

Overheard in Seville

*Bulletin of the
Santayana
Society*

No. 5
Fall 1987



OVERHEARD IN SEVILLE
Bulletin
of the
Santayana Society

No. 5
FALL 1987

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	i	Table of Contents
<i>Irving Singer</i>	1	Santayana's Philosophy of Love
<i>Frederick W. Conner</i>	17	Beyond Truth: Santayana on the Functional Relations of Art, Myth, and Religion
<i>John M. Robson</i>	27	Persons and Places -- Hold the Events
<i>Angus Kerr-Lawson</i>	34	Variations on a Given Theme
<i>Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr.</i>	41	The Santayana Edition
	45	Announcement: Frontiers in American Philosophy
	46	Announcement of the 1987 Annual Meeting
<i>Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr.</i>	47	Bibliographical Checklist Fourth Update

Edited for the Santayana Society by Angus Kerr-Lawson, Department of Pure Mathematics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1, and by Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843-4237. All communications should be sent to one of the editors. The bulletin will appear annually. It is formatted and composed for typesetting with Waterloo Script, and printed by Graphic Services, University of Waterloo. It is published and distributed by the Department of Philosophy of Texas A&M University.

Santayana's Philosophy of Love

Santayana's thinking about the nature of love has never been adequately studied. In the first volume of this trilogy I discussed shortcomings in his concept of idealization. His ideas are richer than I could there indicate, however, and they merit renewed investigation. Speaking of Santayana as the greatest proponent of Platonism in the twentieth century, I tried to show how he combined his Platonism with an antithetical materialism. But it would have been equally valid to have started with his materialism as the basis of his philosophy. In his speculations on love, scattered through all his books, that is how Santayana usually begins his analysis. I shall do likewise in this chapter. Over and beyond Santayana's materialism and Platonism, I also detect a humanistic voice that differs from both of them. I consider Santayana's "humanism" the most promising element in his philosophy.

The implications of Santayana's materialism appear even in his earliest statements about love. In *The Sense of Beauty* (1896) he introduces into a section on "The Materials of Beauty" a discussion about "the influence of the passion of love." Though he is doing aesthetics in this place, he makes remarks that are relevant to the philosophy of love. In effect, he argues that the sexual instinct needed for purposes of reproduction underlies our perception of beauty in another person as well as our ability to love that particular individual. He tells us that there exists a "machinery" (unspecified but presumably discoverable by empirical science) which directs all animals to their proper object of sexual desire. He even analyzes "lifelong fidelity to one mate" as a differentiation related to successful reproduction of the species. But though the sexual instinct cannot be satisfied unless an appropriate object is singled out, Santayana believes this process operates only with "a great deal of groping and waste." From this there arise the effects, which Santayana considers secondary, of beauty and of love: "For it is precisely from the waste, from the radiation of a sexual passion, that beauty borrows warmth The capacity to love gives our contemplation that glow without which it might often fail to manifest beauty."¹

In saying this, Santayana is consciously espousing a reductivistic thesis about love as well as beauty. Like many other materialists and realists, he does so with a sense of admiration, even reverence, for the creative

The following excerpts are taken from a chapter in Irving Singer's book *The Nature of Love: The Modern World*, Volume 3 of his trilogy *The Nature of Love*, published by The University of Chicago Press in Fall 1987. The editors are grateful to The University of Chicago Press for permission to print this chapter, which was read to the Santayana Society on December 29, 1986.

¹ George Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 46.

goodness in the sexual instinct. He sees it as a "dumb and powerful" faculty that can nevertheless "suffuse the world with the deepest meaning."² Unlike traditional moralists, he emphasizes the social and spiritual tendencies that sexual attraction can induce. He reminds us of Stendhal, in one place claiming that "all these new values crystallise about the objects then offered to the mind."³ On the next page he even cites Stendhal's *De l'Amour* after saying that when the new values focus in a single image "the object becomes perfect, and we are said to be in love."

Santayana's reductivism is of a double nature. Not only does he explain love in terms of sexual instinct, but also he derives all love from the relationship between a man and a woman. He says that we become lovers of nature when the values normally crystallized within the image of another person are "dispersed" over the world. And though "woman is the most lovely object to man, and man, if female modesty would confess it, the most interesting to woman," he remarks that repression or frustration often redirect sexual passion towards other ends. These include religion and philanthropy as well as the love of nature. "We may say, then, that for man all nature is a secondary object of sexual passion, and that to this fact the beauty of nature is largely due."⁴ In a similar vein Santayana traces back to the needs of the reproductive function virtually all the social dispositions that constitute civilization and communal enterprise.

One can only speculate about the extent to which Santayana's thinking was influenced by Freud at this stage. By 1923, however, the points at which 'their ideas make contact are firmly established in the essay Santayana wrote after reading *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. In "A Long Way Round to Nirvana; or Much Ado about Dying," Santayana contrasts Freud's dualistic materialism with Bergson's belief in a "general impulse toward some unknown but single ideal."⁵ He recognizes that both conceptions are mythical, but Freud's he finds true to nature while Bergson's he condemns as folly. Speaking always as a moralist and metaphysician, Santayana perceives in Freud's approach a chastening insight into our condition as material entities. "The transitoriness of things is essential to their physical being, and not at all sad in itself."⁶ What Santayana does find sad is the frustration or destruction of instinctual impulses, arrested before their latent potency has had a chance to express itself and reach fruition. Assuming the rightness of Freud's dictum that "the goal of all life is death," Santayana implies that if all their instincts could be satisfied harmoniously human beings would have no further reason to stay alive. In that event, he surmises, "we should be satisfied once and for all and completely. Then doing and dying would

² Ibid., p. 47.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 48.

⁵ George Santayana, *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy: Five Essays* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), p. 92.

⁶ Ibid., p. 98.

coincide throughout and be a perfect pleasure."⁷

Almost twenty years earlier Santayana developed a similar notion in the chapter of *Reason in Society* entitled "Love." Depicting the sexual origins of love in general, he suggests that when passion is vehement and complete it may renounce even life itself "now that the one fated destiny and all-satisfied good has been achieved."⁸ Quoting Siegfried's paean to Liebestod at the moment when he and Brünnhilde merge with one another in Wagner's *Ring*, Santayana remarks: "When love is absolute it feels a profound impulse to welcome death, and even, by a transcendental confusion, to invoke the end of the universe."⁹

In the context of his discussion, it is evident that Santayana is not reverting to Romantic pessimism. For he immediately invokes instincts other than the sexual, instincts related to parental interest. These supervene upon passion and prevent the "transcendental illusion" from causing a total extinction. Instead of death there is the creation of new life, renunciation being followed by a resurrection in the birth of offspring. By introducing parental instincts of this sort, Santayana remains faithful to his vision as a materialist. For the nature of passionate love is still taken as basically dependent upon the needs of reproduction. In this vein he praises Lucretius as "the most ingenuous and magnificent of poets," criticizing him only because he described sex in terms of its external behavior and thus neglected the beauty of its inner life -- the joy and feverish intensity of libidinal instinct as it is actually experienced by each member of a species. Santayana calls this the "glory of animal love." As a staunch materialist and naturalistic philosopher, he laments the human tendency to consider sexual passion a shame or sin rather than an opportunity for communion through "the most delightful of nature's mysteries."¹⁰ Later in the chapter he refers to "the quality of love" as "its thrill, flutter, and absolute sway over happiness and misery."¹¹

To explain how it was possible for the innocent goodness of sex to have been degraded in the course of man's development, Santayana suggests that emotions such as shamefulness result from the relative complexity of human nature. Having a large gamut of instinctual needs, man is subject to the continuous interaction between sexual impulses and other desires that inhibit sex while also submitting to its pressure. His brief reference to a field of interacting forces determining the nature of erotic response Santayana doubtless inherits from William James' psychology. The idea is important here because it implicitly takes Santayana's conception beyond its reductivistic limits. For if shame (or any other attitude related to interpersonal feelings) occurs as a vector of conflicting forces, it cannot be reduced to one of them. And indeed

⁷ Ibid., p. 99.

⁸ George Santayana, *Reason in Society* (New York: Dover, 1980), p. 11.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 14, 15, 16.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 21.

Santayana's approach changes throughout the rest of his chapter. He has less to say about the sexual basis of love than about its function as an imaginative questing for ideals. At this point, Santayana's Neoplatonism becomes the dominating theme in his analysis.

To my knowledge Santayana never calls himself a Neoplatonist, or a Platonist of any kind. In the chapter on love he complains that Plato ignored the "natural history" of the subject. Nevertheless, Santayana repeatedly acknowledges his indebtedness to much of what is most distinctive in Plato's philosophy: the idea that passion, and love as a whole, is elicited by an object that seems good; that this object embodies or represents or symbolizes an ideal goodness and beauty; and that ultimately -- in its final definition -- love yearns primarily for the ideal itself and not for the imperfect object which happens to prefigure it.

Though he drew upon these elements of Platonic philosophy, Santayana rightly saw that they need not conflict with his basic naturalism. In *Platonism and the Spiritual Life* he attacks the "Platonic tradition" for having assumed that ideals have any being as substances. He insists that ideals have no existence prior to the occurrence of matter. Throughout his writings, Santayana maintains that only nature or materiality exists as substance. Ideals emerge as goals that organisms create in the process of adapting to their environment. From this it would follow that the origins of love are natural even though its aim or objective is the perfection encompassed by an ideal. Synthesizing Platonism with naturalism in this way, Santayana believes that "every ideal expresses some natural function, and that no natural function is incapable, in its free exercise, of evolving some ideal For love is a brilliant illustration of a principle everywhere discoverable: namely, that human interest lives by turning the friction of material forces into the light of ideal goods."¹²

Both early and late, Santayana frequently describes love as a "sublimation" related to an "animal basis," and to this extent his kinship to Freud remains intact. But Plato too had thought that love originates in each person's history as a physical, indeed sexual, impulse even though it signified the more ultimate longing for possession of a transcendental good. In Plato's writings, however, we constantly encounter a systematic ambiguity about natural and ideal love. To what extent must material interests be cleansed or eliminated in order for the lover to fulfill his metaphysical mission? Is love a harmonious completion of organic needs, such as the sexual, or is it rather a oneness with the principle of goodness and beauty that requires quasi-ascetic contemplation? By insisting upon the interrelationship between ideals and natural processes, Santayana continues the effort of Neoplatonists in the Renaissance who tried to resolve Plato's ambiguities. Like Ficino, Santayana sees love as a search for ideals that appear in the midst of nature, and as an inherent part of nature. Ficino, like other Platonistic Christians and like Plato himself,

¹² *Reason in Society*, p. 9.

thought that ideals emanate from a super-world beyond nature. Santayana parts company at this juncture, but he never deviates from the belief that love consists in the transmuting of natural desires into a striving for ideals that underlie the goodness of everything that is desired.

* * * * *

If this were all that Santayana said about love, one might have been tempted to dismiss him as a naturalist who weaves a bit of Neoplatonism into his fabric. Despite its belletristic beauties, the chapter on love in *Reason in Society* is remarkable only in its repeated claim that ideals such as married love or the love of humanity may be explained as sublimations of sexual desire. But even in 1905, when the book was published, this suggestion was hardly novel. It is only Santayana's subsequent development of his Platonistic insights that reveals the great originality in his synthesis. The major text is *The Realm of Spirit*, the final volume of *Realms of Being*. It appeared in 1940, at a bad moment in the history of the Western world, and it has never received the attention it deserves. In it Santayana's thinking about love reaches a height beyond anything he had previously attained.

In the first of the epigraphs that precede *The Realm of Spirit* Santayana quotes from a passage in which Plotinus, speaking of love, says "this spirit is generated out of the psyche in the measure in which she lacks the good, yet yearns after it."¹³ Such a view of love and of spirit is wholly coherent with what Santayana stated in *Reason in Society* about the "ideality" of love. He there argued that, in its purified and sublimated condition, love "yearns for the universe of values."¹⁴ Despite its origins in matter, i.e. reproductive necessity, love's "true object is no natural being, but an ideal form essentially eternal and capable of endless embodiments."¹⁵

In *Reason in Society* these statements about the ideality of love adumbrate much of what Santayana later developed in his ideas about spirit. By the time that *The Realm of Spirit* was written, however, he had become sensitive to the contradictions within spirit itself. It was not only a light that shone upon the actuality of what was given or the possible qualities of what could be imagined, but also it included a painful awareness of its inability to make the world better. He now saw spirit as a disposition rent by two different kinds of love. Spirit, Santayana finally maintained, "is inwardly divided and confused."¹⁶ Since it is a product of universal Will, which Santayana capitalizes as if in recognition of Schopenhauer's German usage, spirit must love the love in everything. It

¹³ George Santayana, *The Realm of Spirit*, in *Realms of Being* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), p. 548.

¹⁴ *Reason in Society*, p. 33.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁶ *The Realm of Spirit*, in *Realms of Being*, p. 641.

must feel sympathy for all the forms that life may take and for all the ideal fulfillments that are possible to living things in their diverse manifestations. But the will in one organism competes with that of another, and each occasion of spirit occurs within a psyche that seeks its own welfare. However much spirit may wish to identify with the universal search for goodness, it is hampered by the selfish demands of its own psyche and by the limitations that this imposes upon its capacity for dispassionate love. As Santayana says:

Will here must sympathize with all Will and must love with all lovers; yet it must condemn each Will, not for loving that which it loves but for not loving that which it does not love; in other words, for not loving the good in all its possible forms. But all goods cannot be realized or sanely pursued in any particular life. Only the specific goals of that place and hour are proper to that particular concretion of universal Will.¹⁷

Articulating this contradiction within spirit, Santayana perceives an inevitable conflict between existence and what he calls justice. Being a by-product of matter in one or another configuration, spirit arises as an aspiration toward particular goals. But in itself, in accordance with its own essence, it sympathizes with all potential exemplifications of goodness or beauty, wherever and however they may occur. Santayana considers this "the most tragic of conflicts."¹⁸ He claims there is no way in which it can be avoided. On the contrary, he insists that spirit fulfills its nature by accepting its inability to eliminate the conflict, by submitting to its own impotence in the world, and in that sense choosing renunciation as its destiny.

There are various criticisms of Santayana's conception that one could make. In the first volume of this trilogy I argued that the principle of idealization which Santayana employs prevents one from understanding the love of persons. For if love perceives its object under the aspect of an ideal beauty or goodness that this individual symbolizes and even represents, it is the ideal which is really loved rather than the object. In that event we are in love with a possible perfection and not with this man or woman, and the love of persons is not what we are experiencing. When Santayana says that in love "the true object is no natural being, but an ideal form essentially eternal and capable of endless embodiments," he describes love as a kind of idealization that has little rapport with loving someone as just the particular person that he or she happens to be.¹⁹

This difficulty applies to Santayana's later writings as well as his earlier, to *The Realm of Spirit* as well as to *Reason in Society*. In terms of his final thinking about spirit, the problems appear within the concepts we have just discussed. As jointly the products of psyche, both love and spirit result from desire for a specific good embodied in a particular

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 642.

