *interpretation*. I state this principle here ... as an example of what I have in mind when I say that the system of metaphysics which is needed to define the constitution of this world of interpretation must be the generalized theory of an ideal society. Not the Self, not the Logos, not the One, and not the Many, but the Community will be the ruling category of such a philosophy.²

To miss this trajectory of Royce's thinking is to miss his move to construe “interpretation”³—specifically a metaphysically generalizable notion of triadic “communities of interpretation”⁴—as a third of three ways (or “forms and sorts”) of

¹ This paper was presented to the George Santayana Society at its annual meeting in New York on December 29, 2005.

² *The Problem of Christianity* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2001), p. 344, emphasis added. To be abbreviated as PC.

³ Which fails to get so much as a separate entry in the detailed index of his published Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual* (1899, 1901 rpt. New York: Dover, 1959).

⁴ Royce terms “triadic communities” those whereby some B interprets an A to a C. Examples that he adduces range from the temporal community, in which the present (B) “interprets” the past (A) to the future (C), to the “banker's community,” where the lender or depositor (B) “interprets” the borrower (A) to the banker (C), to Peirce's scientific community, where the

knowing, beyond the cognitional pair of *perception*, whose object is the *particular*, and *conception*, the *universal* being its object. Perception “shows us data of sense and reveals their reality,” while conception “shows us meanings” (MET 33). Royce had long propounded the view that perception and conception constitute a “dual classification of our cognitive processes” that “dominates a great part of the history of philosophy” (PC 277).

George Santayana appears unaware of—at the very least never credits—the seminal, post-1912 developments in Royce’s philosophy. The philosophical critique of Royce that Santayana mounts in *Character and Opinion in the United States* (COUS) largely takes up his former teacher and senior colleague’s longstanding views on error, on evil, on truth, and on the absolute. What emerges is a representation of Royce’s thinking, and of Royce the Man Thinking, as both alike tragically twisted. The portrait is vintage Santayana: stylistically polished, deeply discerning, and (given its assumptions) virtually unanswerable. But it is punctuated with innuendo, something that prompted a number of readers to reprove Santayana for giving vent to a barely disguised personal animus, in passages such as these two:

... all [Royce’s] show of logic was but a screen for his heart, and in his heart there was no clearness. His reasoning was not pure logic or pure observation; it was always secretly enthusiastic or malicious, and the result it arrived at had been presupposed. (COUS 101)⁵

His was a gothic and scholastic spirit, intent on devising and solving puzzles, and honoring God in systematic works, like the coral insect or the spider (COUS 138)

Rather than its wonted stance of disinterestedness, Santayana’s finely modulated tone, aloof and conveying the familiar sense of sovereign intellectual authority, is colored here with what comes across as a strain of arrogance and condescension. What the chapter on Royce gives us is Santayana’s sketch of a Representative Man, the type of a cultural milieu that Santayana once described to William James as “thoroughly alien and repulsive to me.”⁶

One must look nearly two decades beyond *Character and Opinion in the United States*, to the Library of Living Philosophers volume, for a genuinely disinterested observation on Royce, and it is one that affords a bit of insight into a cardinal facet of Santayana’s philosophical development. The observation is thus significant, as well, for how it substantiates the metaphysical ground, hence the philosophical core, of Santayana’s differences with Royce. In the “Apologia Pro Mente Sua” that he contributed to PGS, Volume 2 of Schilpp’s series, Santayana discloses that around 1900

“theorizer” (B) “interprets” the “collector” (A) to the “verifier” (C). See Josiah Royce, *Metaphysics*, William Ernest Hocking initial editor, co-edited by Richard Hocking and Frank Oppenheim (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), chap. 1. To be abbreviated as MET.

⁵ On p. 119, we read that Royce “insisted on seeing reason at the bottom of things as well as at the top, so that he never could understand either the root or the flower of anything.” While on p. 120, Santayana has this to report: “The most indispensable virtues, like courage and industry ... seemed in Royce’s world the only honorable things, and he took them to be typical of all art and virtue—a tremendous error.”

⁶ From the well-known lines of the letter responding to William James’s barbed reaction to Santayana’s newly published monograph on *Poetry and Religion*, in Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, Briefer Version (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 251. “You tax me several times with impertinence and superior airs,” complains Santayana to James, “I wonder if you realize the years of suppressed irritation which I have passed in the midst of an unintelligible, sanctimonious and often disingenuous Protestantism, which is thoroughly alien and repulsive to me, and the need I have of joining hands with something far away from it and far above it” (ibid.).

Royce “said to me that the gist of my philosophy was the separation of essence from existence.” Santayana goes on to credit Royce’s remark as “one of those rare criticisms that open one’s eyes to one’s own nature” and, “perhaps, one of those prophecies that help fulfill themselves; because it came along long before I began to make any special use of the word essence, or attempted to analyse the concept of existence” (PGS 497).

Santayana’s confession pretty well makes the case that the most telling metaphysical issue between him and Royce centered on the relation of essence to existence. And it is this difference in orientation to which Royce himself continually returned in the spring-semester Metaphysics lectures of 1916. Those last lectures, in which Santayana figures so prominently, were the occasion for introducing a “relational” form of the Ontological Argument, by means of which Royce purposed to establish “logically,” as he thought (but in effect dialectically), the realistic purchase of his idealism.⁷

II

Royce incorporates two important new texts in his spring 1916 classes on the “logical approach to metaphysics” (MET 9)—one by Bertrand Russell, the other by Santayana. Both publications appeared in 1915, and Royce holds them up as two alternative versions of what he termed the Third Conception, or Interpretation, of Being: namely, a “highly developed and Critical Realism.”⁸ This is not the place to go into the details, but Royce adduces the Russell monograph titled *Scientific Method of Philosophy* as exemplifying one version of the new Critical Realism,⁹ and he contrasts it with Santayana’s essay on “Meanings of the Word Is,” which he explicates as a paradigmatic statement of a very different version of that realism.

Royce’s own approach to metaphysics, and the purport of his 1915/1916 course, establishes the idealist standpoint—the Fourth Interpretation of Being—from which he seeks to distinguish his onto-epistemology from the trio of other approaches to Being that he identifies: metaphysical or “extreme” Realism,¹⁰ Mysticism,¹¹ and the emerging critical Realism. Royce frames his approach—as he did seventeen years earlier in his

⁷ Royce called his speculative *modus operandi* the “reflective method”—at bottom the introduction of middle terms to demonstrate the relation of antecedent to consequent in mediated judgments—and assimilated it to his onto-epistemology of Interpretation. See *Metaphysics*, pp. 62ff.

⁸ In his 1899 Gifford Lectures, Royce had labeled this Conception of Being “critical rationalism,” an ontology for which to *be* is to be *valid*.

⁹ For Russell, as Royce puts it, “The Real consists, not of the sense-data that are present at a given time, but of the data that *would be* there under given conditions. So if you are speaking of matters of experience, the Real consists of whatever would be present to the appropriate kind of experience under the appropriate conditions. The Real thus defined is defined under our Third Conception of Being” (*Metaphysics*, p. 233). From this Russellian standpoint, the Third onto-epistemological Interpretation is a propositionalism for which Being of the real is the truth of certain propositions (a post-Fregean analytical ontology).

¹⁰ Of which Royce distinguished a Leibnizian variety and an abstract, Platonic variety; he criticized both sorts for generating metaphysical paradoxes. Elements of these views which he singled out as problematic include the “Atoms and the Monads, the Ideas of Plato, the isolated Souls of the Sāṅkhya, the unknowable Things in Themselves of Kant, the transcendent Reals of Herbart, The Eleatic One, the Substance of Spinoza, and the Unknowable of Spencer...” (*World and the Individual: First Series*, p. 109). See *Metaphysics*, pp. 168-71.

¹¹ For which to *be* is to be *immediate*, the *real* falling effectively beyond the power of analytical reason. See *Metaphysics*, chap. 7.

Gifford Lectures—in terms of the classical dichotomy of the *what* (quiddity) and the *that* (haecceity). “The topic of metaphysics,” asserts Royce, “is the true relation, the difference and the relation, of the two aspects of the fact-world, which can be expressed as the *what* and the *that*” (MET 168). Usually thought of as something that one entertains conceptually, the “what” is the ideal, the type, the universal, the *essence*. The “that,” generally taken as something *perceived*, is the particular, the singular, the *existent*. Construing the object of perception—the particular—as itself an abstraction that implicates a more concretely real, “social” relation, Royce challenges this metaphysical dualism, which he sees as perpetuated by interpretations of Being that operate with a false epistemological dichotomy between *conception* and *perception* (the two modes of knowing that he understood to be intermediated by a third, namely *interpretation*). “As we look back in the history of thought,” remarked Royce in the fourth of his 1914 Berkeley Conferences,¹² “we see...that the theory of knowledge has been on the whole dominated by what one may call this dual antithesis between conception and perception Here are two antithetical modes of getting to know things.”

Royce devotes much of the second half-year of his last Metaphysics course detailing how Santayana’s little essay on “Some Meanings of the Word Is” articulates a pure variety of abstract, critical realism—this in contrast to Santayana’s image of himself rather as a materialist or naturalist in the classical mold. Royce, however, contends that realism

can be characterized as that view which Santayana gives expression to when he declares that the great metaphysical distinction is that between the essences and the existents, a distinction which can be defined in terms of perception and conception. The existence of things and their essence are mutually *independent* on this view That kind of independence seems to be the very essential feature of the realism that Santayana exemplifies. (MET 169)

Royce strives to show that the ontological argument contains, in Frank Oppenheim’s words, “some form of the central doctrine of idealism” (MET 286). The pivotal place of Santayana in this undertaking is something that Royce makes clear in a lecture that follows after two weeks of discussing “Some Meanings of the Word Is”: “The really most important feature [of idealism],” he insists, “is exactly the issue here concerned: does the existence of anything make any difference to its essence?...is it any part of the essence of a thing that it exists?” (MET 116.)

Royce emphasizes his categorical opposition to Santayana’s orientation in a series of assertions that reflect the elements of process thought and social hermeneutics that distinguish his mature idealism and that shed light on his recourse to a “relational” version of the Ontological Argument. “You cannot,” he declares,

express the difference between real and unreal in terms of any one distinction between essence and existence. The world turns out to be describable only in terms of fluent topics of interpretation. The world of the essences is itself the world of fluent meanings, fulfillments of purpose.

Existents, as distinguished from essences, are of course known through perception, experience, or through evidence. Any use of evidence requires an interpretation of the *essence of existence*; it requires considering that the grounds why things are in the world of existence are grounds that are due to the essence of existence. We must make some use of some sort of ontological proof if we are to have any reason for believing that anything exists. Experience presents to us types, universals, characters, sorts, and therefore entities

¹² “The Triadic Theory of Knowledge,” *Josiah Royce’s Late Writings: A Collection of Unpublished and Scattered Works*, vol. 2, ed. Frank M. Oppenheimer, S. J. (Bristol, Engl.: Thoemmes Press, 2001), p. 47.

that are not merely perceptual, but entities that are also infected by the conceptual character.
(MET 169)

By seeking to generalize and to frame to his purposes the Ontological Proof, Royce thought that he had logically substantiated the socially interpretational idealism that he was convinced gets to the truth of how “the conceptual character”—how essence—“infects” the entities that we perceive, the *existent*. This speculative stratagem, particularly in view of the criticisms of Santayana that Royce weaves through his exposition, raises some provocative speculative questions that stand out in sharpest relief when one turns directly to the Ontological Argument with an eye toward the means by which Royce adapts it to his metaphysical ends.

III

Recall those most famous passages of Anselm’s formulation that invoke the IQM (*id quo maius cogitari nequit*). One can summarize them this way:

I have an idea of a Being than which nothing greater can be conceived; this idea is that of the most perfect, complete, infinite Being, the greatest conceivable; now an idea which exists in reality (*in re*) is greater than one which exists only in conception (*in intellectu*); hence, if my idea is the greatest it must exist in reality

There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist¹³

Philosophers have distinguished two different currents of argument in Anselm’s account—one readily defeated, the other of perennial speculative value. The lineup of great philosophical players in the scrimmage between qualified supporters and detractors of Anselm bears out this double-argument interpretation:¹⁴ doubtless, Kant and Hegel were for Royce the most important modern figures on opposite sides of the question.¹⁵ The story is of course immensely involved, but Charles Hartshorne and William Reese helpfully single out elements of the Argument in a way that enables one to appreciate what may have led Royce to generalize from Anselm with the aim of both formulating and substantiating a “relational” form of the classic Proof. Here is how Hartshorne and Reese distill the relevant points:

¹³ Anselm of Canterbury, *Fides Quaerens Intellectum, id est Proslogion; Liber Gaunilonis pro insipiente, atque Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem*, ed. Alexandre Koyré (Paris: Vrin, 1930), §70.

¹⁴ Paul Tillich offers an interesting summary statement of this historical split. He himself reads the Argument as “a phenomenological description of the human mind, insofar as the human mind by necessity points to something beyond subjectivity and objectivity, and points to the experience of truth.” Tillich reduces the issue at the heart of the contention between supporters and detractors of Anselm’s Proof to a matter of those who emphasize the Argument’s form against those who grasp it in terms of its content. See Tillich’s *History of Christian Thought: From Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism*, ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1968), pp. 164-65.