¹⁹ *Reason in Society*, p. 31.

object. Spirit refines love, and possibly issues into its own kind of love, as we shall presently see, by detaching the organism from mere possessiveness and focusing the light of adoration upon a universal potentiality for goodness. This means that love has two types of essences, two modalities or levels of being. In one it operates within the realm of matter. In the other it reaches for a purely spiritual love that transcends any attachment to a single object while also accepting it as the approximation of an ideal.

The first of these is what I call a love of things, and it may possibly account for the erotic bonding that instinctually causes us to seek one or another kind of sexual pleasure. The second love that Santayana defines is closer to what I have described as a love of ideals.²⁰ These issue from human aspirations and they enable us to move beyond any momentary or local condition in which we happen to exist. Both are authentic modes of love, and in his supreme awareness of the role that imagination plays in each, Santayana brilliantly portrays their complex relationship to one another. What he does not understand, or recognize fully, is the fact that a love of persons involves a type of love that these two do not explain either individually or in conjunction. It is a love that involves neither possessiveness nor renunciation, neither instinctual gratification of a wholly material sort nor the sacrificial martyrdom of one's individual interests, neither a blind craving for domination nor a willed and willing detachment that culminates in contemplation at a distance. The love of persons endures by being what it was in its origins – a vital attachment. But, in being love directed towards others in themselves, as persons, it is also a bestowing of values that may create a unique and sometimes beneficial interdependency that Santayana's perspective can scarcely accommodate.

If my criticism is justified, one must conclude that Santayana's attempted synthesis has not succeeded. Matter and spirit have been interpreted in a way that does not elucidate what is most in need of explanation. I think that is what William James meant when he called Santayana's philosophy the "perfection of rottenness."²¹ He did not wish to malign Santayana or to deny his competence as a philosopher: he was not saying that Santayana's philosophy was perfectly rotten. He was referring to Santayana's combination of Platonism and materialism, which James considered faulty. For if Santayana's vision of the world included only the superimposing of possible perfections on the rottenness which belongs to its material substance, was he not ignoring man's ability to live

²⁰ See my book *The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther*, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 39ff.

²¹ For James' remark, see *The Selected Letters of William James*, ed. Elizabeth Hardwick (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961), p. 183. For Santayana's comment on James' remark, see George Santayana, "On My Friendly Critics," in *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 247-48. See also Timothy L. S. Sprigge, *Santayana: An Examination of his Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 225.

a good though imperfect life within a natural environment that is not entirely bad or completely hostile? Santayana formulates his analysis as he does in an attempt to remain absolutely faithful to reality as he knew it. His was a tragic view of life precisely because he saw no grounds for minimizing fundamental differences between the realms of matter and of spirit. What justification could there be in putting on a brave show of confidence, as he thought that James pervasively did, instead of admitting the frightening truths of our ontology and learning how to cope with them? Santayana's courage is undeniable. But even so, his philosophy fails to show us how human beings may overcome the split between matter and spirit. In misrepresenting the love of persons, he neglects a major segment of man's reality that cuts across these philosophical categories.

* * * * *

The crack in Santayana's golden bowl recurs in all his statements about love. As in Platonism throughout the centuries, it repeatedly introduces a note of sadness and despair. Human beings strive for ideals that lift the heart and invigorate the spirit but eternally elude our grasp because we are creatures forever bound by an alien materiality. Several times in these volumes I have quoted Santayana's epigram about Platonic love: "All beauties attract by suggesting the ideal and then fail to satisfy by not fulfilling it."²² I now wish to call attention to the aura of frustration and depression that surrounds these words. Though they express a view of the world that has inspired much of the greatest poetry, and though they honestly reflect the disappointments that are always possible in love despite the grandeur of its quest, they also reek of personal failure arbitrarily projected upon the facts of life. It is an outlook that belongs to the experience of those homosexuals who are not proud of their erotic orientation and who do not live in a society that allows them to attain their own type of free development.

Plato himself vacillates in his opinions about sexuality between males: he sometimes accepts it as a means of harmonizing material and spiritual inclinations, but frequently he condemns it as unnatural, even criminal. Within Santayana's writings we often find him referring to homosexual behavior in language that is quite unfavorable though somewhat veiled. Like Ficino and other Neoplatonists, he speaks of it as depraved and possibly diseased. But in a conversation with Daniel Cory he alluded to his own homosexual proclivities, and John McCormick's recent biography gives evidence about the love he felt for several men.²³ Santayana kept his homosexual feelings secret, as if he thought they were shameful. On

²² "Platonic Love in Some Italian Poets," in *Essays in Literary Criticism by George Santayana*, ed. Irving Singer (New York: Scribner's, 1956), p. 99.

²³ On this, see Daniel Cory, *Santayana: The Later Years, A Portrait with Letters* (New York: George Braziller, 1963), pp. 40-41; John McCormick, *George Santayana: A Biography* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987).

the other hand, there is little reason to believe that he savored the varied delights of heterosexual love. All beauties -- male and female -- may well have attracted him, but could any eliminate the painful inhibitions with which he was reared?

I do not wish to magnify the relevance of these biographical details. I mention them only to highlight Santayana's assertion that "A perfect love is founded on despair The *perfect* lover must renounce pursuit and the hope of possession."²⁴ In another work he amplifies this by saying that "possession leaves the true lover unsatisfied: his joy is in the character of the thing loved, in the essence it reveals."²⁵ The first part of this sentence is reminiscent of Proust stating that in sexual possession one possesses nothing (and therefore remains unsatisfied); the second part sounds like Proust using Platonistic language to talk about essences. Despite the differences between Proust and Santayana, they write as men who have been disqualified from appreciating the possibilities of a satisfying sexual love for any other person. Santayana could be speaking for Proust when he concludes that "contemplation is the whole object of love, and the sole gain in loving."²⁶

Santayana's doubts about the love of persons appear most clearly in a chapter entitled "Distraction." He begins by asserting that "frank love," by which he means lovemaking directed toward immediate pleasures of the senses, is not an impediment to spirit. In itself the flesh does not create distractions, particularly when "love turns the flesh into loveliness." Far from being threatened by an appetite for sexual goods, which Santayana considers innocent in themselves, spirit can readily arise as a purification of one's passion. This happens when love "ceases to be a craving for the unknown The object then proves to have been an essence and not an existing person or thing; and among essences there is no jealousy or contradiction, and no decay."²⁷ Distraction occurs when spirit becomes enmeshed in attachments to things or persons that may create "domestic virtue" but scarcely spiritual freedom. "In marriage," Santayana remarks, "love is socialized and moralized into a lifelong partnership which it would be dishonourable to betray; and community of interests and habits buttresses that love into mutual trust and assistance." But in the very next sentence, he adds: "A household rather smothers the love that established it."²⁸

How then can spirit escape the distractions of the world? How can it liberate itself from the duties and responsibilities that it knows to be morally defensible though inevitably imposing a confinement to its free exercise? As always, Santayana's answer presupposes the need to transform personal involvement into contemplative sublimation. To avoid

²⁴ George Santayana, *Persons and Places*, ed. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), p. 428. Italics deleted from first sentence.

²⁵ *The Realm of Essence*, in *Realms of Being*, p. 16.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *The Realm of Spirit*, in *Realms of Being*, p. 686.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

distraction, spirit "will distinguish the loveliness in things or the charm in persons from the existing persons and things. These were the vehicle, *that* was the revelation."²⁹ What he calls "the straightjacket imposed by society" seemed less pernicious to Santayana than "the illusions, revulsions, suspicions, and disasters suffered by love itself when given a free rein."³⁰ Santayana considers these possible occurrences the "vital contradictions" of love. He scarcely intimates that the love of persons can include a system of values not at all inimical to spirit.

In Santayana's defense one might argue that the condition he wishes to explicate is a *purity* of spirit that must not be reduced even to the love between persons. When Santayana talks about "pure spirit" or "the spiritual life," he should be taken as referring to a possible achievement -- an excellence in spirit, a kind of superior subdivision within the realm of spirit. While Santayana defines spirit as the actuality of mind when it attends to what is given or is possible (in other words, when it merely contemplates or imagines), he defines *spirituality* as spirit trying to exclude everything but itself. Though the spiritual life, like spirit in general, is an outgrowth of psyche and the realm of matter, it seeks to disintoxicate itself from them. The word "disintoxicate" often occurs in Santayana's writings, as if to suggest that spirit becomes sober and pellucid only when it treats its material origins as if they were foreign to its being. Santayana does insist that pure spirit will recognize the goodness of all mundane loves: having disintoxicated itself, it will perceive the beauty that is in them. But it will not love anything as the world does. For it will not concern itself with existence focused in a particular object, whether a person or a thing, and it will avoid all bonds that impair its own purified kind of love.

On more than one occasion, Santayana insisted that he himself was closer to the Greeks than to the Indians, and that he aspired to a life of rationality rather than spirituality. The former seeks a harmony among interests, whereas the latter is a single-minded pursuit that would seem to cast aside everything but itself. Do we have to choose between these alternatives? That is the question that Santayana examines dialectically in one of the chapters of his *Dialogues in Limbo*. In the dialogue entitled "The Philanthropist" Socrates and The Stranger converse about two ways in which mankind can be loved. In effect, one is love coherent with the life of reason and the other is love that issues from pure spirituality.

In depicting both possibilities, Santayana voices aspects of his own philosophy that could easily appear to be in contradiction to one another. On the one hand, we are presented with a conception of humanistic "philanthropy," which Socrates defends. As against this idea, The Stranger argues for what he calls "charity." Philanthropy is a love of mankind which Socrates describes as really being "the love of an idea, and not of actual men and women."³¹ Philanthropy directs itself toward

²⁹ Ibid., p. 687.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 691.

what is truly good for human beings; it is geared to the realities of their nature and aims for a "perfect humanity" that ideally would provide fulfillment, regardless of what some individual may happen to desire. The Stranger claims that "any adoration of mankind is mere sentimentality, killed by contact with actual men and women. Towards actual people a doting love signifies silliness in the lover and injury to the beloved, until that love is chastened into charity"32 Santayana employs the word "charity" in approximation of the medieval concept (*caritas*) and not as the word is more commonly used nowadays. He considers charity godlike even if it exists only in human beings. The Stranger calls it "a sober and profound compassion ... succouring distress everywhere and helping all to endure their humanity and to renounce it."³³

In this notion of charity we may recognize the disposition that Santayana generally assigns to pure spirit. Transcending the search for perfection and aspiring toward emancipation from the world, the spiritual life is an exclusive commitment to charity. The Stranger remarks that charity "is less than philanthropy in that it expects the defeat of man's natural desires and accepts that defeat; and it is more than philanthropy in that, in the face of defeat, it brings consolation."³⁴ Socrates sums up the discussion with the suggestion that "philanthropy is a sentiment proper to man in view of his desired perfection, and charity a sentiment proper to a god, or to a man inspired by a god, in view of the necessary imperfection of all living creatures."³⁵

Santayana leaves the dialogue with this minimal synthesis between the two ideals. Though charity is a Christian concept, he makes little attempt to defend Christianity itself. The Stranger classifies that religion as one among other "domesticated evils or tonic poisons, like the army, the government, the family, and the school; all of them traditional crutches, with which, though limping, we manage to walk."³⁶ Even this half-hearted recommendation seems overly generous to Socrates, who gives thanks that he died before the Christian era. All the same, we must realize that the dialectical play between the voices of Socrates and The Stranger duplicates the ambivalence in Christianity between its indigenous concepts of *eros* and *agapē*. In *The Realm of Spirit*, in a passage subtitled "Charity *versus* Eros," Santayana discusses the theological controversy about love that descends regardless of what the object merits as distinct from love that seeks to attain perfection. In different places he offers varying solutions to the problem.

In relations between spirits, Santayana recognizes no possibility of

³¹ George Santayana, *Dialogues in Limbo* (New York: Scribner's, 1925), p. 155.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-57.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

union apart from the fact that each may happen to pursue the same ideals and realize that others may cooperate in some extraneous fashion. "In seeking union with any other spirit," Santayana states, "we are therefore seeking either the Good, in that this other spirit realizes the perfection to which we are inwardly addressed; or else we are seeking such conformity with power and with truth as is necessary to the attainment of our proper good."³⁷

From this it follows that if spirit can ever attain complete and authentic union, this oneness must be a unity within an individual spirit. That is in fact what Santayana does believe. He ends the discussion with a vision of spirit free and wholly unified within a concentrated, detached, but also compassionate human being who sympathizes with the yearning for goodness in every thing and every person although he can never experience fusion with them. Nor does Santayana see any reason to expect permanence or uniformity in the purified spirit. Like Proust, he tells us that "Intermittence is intrinsic to life, to feeling, to thought; so are partiality and finitude."³⁸

In a passage that reminds us of Spinoza as well as the Christian mystics, Santayana's final words about union describe a victory for spirit embracing in an ultimate restoration the world it has renounced. Having achieved unity in its own contemplative nature, spirit enjoys the essential -- though not the existential -- being of everything. This happens by means of "intellectual worship, in which spirit, forgetting itself, becomes pure vision and pure love."³⁹

* * * * *

In reaching this conclusion, Santayana touches upon spiritual possibilities that other materialists and realists have always considered fatuous or bogus. But neither will Santayana's conception satisfy idealists who believe in a separate spirit-world from which human beings originate, with which they may commune in this life, and to which they can return after death. Of greatest import from my point of view, Santayana's ideas about spirit neglect and misconstrue the love of persons. As long as he treats the spiritual life as the transcending of particularities in existence, he cannot explain how spirit may achieve a love that responds to another person *as* a person -- someone who exists in time and space, an "accidental" conglomeration of specific properties and dispositions. As Santayana defines it, pure spirit is incapable not only of merging with other spirits but also of interacting creatively with other persons however they are described. How else can we interpret his assertions about detachment, renunciation, and acquiescence in the ultimate impotence of spirit? A disposition such as this may certainly be

³⁷ *The Realm of Spirit, in Realms of Being*, p. 807.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 825.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

compatible with sympathy, even compassion, but it tells us very little about the ideal of interpersonal love.