¹⁵ Kant’s seminal treatments appear in *The Only Possible Basis for a Proof of the Existence of God*, in *Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770*, translated and edited by David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge, Engl.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. (Cambridge, Engl.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A592-602 / B620-30. Hegel’s assessment, which takes Kant’s views into account, appears in *Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. III, *The Consummate Religion*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R. F. Brown et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 69-73, 179-84, and 352-54.

Ordinary things may of course be conceived without conceiving them as existing, but this is because the existence of their natures [unlike God's] is contingent, not necessary. However, this contingency as a mode of relationship to existence is itself necessary, inherent in the natures [read "essences"]. We need not conceive them as actually existing, but nevertheless we must conceive them, if at all, as at least possibly existing, that is, as such that there could be such entities (if not in this world, then in some world itself at least possible). In that sense, relation to existence is always involved.¹⁶

Royce doesn't explicitly distinguish the two lines of argument in Anselm, but simply tells his lecture-room audience that although it is "so easily refuted, you use it all the time" (MET 130). Some might take this as hyperbole, seeing as how Royce had put the matter in more qualified terms in a previous lecture: "... we are using," he there asserted, "*something like* the ontological proof all the time" (MET 119, emphasis added). In any case, there's no question but that Royce regarded the epistemological extension of the Ontological Argument as comprehensive, categorically affirming that it "underlies all your notions of all reality" (MET 130). Anselm might well have concurred with Royce, but with a very different "reality" in view.

This decision to generalize the Ontological Argument—rather than working out a logic of inference¹⁷—would appear unprecedented, but Royce doesn't see it that way at all. He contends that the nominalists (among whom he counts neither himself nor Santayana) did the same, although in the interest of their unpersuasive atomism. "My thesis is this": announces Royce, "The principal users of the ontological proof, not about God but about the world of common sense, are the nominalists," for whom "to be existent is to be an individual because it is of the *essence* of an existent to be individual" (MET 139, emphasis added). What marks one's grasp of some kind of existent thing whose very essence—whose character or whatness—is inextricable from its existence is that one finds that character or essence to be *self-evident*. For the nominalists, says Royce, "It is somehow 'self-evident' that everything must be *individual*. If so," he goes on, "the essence of individuals is such that the essence of the world requires individuality as the character belonging to being. To maintain that is inevitably to maintain that a certain kind of existence is required by the essence of being of the things that are to exist and by the essence of existence" (MET 144). Opening the way for his *relational* ontology, Royce asks, "Why is it so sure that the existent world consists of individuals?" (MET 138). And he challenges the atomistic thesis in a series of lectures on "Identity and Identification." (For example, like Whitehead, the metaphysical implications of whose early work he singles out as authoritative, Royce rejects the idea of "identity at an instant.") In the end, Royce appropriates for metaphysical purposes of his own "the ontological proof—not," as he puts it, "about God but about the *real world*" (MET 135, emphasis added)—which he also refers to as the "world of common sense" (MET 144).

How viable is it to extrapolate from Anselm's proof in this way? Can one simply jettison the IQM and still plausibly claim to be invoking the Ontological Proof? The most interesting approach to these concerns in the present context is by way of some passages that encapsulate how Royce explained what proved to be the terminal synthetic development of his metaphysical thought. Royce outlines his position in a

¹⁶ Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 97. For an unanswerable refutation of Hartshorne's conclusions about the Argument, see Oliva Blanchette, *The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology* (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1992), pp. 35-40.

¹⁷ As one finds, for example, in Bernard Bosanquet's *Implication and Linear Inference* (London: Macmillan, 1920).

lecture read on March 4, 1916, about six months before his death that September. “The past at least,” he states, “you know to be real from the very essence of the past, from the very essence of the time process, from the very essence of the situation upon which you depend at every moment of your interpretation. You are using an ontological proof of the past” (MET 129). Royce then applies this directly to the act of inductive inference:

The very essence of induction depends on presupposing that the essentials of your account of time—the past with its irrevocable character, the future with its yet expected character—these represent existence. Your evidence about nature and man and whatever else you are dealing with involves the ontological proof. Wherever you use evidence at all as evidence for the existence of *somewhat* not now experienced, you are dealing with that which comes to your knowledge in such wise that its essence involves its existence. (MET 129-30, emphasis added)

A highly telling feature of how Royce applies the Ontological Proof here looks back to Thomas Aquinas’s seminal treatments of it.¹⁸ Aquinas argued that what it is to be the divine subject of Anselm’s Proof and, by extension, what it might mean for this subject to have a predicate—that both of these, and with them the entire ontological point that Anselm supposed himself to have logically demonstrated—are, short of a beatific vision, beyond what can be *per se* known in this life.¹⁹ Aquinas readily acknowledges that to characterize God as IQM is proper enough, as a *definition*. But he finds no middle term, no *aliud quid*, in Anselm’s argument—a point that should have caught Royce’s attention—and on that count Aquinas concludes that it does not amount to a rational demonstration of God’s self-evidence, which is how Thomas understood the sense of asserting that God’s essence is identical with his *esse* (act of being).

Royce finds in “the world of St. Thomas a being whose essence does imply his existence, although we can’t know that fact; while for created beings there is a sharp contrast between their essence and their existence” (MET 144). It is on the strength of this construction that Royce commits the oversimplification of singling out Aquinas as the medieval exemplar of those who show “Anselm’s form of the ontological proof is easily to be rejected.” (It’s worth noting that in the next breath, Royce declares that in the “examination of the meanings of the word ‘is’” Santayana took himself to be rendering this rejection “easier.”)

One discovers the reductive character of what Royce represents of Aquinas when one consults the second question of Part I in the *Summa theologiae—de Deo, an Deus sit* (“of God, that God is”²⁰) mistranslated by Royce, as “Is there a God?” (and by the English Dominicans, as “Whether there is a God”). What it is that one can’t know *per se*, according to Aquinas, is not that God’s essence is identical with his existence, but rather *de Deo quid*—what it is to be God, and by extension any assertion or proposition to that effect. This *doesn’t* mean that one can’t rationally cognize the circumstance that there is such a being. To cite the example that Thomas uses in more

¹⁸ Aquinas’s references to Anselm’s Argument appear in writings early and late, from the Commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (I, d.3, q. 1, a.2) and Boethius’ *De Trinitate* (q. 1, a. 3), to the *De Veritate* (q. 10, a. 12) and the *Summa contra Gentiles* (I, c. 10), to the *Summa theologiae* (I, q. 2, a. 1).

¹⁹ Royce himself cites Aquinas on this point.

²⁰ The “that” signals the matter of the “*per se* known.” The point at issue for Aquinas is never whether God exists, but rather if whether when one knows God, one knows *that* God is; in other words, whether such Anselmian knowing—the veracity of which Aquinas doesn’t dispute—is formally *demonstrable*.

than one place: “the proposition that the whole is greater than its part is” something that we know per se. But one could readily demonstrate that what this whole/part proposition means “would remain unknown to anyone who could not understand the notion of a whole.” And such knowledge of what that *somewhat*—that essence—termed a “whole” *is* need not extend beyond the fact that there *must* be a *what* that we identify as a whole. This is the case even if this whole is a simple essence that is not self-evident, or per se known to us. We have claim to genuine, if mediated, knowledge of the whole so long as we can grasp it as uniquely distinguishable in itself—negatively, as it were, and a posteriori, by means of our materially composed understanding that, by nature, rationally cognizes through a process of abstracting from what is more fundamental than what we are able to master in discursive thought.²¹

Thomas argues that if it is to have philosophical as well as theological force, Anselm’s IQM must be *demonstrated*. The reason for this, as Aquinas points out, is the fact that our cognizance *that* God is, is knowledge naturally put within us—who are after all made in his image. We enjoy this knowledge, however, *only* in a general way, and, since we are composite acts of being, a *mixed* or con-fused way. The clue to demonstrating the pure act of being for which essence is identical with existence (and to which the idea of potential doesn’t apply) is by arguing from *effects* that we do know per se—taking them as middle terms—to a *cause* not known to us per se, but like the truth of the notion of the whole, a cause that is rationally graspable. The famous Five Ways are the means by which Aquinas illustrates as much from the standpoint of each of five such effects, all known to us per se: motion, efficient cause, potency, gradations of perfection, and teleology.

Ironically enough, Royce himself thinks in these same terms as he formulates his doctrine: “Relations,” he explains,

such as causation by known or presumed laws of nature—however you define them—bring in an ontological proof. In the light of relations which are supposed to be known to you, you get evidence that there is a man speaking, or that an animal has been here and made this track in the snow. The prerequisite knowledge is knowledge of the *essence of the relation* of the datum to *somewhat* which is not the datum. (MET 131, emphasis added.)

Royce regularly cites Aquinas in his writings and in this, his last semester, he offers his assessment of Thomas’s position on Anselm’s Proof, or rather an impression of Thomas’s position, as a preface, it turns out, to criticizing in detail Santayana’s treatment of “identity” as the first of four meanings of the word “is.”²² If anything is clear, however, it is that whatever prompted Royce mistakenly to identify Aquinas simply as a major opponent to the Ontological Argument led him to Thomist routes of inference that, had he gone beyond a mere cursory re-reading or recollection of the source texts, would likely have led him to modify his categorical assertions about Aquinas. Royce might also have found himself impelled to rethink his idea of adapting the Ontological Proof to establish (on “logical” grounds) his social theory of reality. If anything becomes plain in Aquinas’s arguments against the Anselmian proof, it is that any “generalization” of the Ontological Argument is on the face of it implausible. Particularly if one thinks, with Royce, that what constitutes the ultimate subject of a “proof” that *underlies*, as Royce put it, “all your notions of all reality” (MET 130), that what constitutes this subject is not the IQM—not a Being than which nothing greater

²¹ See John F. Wipple, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), p. 389.

²² See *Metaphysics*, chap. 6. Santayana was to expand his treatment to seven meanings in the 1924 version of the essay (identity, equivalence, definition, predication, existence, actuality, and derivation).

can be conceived—but rather Royce’s conception of the “world of common sense” in general.

On what basis one can make this substitution and still claim to be using anything resembling the Ontological Argument, Royce doesn’t say. What *is* clear that he regards Anselm’s Proof as little else than a form of a more general metaphysical argument concerning the relation of the *what* and the *that*. But by excising the notion of God, Royce drops the subject that is the very substance of the argument. The result—so far as one thinks of Royce as actually applying the Ontological Argument—is that he effectively abstracts the conclusion of what must be a *demonstration*, so far as it is rational, and offers instead to invoke, as a *proof*, what by itself is no more than a *definition*. Put another way, after substituting the idea of common-sense reality for the idea of God, Royce in effect hypostatizes the regularly refuted line of thinking in the Ontological Argument, namely that an essence existing *in intellectu* necessarily exists (for Royce as an interpreted relation) *in re*.

Beyond this, Royce’s speculative gambit incurs, in my view, a still more deeply problematic liability. This issue has to do with just what it is that follows when, for God, understood as ground of onto-epistemological inference, one substitutes the world of common sense—however communally interpreted. Bear in mind that “God” in this metaphysical context is what one thinks of as the cause of those things, each of which—motion, efficient cause, potency, gradations of perfection, purpose—is *per se* known as self-evidently an effect of an act of Being that is *not* *per se* known to us. This primordial act of Being is in no sense either possible or potential, but purely actual, and thus uniquely *is* its essence. To operate without this moment of the equation, and with the aim of generalizing the Ontological Argument in a bid to establish a hermeneutic ontology, seems a fundamental speculative misstep. This is tantamount to affirming that truth in general is self-evident, while denying its independent ground (or *primam veritatem*), something *not* self-evident, namely the very being or intelligibility in the absence of which one has no onto-epistemological grip on the sense of any proposition or fact—no appeal beyond some “bad infinite” to substantiate that it is intelligible as true.

This line of abstract reflection has some very concrete and very sobering implications. For it discloses that Royce’s culminating speculative initiative to generalize the Ontological Argument is effectively a lapse from a critical to a dogmatic metaphysics, one that at the best is critically impotent before the challenges of ontological relativity and the advent of hermeneutics as politics. The accession of these two currents of thought was soon enough to impact Western intellectual culture in ways that inexorably link the idea of a “social view of metaphysics” to ranges of meaning and interpretation and praxis that could only have reduced Royce to despair.

IV

The metaphysically problematic issues that attach to Royce’s “relational” revision of the Ontological Argument might appear somewhat to blunt his criticisms of Santayana’s relegation of essence and existence to ontologically discrete realms. Had Royce lived as long as Santayana, however (instead of succumbing at the same age as Hegel and Lotze), he would have had the opportunity to recast his objections from the standpoint of Santayana’s own generalization of Anselm’s Proof. One finds this generalization in *The Realm of Truth*, where Santayana offers to reconceive the Ontological Argument with his own systematic ends in view. Unlike Royce, who seeks

to do so within the framework of common-sense reality as such, Santayana reinterprets the Proof in terms of his revised version of a single category of common sense.²³

After noting the existential contingency of the truth of “whatever regularity or unity”—whatever design—“the world may exhibit,” Santayana anticipates, with a drolly sovereign air, the Anselmian challenge of an imagined interlocutor: “But have we not heard of an ontologically necessary Being, the essence of which involves existence? We have heard of it: and this typically metaphysical contention brings to a head, and exhibits boldly, the equivocation involved in the idea that any truth is necessarily true” (RB 413).

Santayana does grant cogency to the Ontological Argument, however, but only on the condition that one construes the IQM, which he properly calls “the first mark of reality and value,” as *power*. “[T]he most powerful of beings,” he explains, “necessarily exists, because power is only another name for the difference which the existence of one thing makes in the existence of another” (RB 414). This account might stand in dialectical counterposition to Royce’s entire effort to generalize the argument. I say this because Santayana ontologically privileges *difference* rather than the act of relationally articulated (constitutively social) *identity*. Identity—essence—for Royce is intrinsically variable, for (quoting Royce) “if it is recognizable identity,” it is difference. Reason, he insists, “is never engaged in dealing with a mere distinction and identification of essences” (MET 146).

To interpret the IQM as “power” in Santayana’s sense (Christologically, the Father) is to credit a “realism” (Royce) that denies, as Santayana put it in *The Realm of Truth*, “final validity to an existential order which, by definition, is arbitrary, treacherous, and self-destructive; a realm of being over which inessential relations are compulsory and essential relations are powerless” (RB 415). Santayana holds that existence thus brings to essence “only an alien ambiguous status, no sooner acquired than lost” (RB 416). And he would not have refrained from using the word *insane* to describe any generalized Relational Form of the Ontological Argument predicated on some socially conceived hermeneutic principle that represents essence as intrinsically variable and as inextricably involved with existence (MET 146).

What are we to make of the generalization that *Santayana* champions? Is not the notion characterizing the IQM, that whose essence by definition involves its existence, as “power”—in effect an appeal to a logic of power—a lapse into a semi-Nietzschean stance or, worse, Foucaultism *avant la lettre*? Santayana would have bristled at any such association, and have directed our attention to the sentence that closes the paragraph in which he introduces his equation of the IQM with power. Here, affirming his materialist credentials, he sets forth his secular, yet sharply anti-Nietzschean *ontological* generalization. As he puts it, “a less religious or more practical investigator of power [than an Anselmian] might well come to the conclusion that this greatest, most formidable, and most real of beings was *matter*, meaning by this not only the substance of interacting things but the principles of their interaction” (RB 414, emphasis added).

Just as Santayana would have seen Royce’s appeal to the Ontological Argument as foundering with the effort to assimilate essence to *existence*, so in all likelihood Royce (objecting that essence is not, in its very ontology, unaffected by matter) would have rejected Santayana’s generalization of the Ontological Argument. For at the same time that Santayana classifies essence and matter as discrete realms of being, he

²³ See *Realms of Being*, one-volume edition with a new introduction by the author (1942 rpt. New York: Cooper Square, 1972), p. 826. To be cited as RB. Santayana there refers to his system as “a revision of the categories of common sense.”

presumes to know that, practically speaking, the *essence*, the *whatness*, of that whose essence is *identical* with its *esse* (act of being) is *matter*, not only as *forma formata* but as *forma formans*. Royce might have charged Santayana on this score with positing a “real distinction of principles of being,” a metaphysical position that presupposes a real *plurality* of things. No essence distinguished in itself as a moment of one principle of being, could in principle be identical with its *esse* taken as existence—at least so far as, with Santayana, one distinguishes matter as a different principle of being. It is only with respect to *individual substances*—and not Matter per se—that one properly understands the alternative principles of being, thus distinguished, as in relation to one another, but this only as such principles (like form and content) are *constitutive* of some particular individuated thing.²⁴ For Santayana, Matter as such and in itself is pure potency in the traditional sense. And he doubtless would be the first to concede that, as a principle of being, pure potency is no individuated substance, no mere *thing* that, beyond accidental change, comes to be and ceases to be. On the strength of some such argument, Royce, more Aristotelian than Platonist, might contend that Santayana’s appropriation of the Ontological Argument renders the Realm of Matter essentially unintelligible.

Has any philosopher, then, avoided the speculative Scylla and Charybdis disclosed by the efforts of Royce and Santayana to generalize the Ontological Argument? One thinker who comes to mind is the philosopher to whom Santayana ultimately wished he had devoted his doctoral thesis, because it “would have prepared me better for professional controversies and for understanding the mind of my time.”²⁵ Let me close with the observation of a contemporary scholar who, in a different context, notes a fact that independently struck me as sufficient grounds for nominating Hegel as the most likely candidate. “According to Hegel,” Adriaan Peperzak remarks, “Anselm’s proof of the existence of God, presented in the *Proslogion*, is an expression—clumsy though it might be—of the heart of all philosophy and all theology that deserves to be called an absolute science.”²⁶ This isn’t surprising to anyone, such as the present writer, who time and again encounters the figure not of Santayana, not of Royce, but of Hegel looming at the end of the deepest-running, the *greyest* corridors of speculative thought.

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²⁴ For a lucid and incisive recent treatment of these issues, see Oliva Blanchette, *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), chap. 12 (“Matter as Indeterminate Being in Potency”).

²⁵ *Persons and Places*, p. 389. Santayana makes it clear that he doesn’t mean by this that the study of Hegel would have prepared him merely to refute Hegelian thought in an informed way. As he confessed, “I liked Hegel’s *Phenomenologie*; it set me planning my *Life of Reason*; and now I like even his *Logik*, not the dialectical sophistry in it, but the historical and critical lights that appear by the way” (ibid.).

²⁶ *The Quest for Meaning: Friends of Wisdom from Plato to Levinas* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), p. 73.

The Philosophical and Interpretive Import of Santayana's Marginalia

Some readers prefer used books and library copies to brand new editions.¹ In older books notes of other readers can often be found. In addition to absorbing the thoughts and observations that the book's author submitted for public inspection, you have the added pleasure of observing another person privately taking in and commenting on the author's work. The book ceases to be an artifact whose contents were frozen at the moment of publication and becomes a witness to the engagement other readers had with the work in front of you.

When the writer of the marginal notes is noteworthy in his own right and when the notes are as frequent and revealing as those made by George Santayana, then the marginalia become a significant addendum to the marginalist's published works.

This report is an inside one not just in the sense that it is a report on notes written in private, but also because Santayana's marginal notes have not yet been published. Kristine Frost of the Santayana Project sent me the available material via email. It is work that has been in progress for about ten years. The collection was put together by Professor John McCormick, who did the extensive legwork of visiting numerous libraries and collections in America and in Europe and meticulously copying the marginalia. (Some of the libraries have rules nearly as strict as those encountered by the reporter who visits the private library in the movie *Citizen Kane*.) Ms Frost, Marianne Wokeck, and Herman Saatkamp have provided editorial assistance.

That these notes were not intended for public scrutiny is part of the fun in reading them — a delight that may be a bit voyeuristic — but the greater delight is in discovering this huge treasure that I expect will provide scholars with many years of fruitful research. Source for dozens of articles can be found here, as Santayana comments on (to name just a few) Bergson, FH Bradley, Collingwood, Camus, Carus, William James, Alice James, Dante, Nietzsche, Toynbee, Spengler, Hegel, Kant, Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Spinoza, Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and Whitehead.

Moreover, the marginal notes give a picture of Santayana's character more alive and spontaneous than can be found in his published works, biographical writings about him (including his own autobiography), and even his letters. These notes give palpable form to something we already knew from those other sources: that a good measure of life as Santayana lived it was the life of a reader. The marginalia reveal his acute attention, the wide range of his concerns, his wit, his playfulness, his sarcasm, and his nastiness.

Unrelated items thrown together

Life does not proceed in single-minded progress toward a fixed goal. What gives special liveliness to this collection is the random juxtaposition of otherwise unrelated items. For example, a 1900 edition of Kant's *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* contains a passage in which Kant criticizes those who, in trying to ascertain the association of thinking beings with the material world, construct an "imaginary science," based on ignorance, "by changing thoughts into things and hypostatizing them." The passage's conclusion and Santayana's comment are as follows:

¹ This paper was presented to the George Santayana Society at its annual meeting in New York on December 29, 2005.

KANT: Nothing but a sober, strict, and just criticism can free us of this dogmatical illusion, which, through theories and systems, deceives so many by an imaginary happiness.

SANTAYANA: Kant's followers, O hear!

Santayana's remark suggests that Kant's followers were guilty of the very thing Kant warned against. Santayana would later, in *Egotism and German Philosophy* (1915), accuse Kant himself of the same malfeasance.

This playful philosophic comment is but one of Santayana's notes in this book. This same edition of Kant's First Critique contains notes for a class Santayana planned to teach, notes that show Santayana wrestling with the categories he would use in the *Life of Reason* (then in progress). There is also a record of Harvard-Yale football scores along with the names of the Harvard captains, revealing that Santayana was very much an American (and an admirer of young athletes), however much he professed to speak with a European mind.

Long way round to a comment

Santayana wrote of how forms or essences make an impression in the mind and often lie subdued for years and then reappear in another guise. Here are two comments in which Santayana jests with one writer, but then uses that writer's point to ridicule another. Those of you who know Santayana's essay on Freud "A Long Way Around to Nirvana," will smile with somewhat jarred recognition at one of Santayana's comments in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. When Freud writes that buried in life is a subconscious longing for death, Santayana notes: "A long way round to nothing."

Then again, in *Experience and Nature*:

DEWEY: We long, amid a troubled world, for perfect being. We forget that what gives meaning to the notion of perfection is the events that create longing....

SANTAYANA: Yes: but you don't see that to be rid of life is the aim of life. Cf. Freud."

Santayana, of course, did not think that the aim of life is death (except in the purely physical sense that life in fact ends in death), but his marginal comments on Dewey's writing repeatedly question the clarity, propriety, or universality of Dewey's own aims.

Sex, behaviorism, and possibilities

Santayana's admitted homosexuality is but one factor among many — others include his being a Spaniard in America, a writer who cared little for professorial duties — that contributed his sense of being an outsider. These factors surely contributed the emphasis that he placed on the solitary individual coming to terms with his place in the world and on philosophy and art as instruments in broadening one's scope and not primarily as tools of communication and social progress. Yet homosexuality was a highly covert matter during Santayana's lifetime. Therefore, although he has a number of marginal comments that refer sexual matters, most of them refer to heterosexual love or are sexually ambiguous, as when he wonders whether Dewey's term 'experience' refers to the lessons of experience that people share or to the subjective experiences "e.g. the feelings of lovers."

Here are two other examples. The first from *Reconstruction in Philosophy*:

DEWEY: It may be asserted that "soul" when freed from all traces of traditional animism denotes the qualities of psycho-physical activities as far as these are organized into unity.

SANTAYANA: "Confessions of a Behaviourist Lover"

The soulful lady opens liquid eyes,
She strains, she clings, she rapturously sighs.
But if she says she feels or thinks,
She lies.

This ditty reinforces what we know from Santayana's other writings: that he tended to read Dewey, however erroneously, as a behaviorist. Santayana also ridiculed Dewey's focus on finding the value of things in their possibilities. In a passage in *The Quest For Certainty* Dewey argued that a religious attitude is primarily a "sense of the possibilities in existence." Religion conflicts with science only when it attempts to adjudicate matters of fact. Religion should abandon such efforts and also abandon fixed beliefs about values, except for "the worth of discovering possibilities of the actual and trying to achieve them."

DEWEY: Whatever is discovered about actual existence ... could not touch the fact that we are capable of directing our affection and loyalty to the possibilities resident in the actualities discovered.

SANTAYANA: Is the object of affection a possibility? A lady-love is the possibility of f_____g.

Santayana on Dewey — possibilities and dualism

The objection to this focus on possibilities may seem surprising in that Santayana also finds that human ideals are to be discovered in the imagination, which means, like all human conceptions they are sifted out of or reside in the Realm of Essence, which was sometimes described by Santayana as the Realm of Possibility. Santayana's objection is to what he regarded as the trivial nature of the possibilities that Dewey and his brethren were concerned about and they concentrated primarily on material or social changes and did not emphasize imaginative images that opened the soul to an investigation of its nature and to the refinement of its desires. An illustration of this attitude is found in another marginal comment, this one from Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy*:

DEWEY: Invention proceeds, and at last we have the telegraph, the telephone, first through wires, and then with no artificial medium. The concrete environment is transformed in the desired direction; it is idealized in fact and not merely in fancy. The ideal is realized through its own use as a tool or method of inspection, [...].

SANTAYANA: Heaven made real by the radio.

One of the biggest metaphysical divides between Dewey and Santayana is Santayana's insistence that spirit and matter are completely different forms of existence as opposed to Dewey's emphasis on consciousness, religion, and poetry as emerging in natural and social contexts. In a passage in *Experience and Nature*, upon which Santayana commented, Dewey implicitly attacks the separation of spirit from matter:

DEWEY: The objection to dualism is not just that it is a dualism, but that it forces upon us antithetical, non-controvertible principles of formulation and interpretation.