Nonetheless, we may find Santayana's conception helpful if we wish to emancipate ourselves from possessiveness, egoism, self-deception, and the restless hunger for dubious goods that makes it impossible for any other kind of love to exist. Santayana shows us how pure spirit may attain joyful serenity by accepting what is given and contemplating what is true or imaginable. This is a kind of *satori* that need not prevent an individual from returning to the world and living in it as an organism capable of satisfying all its faculties. Indeed, the ideal of happiness as the total fulfillment of natural impulses is defended in much of what Santayana wrote, particularly in his earlier work. The importance of undertaking mundane activities, the philosopher descending from his contemplative state and participating in the wretched world, he does not emphasize as much as Nietzsche or even Plato. But he leaves this open as a viable project that can sometimes fill periods of spiritual intermittence with opportunities for moral behavior. The purified spirit would then be joining forces with the psyche from which it arose, the two combining harmoniously and seeking unification with the interests of other spirits.

In Santayana's later philosophy these intimations of beneficent harmony are left largely undeveloped. They are compatible, however, with his former writings about the life of reason. He himself denied that there was significant inconsistency between the two stages in his thought. He accounted for the differences between them in terms of new areas of interest that preoccupied him as he got older. I think Santayana was right about this: he understood the nature of his philosophical development better than the critics who thought he was rejecting reason in favor of spirituality. Although *Realms of Being* calls itself ontology, it may well be taken as a quasi-literary expression of Santayana's experience after middle age. Though that was inevitably different from his experience as a younger man, he did not create a new system of analysis which contradicts his previous philosophy.

In this connection Santayana's comments about friendship, scattered throughout his writings, are extremely pertinent. They represent the humanistic strand that always accompanies, and enriches, his conception of either the life of reason or the life of spirit. In *Soliloquies in England*, he suggests that "One's friends are that part of the human race with which one can be human."⁴⁰ The kind of friendship that mainly interests Santayana is the "union of one whole man with another whole man," which he interprets as "the felt harmony of life with life, and of life with nature."⁴¹ Does the word "man" here refer to both sexes? Seventeen years earlier, in a chapter on "Free Society," Santayana maintained that "friends are generally of the same sex, for when men and women agree, it is only in their conclusions; their reasons are always different."⁴² A few

⁴⁰ "Friendships," in *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*, p. 55.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56, 58.

pages later, however, he tells us that in contemporary society "a well-assorted marriage" approximates, indeed "most nearly resembles," the ancient ideal of friendship that he wants to further.⁴³

The passage is worth quoting more fully:

In spite of intellectual disparity and of divergence in occupation, man and wife are bound together by a common dwelling, common friends, common affection for children, and, what is of great importance, common financial interests. These bonds often suffice for substantial and lasting unanimity, even when no ideal passion preceded; so that what is called a marriage of reason, if it is truly reasonable, may give a fair promise of happiness, since a normal married life can produce the sympathies it requires.

A declaration such as this reinforces my belief that Santayana does not give us an adequate analysis of the love of persons. The statement reveals that his approach to married love mainly concerns itself with the coordinates of a suitable partnership. The "marriage of reason" that Santayana advocates is the same as the social arrangement Schopenhauer contrasted with the bond of sexual love. Schopenhauer despaired of uniting the two within the marital relation, and Santayana makes no attempt to show how that might happen. On the other hand, one could argue that Santayana's references to sympathetic and lasting unanimity do take us part of the way toward understanding how marriage can become a manifestation of heterosexual friendship.

The humanistic (and pluralistic) reach of Santayana's philosophy of love appears most prominently in his posthumous essay entitled "Friendship." In it he sketches a spectrum of affective values, friendship and charity being the two that intrigue him most though they are not the only ones he wishes to defend. He contrasts friendship with brotherly or sisterly love, since they depend on family origin rather than free choice. Friendship is "distinctly selective, personal, and exclusive: in this respect it resembles the passion of love." But friendship differs from passionate love, Santayana states, in directing the imagination outward, toward the world as a whole, rather than focusing it on the relation between the lovers themselves. "What fills the imagination of friends is the world, as a scene for action and an object of judgement; and the person of the friend is distinguished and selected from all others because of exceptionally acceptable ways of acting, thinking, and feeling about other things or other persons." Santayana concludes that friendship is "the union of two freely ranging souls that meet by chance, recognize and prize each other, but remain free."⁴⁴

In citing the freedom basic to friendship, Santayana sets it apart from other kinds of love that he discusses. For it is bound neither by instincts

⁴² *Reason in Society*, p. 148.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁴⁴ George Santayana, "Friendship," in *The Birth of Reason and Other Essays*, ed. Daniel Cory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 81.

that serve reproductive need nor by constraints and moral obligations, as in marriage. Yet he insists that friendship is just as "vital and biological" as sexual or marital love. He also contrasts friendship with companionship fashioned by business or external circumstances in which "the persons are indifferent, transparent, and exchangeable In friendship, as in love, the play must have the persons for its authors."⁴⁵

This way of talking about friendship, and about love, is very remote from Santayana's usual variations on either Platonism or materialism. His emphasis upon persons, and the suggestion that they may have importance in themselves, takes him beyond his notion of individuals being the vehicle to some transcendental ideal. But Santayana's philosophy is incomplete at this point. Though he sees love and friendship as similar in their concern for "a vital personal sympathy," he makes no attempt to understand, or even acknowledge, the ways in which the two may coalesce. He treats sexual and marital love as sentiments controlled by the needs of domesticity, and he seems to take it for granted that the burdens they involve -- to say nothing of "jealousy, masterfulness, the desire to monopolise," -- must be inimical to friendship. Predicated upon a free choice, and remaining an expression of freedom throughout its career, friendship must belong to the spiritual life. As he has little conception of how spiritual and nonspiritual love may interpenetrate, so too does Santayana ignore the possibility of a love between persons which is both sexual or marital and also a type of friendship. The rift I mentioned earlier has not been overcome.

In describing friendship as a "union of souls," Santayana might seem to be undermining his claim that spirits cannot merge with one another. As a matter of fact, his thinking is quite consistent in this regard. Although he maintains that the union in friendship is "more than agreement," he also refers to it as "a coincidence of free souls."⁴⁶ This does not diverge from what he says elsewhere about union. Moreover, his remarks about friendship serve as a corrective to the charge that Santayana's later philosophy seeks to orient all human relations toward the achievement of spiritual purity. For he insists upon the differences between friendship and charity. The latter "not being intrinsic either to love or to friendship, requires the intervention of imaginative reason, by which we detach ourselves from our accidental persons and circumstances and feel the equal reality of all other persons in all other plights."⁴⁷ Santayana extols the infinite beauty in charity, but he points out that love or friendship or philanthropy can also be beautiful. Nowhere does he suggest that anyone must extirpate natural virtues or devote himself to the peculiar and exclusive interests of pure spirit. That remains a matter of individual choice.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 85.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

It is this pluralistic substratum that I particularly admire in Santayana's moral philosophy. It is the aspect of his vision from which we can learn the most.⁴⁸

© IRVING SINGER 1987

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

⁴⁸ For a discussion of Santayana's pluralistic moral philosophy, see my book *Santayana's Aesthetics: A Critical Introduction* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 201-22.

Beyond Truth: Santayana on the Functional Relations of Art, Myth, and Religion

George Santayana's *The Realm of Truth* (1938), the third volume of his second *magnum opus*, *Realms of Being*, ends with a short chapter arrestingly entitled "Beyond Truth." It was intended, as he stated elsewhere,¹ merely to provide a connection with the prospective fourth volume, *The Realm of Spirit*, and it is of no great consequence in itself. The idea broached in its title, however, is of great importance not only in his philosophy broadly considered but also in the relation of this philosophy to the perennially engaging topic of the meeting for which this paper was originally prepared, namely, "the functional relations of art, myth, and religion." The idea that there is a kind of affirmation somehow superior to that of truth gets to the heart of the synthesis which made his writing especially appealing to the many readers of his time who felt themselves torn between ideal interests on the one hand and the impersonal mechanisms of science on the other. Indeed, in his own life he had discovered that it was possible without strain or distress at the same time to be a declared materialist and atheist² and to believe that religion is "the head and front of everything."³ He had learned early from his parents, both ardent anticlericals, that religion is a work of imagination, and the thesis of one of his earliest books was that religion and poetry are "identical in essence,"⁴ differing only morally. This judgment, however, did not carry for him the implication that such figments are bad. "No, I said to myself even as a boy," he later recorded, "they are good, they alone are good."⁵ What these seeming paradoxes could mean and how they could be justified will be the concern of this paper, starting with the truth which he proposed to go beyond.

This truth was a nice blend of the correspondence and the pragmatic theories. As a card-carrying member of the school of "critical realists" he believed it unavoidable to assume, despite the powerful arguments of skepticism and even of solipsism, that there *is* a coherent objective reality existing independently of our knowing it, and that, in his language,

¹ Daniel Cory, *Santayana: The Later Years*, (New York, Braziller, 1963), p. 183.

² " ... in respect to popular religion that thinks of God as the creator of the world and the dispenser of fortune, my philosophy is atheistic." *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 838f. References to *Realms of Being* and its component works are to be the one-volume edition, N.Y., Scribner, 1942.

³ "A Brief History of My Opinions," in *The Philosophy of Santayana*, ed. I. Edman (N.Y.: Modern Library, 1942), p. 5. Originally in G.P. Adams and W.P. Montague, eds., *Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements* (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1930).

⁴ On the view of his parents see "A Brief History of My Opinions." The quoted sentence is from *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (N.Y.: Scribner, 1900), page v.

⁵ "A Brief History of My Opinions," pp. 5-6.

"the standard comprehensive description" of this reality, would be *the* truth,⁶ subsistent even if not attainable. This truth, *the* truth, is thus of the nature of correspondence, correspondence between the description and the reality described. *Knowledge* of the truth, however, – and he insisted on the distinction – is a quite different matter. Though its ideal and definition might still be that of copy, it is at best an approximation and not really susceptible of comparison with its original, which is not known immediately but only believed in. "All human *knowledge* of truth," he wrote, "by virtue of its seat and function, must be relative and subjectively coloured. It expresses the sensations and expectations of a specific animal."⁷ "Knowledge is not truth," he added elsewhere "but a view or expression of the truth. ... A lover of paradox might say that to be partly wrong is a condition of being partly right."⁸ Absolute truth presumptively exists, but its possession "is not merely by accident beyond the range of particular minds; it is incompatible with being alive, because it excludes any particular station, organ, interest, or date of survey."⁹

The medium of this partial knowledge is the profusion of images, concepts, and symbols which under inner and outer influences arise with dream-like spontaneity in each of us and make up our streams of consciousness. Most of these visitations simply flit by, but some of them are arrested, combined, and put to one or another of various uses.¹⁰ As he wrote, very early, of this stream: "Those conceptions which, after they have spontaneously arisen, prove serviceable in practice and capable of verification in sense, we call ideas of the understanding Understanding is an applicable fiction, a kind of wit with a practical use."¹¹ *The Life of Reason*, his first *magnum opus*, was, in his own description, a summary history of the imagination and its uses.¹² and,

⁶ *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (London: Constable, 1923), p. 267.

⁷ *The Realm of Truth*, p. 526.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 469.

⁹ *Realms of Being*, Preface, page xiii.

¹⁰ This concept, influenced certainly by James, recurs throughout Santayana's career. E.g., in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*: "perceptions fall into the brain ... as seeds into a furrowed field or even as sparks into a keg of powder. Each image breeds a hundred more." (p.2), and "Sanity is madness put to good uses; waking life is a dream controlled" (p.261). In "A Brief History of My Opinions," p. 19: "all is a tale told, if not by an idiot, at least by a dreamer; but it is far from signifying nothing. Sensations are rapid dreams; perceptions are dreams sustained and developed at will; sciences are dreams abstracted, controlled, measured, and rendered scrupulously proportional to their occasions. Knowledge accordingly always remains a part of imagination in its terms and in its seat; yet by virtue of its origin and intent it becomes a memorial and a guide to the fortunes of man in nature." In "Normal Madness," *Dialogues in Limbo* (New York: Scribner, 1926), pp. 36-57. In *Realms of Being*, page x: "Poetic, creative, original fancy is not a secondary form of sensibility, but its first and only form." In *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* (New York: Scribner, 1946), p. 7: Ambient influences stimulate "the organism to fuse scattered impressions, to revive and transform forgotten images, to invent, as in dreams, scenes that justify ripening emotions, and to feel affinities or equivalence in apparently disparate things"; this process, called "inspiration" in the making of poetry and sacred texts, "remakes the image of the world, or unmakes it, according to the mood of the soul."

¹¹ *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 5. I have reversed the order of the sentences.

much later, in that little masterpiece, "A Brief History of My Opinions," he clinched the matter for us in these words:

Here was a sort of pragmatism The human mind is a faculty of dreaming awake, and its dreams are kept relevant ... by the external control exercised over them by Punishment, when the accompanying conduct brings ruin, or by Agreement, when it brings prosperity.¹³

John Dewey's comment was that this was too pragmatic for him.¹⁴

The "knowledge of truth" as thus distinguished from truth proper may be said to go "beyond" it in the sense of being in a measure the creation and expression of its knower rather than merely an imposition upon him, and this transcendence is even further extendable as we move beyond truth even in the pragmatic sense. For the "knowledge" of truth thus conceived, as the word "pragmatic" suggests, is only an instrumentality, only a preliminary to a supposed fruition "beyond," and pale by comparison with that fruition on the scale of human value. The real glory redounds to the hoped for result. "Happiness in the truth," Santayana wrote in one of those wry domestic images to which he was so partial, "is like happiness in marriage, fruitful, lasting, and ironical. You could not have chosen better, yet this is not what you dreamt of."¹⁵

¹² "A Brief History of My Opinions," p. 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14

¹⁴ In Dewey's rejoinder to his critics in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (The Library of Living Philosophers, Northwestern University Press, 1939), p. 526. Dewey's specific words were "a kind of arbitrary pragmatism from which I shrink." Relevant comments by Santayana on this paragraph and the last are the following:

- (1) Limiting his pragmatism: "If an 'idea' is useful, it is useful, not true." (*The Realm of Truth*, p. 448)
- (2) Supporting his pragmatism: "truth at the intelligible level where it arises, means not sensible fact but valid ideation, verified hypothesis, and inevitable, stable inference." (*Reason in Common Sense*, New York: Scribner, 1922, p. 201)
- (3) Supportive of copy theory: "What renders knowledge true is fidelity to the object; but in the conduct and fancy of an animal this fidelity can be only rough, summary, dramatic" (*Realms of Being* p. xii). "This relativity does not imply that there is no absolute truth If views can be more or less correct, and perhaps complementary to one another, it is because they refer to the same system of nature, the complete description of which, covering the whole past and the whole future, would be the absolute truth." (*Ibid.*, p. xv). "The experience which makes even the empiricist awake to the being of truth ... is the experience of other people lying. When I am falsely accused ... I rebel against that contradiction to my evident self-knowledge There is, I then see clearly, a comprehensive standard description for every fact, which those who report it as it happened repeat in part, whereas on the contrary liars contradict it in some particular The standard comprehensive description of any fact which neither I nor any man can ever wholly repeat, is the truth about it." (*Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 266)
- (4) Concessions to common usage: "Dramatic myth ... in that at least it responds to the facts reflectively, has entered the arena of truth." (*The Realm of Truth*, p. 471). "Integrity, ... the clear allegiance of a transparent soul to its radical will, without being true to anything external, makes a man's choices true to himself." (*Ibid.*, p. 475)
- (5) The Preface of *The Realm of Truth* includes nine extended passages on the subject quoted from the author's previous works.