SANTAYANA: Why is this wrong? (p. 241)

This is one of those comments that make the marginalia especially worthwhile. In one short question, Santayana zeroes in on a key difference between him and Dewey: for Santayana spirit and matter are fundamentally different kinds of existence. They are precisely “antithetical, non-controvertible principles of ... interpretation,” a difference Santayana once said had been expressed by Aristotle when he wrote that anger could be described both as a boiling of the humors and as a desire for revenge. For Dewey, experience is part of a continuum, fully grounded in natural and social circumstances.

Santayana and Munitz — self-reflection through comments on another

Scholars searching for insight into both the background of a public exchange and Santayana's assessment of his own work will find a number of choice items in his comments on *The Moral Philosophy of Santayana* (1939) by Milton Karl Munitz. In the Santayana Schilpp volume Munitz criticized Santayana for having a metaphysics that does express any “genuine moral ideal.”³ Santayana, in his reply, noted that Munitz, along with Irwin Edman, “had previously published appreciative studies of my writings, showing a proper independence of judgment on their part, without impatience or misrepresentation.”⁴ Here is Santayana commenting on a passage in Munitz's book:

MUNITZ: He has been able, as perhaps few other contemporary philosophers have been, to present a successful restatement of certain orthodox positions that together combine to fill out a thoroughgoing naturalistic theory in metaphysics, methodology, and ethics.

SANTAYANA: This is all I should desire to have done.

Munitz, in his essay in the Schilpp volume, found a pronounced difference between the early Santayana and the late, a difference Santayana frequently played down himself. But in Munitz's 1939 book, when Munitz quotes from the *Life of Reason*, Santayana's marginal comment acknowledges a change:

MUNITZ QUOTING SANTAYANA'S *LIFE OF REASON*: ||Transcendentalism assumes that|| “a spontaneous constructive intellect cannot be a trustworthy instrument, that appearances cannot be the properties of reality, and that things cannot be what science finds that they are.” [Text enclosed by a pair of vertical double bars (“||”) is an editorial paraphrase. The underscore indicates an underline handwritten by Santayana.]

SANTAYANA: Here is a genuine difference between S the 1st and S the 2nd. I still say that some may be properties of “reality”, and all may be signs of it. But it is only physical reality that is so remote from intuitive sympathy. The other realms are more open to inspection.

The paraphrase may lead to some confusion. In the first place, it is not clear how much of Santayana's text Munitz actually quoted. In the second place, in Santayana's original text the sentence quoted reads as follows:

The panic came from the assumption (a wholly gratuitous one) that a spontaneous constructive intellect cannot be a trustworthy instrument, that appearances cannot be the properties of reality, and that things cannot be what science finds that they are.

The dropped words “wholly gratuitous” make it clear Santayana believed the opposite of the position he was presenting. His response then becomes clear: He was not reacting to Munitz, but to his own earlier position that appearances can indeed be properties of reality. His marginal comment refers to his later distinction between imaginative knowing and scientific knowing (an example is literary psychology vs.

³ Milton Karl Munitz, “Ideals and essences in Santayana's Philosophy,” in *The Philosophy of George Santayana*, Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., *The Library of Living Philosophers*, vol. 2, Open Court Press (1940; second edition, 1951), p. 215.

⁴ George Santayana, “Apologia Pro Mente Sua,” *ibid.*, p. 538.

scientific psychology). An appearance (an essence) is a property of reality only when the imagination accurately reconstructs the thoughts or feelings of another. Spirit can accurately represent spirit. Essences, which form the content of spiritual life, can be inspected without regard to whether they represent something. We can believe that appearances in fact represent something and therefore belong to the Realm of Truth, but the properties of appearances may be different from the actual properties of the things or events even when the appearances are accurate reports. This difference is the remoteness from intuitive sympathy that Santayana's later writings (according to his marginal comment) attribute to the Realm of Matter.

Problems with aiming for a published book

While these two examples from Munitz's book illustrate the potential richness of the marginalia for scholarly work, they also illuminate potential problems in the project as it currently constituted. The summary that truncated the meaningful phrase "wholly gratuitous" is present largely because of **space limitations**. But the space limitations lead to another problem: **the marginalia are selected**. The editor decided to eliminate comments he believed repetitive or not especially fruitful. Another problem is that the marginalia are ordered alphabetically by author. In and of itself this a reasonable choice, but it makes things cumbersome for a researcher who wants to read thematically or in the order Santayana was likely to have acquired the books (or — harder to determine — first read them).

These limitations are primarily due to the focus on eventually publishing the marginalia as a book. Work on the marginalia began well over decade ago, when the power of the Internet and electronic publishing was only beginning to be felt. Even today it is not the customary first choice for publication. In the scientific community the Internet has become a major, if not the dominant, medium for initial communication of new ideas and research. I am not advocating that the humanities move with heady enthusiasm away from well-constructed essays and carefully thought out books (if anything, it should emphasize them more). Nevertheless, the haphazard nature of Santayana's marginalia almost beg for an electronic publication.

First of all, you would not typically want to sit down and read the marginalia from start to finish in the proposed published order. More likely you would have a research angle in mind, and you may want to sort or sift through the marginalia by topic, chronologically, or some other set of selection criteria. An electronic version could provide not only full search and sorting capability, but hyperlinks to other sections and, even more important, to original texts as they become available online.

The current electronic format of Santayana's marginalia is QuarkXPress. QuarkXPress is a proprietary format designed to prepare books for printing. If you do not have a license to the expensive QuarkXPress software, you can use a demo version to read it. But the demo version has severe limitations. It has no search capability and the process of scrolling from page to page is cumbersome and you can easily lose your place. An HTML version (or a version in another format designed for reading in an Internet browser) would be a genuine boon to scholarship. Furthermore, the space limitations that left some marginalia out would disappear.

Santayana on Dewey — critique of pragmatism

To illustrate the problems caused by the space limitations, consider comments in two works by John Dewey. Before doing that, let me provide some background. One topic that recurs throughout Santayana's notes is pragmatism. It is matter of scholarly debate as to what degree Santayana influenced the pragmatists and to what extent he

was one himself. Those who like to read Santayana as a quasi-pragmatist, proto-pragmatist, or constructive critic of pragmatism might attend to Santayana's incessant effort to root out and expose pragmatism and to uncover its critics in every possible corner. Not just in James and Dewey, but in such unlikely places as Plato, East Indian philosophy, and Martin Heidegger. When Heidegger, for example, looks at the Greek root of the word and writes that

HEIDEGGER [summarized]: ||The Greeks regarded pra/gmata as household utensils, things to fill up a room.||

Santayana replies with a jocular cultural distinction:

SANTAYANA: Pragmatism = possessiveness. It is the philosophy of acquisition, not inquisition. The difference between the U.S. and Spain.

In Dewey's *Experience and Nature* Santayana has two useful, but puzzling notes. The first is:

SANTAYANA: Pragmatism No. 1. Knowledge is knowing what to do & get. (p.21).

Then 14 pages later we find:

SANTAYANA: Pragmatism No. 3. Bias made innocuous by being confessed. Pragmatic cure for pragmatism. (p.35).

Now McCormick does not explain where Pragmatism No. 2 is. Did Santayana leave it out or did McCormick? In between these two notes we have

SANTAYANA: Uses of Empiricism. 1. Historical criticism of philosophy (as if history or historical romance were not open to criticism)
2. Knowledge & science are conditioned biologically & valuable only practically.
3. Against favouritism among classes of things. (pp. 31-32)

Now these comments could be Pragmatism #2, but without an editorial note, we are left in the dark.

Santayana's criticism of pragmatism takes several forms, often without overt use of the term 'pragmatism.' The principal signs that Santayana is complaining about pragmatism are when he does one the following:

1. Displays suspicion of philosophers who ignore Santayana's Realm of Truth and find truth in the useful
2. Scorns philosophy that appears to promote or be caught up in the spirit of American enterprise
3. Raises questions about ultimate objectives.
4. Notes places where a philosopher emphasizes social action or interactions
5. Notes a focus on means rather than ends

Examples of most these forms of Santayana's anti-pragmatism are found in the first 40 pages of Dewey's *The Quest for Certainty*. For example, we find on page 25:

DEWEY: Things in the production of which we participate we cannot know in the true sense of the word, for such things succeed instead of preceding our action.

SANTAYANA: Before they arise, unless we have a prophetic vision. D seems not to understand "truth" at all.

On page 27, concluding the 1st chapter, is the following, which Santayana translates into his vocabulary — perhaps to play down the importance of social interaction:

DEWEY: The consequence of substituting search for security by practical means for quest of absolute certainty by cognitive means will [in a later chapter] be considered in its bearing upon the problem of our judgments regarding the values which control conduct, especially in its social phases.

SANTAYANA: This is really the object of animal faith.

On page 32 Santayana observes the kinds of thing Dewey finds of value:

DEWEY: What the security of values, of things which are admirable, honorable, to be approved of and striven for.

SANTAYANA: Synonyms for "values"

Then on p.33, Santayana raises the issue of whether Dewey has any clear sense of the value of human life:

DEWEY: The idea that the stable and expanding institution of all things that make life worth while throughout all human relationships is the real object of all intelligent conduct is depressed from view by the current conception of morals as a special kind of action chiefly concerned with either the virtues or enjoyments of individuals in their personal capacities.

SANTAYANA: When is life worth while?

The full import of this question is found on page 37, where Santayana makes it clear that he thinks Dewey has no clear notion of ultimate value:

DEWEY: Regulation of conditions upon which results depend is possible only by doing which has intelligent direction

SANTAYANA: The intelligence appears in the choice of means: the ends are irrational.

Of these five quotations, only one (the fourth) appears in the edition being prepared for publication. The other four were in my own copy of *The Quest for Certainty* into which I copied Santayana's marginalia more than 25 years ago from his copy, which is at the Columbia University library. I revisited the library in January of 2006 to verify the accuracy of my transcriptions.

An electronic version with complete notes would avoid the need to rely on editorial discretion and save a scholar interested in Santayana's comments on a particular book the laborious task of traveling to the library holding the work to determine if the published version of the marginalia left anything out.

A printed book version should be published, but it should be even smaller than the one now planned. Lots of editorial discretion should be used to select to the choicest marginalia. Such a volume one might actually sit and read for pleasure. It could be published in conjunction with a set of essays based on the marginalia. The complete set of marginalia could be provided in a CD attached to the book, or displayed on a website.

The shade of Santayana is looking over my shoulder laughing that I have spent so much valuable time poring over his stray scribbles and muttering from time to time whenever I get things wrong. My apologies to him for disturbing his privacy. All I can say is: we do our best.

RICHARD MARC RUBIN

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Mimicking Mrs. Toy

In their occasionally erudite fifty-eight year correspondence, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock referred with some frequency to widely-read writers of philosophy. Among these references one finds a dozen comments on the work of George Santayana.

It is not too surprising that these gentlemen were familiar with Santayana's writings, and that they ventured private, casual opinions about his philosophy. Holmes is remembered not only for his incisive judicial opinions, but also for his scholarly bent. As a young man, he showed an interest in philosophy, attending meetings of the "Metaphysical Club" held at the home of William James. It is also clear that Holmes and his family were acquainted with Santayana. Pollock still commands a sterling reputation as a legal scholar and historian, and as an extraordinarily learned man of broad interests. While Pollock met Santayana at least twice in later years, his acquaintance with Santayana's work seems to have been prompted by Holmes.

Shortly after Mr. Mark DeWolfe Howe published his *Holmes-Pollock Letters*,¹ Mrs. C. H. Toy wrote to Santayana, including in her letter pertinent extracts from the correspondence. Santayana thanked Mrs. Toy a few weeks later, noting that the Holmes-Pollock comments were "sweet flattery after my Schilpp critics" (LETTERS 7: 27). It may be of interest, then, to mimic Mrs. Toy and clip these paragraphs once more, this time for the readership of *Overheard in Seville*.

Extracts from the Holmes-Pollock Letters²

Holmes to Pollock, November 23, 1905 (HOWE I: 122)

"I am just turning to Santayana's last two volumes of *The Life of Reason* which I like better than any philosophy I have read—or nearly so. But more and more I am inclined to belittle the doings of the philosophers while I think philosophy the end of life."

Holmes to Pollock, June 23, 1906 (HOWE I: 126-127)

"I write to Little Brown & Co. to send you Santayana—4 vols—but not big ones. My wife says that the critics are not so warm as I in praise of it. I liked it because the premises are so much like my own. I always start my cosmic salad by saying that all I mean by truth is what I *can't help* thinking and that I have no means of deciding whether my can't helps have any cosmic worth. They clearly don't in many cases. I think the philosophers usually are too arrogant in their attitude. I accept the existence of a universe, in some unpredictable sense, just as I accept yours—by an act of faith—or by another can't help perhaps. But I think the chances are much against man's being at the centre of things or knowing anything more than how to arrange *his* universe—according to his own necessary order. I dare say you will think Santayana something of an *improvisatore*, and say that he talks too much. But to my mind he talks like a cultivated man, and with a good deal of charm of speech, though that also may weary, after you have caught his rhythm and trick. At all events his book was one

¹ Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., *Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock 1874-1932* (Cambridge-Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1941) [hereinafter HOWE I and HOWE II].