"More deeply than with the truth," he added, "spirit is concerned with conceiving, loving, or hating what might have been true."¹⁶ And again: "merely being true does not make things worth knowing"; they achieve such worth only by "invigorating and entertaining the mind."¹⁷ Finally, consider the following warm declaration, elaborating the suggestion of invigoration and entertainment:

Facts for a living creature are only instruments; his play-life is his true life. On his working days, when he is attentive to matter, he is only his own servant, preparing the feast. He becomes his own master in his holidays and in his sportive passions. Among these must be counted literature and philosophy, and so much of love, religion, and patriotism as is not an effort to survive materially.¹⁸

Thus, "beyond truth" -- not fact but vision.

The criterion here, despite the inclusion of grave categories like philosophy and patriotism, is clearly aesthetic -- pleasure, not duty -- and recalls the conception of value as appreciation which was presented at the beginning of his first book, *The Sense of Beauty* (1896), as well as; also in that place, his implicit elevation of aesthetic above moral value as intrinsic rather than merely instrumental.¹⁹ Whatever its technical standing, this axiology is close to the heart of Santayana's personal philosophy and the basis of the objection of many of his more earnest American critics -- President Eliot, for example -- that in being at bottom aesthetic his way of thinking and living was idle and indulgent.²⁰ Instead of a soldier in the wars of progress, he was the detached spectator and dreamer. This detachment was the point of that early "change of heart" which he described memorably in the opening of the third volume of his autobiography²¹ and quite unforgettably in the following reflection on the tragedies of World War I and the pessimistic lesson that they drove home:

Under these circumstances, what is the part of wisdom? To dream with one eye open; to be detached from the world without hostility to it; to welcome fugitive beauties and pity fugitive sufferings without forgetting for a moment how fugitive they are; and not to lay up treasures, except in heaven.²²

¹⁵ *The Realm of Truth*, p. 540.

¹⁶ *The Real of Spirit*, p. 805.

¹⁷ *The Realm of Truth*, p. 441

¹⁸ *The Realm of Being*, page xi.

¹⁹ See pp. 18 and 23.

²⁰ E.g., Charles William Eliot: "The withdrawn, contemplative man who takes no part in the everyday work of the institution, or of the world, seems to me a person of very uncertain value. He does not dig ditches, or lay bricks, or write school-books, his product is not of the ordinary useful, though humble, kind. What will it be? It may be something of the highest utility; but, on the other hand, it may be something futile, or even harmful because unnatural and untimely." G.W. Howgate, *Santayana* (Philadelphia, U. of Pa. Press, 1938), pp. 42-3.

²¹ *My Host the Word* (New York: Scribner, 1953), pp. 1-15.

²² *Soliloquies in England* (New York: Scribner, 1922), pp. 96-7. The whole essay, "War

His way, however, as is evident in these words, was not a simple hedonism. His Epicureanism had its *ataraxia*. Thus, when he explained to his good friend and fellow football rooter, Billy Phelps, that he could dispense with Phelps's kind of faith because he had "the Epicurean contentment," he added quickly that this "was not far removed from asceticism."²³ It was also not far removed from religion, as we shall discover through a closer look at his "realm of spirit."

As one of the four "realms of being", the realm of spirit is in Santayana's system the realm of awareness.²⁴ When he was first beginning to develop this new phase of his philosophy, as early as 1911, he spoke of the realm of spirit as the realm of "consciousness,"²⁵ and in the opening chapter of the volume which was finally devoted to it he said that "other names for spirit are consciousness, attention, feeling, thought, or any word that marks the total *inner* difference between being awake or asleep, alive or dead."²⁶ He distinguished spirit from what he called the "psyche," which, with Aristotelian reminiscences, he defined as "the self-maintaining and reproducing pattern or structure or an organism, conceived as a power."²⁷ The supposed origin of spirit in the evolution of the psyche he describes in these terms:

spirit ... arises at a specially energetic phase in the life of the psyche, namely, when the range of adjustment and control begins to extend beyond the body; for so long as life remains purely vegetative it seems to be unconscious We may then say that spirit arises whenever Will in one place finds it profitable to mark, trace, and even imitatively to share the movement of Will elsewhere. By so doing a psyche anticipates attack and defense, putting forth telepathic feelers, as it were, indefinitely far into space and time.²⁸

This conjectural history, which is more an expository device than a scientific conclusion, serves to define the distinctive vocation of spirit and to suggest its entanglement:

This sensibility to the not-self arises entirely in the self's service. Those far-reaching senses are not speculative in their Will, but defensive or aggressive; and the mechanism that generates and supports them necessarily subserves the welfare of the body Yet meantime, by that useful trick of exact

Shrines," from which this passage is taken, beginning, "What does the cross signify?" is relevant to the present discussion, especially these two passages when taken in conjunction: "The knowledge that existence can manifest but cannot retain the good reconciles us at once to living and to dying. That, I think, is the wisdom of the cross." "There is no cure for birth and death save to enjoy the interval." (pp. 94, 97)

²³ Letter to Phelps, Feb. 16, 1936. *The Letters of George Santayana*, ed. Daniel Cory (New York: Scribner, 1955), p. 305.

²⁴ The present paragraph and the next one are taken from an earlier article of mine, "Lucifer and The Last Puritan," *American Literature*, XXXIII, No. 1 (March, 1961), pp. 1-19.

²⁵ *Letters*, p. 104.

²⁶ *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 572.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 569.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 608-9.

adaptation and imitative sympathy, the psyche has automatically generated spiritual sympathy and true intelligence, without in the least requiring these gifts or profiting by them.²⁹

"In this way, like an ignorant girl, the psyche has become a mother without counting the cost either to herself or to her miraculous child."³⁰

Two points in this conception must be given special emphasis. The first is that though spirit arises in the service of the body and continues in this service, it is itself contemplative and disinterested and stands therefore in its ideal aspect for impartiality. Like pure science or an ideal intelligence service, its function is to know, without anxiety as to consequences. Santayana explains its status and distinction in this way: "The difference between the life of the spirit and that of the flesh is itself a spiritual difference: the two are not to be divided materially or in their occasions and themes so much as in the quality of their attention: the one is anxiety, inquiry, desire, and fear; the other is intuitive possession."³¹ The second point to be noted is that the same ideal of impartiality which follows from the cognitive function of spirit is reinforced and given an additional dimension by spirit's trick of sympathetic projection. Out of this useful talent for putting itself in others' places arises the ideal of charity, which Santayana early defined in terms of imagination ("charity is nothing but a radical and imaginative justice")³² and which he understood in the classical Christian sense not simply of pity for suffering but love of a good which is universally longed for but pitifully perverted and frustrated.³³ The way of life in which these two points agree, together with the asceticism which this life entails, is presented in the following terms in *The Realm of Spirit*:

[spirit] has chosen what in its own eyes is the better part, intelligence, sympathy, universality. It has thereby chosen for all others that which their nature, in each case, demands; but for itself spirit has chosen renunciation, not to be preached to others who cannot love it but to be practised inwardly in its own solitude. The first thing that spirit must renounce, if it would begin to be free, is any claim to domination. Its kingdom is not of this world; and the other world, where its will is done, is not a second cosmos, another physical environment, but this very emancipation and dominion of spirit over itself, which raises it above care even for its own existence. Suffering is not thereby abolished, either in the world or in the spirit, so long as the spirit lives in any world; but suffering is accepted and spiritually overcome by being understood, and by being preferred to the easy injustice of sharing only one

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 613.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 617.

³¹ *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, Harper Torchbooks Edition (New York, 1957), p. 260.

³² *Reason in Religion*, p. 221.

³³ "It was this spectacle that moved God, in the person of his Son, to a new Christian love for the world, which is called charity: ... love of something missed, of something defeated and unexpressed, to which this erring world was inwardly addressed, and for the lack of which it horribly and perpetually suffered." (*The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*, p. 215). For extended discussions of charity, see *The Realm of Spirit*, pp. 782-97 and *Reason in Religion*, Ch. XII.

craving, to be satisfied with one sweet.³⁴

This relationship of bondage and deliverance was to Santayana not only an ingenious philosophical concept and something of a personal confession; it was also the essence of true Christianity. In the words of the title of a book which he had not yet written, but was about to, "the idea of Christ in the Gospels." This, further, was an idea which, though not always in so developed a form, he had celebrated throughout his career. Thus, as early as *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* in 1900 he had argued that "Christian doctrine" as compared with its early rivals was "alone justified" because it was "the felt counterpart of personal experience."³⁵ And now, nearly fifty years later, in exploring the theatre of this very experience, the realm of spirit, he was led directly by its tragedy to the figure of Christ as, in his phrase, the "supreme instance"³⁶ of spirit's suffering and liberation, and to the writing of ten pages which are the germ of the later book. The subtitle of *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* is *God-in-Man*, and its contention, as we have just seen in the more abstract terms of *The Realm of Spirit*, was that this mystery derived its significance and greatness from its expression of an "in-born predicament of the spirit."³⁷ The mission of spirit was to love and understand all things, but it was incarnated in a world and organism in which discrimination and choice, selection and rejection, love and fear, were of the essence. Nor were this analysis and the claim of its universal religious significance merely ingenious apologetics. Nothing is more familiar to any reader of the daily papers than the conflict between the ideal of peace and love on the one hand and the actualities of possession and survival on the other. The Passion is ours.

This "supreme instance," this doctrine "alone justified" comes to us, however, as myth rather than theology -- a specific myth, indeed, the Christian epic.³⁸ -- and the question thus arises, how does one who as a philosopher is committed to more literal modes of thought deal with it? An important preliminary fact as far as Santayana is concerned is that he did not wish to dispense with the myth, either to dismiss it as only a manner of speaking or to transform it into something more comforting, as was so common in the Unitarian world in which he had grown up. The disenchanting, ascetic, unworldly emphasis of the Gospels and of early Christian life, the message of salvation through renunciation, was, he believed, the true one and not to be explained away. Scripture, he

³⁴ *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 643. Some of the difficulties of Santayana's epiphenomenalism appear here, as, indeed, in a number of places in this paper. The impotence of spirit in this theory of mind is difficult to maintain and tends to be broken by words like "chosen" in this and other statements.

³⁵ pp. 95, 105.

³⁶ *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 757.

³⁷ p. 19.

³⁸ The classic statement is Chapter VI, "The Christian Epic," in *Reason in Religion*, but a worthy predecessor is Chapter IV, "The Poetry of Christian Dogma," in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*.

urged, in *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels* should be taken literally at the same time that it is recognized to be fable. The orthodox interpretation of Christianity is the sound one, but it is poetry and not fact. Concepts like that of Creation, for example, are admittedly not sound physics or history, but they are true to the life of the spirit and therefore not to be abandoned but to be interpreted. A second important preliminary is his predilection for teleological explanation. Thorough naturalist that he was, he could easily have agreed that the process of myth-making (or of metaphysic-making) is an instance of what John Dewey regarded as the greatest of philosophical fallacies, "the conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence."³⁹ However, Aristotelian that he also was, he would have wished vigorously to deny (as would Dewey, for that matter) that antecedent existences or causes are the only or even the most important kind of explanation. In an important passage in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* he asked our central question in these words: "Was Christianity right in saying that the world was made for man?" His answer was this:

Certainly not, if we are thinking of a scientific, not a poetical explanation ... , [but] what is false in the science of facts may be true in the science of values. While the existence of things must be understood by referring them to their causes, which are mechanical, their function can only be explained by what is interesting in their results, in other words, by their relation to human nature and to human happiness.⁴⁰

Reason in Science, the final volume of *The Life of Reason*, must have seemed strange to some of its readers, for, despite its title, it contains its author's most extended treatment of ethics and, half way through, shifts from efficient to final considerations, from mechanics to intent, from the sciences to the humanities, to "dialectic," as he calls the new focus. At the beginning of the sixth of eleven chapters, he glances quickly back over the ground he has covered, and summarizes as follows: "These investigations, taken together, constitute physics, or the science of existence." He then presents his surprise: "But this is only half of science and on the whole the less interesting and less fundamental half. No existence is of moment to a man, not even his own, unless it touches his will or thwarts his intent."⁴¹ It is here that Santayana was most at home. His was the world of appreciation, not of control⁴² -- the intuition of essence as he would later say. He always warned that "without knowledge of existence nothing can be done," but his final word was that "nothing is really done until something else is known also, the

³⁹ *Experience and Nature* (Chicago: Open Court, 1925), p. 35. See also p. 68, where he speaks of antecedent cause as well as antecedent existence.

⁴⁰ pp. 91-2.

⁴¹ p. 167

⁴² Having used Dewey for comparison and contrast a number of times, I may mention here the chapter, "The Art of Acceptance and the Art of Control" in *The Quest for Certainty*, in which Dewey's preference was the opposite of Santayana's.

use or excellence that existence may have."⁴³

If we are thinking in terms of origins, there are at least two good reasons why this world of value should have taken the form of myth. One is that the assignment of causal status to an ideal confers upon it an objective authority which it does not have as merely something desired;⁴⁴ we wish our values to be universal and necessary, even coercive, and to be guaranteed by the nature of things. The other is that, being something felt as well as understood, it is more suitably expressed in dramatic than in abstract terms.⁴⁵ To go beyond truth into this world of appreciation invites the strategies and language of the poet and finds its natural medium in that "inverted image of things" called myth, "wherein," as Santayana says, in language like that of Dewey on his philosophical fallacy, "their moral effects are turned into their dramatic antecedents -- as when the wind's rudeness is turned into his anger."⁴⁶ "Those pious philosophers," he wrote in *The Realm of Spirit*, "do not altogether waste their time studying their fabulous universes; for they are but reversed images of the spiritual life, and the deeper the devotee penetrates into their magic economy, the better he learns to know his own heart."⁴⁷ For the double treat of amusement as well as instruction on this point, however, the passage most suitable to bring these remarks to a close is one at the beginning of his essay on Dante in *Three Philosophical Poets*, where he was establishing the radically teleological outlook of Dante's world.⁴⁸ His point of departure is the passage in Plato's *Phaedo* in which Socrates tells of moving from Anaxagoras' principle that Reason, as the disposer of all things, will dispose all things for the best to the venturesome conclusion that "if any one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what ... was best for that thing." This then, burlesquing Plato in the *Timaeus*, he illustrates as follows:

The highest occupation, according to Plato, is the study of philosophy; but this would not be possible for man if he had to be continually feeding, like a grazing animal, with its nose to the ground. Now, to obviate the necessity of eating all the time, long intestines are useful; therefore the cause of long intestines is the study of philosophy. Again, the eyes, nose, and mouth are in

⁴³ p. 168

⁴⁴ "Religion may falsely represent the ideal as a reality, but we must remember that the ideal, if not so represented, would be despised by the majority of men, who cannot understand that the value of things is moral, and who therefore attribute to what is moral a natural existence, thinking thus to vindicate its importance and value." *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 284

⁴⁵ "Primitive thought has the form of poetry and the function of prose. Being thought, it distinguishes objects from the experience that reveals them ... ; but being poetical, it attributes to those objects all the qualities which the experience of them contains ..." *Reason in Religion*, pp. 49-50.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁴⁷ p. 176.

⁴⁸ Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1910, pp. 73-6.

the front of the head, because (says Plato) the front is the nobler side, -- as if the back would not have been the nobler side (and the front side) had the eyes, nose, and mouth been there!

Having had his fun, however, he goes on to the serious point that beyond this ridiculous physics, beyond indeed truth or error, there is a genuine wisdom: "After all,... the *use* of the body *is* the mind, whatever the origin of the body may be. And it seems to dignify and vindicate these uses to say that they are the 'causes' of the organs that make them possible. What is true of particular organs or substances is true of the whole frame of nature. Its use is to serve the good -- to make life, happiness, and virtue possible."

Thus, to come to an abrupt conclusion, do we go "beyond truth"; and thus is religion, in the sense of our deepest experience and aspiration, "the head and front of everything." In the words of the familiar formula of the Preface to the 1900 volume:

Poetry is called religion when it intervenes in life, and religion, when it merely supervenes upon life, is seen to be nothing but poetry.

or, more carefully stated, a page later:

As religion is deflected from its courses when it is confused with a record of facts or of natural laws, so poetry is arrested in its development if it remains an unmeaning play of fancy without relevance to the ideals and purposes of life.⁴⁹

Thus, again, do we not only go beyond truth but perceive a functional relation between art, myth, and religion.

FREDERICK W. CONNER

Gainesville, Florida

Persons and Places -- Hold the Events

Most literary genres provide opportunities for second thoughts: if your novel or poem or newspaper editorial is not what you had hoped, you can revise or write another. But autobiography usually offers no reprise, being itself one. Written generally late in life, and often published posthumously, it offers less to tempt the author seeking responses or royalties. (I pass by the "celebrity" autobiography, often written by someone else, and invariably intended to build bank balances, not monuments of brass.)

What remains to motivate an author? Posthumous fame, yes, particularly for those, unlike Santayana, whose faith in an afterlife includes the perusal of the mundane -- or even for those, a mighty horde, who take pleasure in imagined future moments. How often have we heard (or said): "Oh, I could tell a tale!" So arises the itch to set the record straight, to have the tale told by the only one who knows how it really was, to give the proper evidence, whether straight or ironic, eulogistic or confessional. There is also the driving curiosity about oneself, the bitter-sweet urge to face the self that can be found only through examining and expositing the record of origins, growth, behaviour, reflection, interaction, and reputation.

It is well for a reader to take some heed of the author's motivations when opening an autobiography, for the matching of expectations with intentions is essential to a happy contract. And in modern times, when editors too have their intentions, the reader should also have some understanding of what motivates the midwife. These ruminations are occasioned by the welcome appearance of the first volume of the projected critical edition of the works of George Santayana, *Persons and Places. Fragments of Autobiography*, ed. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., with an introduction by Richard C. Lyon (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986 [1987]).

First, the author. Santayana presents problems -- that is an understatement, of course, even with reference to the matter in hand, i.e., trying to grip his intentions. (In one sense that word plagues editors, as will be evident below; here it is used in the sense that plagues those literary critics who are so paralyzed by the fear of committing the "intentional fallacy" that they try to bootstrap idiosyncrasy into reality.) In his all too brief introduction to this critical edition of *Persons and Places*, Richard Lyon properly dwells on possible false expectations: it is "not a work whose every image and episode subserves a central vision Nor is it a chronological narrative designed to demonstrate the autobiographer's advance on chaos and dark night." Though there are "telling accounts of crucial turns in his development, the book as a whole does not find a focus in rites of passage or the evolution of a mind.

Moreover its episodes ... do not issue in a single dramatic perspective or summary insight." And finally, it is not "designed to be the portrait of an age" (pp. xxxv-xxxvi).

Santayana himself is candid about the impropriety of taking the account as fact. In his splendid biography, *George Santayana* (New York: Knopf, 1987), John McCormick quotes Santayana as saying of *Persons and Places*: "I rely on very few documents -- only my father's letters and Russell's -- and my memory is what in modern cant might be called 'creative'. It seems to me very exact, very clear, and no doubt that illusion helps me to describe things vividly: but alas! not with historical truth. At bottom, I don't much care to discriminate history from poetry: good history is unintentionally poetical, and poetry is inevitably a capital historical document concerning the poet's mind." (Pp. 440-1.) In the work itself the warning is explicit: "I have a very short memory, except for such things as I absorb and recast in my own mind; so that I am a good observer and critic, but a bad historian: let the reader of this book take warning" (p. 190). The recasting is of course fictional in mode, as he emphasizes and, with his characteristic cool veracity, even defends, though in doing so he betrays adherence to another autobiographer's goal that he appears normally to eschew: "Of early childhood I have some stray images, detached and undatable, called up occasionally for no reason, after the fashion of dreams. Indeed, sometimes I suspect that they may be fragments of old dreams, and not genuine recollections; but in that case, where did the old dreams come from? For autobiography it might be no less pertinent, and even more telling, to report them if they were dreams than if they were true memories, because they would show how my young mind grew, what objects impressed it, and on what themes it played its first variations." (P. 115.) (For other pause-giving passages, see *Persons and Places*, pp. 145 and 146, and McCormick, pp. 194 and 330.)

What then can one expect from Santayana's autobiography? He gives important clues in the title: *Persons and Places. Fragments of Autobiography*. There can be no doubt that from the first autobiographical stirrings in Santayana, both the centrality of "persons" and "places" and the impossibility -- probably the undesirability -- of a fully connected narrative were evident to him. Indeed the evocative focussing on persons and places entails narrative fragmentation, and almost certainly rules out thematic unity. Moreover, in Santayana's case, it even rules out the author except as observer. "More than once in my life," he says, "I have crossed a desert in all that regards myself, my thoughts, or my happiness; so that when I look back over those years, I see objects, I see public events, I see *persons and places*, but I don't see myself. My inner life, as I recall it, seems to be concentrated in a few oases, in a few halting-places, *Green Inns*, or sanctuaries, where the busy traveller stopped to rest, to think, and to be himself." (Pp. 147-8.) (For other uses of the terms, see pp. 334, 352, 418, 535, 536, and 537. At p. 391 one finds "persons and ideas," and at p. 428 "things and persons," both retaining one eye on

humanity, but casting the other on rather different notions.)

It is interesting to note that in Santayana's novel, *The Last Puritan: A Memoir in the Form of a Novel* (London: Constable, 1935), Peter Alden, father of the hero, Oliver, "devoured Mr. Lowe's library of adventure: he remembered everything about persons and places that Mr. Lowe himself or the boys, or the visiting neighbours, happened to mention" (p. 54). But Alden, like Santayana himself, got little closer than remembered observation would allow; as McCormick says, when either friendships or places threatened Santayana's "habits of work, he was prompt to remove himself" (p. 280). In Santayana's words: "To possess things and persons in idea is the only pure good to be got out of them; to possess them physically or legally is a burden and a snare" (p. 428). And, in a letter quoted by McCormick, "What I want, and find, is a congenial setting for solitude" (p. 240) -- as has wisely been said, solitude is something that cannot be shared.

So one finds Santayana's characteristic stance: unmoved by reflection, though much moved in space, detached from events and habits, from family and friends, that once had their effect. The retrospect is that of the traveller, as Lyon says, with much textual authority, and of the stranger. On saying goodbye to Avila and Spain, "I shed no tears. I retained within me all that I wanted or could ever now enjoy in Spain. I cut off only useless repetitions and disappointments." (P. 336.) "... I was notoriously content with looking on ..." (p. 344). "... I lived in a kind of solitude, not transcendental and spiritual, but decidedly solitariness in a crowd and foreignness among very distinct people" (p. 418).

This disposition leads to an impression that Santayana is like the writers of eighteenth-century imaginary voyages, able to portray the ordinary lives of others from an irredeemably foreign perspective. And once again the text bears out the implication: "All my life I have dreamt of travels, possible and impossible: travels in space and travels in time, travels into other bodies and into alien minds. Not having been suffered by fate to be more than an occasional tripper and tourist, I have taken my revenge in what might be called travels of the intellect, by admitting the opposite of all facts and of all beliefs to be equally possible and no more arbitrary." (P. 447.) Thus too the chilling effect of his comments on persons (places can attend to themselves), as for instance in his claim that he felt a "certain strange distance" from his parents, with whom his bond "had not been close and physical, but somehow accidental and merely social or economic, as with a schoolmaster or a school matron" (p. 248); or his report of a remark that might well be taken to rebound on himself: Frank Russell "used to say in the early years that he cared nothing for what his friends might do when he wasn't present" (p. 516); and most characteristically, his comment, "I like to be a stranger myself, it was my destiny; but I wish to be the only stranger" (p. 528).

From all this one may say (avoiding more testing remarks) that one of the dominant impulses to read autobiographies, the interest in events, is not fulfilled here. Santayana admitted that it "was a retreat [he] was

looking for, not a field of action" (p. 529). So it is that the civilization shattering wars, revolutions, economic depressions, upheavals in sensibility, are scarcely taken into his account. Even the one kind of action that is evident, philosophic battle, is much more distanced than in his other major writings. Here Santayana does not appear, as many philosophers do in their personal memoirs, to be a tome traveller, measuring his movement through the great speculative works. Perhaps he is most typical of the philosopher only in his contemptuous dismissal of other philosophers, and though the close interfiliation between life and ideas enriches a reading both of his philosophy and his autobiography, one would not comprehend the former by a reading of the latter.

What one does find, and that in plenty, is the richness of a capacious mind, indulging itself in the locating and shaping of impressions, taking as much pleasure (frequently ironic) in the mode of statement as in the recollection. There is no room to give my own favourites among the *sententia*, but each reader will find sufficient, and will perhaps note that their strength comes not so much from concision as from surprise, not so much from unconditioned validity as from particular rightness. Santayana's line of attack is of course that of his proper contemporaries in the U.S.A. and the U.K., and like his own novel, his memoir is more Henry than William Jamesian, dwelling on persons and places rather than events, with few things -- no one makes the widgets from which the money comes. The lasting value for the reader is in having been asked along, not in being told.

Now, what are the editors' intentions? Unlike Santayana, they are very aware of, and eager to talk about, a revolution: that in textual editing. Apart from the Introduction and preliminaries, the volume contains 762 pages, the text ending on p. 547, and the rest being made up of editorial apparatus of various kinds. Such a proportion is typical of modern critical editions based on the ideas of a warlike group of scholars, founded by Sir Walter Greg and best led by a deeply learned and skilled theoretician and practitioner, Fredson Bowers, one of whose dicta is that all the editing cards should be on the table, face up. Professors Holzberger and Saatkamp have done a thoroughly professional job of making sure that the cards are in hand, and in getting them spot up. One key card is missing -- the typescripts of Santayana's manuscripts, which were used as type-setting copy -- but they keep assiduously pointing to the vacant slot in the flush to keep the game clean. Being myself a textual editor, I can fully appreciate and praise their careful and authoritative work. (There are, as always, a few puzzles: I need enlightenment, for instance, on the location of the manuscript of the second part -- cf. the accounts on pp. 599-600 and p. 602, which seem to place it both at Columbia and Tampa.)

Being also, however, a textual editor of the writings of a philosopher (and much else), John Stuart Mill (on whom Santayana's judgments are simply wrong), I am aware of the profound lack of interest most readers take in textual questions, and I am not at all sure that, *vita brevis*, they are

wrong. Let me say, then, that some statements I could well do without. We may excuse the publicity flyer for the tone of a talk show: "Please join the M.I.T. Press in welcoming PERSONS AND PLACES to its rightful place in American scholarship"; however, the editors should be relaxed in their strength, and not say such things as these: "All work has been conducted with the utmost care and attention to detail" (p. 604); the "placement" of the unpublished essay, "We Were Not Virtuous," as an addendum to part one "assures its inclusion in future editions of the autobiography based on the Critical Edition" (p. 611); and, "In quotations from the present critical edition, no line-end hyphens are to be retained except the following [one-page list]" (p. 647) (my emphases).

That last comment, probably to most readers mysterious in content as well as vain in hope, may serve to introduce the main principle. The editors' goal is to follow Santayana's final "intentions" as to text. (Their practice is fully laid out on pp. 606-10.) This is not a metaphysical notion, at least in practice, for it involves a meticulous attention to actual evidence, especially physical (in the form of manuscripts, proofs, printed texts); that it is not purely positive, however, has become increasingly apparent in recent years, as new eyes have come to look at old problems. (One instance only: what can one say about the final intentions of a poet concerning verses that have been published in several revised forms? Is each form a different poem, representing different intentions, even if all forms have been given the same title?) All intentions, it might be said, are interim, pending further thought. And that further thought may well include decisions prompted by the advice or intervention of others. (Which modern philosopher ignores the advice of pre-publication readers?) This is not the place to instance cases where the dogma has not provided answers for Holzberger and Saatkamp, and they have had to fall back on their abundant resources of reason and common sense -- determined diggers may consult the entries in the "Discussion of Adopted Readings" for 113.5-6, 122.7, 215.26 (a testy dealing with a slur on Jews), 226.15-16 ("In any case, it is the sort of correction that Santayana would approve."), 226.21-23, 231.28, 233.26-28, 303.2-3, 320.9, 320.27, 377.24 (there is no identification of "the scheming Marquise" either here or in the "Notes to the Text"), 384.39-385.1, 427.30, 432.24, 435.6, 439.29, and 496.36 (one of the few with philosophic implications, and where the editors use the term "original intent"). I should make it clear that I accept virtually all the decisions covered in these places, bowing happily to the editors' expert knowledge; what I am indicating is a dissatisfaction with the dogmatism of theory, and with a failure to realize that most readers of *Persons and Places* in "the Critical Edition" will care much more about understanding the text than knowing how it came about.