² Passing references to Santayana at HOWE I: 125 and HOWE I: 211 have been omitted from this compilation.

which seemed to me to express the world as I should express it, more nearly than often befalls.”

Pollock to Holmes, July 6, 1906 (HOWE I: 127)

“Many thanks for Santayana: it makes a pleasant humanist link for us. I guess he is rather a philosophical humanist than a professional philosopher.”

Holmes to Pollock, September 6, 1906 (HOWE I: 133)

“You talk well also as to Santayana, except that what you rightly call the exotic quality in his style charmed and bullied me until I thought that I saw the trick and began to be slightly bored at the recurrence of the device.”

Pollock to Holmes, January 9, 1914 (HOWE I: 210)

“Santayana’s last volume [*Winds of Doctrine*] is quite brilliant—we read it some months ago. I quite agree with you that he scores neatly off the Pragmatists and also Bergson.”

Holmes to Pollock, May 28, 1914 (HOWE I: 217)

“Bergson I think in the main a humbug agreeably pinned to paper by Santayana.”

Pollock to Holmes, February 3, 1918 (HOWE I: 259)

“Last Wednesday I made acquaintance with Santayana at a lecture he gave to the British Academy on the state of philosophy in America. He was in England at the beginning of the war and has been living at Oxford ever since: whence I infer that he has few or no domestic ties. His discourse was brilliant and in parts amusing—of course one could not appreciate it properly off hand but we shall have it in print. There is a curious contrast between the complex style, which I do not find easy, and the core of hard Latin demand for definiteness in [Santayana’s] way of thinking, and also a certain Latin dogmatism which tries to explain systems in terms of absolute value with little regard to their surroundings. This makes him unjust to all the 18th century philosophers and grossly unfair to Berkeley, for whom he seems to have a special aversion. He quite forgets that if B. was superficial on some vital points the people he was controverting were much more so. However, a man either has a historical mind or he has not.”

Holmes to Pollock, March 1, 1918 (HOWE I: 260)

“I am much interested in the impression Santayana made on you. He has seemed to me to hit, more subtly than other philosophers, points as to which I was disposed to agree with him. There seems to me something repellent as well as something attractive in him personally. His style which you don’t like has pleased me, although after a time you seem to see the trick of it.”

Pollock to Holmes, May 30, 1918 (HOWE I: 266)

“Also, I am reading Santayana’s volume on Religion. I like his detached humanism and absence of any desire to grind any axe in particular. Yet somehow there is something elusive about him. His analysis of Augustine’s view of the world is a singular, fine piece of historical-philosophical criticism.”

Holmes to Pollock, April 6, 1924 (HOWE II: 132)

“Have I uttered the fundamental blasphemy, that once said, set the spirit free? The Literature of the past is a bore—when one has said that frankly to oneself then one can proceed to qualify and make exceptions. Now I have opened Santayana *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. He is not a bore, but I think he improvises and obscures the foundation of his thought with too many tickling words. *Au fond*, unless I mistake, he takes much the same view that I have taken *en passant* in one or two of my things. His philosophy is much nearer to my way of thinking than James’s or Royce’s.”

Santayana on Holmes and Pollock

While Santayana corresponded rarely with Holmes (*see, e.g.*, LETTERS 2: 166), and apparently never with Pollock, snippets from his letters and his autobiography provide some insight into his opinion of these two men and their work.

Santayana crossed paths with Pollock in 1918 at a lecture given to the British Academy (HOWE I: 259), and then again in 1932 at the Spinoza commemoration at The Hague. Santayana described the second meeting in letters to Mrs. C. H. Toy (LETTERS 4: 360) and to Mr. George Sturgis. A humorous extract from the latter reveals an aged Pollock straining to stay awake during Santayana’s lecture on “Ultimate Religion”:

My journey to Holland and then to England went smoothly—even at sea: and I gave my two lectures to polite audiences that showed no impatience or hostility, whatever they may have felt. My most distinguished auditor was Sir Frederick Pollock, aged 92; being a little deaf he sat close at my side, and through the corner of my eye I could see him close his own (to concentrate his attention) & begin to nod (to express his agreement): and he didn’t wake up until the end, when hearing a little applause, and [*across*] supposing it was for him, he roused himself to bow pleasantly, and saw where he was. Wisely, he went home to bed, without telling me [*across page one*] how very much he had been interested[.] (LETTERS 4: 369 to 4: 370)

Apparently Pollock did not sleep through the entire encounter at The Hague, as a conversation they had that evening is alluded to in Santayana’s autobiography. There Santayana expressed his appreciation of Pollock’s scholarship on Spinoza:

I will not attempt to describe here the many lessons that I learned in the study of Spinoza, lessons that in several respects laid the foundation of my philosophy. I will only say that I learned them from Spinoza himself, from his *ipsissima verba*, studied in the original in all the crucial passages; as a guide and stimulus I had Sir Frederick Pollock’s sympathetic book, with good renderings, and not much modern interpretation. It was a work, as he told me himself forty-five years later, at the Spinoza commemoration at The Hague, of his youth; and perhaps the science was emphasised at the expense of the religion. Yet that the object of this religion was *Deus sive Natura*—the universe, whatever it may be, of which we are a part—was never concealed or denaturalised. (PP 233-234)

While Santayana recorded little of his impressions and opinions of Pollock, a slightly better picture of his acquaintance with Holmes is drawn in *Persons and Places*. Early in his autobiography, Santayana contrasted the character of Holmes’ generation with that of Holmes’ father’s generation:

I also knew Lowell, in his last phase; I once shook hands with Longfellow, at a garden party in 1881; and I often saw Dr. Holmes, who was our neighbor in Beacon Street; but Emerson I never saw; while William James and Judge Holmes and ‘Jack’ Chapman, etc., belonged to a younger generation, more scatter-brained and dispersed, and revolutionary, without any real dominion, however distant and water-colourish, over the universal scene. They tried to paint in oils, impressionistically, with masculine dashes of colour; but everything was confused, amateurish, out-of-focus, and violently useless. (PP 46)

Later in his autobiography, Santayana provided a polite but penetrating account of Holmes:

One distinguished Bostonian that I came to know in this way was Judge Holmes. ... [H]is mind was plastic also in speculation. Being an exceptionally successful man he could be pessimistic in philosophy, and being an old Bostonian he could disinterestedly advocate democratic reforms. ... It is or it was usual, especially in America, to regard the polity of which you happen to approve as sure to be presently established everywhere and to prevail for ever after. To have escaped this moralistic obsession, at least for a moment, evidently was a pleasure to Judge Holmes. He had a really liberal, I mean a truly free, mind. (PP 368)

While Holmes had felt a kinship at some level with Santayana's philosophy, Santayana rather firmly distanced himself from the views he supposed Holmes to have held. In a letter to Mr. Henry Ward Abbot, Santayana suggested a likely point of divergence between him and Holmes:

I am very much pleased that Judge Holmes should agree about common sense being faith. I knew he was something of a philosopher, but perhaps too much inclined to follow Nietzsche. Romanticism & egotism are all very well as a mood; but absurd when turned into a doctrine. The doctrine implied in them is pure naturalism or Spinozism. (LETTERS 4: 369)

Santayana's most trenchant criticism of Holmes is found in a letter to Mr. Beryl Harold Levy which focused chiefly on the philosophy of law of Justice Cardozo. Here Santayana questioned what political ideals had animated these judges, and bemoaned the ambiguity of the pragmatism and empiricism which he associated with their outlooks:

I had never heard of Cardozo before (I live out of the world), but I knew Judge Holmes well, and I need not say that I sympathize with the desire to humanize the administration of justice. But neither of those jurists, nor even you in your comments, satisfy me on what seems to me the crucial point, skirted on p. 115. What is the highest good of society? This is a question of political ideals. ... Now what 'ideology' guides Cardozo in determining the direction in which his conscience shall exercise a gentle pressure upon the law? I can find nothing more definite than 'The social mind' or 'cherished social ideals.' Something psychological, then, or prevalent sentiment or opinion? Or something biological or anthropological, the actual tendency which manners and morals show in their evolution? ... [P]ragmatism, like empiricism, is a most ambiguous thing. They may mean testing ideas by experiment, by an appeal to the object or physical fact, which in ethics would be human nature with its physical potentialities of achievement and happiness. On the other hand, empiricism and pragmatism may mean accepting every idea as an ultimate fact and absolute standard for itself, and in practice deciding everything by vote, by sentiment, or by the actual prevalence of one idea over another. In this second direction lies softness, anarchy, and dissolution. (LETTERS 6: 151)

This is vintage Santayana: tracing law to ethics, ethics to human nature, and human nature to potentiality, thereby recognizing a natural relativity of ideals, while dismissing an unqualified relativity implicit in subjective schools of thought—whether they be pessimistically romantic or naively realist avenues to progressive reform. It is unfortunate that Santayana did not write an essay or short treatise directed at the jurisprudential initiatives of such contemporaries as Holmes and Pollock. Piecing together a stunted *apologia* of these friendly critics of Santayana, though, may inspire scholars of his work to undertake the task.

T. P. DAVIS

North Carolina Supreme Court Library

C. A. Strong and G. Santayana in Light of Archive Material¹

A philosopher is commonly thought of as a ... reasoner, but I would rather conceive him as a person who is careful in his assumptions. C. A. Strong²

It is odd that the long lasting philosophical friendship between Charles Augustus Strong and George Santayana has gained so little attention³; all the same this relationship had many dimensions that should all be explored in any future research. Thus, from the historical point of view, it is of interest to see Strong as a member of two famous families: the Stronges and the Rockefellers; with Santayana a friend of both. From the religious viewpoint, we may see him as an eminent son of a famous theologian whose main treatise caused the loss of faith in his own son, with Santayana one of the addressees of Charles's deliberations on religion and non-religious ethics during their student years. From a philosophical perspective, we may see the two as members of the Critical Realism movement as well as influential authors on the theory of cognition. In biographical terms, we may see the development of his and Santayana's philosophies clearly visible in the extensive correspondence between them. From didactical point of view, this correspondence could be seen as an excellent introduction into the intricacies and importance of the problems of epistemology, with carefully made distinctions between the terms (e.g. "sense-datum," "essence," "intent," "intuition," "consciousness," and many others) and the ways of solid argumentation and profound justification of epistemological positions (e.g.: "critical realism," "neo-realism," and "(non-) representationism," and others). Below, I shall take a brief look at this relationship in the light of the unpublished material — correspondence, notes, and drafts — held at the Rockefeller Archive Center at Rockefeller University and, to my knowledge, never previously published or commented upon before.⁴

Strong's Criticism of Santayana's Philosophy

The correspondence between Strong and Santayana lasted around fifty years and was devoted primarily to philosophical rather than personal issues, and that is why it is appropriate to give it the name of *debate* rather than mere correspondence. However, since all Santayana's letters to Strong have been published, it is not necessary to present the full debate here, and the form of my presentation will be somewhat one sided: I would like to focus more on Strong's criticism by means of the unpublished

¹ This is an abbreviated version of a longer paper which can be found in its entirety on the website of this *Bulletin*. I should like to thank the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) in Sleepy Hollow, NY, for a grant and for their hospitality, enabling me to study the papers collected at The Charles Augustus Strong Archive in August and September of 2005.

² C. A. Strong, *A Theory of Knowledge*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923, p. xi.

³ The exceptions are Daniel Cory, *Santayana: The Later Years. A Portrait with Letters*. (New York: Braziller, 1963) (especially in Chapter One); John McCormick's *George Santayana: A Biography*. (New York: Paragon House, 1987) (especially in Chapter 20); and, Strong's short manuscript, edited by Kristine W. Frost, containing a dialog with Santayana on essences, "A Conversation, Partly Real and Partly Imaginary" in *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 19 (2001), pp. 31-33. (To be cited as BSS.)

⁴ Let me add that Strong's papers, at present arranged in 11 boxes, were transferred in 1994 to RAC by Strong's granddaughter, Elizabeth Strong Cuevas, a well-known sculptress.

material, rather than present the detailed argumentation of both sides, which would be a major undertaking.

The criticism of Santayana's doctrine of essences, which Strong sometimes identified with and sometimes differentiated from sense data, took the greatest part of Strong's energy. However, it should be noted that his approach was the result of his own (Strong's) studies, which evolved and took on at least two distinct stages. Thus, in one of his early letters (to Durant Drake, May 4, 1912) he claimed that "The sense-datum is indeed a part of the objective world, but it is not *the* part of it which we perceive when we have the sense-datum in our minds" (folder 119, box 8).⁵ In contrast to this, Strong in his later period (that is after *Essays on Critical Realism*) understood this category in psychological terms rather than logical; according to this position, the qualities are "psychic" states rather than essences, complex arrangements of non-qualitative elements rather than platonic beings, having various degrees of clearness rather than static constitution, and co-created behavioristically (action and reaction in distance and time) rather than discovered speculatively. To Strong, the status of a datum was, in his later period, the main bone of contention between him and his friend. In a letter to Santayana (June 12, 1930), Strong clarified his position:

The simple quality, pain, sound, or light, is only in the essence — not in the real state; which latter is extremely composite. But besides this *particular* quality by which pain, light, and sound differ, it seems to me that there is also in the introspective essence a *general* quality in which all three agree, and which I should designate as 'feeling.' The essence intuited is not simply pain or sound or light, but it is pain-sensation, sound-sensation, light-sensation. This empirical observation seems to me to locate exactly the only remaining difference between my philosophy and yours" (folder 130, box 8).