In fact, much more care was expended on textual questions than on substance; the "Notes to the Text" are not in the same class as the textual apparatus. As the editors say, these notes give "information of general interest" but are "not part of the evidence for the Critical Edition text"; "These notes do not pretend to be complete, since information was often

unavailable" (Pp. 611-12.) Of many instances, let me cite only one, almost trivial but typical: the note (p. 569) to *The Bible in Spain* (not to its author, whose name also appears on p.289), reads merely: "George Henry Borrow (1803-1881), author of *The Bible in Spain* which was first published in 1842." Why no comment on the surprising nature of that work, or on Santayana's confessed ignorance of it? On the other hand, in the "List of Emendations" (p. 639), it is carefully noted that the italicization of the title of that work in the American and English editions is accepted over the placing it in quotation marks in the manuscript. I should have been happier if all such emendations had been covered in one general sentence, and the effort that went into listing them had gone into better explanatory notes.

One more carping instance and I shall cease; Santayana provided marginal headings in his manuscript, which have been restored to their proper status here, and which the editors have regularized by placing a period after each. Rather than simply saying so, with an explanation of the reasons, the editors give more than a page in their "List of Emendations" to a double-column list of places where they have supplied the period (pp. 632-4), and more than two pages in their "List of Substantive Variants" to page and line references to all the places where they have supplied the headings which were left out of earlier editions (pp. 650-2).

It is as though Professors Holzberger and Saatkamp (both well established scholars) felt an extraordinary need not only to prepare their case, but to "discover" it publicly, lest they be called before a court presided over by the now traditional justices, headed by Thomas Tanselle in scarlet robes and black cap. For example, they provide an account of the process of textual production (p. 586), which includes these compelling details: "the word-processing files containing the established text are converted to ASCII files and these files are structured for use by the Penta Front-End System in conjunction with an Autologic Aps Micro 5 (a digital typesetter). These ASCII files are sent on floppy discs to MIT Press where they are transferred to magnetic tape" Yet, alas, the Front-End System lived up to its name in refusing to place the marginal headings exactly where Santayana wished them, insisting rather that they go against the beginnings of paragraphs.

The account of proof-reading is even more meticulous (pp. 602-3), citing the details of sight collations (thirteen described under six heads) and of machine collations (twelve collations of the examined copies, again under six heads). Not being on jury call, I can again indicate my admiration for their thoroughness, and as one who has suffered similar indignities, I can appreciate how grinding it must have been for them to include an errata slip for captions -- and how unspeakably distressing to find that there is text missing at the transition from pp. 312-13.

And that is my account of the meeting of one reader's expectations with an author's and his editors' intentions. What has not, I fear, been conveyed is my pleasure in the encounter, not only with Santayana's wary

and astonishing powers of observation and expression, but also with an example of the best of modern textual editing. That I have reservations about both reflects as much on me as on them; what I have no hesitation about is calling attention to the ambiguity in my title: now is the time to hold the events celebratory of a compelling author and the first volume of a commanding edition.

JOHN M. ROBSON

Victoria College, University of Toronto

Variations on a Given Theme

If we set aside the difficulties readers have with the content of Santayana's philosophy, there remains a no less formidable barrier due to his style and methodology. Looking for closely reasoned argumentation, they find instead a barrage of literary devices; the prose is wonderful, but is it philosophy? About his turn of mind, he says:

... my mind works by making variations on a given theme or congruous extensions. I tend to repeat myself like a refrain; I do not pass to something else that suggests itself by chance. In a word, I move in the realm of essences, not in that of accidents. One reason for this may be limitation of experience but another reason may be the intensity of what experience I have.¹

This observation certainly applies to his philosophical writings; there we find a number of themes which tend to be repeated again and again, although they are always presented with fresh images and original phrasing. An example of such a theme is the often repeated, two-part assertion: that "similar things under the same circumstances change in the same ways"; but that "Chances and fresh creations may occur for all we know. ... Believers in miracles, in enormous unknown worlds, and in final cataclysms think of nature as she deserves."² Laws apply, he says, but they need not *always* apply. Statements like these two are vexing to the trained philosopher, who is apt to find them too vague to be of interest, or contradictory if given a more precise formulation. Indeed several of the familiar difficulties found by philosophers in their reading of Santayana are well illustrated here. There appears to be vagueness and inattention to detail: surely laws apply or they do not apply; and what meaning can be attached to the two opposing statements when no attempt is made to give a principled demarcation of their range of application? There is moreover little argumentation: not only do the two statements appear to contradict each other, but neither one seems to be justified in the text. Then finally there is a literary flourish not normally found in philosophical works.

I shall pursue this example, and try to respond to some of these charges. Santayana maintains that, at a certain level, differences in sincerely held beliefs must be accepted:

As to contrary principles or preferences that dictate our various views, it

¹ See page 599 of George Santayana, "Apologia Pro Mente Sua," *The Philosophy of George Santayana*. Paul Arthur Schilpp, editor, (The Library of Living Philosophers, Northwestern University, Evanston, 1940). We cite this text as PGS.

² See page 49 of *Physical Order and Moral Liberty*, Previously unpublished essays of George Santayana, Edited by John and Shirley Lachs, (Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1969). We cite this text as POML.

would be chimerical and ill-natured to argue. You cannot refute a principle or rebut a preference, you can only indicate its consequences or present alluringly the charms of a rival doctrine [PGS p. 604].

Unquestionably, Santayana is striving to charm the philosophical reader with his own doctrines. There is nonetheless argumentation tied to the repeated themes, although the arguments need not be found with the statements, and may be quite dispersed. The themes themselves are often tenets of materialism that are set at too fundamental a level for conventional demonstrations of them to be helpful, due to the lack of suitable, more obvious, assumptions.

A thorough reader will quickly realize that Santayana's different themes for variation are chosen because they are crucial for his theory, not because of their potential for ornate imagery. The above theme, for instance, describes for him "the one great natural law, at once the charter of freedom and of necessity" [POML p. 49]. The arguments associated with this theme do not all appear in any one variation, and often those which do appear are merely referred to or mentioned, or are illustrated by an example. It is therefore necessary to gather together, often from quite unexpected texts, the different statements of a theme. Here is a second rather longer variation on the above theme:

I think that the reality of law can be briefly expressed in two maxims: one, that whatsoever happens anywhere, happens there spontaneously, as if it had never occurred before and would never occur again; the other, that whatsoever spontaneously happens once will have spontaneously happened before and will spontaneously happen again, whenever similar elements are in the same relations. The first of these maxims proclaims the contingency, substantiality, originality of fact everywhere The second maxim proclaims the postulate of action and of reason called the uniformity of nature. It is only a postulate, which contingent, substantial, and original facts may at any point disallow; but in so far as they do so, they revert to chaos and render life and art difficult, if not impossible.

"The reign of law" is accordingly only a modern and bombastic equivalent for the ancient naturalness of nature. In so far as law is more rigid than a habit, it is a human artifice of notation.³

Here the focus is on spontaneity; a major part of Santayana's case for spontaneity consists in a historical claim that, because of the empiricist tradition of ignoring substance and substituting ideal objects like laws in its place, we are alienated from the common sense and obvious fact that change is generated locally and spontaneously by the flux of substance. Santayana believed until his death in 1952 that the idealist tradition still held sway, even where it was ostensibly rejected, and that many philosophers continued both to identify things with the ideas which define them, and to think of ideas as controlling things. Physical laws, in

³ See pages 301-302 of *Realms of Being*, One-volume edition, (Scribner's, New York, 1942). We shall cite this text as RB.

particular, are hypostasized by empiricists, and are thought to govern events, instead of being found exemplified in those events. These psychological and historical reasons for restoring spontaneity are not presented here, although they do appear many times elsewhere; the word "bombastic" is their only trace in the above passage.⁴

This notion of the spontaneity of all physical events is important in Santayana's treatment of freedom; those who consider external laws to be a threat to our freedom ought instead to recognize that human action represents a spontaneous movement of a psyche, and that action is no less spontaneous if it is a repetition conforming to law. The regularity described by the law is not a hindrance but is our guarantee that we can exercise our freedom to some effect. Our actions do not happen *because* of the laws, says Santayana, but because of the driving force in the substance underlying the living psyche, and take on a form which may or may not be duplicated elsewhere to give rise to a law. However the empiricist does not recognize substance and the hidden forces traceable to matter; he has little recourse but to assign to the laws or tropes themselves the dynamism of change.

This argument seeks a recognition that the notion of freedom, seen as the power of an individual psyche to carry out the actions it chooses, is a viable one; perceived threats to freedom due to the determinacy of fixed external laws are illusory, and depend on an over-emphasis on global laws, to the exclusion of the internal, local, driving force of substantial change within ourselves, which is always primary. Laws can only catalogue these changes, for the time and to the extent that the changes fall under a common description; however laws have been made into metaphysical idols in the Western tradition.

Insisting as he does upon contingency, Santayana allows for the possibility of lapses in the causal order; no philosophically legitimate arguments can justify our quite natural expectation that events will continue tomorrow the same patterns they followed yesterday. Of course, should such a disruption occur, the change it exemplifies must have a form -- it may be the exemplification of a higher law, so that determinism may apply on a deeper level. The question of determinism is perhaps unanswerable; it is not crucial at the level of rational action anyway, since it is not the possibility of lapses which renders life and spirit possible, but the regularity of nature. Santayana is happy to set aside the difficult question of determinism, as "merely a question of fact" [PGS p. 591], which science can address, although probably never resolve. Taking the

⁴ Santayana loves to cite examples to parody the excessive metaphysical burden attached by empiricists to laws. One of his favourites, no doubt partly due to its source, comes from Bradley: "It is *always* wet on half-holidays because of the Law of Raininess, but *sometimes* it is not wet, because of the Supplementary Law of Sunshine". See page 49 of "Fifty Years of British Idealism," *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy: Five Essays*, (Scribner's, New York, 1933). Of course the theme from Santayana we are discussing has this same contradictory flavour, and will be seen as vacuous in content by just those who demand of a law that it be "more rigid than a habit."

perspective of the scientist, we must always be prepared for the laws we have formulated to be refuted, by what seem to be random events (or for such randomness to be removed by being absorbed into further theory). Nevertheless regularity prevails, at least to the extent that we may take advantage of it from our perspective as rational agents. The vagueness of and apparent contradiction between Santayana's two statements about laws, and the lack of any clear demarcation of their relative scope, is therefore entirely understandable: for no sure demarcation is available to us; human agency and human freedom of agency are real in any case, and to see this, one need only accept the human psyche as a part of the natural order.

About freedom of the will, as against freedom of agency, Santayana finds further confusions. We have seen that, as he understands freedom, it is not dependent upon indeterminacy. On this question, he does not much differ from Spinoza, a strict determinist. Thus Santayana dismisses as a confusion the liberty of indifference, and the versions of freedom which call for indeterminacy as a prerequisite; these he disparagingly calls "vacant" and "dispersed" freedom. The arguments he offers here depend upon distinguishing human agency at the material level of the psyche, from the mental representation we make of ourselves and of what we perceive to be goods at the level of spirit. These latter are at best a partial guide to the actual psyche and to the real goods open to the psyche. Only when the psyche is harmonized by a serious spiritual discipline, so that the capricious spirit becomes resigned to its secondary nature, will real self-knowledge arise. He notes -- something widely accepted -- that the need for indeterminism arose in the Christian tradition, in order to solve the problem of evil. In Santayana's account, this problem arose because Christianity merged together its Hebraic and Platonic sources, the former making God all powerful, and the latter identifying God with the good. In modern times, moreover, he finds this confusion much exacerbated by the psychological turn taken in Western philosophy, with its stress on the immediate, on self-consciousness, and with its denial of a substantial underpinning to our experience.⁵ He follows Spinoza's doctrine that people believe in free will because they are conscious of their desires, but ignorant of the origins of those desires. In modern idealist and post-idealist thought, which elevates experience to absolute status, this illusion becomes more pronounced:

Freedom and indetermination accordingly reign everywhere on the surface of experience, and those whose logic forbids them to peep beneath the surface may rejoice for ever, like the angler, in the expectation of novelty [POML p. 37].

Santayana does not hesitate to reinforce his argument with the image of a fisherman unaware of events stirring beneath the surface. The figure is not haphazard, but is directed toward the philosophical issue at hand.

⁵ A good discussion of these points is found in POML on page 300.

Here is a second metaphor, meant again to support his position that spirit (although not the psyche) is impotent:

The great difficulty, the rooted illusion hardest to extirpate, does not regard fabulous physics but fabulous psychology. It is in ourselves that we are fundamentally deceived. Spirit awakes in us like an infant king born to the purple but helpless; yet soon childish ignorance and royal pride unite to produce in it a sense of absolute power. Painful is the education of young omnipotence, and apt to issue in disaster. The spirit, convinced of its authority, may obstinately defy circumstance and prefer ruin to compromise; or else, in order to maintain the illusion of freedom to do as it will, it may turn into the path of least resistance, adopt fashionable vices and dominant opinions, and profess to lead in whatever direction it is carried [POML p. 184].

Readers have reacted ambivalently to the richness of Santayana's prose. Russell's comments are not untypical. He finds Santayana's books to be "more important than they appear on a cursory reading," because "the extraordinary excellence of the style has a soothing effect." "The delightful aphorisms ... temporarily dispel the reader's seriousness, and make him happy instead of earnest." They are "obstacles to be overcome" [PGS p. 470]. Russell connects the mellow style with Santayana's conservatism, asserting that it depends upon a continuity with the past, and is incompatible with any originality of technique. What is missing in Russell's assessment is a feeling for the tie between Santayana's imagery and the issues being discussed. For those to whom Santayana's philosophical vision is congenial, this imagery is an indispensable aid to a clearer understanding of that vision. Russell himself senses the connection better in cases where he is in sympathy with that vision. Quoting a trenchant summary by Santayana of Kant's ethics, he says: "Most professorial philosophers would develop this sentiment into a volume, but Santayana is content with a polished expression of contemptuous distaste. It may well be doubted whether greater length would have added anything of value" [PGS p. 455].