One of the consequences of this was a further rearrangement of Strong's approach, and his saying that "appearances" rather than "data" matter in his own system. In his letter to Santayana (February 4, 1926) he explained: "I now say that what we are aware of is an object supposed to exist, but I hold, with you, that we cannot be aware that the object *does really* exist. This is why I have taken to using the word 'appearance' for the datum, and not your 'essence' " (folder 121, box 8).

In later years, Strong frequently argued that Santayana's concept of essences is somewhat loosely related to the realm of matter, and the connection between these two was not adequately explained: "It seems to me that the realm of essence as you conceive it, is too detached from Nature. Given essences, and intuition of them, seem wholly unrelated to anything in Nature, and the latter to have arisen by a sort of miracle" (letter to Santayana, January 30, 1928; folder 121, box 8). In his letter (April 28, 1927) commenting upon Santayana's just published *Platonism and The Spiritual Life*, Strong articulated the difference between them more clearly: "At present I cannot help feeling that you think of essences as detached from all necessary reference to existence — whereas I am accustomed to think of them as a very late and artificial product, mined out of things, and owing their very subsistence (i.e. the being and the character which thought finds in them) to their embodiment in things" (folder 121, box 8). This criticism seems to have been lasting and Strong also presented it, in a similar form, in print in PGS.

Another thing that in Strong's opinion was neglected by Santayana is the problem of the intensity of essences. The following remark is even more to the point if seen from the perspective of Strong's own philosophy in the late stages of its development:

I ask you to consider whether, in conceiving the intuited essence as a mere quality, you are not allowing something very important to slip between your fingers. A good way of

⁵ I quote from the C. A. Strong Papers held at RAC (Record Group: III-51). All citations are printed here by permission.

approach is to note that the essence intuited in sense perception certainly has, besides quality in the ordinary sense, *intensity*, in varying degrees in different cases. ... An essence when I am attentive has more of this, an essence when I am half-awake less. It is a mistake to put this all in the *act*, and not to recognise that it is also a characteristic of the essence. This last is of course what I mean by feeling or sentience—not as it is in the self but as it is shown in the essence through which the self is known. (letter to Santayana, June 12, 1939, folder 130, box 8)

Strong also accused his friend of not having been able to provide a satisfactory explanation of how consciousness arises, an issue which, by the way, never troubled Santayana too much (cf. PGS 596); and even, in one of the earliest letters to Strong, he compared consciousness to “a local and occasional ebullition like the hiccough.”⁶ Santayana had strong predilections towards epiphenomenalism and was not deeply interested in issues that, in this perspective, seemed secondary. Strong, in his letter to Santayana (March 2, 1921) wrote as follows: “The choice between my theory and yours seems to me like the choice between Darwin’s explanation of how species come into being, and the view that they simply do come, God knows how” (p. 2-3, 120). In another letter written shortly after (March 18, 1921), he continued his thought and tried to convert Santayana to his (Strong’s) freshly acquired position: “the theory, based on what I consider to be exact observation, being devised from the start to explain the origin of consciousness in a world apparently purely physical. You do not even refer to this evolutionary aspect of my doctrine; because, I suspect, being unable to assimilate my principles, the road to the conception is closed to you” (p. 4, folder 120, box 8). Ten days later he continued:

Thus, on my theory, ‘intuition’ (in a sense involving an essence *and an ego intuiting it*) comes through organization, only by the intuiting mind-stuff having a definite place in a body, from which it directs the behaviour of that body towards an object beyond it or towards a state of itself, sense-perception, external and internal, is the lowest function in which such intuition occurs; but, that we may ‘intuit’ an essence in the full sense, a higher organization is necessary, by which the actualized essences do not merely elicit external acts, but, by means of memory and association, are enabled to call up other actualized essences and suggest what each such essence *means*. Only in the midst of such a complex organization does the intuition of essence arise. To insist on the intuition of essence as an ultimate is thus to renounce evolutionary psychology. Such an attitude may be simpler, but it doesn’t explain things which are quite capable of explanation.” (letter to Santayana, March 28, 1921 p.2; folder120, box 8)

Last but not least, Strong was critical about his friend’s lack of a full appreciation of science — despite his declarations, especially in *The Realm of Spirit* — and his excessive exposition of contemplation and the spiritual life. After *The Realm of Essence* was published, he wrote to Santayana (January 30, 1928): “I cannot think so meanly as you seem to of the truth of science” (folder 121, box 8), suggesting that the results of modern science were underestimated and the significance of essence exaggerated. This was corroborated by Strong’s reaction to the just published *Platonism and The Spiritual Life*, expressed in a letter to Santayana (April 28, 1927) in the following way: “Is it right to exalt the essences and look down on the things? Why should the *what* be much more venerable than the *that*?” (folder 121, box 8). On another occasion (Strong’s letter to Cory, January 28, 1931), he added: “I have always said to myself that, if Santayana missed the truth, it would be because he disdained to know about the nervous system — and relied too much on the wisdom of the ancients (such ancients as Kant)” (folder 122, box 8).

⁶ Letter to Charles Augustus Strong, August 10, 1890. *The Letters of George Santayana, Book One, 1868-1909*. Edited by William Holzberger. The MIT Press, 2001, pp. 1:14 to 1:17.

Santayana's Criticism of Strong's Philosophy

Strong obviously neither followed Santayana's metaphysical predilections and epistemological assumptions nor grasped the intensive role of imagination in Santayana's philosophical efforts — all of these composed a system in which there is hardly any place for the elevated or privileged role of science. Strong, reiterating that we have a real knowledge of real things, could not meet Santayana's acceptance of various complementary visions of indefinable and unapproachable reality. Small wonder, as although Strong was Santayana's closest philosophical friend, Santayana did not exclude him from the thinkers who did not understand his thought; he never referred to him as an ally in his philosophical defenses against his critics, nor mentioned Strong as one of those who interpreted his thought in a creative way.

The great imagination of Santayana and his vast perspective including all areas of philosophical thinking clashed with the limited scope of Strong who focused all his life upon only two or three problems, hardly going beyond the juncture of epistemology, psychology, and ontology. Santayana's ironical approach to the surrounding environment of the present and the historical events of the past did not overlap with the sternness of Strong in his minute examinations. The scepticism that Santayana presented and which let him accept other forms of coping with reality did not dovetail with Strong's efforts to get to know the "real" truth about how things happen. These differences must have had some importance on the intensity of their philosophical dialog. Not without meaning is Santayana's disbelief in the conclusiveness of philosophical arguing; you are able to justify any position you wish because there are innumerable essences of the possible situations and potential states of affairs, and the factual difference between thinkers is due to hidden and non-debatable presuppositions rather than to surface wording.⁷

Interestingly and characteristically, Santayana did not criticize Strong's philosophy in the same way as Strong criticized Santayana's; Santayana indicated the points of difference between them without any claim about who was really correct. Thus, in (PGS 595-597), he wrote about the dogmatic presuppositions that he could not share with his friend, and in his private letters to Strong he simply tended to present his view rather than argue and thus give rise to a further dispute. However, he indicated the difference in the language used by Strong and not understood by himself in a description of the things which might have a similar meaning.⁸ Such terms as "feeling" (that is "the existence we perceive when we perceive motion of matter,"⁹) "sentience" (ineffable, non-cognitive, psychic animation in all nature), "mind-stuff" (something like "psychical flux"¹⁰) were difficult for Santayana to refer to due to the ambiguity of their denotations and the difference in presuppositions upon which the justification of Strong's categories seem to have been based.

Perhaps it was also Santayana's fault that in his philosophical relationships with contemporaries, he brought out distinctions rather than a common ground. Such seems to have been the case with John Dewey as regards aesthetics (especially, somatic naturalism) and William James as regards epistemology (especially, the theory of

⁷ Cf. *The Letters of George Santayana*. Edited by Daniel Cory. New York: Scribner's, 1955, p. 438.

⁸ e.g. letters to Strong of March 16, 1910 and August 3, 1910: *The Letters of George Santayana, Book Two, 1910-1920*. Op. Cit., pp. 2:9 to 2:11 and 2:17 to 2:19.

⁹ Charles A. Strong, *The Origin of Consciousness. An Attempt to Conceive the Mind as a Product of Evolution*. London: Macmillan, 1918, p. 319.

¹⁰ Charles A. Strong, *Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind*. London, Macmillan, 1930, p. 274.

knowledge). Santayana always wanted to express, in form and in substance, the specificity of his own philosophical option. The same seems to have been the case with Strong, who, especially in his earlier period of philosophical development, could have been Santayana's tenacious ally in elaborating the doctrine of essences.

It was also characteristic of Santayana to depict Strong, like a few other American thinkers, as having Puritanical traits in his Americanism. In "Three American Scholars" he described John Dewey as the main representative of "sanguine, enterprising Americans" inheriting "the Puritan conscience grown duly practical, democratic, and positivistic."¹¹ He said, in various places, almost the same thing about his famous Harvard colleagues: Josiah Royce, William James, George Herbert Palmer, and about Strong himself. During one of Strong's scholarly stays, this time (1887) at Oxford to study Mill's *Logic*, Santayana wrote about him in the following way: "I have no doubt that when he has a definite and inevitable task before him he will find it easy and pleasant; but he seems to lack the faculty of intellectual delight, so that study is hard for him if it has no definite purpose. This is rather an American trait, isn't it?"¹².

Aiming at Completion

In the preface to the one-volume edition of *The Life of Reason* Daniel Cory, with whose collaboration Santayana arranged it, relates Santayana talking about his life-long yearning for completion.¹³ As it seems, Santayana was happy to have reached it, and his output can give evidence of this — the evidence being his numerous books on a variety of philosophical topics manifesting a profound, broad, and compact system of thought. Also Strong declared his joy about his own self-realization in philosophy; thus, he communicated to Santayana a year before his death: "*I have solved my problems*. I understand how mind and body are connected and how consciousness can come out of matter. I have a philosophy very close to that of Spinoza, but more pluralistic, which makes these things clear to me" (letter to Santayana, November 25, 1939, p.2, folder 139, box 9). Judging from the above, one can claim that the lives of both of them were concluded with the fulfillment of their philosophical ambitions.

Although once complimented by William James "as one of the most formidable thinkers of his generation,"¹⁴ Strong realized the greatness of his friend Santayana rather than his own. Three years before his own death, while tidying up his papers, he wrote to Santayana (October 1, 1937): "... if Cory finds among them some fit for publication, *I* may go down to posterity, if not as a separate thinker, at least as your friend" (folder 122, box 8).

KRZYSZTOF PIOTR SKOWROŃSKI

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¹¹ George Santayana, *The Birth of Reason and Other Essays*. Edited by Daniel Cory. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 130.

¹² Letter to William James, May 11, 1887. *The Letters of George Santayana, Book One, 1868-1909*. Edited by William Holzberger. The MIT Press, 2001, pp. 1:69 to 1:70.

¹³ Cf. George Santayana, *The Life of Reason*. New York: Prometheus Books, 1998, p. x.

¹⁴ Grant Wacker, *Augustus H. Strong and the Dilemma of Historical Consciousness*. Mercer University Press, 1985, p. 99.

On the Supervenience of Spirit

A familiar criticism of Santayana's philosophy is directed at his doctrine of impotent spirit, which many find implausible. I think that his response to critics is correct and worth noting — they are not using the term 'spirit' in the sense he intends. Anyone who is prepared to consider a moment of spirit as *nothing but the awareness*, I believe, is thinking of spirit in his sense, and is not likely to expect this awareness to generate physical results. However, when readers speak of consciousness, it is more common for them to think of the spirit *along with* bodily activity: thus "mental events." Now Santayana is entirely prepared to admit this combination as potent. Thus it is possible to misunderstand his intentions due to a misreading of 'spirit', which is narrow in the sense that its sources in the material are stripped from the definition (but broad in the sense that it includes perceptual as well as conceptual experience).

Against this definitional view of impotent spirit, many of the familiar arguments against epiphenomenalism are themselves impotent. However, quite different questions arise: for instance, the difficult mind/body problem is surely not settled by a mere definition. I believe that his general response to this question is clear: he wants to avoid dealing with this classical problem since he feels that only science could solve it (and may perhaps never be able to do so). His definition of spirit, about which he has a great deal to say, allows him to discuss these matters without having to offer a prior solution to that long-standing problem.

I shall not deal with this general question here, and merely want to comment on two issues about his position on mind and spirit; perhaps this will shed some light on his overall view. I consider first his account of the will, which for him is merely an instance of impotent mind, and try to account for some of the implausibility of his treatment of the exercise of will. One possible explanation is a confusion about *pure* spirit. Beyond this, I suggest that Santayana has resources at his disposal on this point that might render his account more plausible.

Spirit is of the first importance in Santayana's system, despite its impotence. For what could be of value in human life without thought and feeling? Especially important in his eyes is the human ability to rise above animal life and size up the world and our place there: it can aspire to spiritual sympathy and true intelligence. But how can such an extraordinary ambition arise in that animal life? I discuss this second issue in the remainder of the paper. In order to deal with it, he offers a rudimentary theory, or appears to do so. In the second section, I attempt to clarify this apparent theory, and ask whether he has in mind the following: although spirit itself is impotent, psyche along with spirit is more effective than psyche without spirit. The supervenience of spirit on the material psyche would not rule this out. There might be an evolutionary advantage in the emergence of spirit. I conjecture in this second section that Santayana means to include in his theory my attempted clarification.

Before continuing with this theme, I consider Santayana's treatment of sympathy, which he pairs with understanding as two remarkable human attributes that might be accounted for by such a theory. This raises interesting issues, but these lead away from the theme being considered.

In the final section, I offer reasons for doubting my conjecture. In fact, Santayana never makes clear whether or not he adheres to or would adhere to such a doctrine; he appears to do so, but this is not forced on him. Just as with mind/body problems in general, he does not seek to take a clear position. The question as I have posed it is of secondary concern. He is much more interested in two other points in his study of

spirit: the will, considered as the awareness of wants and desires, is impotent in itself; what spirit can do, however, is aspire to true knowledge and objective sympathy.

Will and will

For Santayana, the will is something secondary, arising through bodily events. To accept it as an original power would be “to allow theoretical sophistries to blind us to the plainest facts” (RB 313). Conscious will, he says, is a symptom and not a cause. Just like other manifestations of consciousness, it is impotent; it is nothing but a moment of spirit, where spirit is defined as mere consciousness, and so cannot exert power. The psyche, however, *is* potent, and influences events through Will (with upper case *W*). According to his definitions, Will is the dynamic force of the realm of matter; the term is used metaphorically, and does not at all mean that the universe enjoys consciousness. A certain part of universal Will operates through each psyche, this being possible inasmuch as psyche is a trope in matter. Thus psyche makes persons into genuine agents, not wholly independent agents, but agents nonetheless.

Thus will (with lower case *w*), the consciousness in spirit of universal Will, is unreliable and ineffective. Following Spinoza he treats it as a mere wish. Here is a typical passage that critics might question and find implausible:

A wish—a consciousness of Will in the spirit—may easily be fulfilled by a physical event when the wish has been formed in a psyche accustomed to such events and ready to prefigure them or, by action, to bring them about. In a psyche action and readiness for action have a moral dimension which, by the nature of things, appears in consciousness. Reflection may then appropriately see in a prophetic wish the moral reason or motive for such events, as warnings may be omens, or miracles answer to prayer. It was *better* that thing should so happen responsively to a living desire and as spirit somewhere had invoked them; it was *saner* and more *reassuring* for that spirit to find itself so harmonious with fate that its wishes could be granted and its prophecies fulfilled. But a moral reason or a prayer answered indicated a harmony, it does not disclose a cause. The Will in the spirit was attuned in such a case to the dominant or resultant Will in nature: so that the spirit saw and loved in advance, or in unison, the very things that nature was primed to produce. (RB 633-4)

As an account of how action is generated, this is awkward and indeed implausible. That some prophecy should be realized is hardly a viable account of how people achieve what they wish to do.

A partial explanation of the implausibility of the passage is that in fact he is not seeking there to explain the link between project and achievement. It occurs in the chapter on freedom in *RS*, and moral freedom can arise without assuming any such link. The spirit is free when events are such as to eliminate or reduce the irksome constraints that matter places on it, and when these events follow a course to the liking of that spirit. As he says, this is not a question of cause but merely one of a harmony. A similar passage occurs in what is thought to be a discarded alternative to the chapter on freedom (POML 277). Again, he sketches an account with a detached relation between a project and its achievement. There is a premonition and then satisfaction that the result takes place, with little about a connection between the desire or will and that result. However, here he makes it clear that it is not his aim in the passage to make such a connection. He is dealing with “another” aspect of how will is accomplished, namely how moral harmony or freedom might be achieved. “Another circumstance that naturalises for us the miracle of will accomplished is the *moral* harmony and continuity between the project and the achievement” (POML 277). Thus he is not dealing with the physical continuity between the two, but rather with moral freedom, which arises when events happen to correspond to our wishes and our best interests,

whether or not we effectively bring about the changes required.¹ It is thus understandable that in this context he should be speaking of projects and achievements without tracing a connection between the two.

However, there *is* a link between a conceived project and its achievement, namely the psyche that brings them both into being. Thus in the rejected chapter he once again points to the definitions he has given to psyche and spirit, which assign to the former all powers and to the latter nothing but the awareness. It would be a mistake to say that spirit of its own initiative can evoke ideas and bring them into effect. "We should then be giving the name of spirit to something that pre-existed and that possessed a soil, fertilised by past experience, out of which certain new ideas rather than others would be apt to spring" (POML 274). This something is psyche. In literary psychology and metaphorical discourse, we may apply the terms "mind" and "soul" to "so much of the psyche that is manifested in memory or soliloquy." However, it is psyche that retains past experience and generates new. "The psyche ... certainly pre-exists, and with the organs of sense, dream, and passion supplies abundance of fresh imagery continually to the spirit" (POML 274).

The spirit proper is the witness throughout, but not the agent. The agent everywhere is the person, the self, the animal whose form of life may be called his psyche, his character or his Will: latent principles of organisation and reaction, which consciousness brings to light spasmodically, now in scattered whims, now in clear planning. ... We are in the work-shop of nature, in the realm of matter. To attribute these movements and leaps to spirit would be a lapse into blinding metaphor. (POML 275).

This is closer to what Santayana has as his account of agency, depending on the interplay between his two defined terms, psyche and spirit.

Genuine agency arises through psyche; however, when Santayana deals with the connection between psyche and the spirit that it also generates, his account remains somewhat implausible. I have always felt that Santayana's discussions of conscious will fail to make full use of the materials he has already made available. To have a wish is one thing; but to will some end and to feel that one is bringing that end about is another. It is this latter feeling, something that goes beyond a wish, which people think influences action. Santayana denies any such influence and I believe he is right to do so; but even assuming he is correct, this does not strip from the feeling its obvious tie with the action. As he says, will is the consciousness of Will in the spirit; and as such, it may or may not be a faithful rendering of that Will. This is a question of knowledge: is one correct in believing that the will corresponds to the psychic Will being enacted? It can of course be no better than symbolic or non-literal knowledge, as is all knowledge of matters of fact. Nevertheless, knowledge of this kind is permitted by Santayana: it is called self-knowledge, something he explicitly grants and indeed places at the heart of his moral philosophy. Self-knowledge may be difficult, but it is possible; and for those who are in possession of it, the feeling of willing and carrying out an action is more than a mere question of prophecy. The agent has in mind the truth that psyche is purposively carrying out an action. While it is false to think that the feeling of will or the wishing are the sources of the action, it is still true that spirit can trace the psychic initiative and sometimes correctly sense the power exerted by psyche. There are signs in the text being cited that he would not be averse to this amendment of his position: "We can often trace, as reflection proceeds, the labyrinthine conjunction ... the ripening of a plan, the budding of an idea" (POML 274).

¹ Psychic freedom, on the contrary, does make the connection.

Spirit and Understanding

Here is one of many passages where Santayana appeals to a rough account of how spirit arises:

An animal organism, in developing smell, sight, and hearing, adjusts itself to external things merely in confirming and steadying its own life. This sensibility to the not-self arises entirely in the self's service. Those far-reaching senses are not speculative in their Will, but defensive or aggressive; and the mechanism that generates and supports them necessarily subserves the welfare of the body. If it did not, it would tend to destroy that body and to annul itself. Yet meantime, by that useful trick of exact adaptation and imitative sympathy, the psyche has automatically generated spiritual sympathy and true intelligence, without in the least requiring these gifts or profiting by them. A purely ideal consciousness of things not hers has sprung up within herself. She has given birth to a spirit that potentially, in its intellectual vocation, infinitely transcends her. (RB 613)

He appears here to appeal to a theory about the origins of spirit, how spirit emerged in animal life and how this serves the welfare of the person. However, he neither makes clear exactly what this theory says, nor precisely what is its main application. I shall try to clarify what he has in mind with sentences like the above, and conjecture that my clarification is a part of his theory. In this section I give reasons for thinking that this interpretation is correct; in the last section, I shall consider other arguments that tell against my conjecture.

It is entirely plausible that consciousness emerged in animal life because it carries with it an evolutionary advantage. And he several times makes a claim like the one in the above citation, saying that the emergence of spirit followed from the development of intelligence in the adaptation of complex organisms to their environment. Although he does not speak of a theory and does not use the word 'evolutionary', he at least *appears* to hold a theory that the evolution of spirit brings an advantage. My conjecture, then, is that his theory embraces the notion that spirit adds to the effectiveness of the material psyche

We may think of spirit in terms of supervenience: spirit supervenes on matter through the material psyche.² However, psyche in the presence of spirit could be more potent and effective than psyche without spirit. This would not contradict the supervenience of spirit on psyche. Spirit is the creation of psyche, and is entirely secondary to it; but psyche has become more powerful in the presence of this subsidiary. Although Santayana often uses the term "supervenient," and there gives it a sense not unlike the current understanding, it is not given the prominence found today. It seems correct to see his spirit as supervenient, but he wants to go beyond the definition and to be more explicit about the connection between spirit and its ground in psyche. The current definition is neutral about how the supervenient entity is tied to its grounding, whereas Santayana explicitly assigns psyche, a trope in the realm of matter, as the source of spirit.³

When Santayana says: "without in the least requiring these gifts or profiting by them," it might seem that he is renouncing my interpretation that spirit arose because it brought some evolutionary advantage. As I read the text, this objection would not be

² To say that spirit supervenes on matter is merely to say that there can be no appearance of spirit without some change in matter, that is to say in the material psyche.

³ Santayana cautions that 'cause' would not be the correct term for this tie, unless it is given a different sense; in its usual sense, he says, causality can only operate among entities "on the same plane." Certainly psyche and spirit belong to two entirely different planes, the realms of matter and of spirit; however, with a certain change in meaning, 'cause' would be a satisfactory designation for the tie between matter and spirit. See (POML 27).

definitive. It is to pure spirit, the spirit of pure intellectual insight and sympathy, that this phrase applies. It does not rule out any explanation of the emergence of consciousness in terms of evolutionary advantage. I would point to the distinction between his comments on spirit in its pure intellectual vocation, which indeed is not required or immediately profitable, and the general participation of spirit in animal activities, in which the situation is not made entirely clear. His chief interest, especially in *The Realm of Spirit*, is in the former; it is there that human life is to some extent able to transcend its material existence and aspire to see things as they are. There can be found many passages like the above throughout his writings, as for instance: "The need of keeping a look-out may generate a disinterested interest in the winds and tides" (PGS 26). It could be said that this interest, this disinterested interest, arises spontaneously, without any need or profit as its source. This is an instance of pure detached spirit coming into being, and spirit is embarking on its intellectual vocation.

Following this sentence on winds and tides is some confirmation of my conjecture that does refer to spirit and does suggest that spirit in general arises because it is required and profitable:

Spirit and reason, as I use the words, spring from the same root in organic life, namely, from the power of active adaptation possessed by animals, so that the external world and the future are regarded in their action. Being regarded in action, absent things are then regarded in thought; and this is intelligence. But intelligence and reason are often merely potential, as in habit, memory, institutions, and books: they become spirit only when they flower into actual consciousness. Spirit is essentially simpler, less troubled, more lyrical than reason: it is not specifically human. It may exist in animals, perhaps in plants, as it certainly exists in children; and in its outlook, far from being absorbed in tasks and cares, like reason, it is initially universal and addressed to anything and everything that there may happen to be. (PGS 26)

This passage certainly would suggest that spirit arises because it is of some use. However, this too is less than a forthright assertion of my conjecture.

Perhaps the best evidence for my conjecture is inferential and appeals to his account of knowledge. Spirit is an essential part of knowledge: as he says: "all the *terms* of human knowledge are *essences* present to *spirit*" (PGS 574). But knowledge has a clear impact on events brought about by the agent. Taken together, these two points imply that spirit carries with it a practical advantage. Here is his position on the matter:

The knowledge that men of action possess may be indispensable for executing their decisions; but the decision comes from a deeper source that can be expressed only in feeling. When we say, the die is cast, perhaps not one of our motives, not one of the circumstances, is clearly present to us; but we feel that the hour has struck, that the decision has finally been made within us, and that, come now what come may, we are in for it. (PGS 579)

When spirit as represented in knowledge is combined with the material energies of psyche, the result will surely differ from what might result in the absence of that spirit. This knowledge is "indispensable" to the nature of the decision, even granting that the decision comes from deeper subconscious parts of the psyche.

There are opposing reasons for doubting that he embraces this conjecture; before giving these, I mention that his moral position is also at issue here.