Santayana in his turn speaks of the concentration of thought he finds in Russell:

Lord Russell's eye is mobile and accurate. It sweeps the universe like an intensely concentrated searchlight, but it sees only a small patch at a time.⁶

Readers of Santayana's works have found a remarkable concentration of thought there too, but one of a quite different nature; his prose style is strong in just the area where he is critical of Russell, in its capacity to touch many themes at the same time, to balance them together so as to permit a reconciliation of their differences. It is not easy to specify just what aspects of his style bring about this effect, but it is surely due in

⁶ See page 127 of "Russell's Searchlight," *The Birth of Reason and Other Essays*, edited by Daniel Cory, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1968).

part to the multitude of subtle references found everywhere to other parts of his overall thought. Only those familiar with the corpus of Santayana's writings are likely to catch many of these references; those unfamiliar will perhaps find no argument at all, or will complain that philosophers should present arguments, rather than always referring to them. Of course, whenever we read a philosopher whose works we know well, we see unexpected links to other parts of those works; yet rarely has a man of letters directed his literary devices so completely to bringing out these links, in the search for unity and philosophical self-consistency.

Turning again to the example, we piece together the argument related to his theme about laws and its bearing upon human freedom. It would not be easy to find all of these points stated forthrightly in one place. Most of them, however, do make an appearance in some form whenever the theme is rehearsed.

- (1) Natural events repeat themselves. There is a regularity of existential change. This tenet of naturalism is an assumption, impossible to prove, but difficult not to believe.
- (2) The laws which trace natural regularities are not necessary. This second claim is derived, at least in part, from the realm of essence. After reflecting on his essences, which he scrupulously detaches from any sort of external relations or causal ties, Santayana was led to the view that contingency prevails at the level of physical events, because of the equal status of the essences of alternative events.
- (3) All life and art are possible only because of the natural uniformities of (1). This is often given as an argument for (1), but perhaps the two together should be taken as a naturalist assumption.
- (4) Changes which arise in the world, whether repetitive or not, arise spontaneously, due to the local action of an underlying substance. We have seen some historical and psychological reasons why we might mistakenly find this implausible; but Santayana takes the posit of a dynamic substance also to be an assumption of naturalism.
- (5) Freedom arises in us by (4), because of the spontaneity of that part of substance which makes up the psyche.
- (6) That lapses or disruptions may occur in the natural order follows from (2). However it is a mistake to look here for a vindication of freedom; indeed by (3) such lapses can be expected to detract from freedom, not enhance it.
- (7) The spirit is impotent; action arises through the psyche, as does spirit itself. This is supported elsewhere by a variety of arguments.
- (8) Our sense that we possess a measure of self-determination is correct, by (5); but we see from (7) the incorrectness of any notion that by taking thought, the spirit has absolute freedom to recreate the psyche. Rather naturalism calls on spirit to come to terms with a psyche already in place.
- (9) Human dignity does not demand the assertion by the spirit of absolute power, like the infant king. Instead, wisdom requires of a subdued spirit an understanding of and a reconciliation with the

real nature and potential of the psyche.

The reasoning throughout falls back upon materialist assumptions, and also offers naturalist accounts of why we are prone to certain misjudgements. Philosophers must revise their thinking, he is saying, to correct a serious bias, due partly to illusions common whenever spirit arises in animal life, but made more acute because of the psychologism which pervades modern Western thought: we tend to question our own powers to act, when we see ourselves as enslaved by universal laws external to us; on the other hand, we are also apt to confuse the material source of these powers with a *persona* created from our thoughts and ideals, which diverges significantly from that source. To counter these illusions, Santayana offers his doctrine of the psyche. Since it is set in material nature, the psyche is a genuine locus for agency. But as with all other existing objects, our knowledge of it is incomplete and symbolic; we must therefore guard against the illusion that the psyche is merely our idea of ourselves, or that our freedom is merely our sense of freedom.

An argument which aims to dispel a widespread illusion can scarcely follow today's popular philosophical model, which asks how people typically speak, or which begins always with the expected or usual reaction of philosophers to some carefully worded sentence. Such a form of argument is an impressionistic one, although it is not usually seen as such; it can only serve to perpetuate illusions, in cases where one's first reactions are governed by those illusions. Indeed it is difficult to find any kind of argument which will change people's views on mind and freedom, for opinion here is set at such a deep level. Here Santayana's recourse is to naturalism. Views about spirit similar to his own will arise, he feels, in those who embrace a deep-seated and fundamental naturalism, just as it arose in him from finding in writers like Lucretius a sense of the naturalness of nature and of mind in nature.

ANGUS KERR-LAWSON

University of Waterloo

The Santayana Edition

This has been a significant year for *The Works of George Santayana*. The first volume, *Persons and Places*, was published in late fall 1986, and from the outset, the volume has won critical acclaim in reviews appearing in *The New York Times*, *The New Republic*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Village Voice*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, *The Boston Globe*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Dallas Times Herald*, and other publications. Rarely do the works of philosophers receive such notice, but it is clearly overdue for George Santayana. Fortunately, the official announcement of the volume coincided with the publication of John McCormick's, *George Santayana: A Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1987), the first complete biography of Santayana.

The appearance of John M. Robson's article in this issue of *Overheard in Seville* represents the finest of critical evaluations and also indicates two areas that I find disappointing in many of the reviews. First, most of the reviewers provide little indication of the autobiography's importance for understanding Santayana's philosophy. The philosophical import of the volume may be a particular bias on my part, but it does seem that the substantive inclusion of material on the development of Santayana's thought as well as the inclusion of all the previously omitted passages on Spinoza, for example, deserve notice, and more than passing notice.

Secondly, the function of a scholarly, critical edition is often misunderstood, although Daniel Aaron and John Robson clearly have an understanding of these issues far beyond the normal fare. Critical editions are attempts to publish works that are as close to what the author wanted as is possible. The apparatus of a critical edition provides evidence for editorial decisions made in the establishment of the text, i.e., evidence for the critical judgments made by the editors when several variant readings of the same text occurs in authoritative sources (manuscripts, first editions, later editions, annotations, etc.). Some reviewers complain of the length of the editorial apparatus in volume one, but, in fact, it is considerably shorter than for most critical editions of its nature. (Robson's page counting unfortunately includes the 79 page index which I assume he would not wish to shorten.) The Council for Scholarly Editions, the Modern Language Association agency that provides the seal "An Approved Edition," allowed the apparatus to be significantly shorter than normal by adjusting their requirements, for example, by permitting us not to include the Alterations List (344 typescript pages). For those who are interested in Santayana's alterations to his manuscript (often important in understanding why Santayana finally settled on using a particular word), the list is now housed in the Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.

There is no question that most scholars are more interested in the substantive than in the textual issues of the volume, but what seems to be

missing on the part of many reviewers is the role of textual issues in substantive matters and in the basic authority of the text. Scholars may not be interested in the textual issues, but they should at least be aware of their significance.

Without any of Robson's ambiguity, I think it is time to celebrate the accomplishment of our first volume. For the first time, Santayana's autobiography is available in a form that is as close to his intentions as the editors could determine. The omitted passages concerning Spinoza, Santayana's family, and the Russells are restored. The 717 marginal headings written by Santayana have been published for the first time, and they not only provide additional substantive information about the life and times of Santayana, but they also lend insight into his ironic wit and his acute sense of persons and places.

The autobiography also provides significant philosophical insight into the development of Santayana's thought. The restoration of the marginal headings alone renders for the first time a three-stage development of Santayana's thought characterized by him in Chapter 11, "The Church of the Immaculate Conception." (See Saatkamp, "Santayana's Autobiography and the Development of his Philosophy," *Overheard in Seville*, 4 (Fall, 1986), 18-27.)

In addition, this one volume presented some of the most complex and difficult problems associated with modern scholarly editing. Santayana's wishes for this work were well-documented in letters, annotations, and publisher's records. However, the social climate of the time did not in fact permit the realization of his wishes; he referred to the first volume published by Scribner's as "a mutilated victim of war." (Santayana to Cory, March 14, 1945.)¹

Such difficulties poignantly demonstrate the conflicts and compromises of a writer within the social context of publishing, and they clarify the cornerstone questions of editing that concern the theoretical warrant for critical editions. Is there a basic text that will serve as the principal document for the edition? What is the justification for that text? Can one determine the author's intentions concerning the form and content of the publication, and, if these intentions differ from the actual publication, can one argue that the author's wishes take precedence over the published data? Is it enough to say that the author's intentions can be described as his or her mature and considered judgments regarding the form and content of the publication? Is it enough that an author's intentions can often be documented or clearly demonstrated? Are there not times when a variant reading, perhaps one the author has been indifferent towards, could best be decided by a scholar knowledgeable about the life, thought, and times of the author?

With the publication of Jerome McGann's *A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983),

¹ Unpublished letter to Daniel Cory. Santayana's letters to Daniel Cory are in Butler Library, Columbia University.

many scholarly editors have been compelled to examine the issues of authorial final intentions and the social context of publishing. Santayana's autobiography is an archetype of a work by a single author being published in a form quite different from his stated and documented intentions. In such an instance, it appears clear that Santayana's considered judgments regarding the nature of his published works should take precedence over the happenstance of the social context. However, such clarity is not available when one ponders the editorial decisions associated with performance-oriented publications such as operas, plays, and ballads. Here the social context may have a priority that is not apparent in books written by a single author.

These issues were the focal points of an invited address given by the General Editor to the Society for Textual Scholarship in March 1987. In the address, "Final Intentions, Social Context, and Santayana's Autobiography," I argued that Santayana's autobiography presents something of a paradigm for editing, but that the value of the paradigm rests with its usefulness and interpretative value with paradigmatic works as well as non-paradigmatic ones.

The delight of having published the first volume is slightly dampened by several errors that occurred in the volume. The General and Textual Editors believed that they had seen the final page proofs for the volume when the General Editor gave the final approval to publish the work. This was not entirely true. There were at least three pages that were later altered by a copy-editor who, with good intentions, generated several textual errors. Each of these has been listed on an errata list that should accompany the volume. For example, some of the identifications of Santayana's friends, Illustrations 22-29, were incorrectly switched without the General and Textual Editors' knowledge. In addition, a copy-editor attempting to eliminate too many hyphenated words in the marginal headings, altered the headings on page 97 line 30 and on page 312 line 39 forcing, unknowingly, the typesetting machine to eliminate text at the bottom of the page.

The Editors at MIT Press are considerably disturbed about these errors in the text, and they have taken three steps in response to them. First, they are inserting an errata list with each volume. Second, they are correcting the errors in the paperback trade edition that is likely to be published within the next year. Third, they have assured the General Editor that such well-intended errors will not occur again, i.e., the General Editor will see all the final page proofs before the book is bound. These are significant considerations as we now prepare for the publication of Volumes Two and Three.

Volume Two, *The Sense of Beauty*, is scheduled for publication in the fall of 1988. The galleys of the text have been received and proofed, and the editors are now preparing the critical apparatus for typesetting. An inspector will soon be appointed to examine the editorial procedures and practices associated with this volume. As with the first volume, we hope this inspection results in our receiving the seal of An Approved Edition

presented by the Committee on Scholarly Editions of the Modern Language Association.

Volume Three, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, is also scheduled for publication in the fall of 1988. All in all, we appear to be progressing nicely and to have steadily and carefully upgraded our production timetable without losing sight of the care and attention to detail that must be a part of each critical edition of Santayana's works.

In connection with the promotion of Santayana scholarship, see the announcement on the opposing page of an international conference, "Frontiers in American Philosophy," to be hosted on June 1-4, 1988, at Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4237.

HERMAN J. SAATKAMP, JR.

Texas A&M University

THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY

wishes to announce an international conference

Frontiers in American Philosophy

to be held June 1-4, 1988, in College Station, Texas.

The purpose of this conference is to invigorate, promote, and revitalize the study of Classical American Philosophy by:

- (1) Identifying and encouraging new areas of study related to American philosophy of the classical period;
- (2) Promoting original, creative further developments of themes and problematics native to classical American thought;
- (3) Bridging gaps between the study of classical American philosophy and philosophizing within other major philosophical traditions and styles, e.g., phenomenology, existentialism, analytic philosophy;
- (4) Encouraging undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy to pursue the study and development of the classical American period;
- (5) Stimulating interest in classical American philosophy among philosophers whose current specializations may be in other areas;
- (6) Creating a publishing outlet for papers exploring the frontiers of American philosophy.

This conference will include speakers of major national and international reputation: both specialists in American philosophy and philosophers whose interests merge with actual themes and potential developments of classical American thought. Philosophers who have been engaged to participate in plenary sessions include **Karl-Otto Apel** (Göttingen), **Arthur Danto** (Columbia), **Gérard Deledalle** (Perpignan), **Thelma Lavine** (George Mason), **John Lachs** (Vanderbilt), **John McDermott** (Texas A&M), **Hilary Putnam** (Harvard), **Nicholas Rescher** (Pittsburgh), **Herman Saatkamp** (Texas A&M), and **Ralph Sleeper** (Queens College).

The conference will incorporate both **an undergraduate and a graduate essay competition**. The winning graduate student will receive an award of \$1,000, and the winning undergraduate student will receive an award of \$500. Each will have the opportunity to read his or her prize essay at the conference.

For more information contact:

Robert Burch or Herman Saatkamp, Department of Philosophy,
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843. TEL. (409) 845-5660.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The Society's annual meeting will be held in conjunction with the December meetings of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) in New York, New York.

SANTAYANA SOCIETY

1 9 8 7
ANNUAL MEETING

Speaker: ***John Lachs***
Vanderbilt University

The Enduring Value of Santayana's Philosophy

7:30 p.m. 28 December
Regency Foyer
Sheraton Center Hotel

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CHECKLIST

FOURTH UPDATE

The items below will supplement the references given in *George Santayana: A Bibliographical Checklist, 1880-1980* (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982) prepared by Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. and John Jones. These references are divided into primary and secondary sources. Except for the manuscript collections in libraries and the book reviews, the following articles and books are classified according to their year of publication. Readers with further information or corrections are invited to send these to Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., Santayana Edition, Goodwin Hall, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843-1588.

A special note of thanks is extended to George M. Barringer, Special Collections Librarian, and to Nicholas B. Scheetz, Manuscripts Librarian, at Georgetown University, for the list of their Santayana Collection. (Written permission for photocopies or publication of any Santayana materials must be obtained from Santayana's literary executrix. Contact Mr. Scheetz for information.)