Sympathy

The original and proper function of spirit, in Santayana's view, is not just understanding but also sympathy: "[Spirit] suffers when thwarted in its proper life of free sympathy and understanding" (Marginal note: RB 567). The two are almost always considered together, as for instance in the passage cited at the beginning of the previous section: "the psyche has automatically generated spiritual sympathy and true intelligence" (RB 613). Again, in the following passages much of what we have said arises:

For even spirit is a form of Will, involved in the functioning of a special organ; so that it too has a native unexpressed vocation, in violation of which it cannot live at ease. Seen from within, this vocation seems so simple and self-justified that it ought to meet with no obstacle, since it antagonizes nothing and interferes with nothing, but innocently wishes to understand and to love everything. (RB 641)

For spirit too exists by virtue of a specific Will, manifested in special functions and aimed at a special object; and this object, in the case of spirit, is universal knowledge and universal love. (RB 622-3)

Even if we grant to Santayana his theory that the origins of pure spirit lie in the natural requirement for practical understanding, a further explanation is still needed for the sympathy and the love of beauty he assigns to it. A hint of what he has in mind here lies in a passage early in *The Realm of Spirit*, where he says that spirit "cannot bear to feel dragged hither and thither in tragic confusion, but craves to see everywhere well-ordered and beautiful, *so that it may be better seen and understood*" (RB 567-8). In this last (by Santayana italicized) phrase, he clearly addresses the issue: it is in the interests of understanding that spirit seeks beauty. Again, this point is made in the preface to *The Realm of Spirit* (RB 553). Spirit, he says "is *therefore* charitable and sympathetic to whatever forms life may have taken elsewhere" (my italics). In forming this kind of love, spirit "simply fulfils its own commitment to see things as they are."

Spirit has a love for ideals, not just for one's own aspirations but for those of others as well. Just as with understanding, spirit introduces objectivity to sympathy; we can have sympathy for the suffering of others. This sympathy, although it will not dominate the vital preferences of a healthy psyche, does introduce a leaven to his purely self-interested theory of morality. Here too, however, pure spirit introduces complications. To the extent that sympathy is actuated by pure spirit it will become reflective and detached; it will be characterized by a charity that is purely contemplative and does not lead to charitable actions in the normal sense of the term. I cannot pursue here the issues this raises. Let me just point out that, if the charity tied to pure spirit is abstract and detached, this does not mean that charity in the more usual sense must fail; it is a part of our humanity.

Santayana's Epiphenomenalism

I revert to my conjecture that Santayana believes that spirit — awareness — contributes an evolutionary advantage to human action. Although I have offered reasons for thinking that he holds it, he never gives it a strong formulation, and usually moves on from this topic to that of pure spirit. Indeed, there are reasons for doubting that he espouses this position at all. My conclusion is that the very framing of the conjecture is alien to his conceptual view; it would encroach on the scientific domain, something he is always reluctant to do.

Certainly, Santayana does offer examples showing that, in the *exercise* of intelligence, awareness need not arise. On an abstract level, indeed, there seems to be

no definitive reason why awareness is at all needed; since the material psyche governs everything that occurs, both the awareness and the action, it is hard to imagine any proof that psyche could not have managed quite as well without generating awareness. Again, it would not be surprising if, when he mentioned smell, sight and hearing, he was thinking of these perceptions in the absence of conscious sensation. Even the argument that knowledge does influence action and that spirit is essential to knowledge relies too heavily on his definition of knowledge. He has reasons for adopting his definition, but the argument would be nullified with an altered definition allowing skill and knowledge to come into play unconsciously. This would make it similar to his treatment of reason, which can function without spirit. It would therefore surely be possible for Santayana to deny the proposed conjecture.

It would be unfair to accuse Santayana of contradicting himself here; it was not he who pointed to a theory or conjecture. What he is doing rather is to ignore the question. He really does not either clearly assert or clearly deny the conjecture I set forth. That spirit emerges is a fact, and the only person likely to show that it had to emerge or explain how it emerges must surely be a scientist. I see an analogy here with his general attitude to mind/body problems, which he finds ways to avoid. Indeed, it might be seen as a special case of that classical problem. Here too, the conceptual frame he adopts allows him to proceed with the issues that concern him, and to avoid exploring the distinction between the purely material psyche and the powers of psyche when spirit is added. For him the important distinction is between psyche with spirit added and pure spirit. In terms of this distinction, he can speak at length about spirit without having to make questionable conjectures about mind.

For him, two other issues are of more importance than the truth of my conjecture. One is his conception of will: spirit is never the source of action or of anything else; it is impotent. The ruinous idea that consciousness does govern one's own actions or does govern the world is one of the false steps in modern philosophy. Secondly, with the emergence of spirit came the possibility of pure reflection about our status and mortality. Humans have evolved through their psyches ways to evaluate in an objective way their dangers and opportunities; whether or not spirit must have evolved at the same time is a factual question he does not try to answer. However, it did evolve, and with this spirit came its special vocation to see things as they are. There has arisen, as a matter of fact, a disinterested spirit that reaches beyond its original psychic burden, and can from time to time in quiet moments reflect on larger philosophical issues.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CHECKLIST

TWENTY-SECOND UPDATE

The items below will supplement the references given in *George Santayana: A Bibliographical Checklist, 1880–1980* (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982) prepared by Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. and John Jones. These references are divided into primary and secondary sources. Except for the book reviews, the following articles and books are classified according to their years of publication. Readers with additions or corrections are invited to send these to Kristine Frost, Santayana Edition, School of Liberal Arts, IUPUI, INDIANAPOLIS IN 46202–5157.

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Carta desde España

In order to keep readers of *Overheard in Seville* abreast of activities and developments concerning Santayana in Spain, there will be a regular page containing items of interest. I have received information from Professor Manuel Garrido and Professor Daniel Moreno Moreno for this first such page. There also will be information on activities in Spain and elsewhere in Europe in a section on the webpage for the George Santayana Society, at such time as this site is prepared. This is anticipated for the autumn of 2006. As well, there is to appear a Spanish website associated with the journal *limbo*.

First appearing in 1996, *limbo* is the creation of Professor Manuel Garrido. It has been published as a periodical supplement to the international philosophical journal *Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía*, which reappeared at the same time, directed by Professor Luís M. Valdés. At the present time, in the context of a clear and promising revival of interest in Santayana in Spain, *limbo* starts a second, more ambitious and independent period, with the support of an Editorial Board of scholars from both sides of the Atlantic. As Daniel Moreno, one of his new secretaries, puts it: “*limbo* hopes to continue in this way the dialogue which Santayana, as symbolized by the flights of the owl Minerva, maintained in the last century between the American and European cultures.”

The following translations of Santayana’s books were published under the auspices of Professor Garrido, as philosophical assistant of Cátedra y Tecnos:

IPR: *Interpretaciones de poesía y religión*. Madrid, Cátedra, 1993. Translation by Carmen García Trevijano and Susana Nuccetelli.

TPP: *Tres poetas filósofos: Lucrecio, Dante, Goethe*. Madrid, Tecnos, 1995. Translation by José Ferrater Mora.

DL: *Diálogos en el limbo*. Madrid, Tecnos, 1996. Translation by Carmen García Trevijano.

The *Instituto de España*, presided over by Salustiano del Campo, has proposed to the Council of Madrid that there be a memorial plaque dedicated to George Santayana in Madrid, the city of his birth. The Council agreed to do so, and has included the project in the *Plan Memoria de Madrid de Placas Conmemorativas*. Arrangements are under way to carry this out. Santayana was born in 69 Calle Ancha de San Bernardo, an dwelling that at the present time has the address 67 Calle San Bernardo. The plaque will read: “Aquí estuvo la casa donde nació en 1863 el filósofo, poeta y novelista JORGE SANTAYANA cuya vida y obra fueron un diálogo entre las culturas latina y anglosajona” — that is to say: “In this house was born the philosopher, poet and novelist GEORGE SANTAYANA, whose life and works represent a dialogue between the Latin and Anglo-Saxon cultures.”

Second International Conference on George Santayana

The conference took place at the University of Opole in Opole, Poland, with four days of talks from June 21 to June 24. A list of the speakers and the titles of their talks appears above in the Bibliographic Update. The excellent presentations covered all the main topics in Santayana's oeuvre. They are currently being prepared for publication, under the joint editorship of Matt Flamm and Chris Skowronski.

One of the main aims of the conference was to promote the interchange of views between scholars in America and in Europe. This was achieved. This bulletin, *Overheard in Seville*, will henceforth keep its readers informed about activities concerning Santayana on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean; and the Spanish journal *limbo* has chosen an editorial board with scholars on both sides. As well, information will be posted on several websites, that of The George Santayana Society, that of this bulletin, and that of *limbo*. For information on *limbo* see the above *Carta Desde España*.

As well as conceiving and organizing the conference, Chris Skowronski coordinated the actual event, and saw to everybody's needs. Opole provided a fine setting, and everyone concerned with the conference was helpful and friendly. Not many of the participants had attended the first international Santayana conference in Avila held almost fifteen years ago. It was strongly felt that a third international conference should be held within five or so years, perhaps in Spain.

Liberty Fund Conference on George Santayana

Interest in George Santayana's philosophy is gaining along with recognition of its importance. Further support for this thesis comes from a conference sponsored by the Liberty Fund and entitled: "Towards a Philosophy of Modesty: Freedom, Reason, and Limit in Santayana's Moral and Political Thought." It was held on December 1-4, 2005 in Cambridge, England, under the directorship of Professor Noel O'Sullivan (University of Hull). Although others of Santayana's books were read and discussed, the main text considered was his *Dominations and Powers*. It was amazing to see during the debate itself how many external points of reference (including Hegel, Nietzsche, modern liberalism, conservatism, aesthetics) came into play on the one hand, and yet, on the other hand, how its uniqueness, specificity, and originality had to be respected. To put this in other words, although the applicability of Santayana's specific proposal and suggestions for the problems of the modern world were often questioned, his system itself as a coherent articulation of thought was highly appreciated. It should be added that the excellent conditions provided by Liberty Fund made it possible to enjoy the atmosphere of free exchange of opinions during all six sessions of the conference.

KRZYSZTOF PIOTR SKOWRONSKI

The *Bulletin* and other Websites

The website for *Overheard in Seville* is:

<<http://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/~kerrlaws/Santayana/Bulletin/seville.html>>

Articles from 1993 to the present are posted there (in unpolished form). More recent papers are in pdf format, readable by Adobe Acrobat.

The Santayana Edition maintains a website dealing with all aspects of the project:

<<http://www.iupui.edu/~santedit/>>.

Tom Davis maintains a site dedicated, among other things, to Santayana citations and exchanges of opinion on various issues:

<<http://members.aol.com/santayana>>

Herman Saatkamp has prepared a site in the Stanford University philosophy series:

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/santayana/>

George Santayana Society

A website is planned for the Society, to be linked to that of this *Bulletin*. Also in the works is a constitution, a draft of which should be ready for the December 2006 annual meeting. This draft will be posted on the website as soon as ready.

Announcements and information about the Society will typically be posted on its website. Agendas and information on meetings will be recorded, along with the names of the current and past executive members. There will be material on events pertaining to Santayana in Spain and elsewhere.

It is anticipated that communications with the executive will normally be carried out by Email.

At the annual meeting two directors are to be elected. Nominated are Matt Flamm and Glenn Tiller. It is anticipated that the constitution will call for an elected president and two elected directors.

Overheard in Seville

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Some Abbreviations for Santayana's Works

Page numbers given with no further information on the edition will refer to a volume in the critical Santayana Edition, where this exists, or to the Scribner's edition in most other cases.

AFSL	<i>Animal Faith and Spiritual Life</i> , ed. John Lachs	OS	<i>Obiter Scripta</i>
BR	<i>Birth of Reason and Other Essays</i>	PGS	<i>The Philosophy of George Santayana</i> , ed. P. A. Schilpp
COUS	<i>Character and Opinion in the United States</i>	POML	<i>Physical Order and Spiritual Liberty</i> ed. John and Shirley Lachs
CP	<i>Complete Poems</i>	PP	<i>Persons and Places: Fragments of Autobiography</i>
DL	<i>Dialogues in Limbo</i>	PSL	<i>Platonism and the Spiritual Life</i>
DP	<i>Dominations and Powers</i>	RB	<i>Realms of Being</i> (One volume edition)
EGP	<i>Egotism in German Philosophy</i>	RE	<i>The Realm of Essence</i> . RB Bk. I
ICG	<i>The Idea of Christ in the Gospels</i>	RM	<i>The Realm of Matter</i> . RB Bk II
IPR	<i>Interpretations of Poetry and Religion</i>	RT	<i>The Realm of Truth</i> . RB Bk III
LP	<i>The Last Puritan</i>	RS	<i>The Realm of Spirit</i> . RB Bk IV
LR	<i>The Life of Reason, or The Phases of Human Progress</i>	SAF	<i>Scepticism and Animal Faith</i>
LR1	Vol. 1. <i>Reason in Common Sense</i>	SB	<i>The Sense of Beauty</i>
LR2	Vol. 2. <i>Reason in Society</i>	SE	<i>Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies</i>
LR3	Vol. 3. <i>Reason in Religion</i>	TTMP	<i>Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy</i>
LR4	Vol. 4. <i>Reason in Art</i>	TPP	<i>Three Philosophical Poets</i>
LR5	Vol. 5. <i>Reason in Science</i>	WD	<i>Winds of Doctrine</i>