PRIMARY SOURCES IN LIBRARY COLLECTIONS

**George Santayana Holdings
from the Mark Lauinger Library
of Georgetown University
Box 37445, 20013
Washington, D.C. 20013**

I. Santayana's own copies of his published works¹

Character and Opinion in the United States. London: Constable, 1920. A few marginal comments, numerous excisions of text.

The Life of Reason: Introduction and Reason in Common Sense. London: Constable, 1914. Marginal comments and notes at end, numerous excisions of text.

The Life of Reason: Reason in Art. London: Constable, 1914. Marginal comments, numerous excisions of text.

¹ These volumes were apparently used in the preparation of the volume *Little Essays Drawn from the Writings of George Santayana* (1920), selected by Logan Pearsall Smith but with the text constructed by Santayana. Cf. the manuscript at the head of section II.

The Life of Reason: Reason in Religion. London: Constable, 1914. Marginal and interlinear comments, a few excisions of text.

The Life of Reason: Reason in Science. London: Constable, 1906. Marginal comments and notes at end, numerous excisions of text.

_____. New York: Scribner's, 1906. Autograph signature and date (1907), a few marginal comments.

The Sense of Beauty. London: Black, 1896. Marginal comments, numerous excisions of text.

Winds of Doctrine. London: Dent; New York: Scribner's, [1913]. A few marginal comments, notes at back, a few excisions of texts; with the signature of Logan Pearsall Smith and date (1913) at front, and with notes in Smith's hand at back.

II. Santayana manuscripts

[*Little Essays Drawn from the Writings of George Santayana*] [before 1920] Five folders containing Santayana's essays as selected by Logan Pearsall Smith, the text composed of snippets cut from various of Santayana's previously published works with very ample added amendments and transitions in Santayana's autograph; with a few notes in Smith's hand as well; the text extending in all to some 571 pp.

[*Philosophy lecture notes*] 1907-12. Two seemingly inter-related series of autograph notes for courses Philosophy 10, Philosophy 12, and "Phil. B" as offered at Harvard University (Plato and German philosophy, for the most part), the texts undergoing a cumulative "improvement" over time; the text extending in all to some 234 pp., including those whose only content is professorial doodles.

"*Fallacies in Heymans*" 1905 (Sept.) 3 pp., 12mo, identified and dated by Charles Augustus Strong.

III. Notes in Santayana's hand removed from books

[] 2 pp., 4to, review of Kant's philosophy, from : Scheler, *Die Transzendente und die psychologische Methode*, Leipzig, 1900.

[] 3 pp., 8vo, notes on Plato, from: Plato, *Parmenides*. *Griechisch und Deutsch*, Leipzig, 1854.

[] 4 pp., 8vo, notes on Plato, from: Plato, *Dialogi*, Leipzig, 1887, vol. 1.

[] 3 pp., 4to, notes on Dewey, from: Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, Chicago, 1925. The final page is written on the back of a letter to Santayana from Thomas E. Woodbridge, 20 Feb. 1925, soliciting a review by Santayana for *The Journal of Philosophy* of the Dewey title cited above.

[] 4 pp., 12mo, notes on the book arranged by page number, from : Johnson, *Some Winchester Letters*, 1919.

[] 4 pp., 8vo, notes on Reid, from Reid: *Essays*, 1864.

[] 1 p., narrow 12mo, printed class list for Philosophy 15, with notes on attendance.

IV. Correspondence: Letters received

Bridges, Robert. ALS, 10 June [1918?], 1 p., 12 mo, notifying Santayana that Bridges has sent on his "address." Found in Bridges, *The Necessity of Poetry*, Oxford, 1918.

Constable and Co. TLS, 2 Jan. 1919, 1 p., 4to, transmitting draft of agreement for the publication of Santayana's *Character and Opinion in the United States*. Found in Semon, *Die Mneme*, 1911.

Strong, Charles Augustus. APCS, 7 June 1912, asking for Santayana to send a copy of Spinoza and mentioning some business with Rome.

____. APCS, 7 June 1912, asking Santayana to receive one Perry.

____. APCS, 16 June 1912, mentioning the adamancy of the Mother General in the Roman business and his desire to meet with Berenson, staying at the Ritz.

____. APCS, 24 June 1912, mentioning his satisfaction with plans for the new (smaller) house. This and the three preceding items were found together in Denifle, *Luther et le lutheranisme*, 1911.

Woodbridge, Thomas E. See in III, above.

V. Correspondence: Letters sent by Santayana

The following 5 items are all addressed to Charles Augustus Strong:

ALS, 21 Aug. 1893, 3 pp., 12mo, commenting on his being delayed in Avila by the death of his father.

ALS, 28 May 1906, 1 p., 12mo, regarding his departure from Paris and errata Strong has discovered (in one of Santayana's publications?).

APCS, [date not certain, 1906], regarding his health and referring to the shabbiness of Avignon, whence the card is sent.

ALS, [late March or early April, no year] 3 pp., 12mo, regarding arrangements for a visit to Strong and his reading more Fichte and Hegel.

ASN, [nd], on the back of a calling card, mentioning his availability for a visit and conveying his sympathy.

VI. Books from Santayana's Library

Georgetown Library is in the process of cataloguing approximately 125 volumes, frequently annotated (sometimes at great length) in Santayana's hand. When the cataloguing is completed, a descriptive list of the holdings will be given in the *Bulletin of the Santayana Society*.

**George Santayana Holdings
from the Dartmouth College Library
Hanover, NH 03755**

Holograph ms. of the preface to the Triton edition of *The Last Puritan*, 20 pp. and letters, primarily to Sadakichi Hartmann and Sterling Lamprecht, pertaining to literature.

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF PRIMARY SOURCES**1908**

Holograph note, 7 pp., written on the fly-leaf through page i of *Lucifer: A Theological Tragedy* (Chicago and New York: Herbert S. Stone and Co., 1899), which describes his purpose in writing the work. Personal library, Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr.

1981

"Carnival" (1921). *The Dial: Arts and Letters in the 1920s, An Anthology of Writings from The Dial Magazine, 1920-1929*. Ed. Gaye L. Brown. Worcester, Mass.: Worcester Art Museum, 1981, 92-95.

1985

Los Reinos del Ser (Realms of Being). Trans. Francisco González Aramburo. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1985. (Rpt. of the first Spanish edition, 1959.)

"Un Matrimonio." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 3 (Fall, 1985): 39-41.

1986

Persons and Places: Fragments of Autobiography. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 1 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 1986, xl, 761.

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF SECONDARY SOURCES

1966

Singer, Irving. "Idealization in Freud and Santayana." *The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther*. New York: Random House, 1966, 24-39. (Rev., 2nd ed., vol. 1, Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1984, 23-38.)

1969

Youman, A. Eliot. "Santayana's Attachments." *New England Quarterly* 42.3 (1969): 373-387.

1973

Cotan, J. D. "La esencia en la Filosofia de Jorge Santayana." Diss. University of Madrid, 1973.

Marx, Leo. "'Noble Shit': The Uncivil Response of American Writers to Civil Religion in America." *Massachusetts Review* 14.4 (1973): 709-739.

1976

Hedrick, Joan D. "Harvard Indifference." *New England Quarterly* 49.3 (1976): 356-372.

Rorty, Richard. "Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture." *Georgia Review* 30.4 (1976): 757-769.

Sabater Rillo, José Miguel. "Conocimiento y verdad en la Filosofia de Santayana." Diss. University of Barcelona, 1976.²

1978

McDermott, John J. "The Renaissance of Classical American Philosophy." *American Studies International* 16.3 (1978): 5-17.

Monsanto, Carlos H. and Harold Durham. "George Santayana: A Spanish Glory in American Philosophy and Letters." *A Hispanic Look at the Bicentennial*. Ed. David Cardus. Houston, Texas: Institute of Hispanic Culture of Houston, 1978, 81-89.

² Update of an entry first given in *Bulletin* No. 3.

1979

Marotta, Gary. "Pragmatism, Patriotism, and Imperialism: The Issues Between William James and George Santayana." *Markham Review* 9.8 (1979): 41-44.

Samuels, Ernest. *Bernard Berenson: The Making of a Connoisseur*. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979, xviii, 477.

1980

Alexander, Charles C. *Here the Country Lies: Nationalism and the Arts in Twentieth-Century America*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, xiv, 336.

Joralemon, Dorothy Rieber. "Too Many Philosophers." *American Heritage* 31.6 (1980): 16-19.

Mink, Louis O. "The Golden Age of the Golden Department." *History of Education Quarterly* 20.2 (1980): 189-195.

1981

King, Alison. "Aesthetic Response: An Overview of Selected Theories and the Postulation of a Model." EDRS Report. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Counseling and Personnel Services, School of Education, University of Michigan, 1981. ERIC ED 228 567.

Kinsley, Michael. "Walter Lippmann and the American Sycophancy." *Washington Monthly* 13.1 (1981): 42-46.

Lukanov, D. M. "Dzhordzh Santaiana I Ekzistentsializm" ("George Santayana and Existentialism"). *Voprosy Filosofii* 7 (1981): 133-143.

Ruddick, Lisa. "Fluid Symbols in American Modernism: William James, Gertrude Stein, George Santayana, and Wallace Stevens." *Allegory, Myth, and Symbol*. Ed. Morton W. Bloomfield. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, 335-353.

Savater, Fernando. "Prólogo." *El Ultimo Puritano*. Vol. 1. Barcelona: Edhasa, 1981, 7-12.³

1982

Bachinger, Katrina E. "Years of Ferment: American Literary Criticism Enters the Twentieth Century." *American Studies International* 20.4 (1982): 31-45.

³ Update of an entry first given in *Bulletin* No. 3.

- Nagy, Paul J. "George Santayana and the American National Character." *Atlantis* 4.1-2 (1982): 81-91.
- Ruddick, Lisa Cole. "Models of Consciousness in the Works of William James, Gertrude Stein, and George Santayana." Diss. Harvard University, 1982, 194.
- Ruddick, Lisa Cole. "Models of Consciousness in the Works of William James, Gertrude Stein, and George Santayana." *DAI* 43.5 (1982): 1547A. Harvard University.
- Woodward, A. "Romanticism, Faust, and George Santayana." *English Studies in Africa* 25.1 (1982): 1-9.

1983

- Friedrich, O. "Anti-Meetings: Max Beerbohm, George Santayana, Lotta Lenya, and Albert Schweitzer." *American Scholar* 52.4 (1983): 519-524.
- Kerr-Lawson, Angus. "Santayana's Anti-Empiricism and its Contemporary Relevance." *Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society* 19 (Fall, 1983): 361-380.
- Miguel Sabater, José. "Materialismo e Idealismo en la Filosofía de Santayana." *Filosofía, Sociedad e Incomunicación*. Ed. Eduardo Bello. Murcia: University of Murcia, 1983, 347-361.
- Perricone, Christopher. "George Santayana's View of the Place of Art in a Cultural World." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 21 (Winter, 1983): 547-564.
- Weinstein, Michael A. "Twentieth Century Realism and Autonomy of Human Sciences: Case of George Santayana." *Foundations of Morality*. Ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. Boston: Reidell, 1983, 119-130.

1984

- Campbell, J. "Politics and Conceptual Reconstruction." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 17.3 (1984): 156-170.
- Filreis, Alan. "Wallace Stevens and the Crisis of Authority." *American Literature* 56.4 (1984): 560-578.
- Fischer, J. "Wallace Stevens and the Idea of a Central Poetry." *Criticism* 26.3 (1984): 259-272.
- Green, S. "Elements of Transcendence in Dewey Naturalistic Humanism." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 52.2 (1984): 263-288.
- Kerr-Lawson, Angus. "Spirit's Primary Nature is to be Secondary." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 2 (Fall, 1984): 9-14.

- Lachs, John. "First Toast." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 2 (Fall, 1984): 26-27.
- Lachs, John. "George Santayana." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 2 (Fall, 1984): 15-22.
- Levi, Albert W. "Nature and Art." *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 18 (Fall, 1984): 5-22.
- McDermott, John J. "Classical American Philosophy: A Reflective Bequest to the 21st-Century." *Journal of Philosophy* 81.11 (1984): 663-675.
- Putnam, Hilary. "Greetings." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 2 (Fall, 1984): 24-26.
- Ruja, Harry. "Russell on the Meaning of 'Good'." *Russell* 4 (Summer, 1984): 137-156.
- Savater, Fernando. "Concepto y estetica en George Santayana." *Travesia* 3 (1984): 4-11.
- Sedgwick, Ellery, III. "The American Genteel Tradition in the Early Twentieth Century." *American Studies* 25.1 (1984): 49-67.
- Shea, William M. "George Santayana: Religion as the Poetry of Moral Consciousness." *The Naturalists and the Supernatural: Studies in Horizon and an American Philosophy of Religion*. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1984, 91-115.
- Singer, Irving. "Second Toast." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 2 (Fall, 1984): 27-28.
- Sparshott, Francis. "Birthday Poem." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 2 (Fall, 1984): 29.
- Sprigge, Timothy. "Santayana and Panpsychism." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 2 (Fall, 1984): 1-8.
- Springsted, E. D. "Is There a Problem with the Problem of Evil." *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24.3 (1984): 303-312.

1985

- Armstrong, T. D. "An Old Philosopher in Rome: George Santayana and His Visitors." *Journal of American Studies* 19.3 (1985): 349-368.
- Beltrán, José. "La Teoría del Conocimiento de George Santayana." Tercer Congrés de Filosofia al País Valencià, Societat de Filosofia del País Valencià. Spain. 2 April 1985.

- Filreis, Alan. "Wallace Stevens and the Strength of the Harvard Reaction." *New England Quarterly* 58.1 (1985): 27-45.
- García Martín, Pedro. "Jorge Santayana y sus vinculos humanos en Avila. Breve recopilación epistolar." *Azafea* 1 (1985): 357-368.
- Helm, Bertrand P. *Time and Reality in American Philosophy*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985, 250.
- Kerr-Lawson, Angus. "Essentialism and Santayana's Realm of Essence." *Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society* 21 (Spring, 1985): 200-221.
- Kuntz, Paul G. "Categories and Orders of Santayana's Neo-Platonism." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 3 (Fall, 1985): 9-21.
- Lyon, Richard C. "An Introduction to Santayana's *Persons and Places*." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 3 (Fall, 1985): 1-8.
- Saatkamp, Herman J., Jr. "Hermes the Interpreter." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 3 (Fall, 1985): 22-28.
- Savater, Fernando. "Concepto y Estética en George Santayana." *Instrucciones para olvidar il Quijote y otros ensayos*. Barcelona: Taurus. 1985, 41-52.
- . "Santayana huésped del mundo." *Instrucciones para olvidar il Quijote y otros ensayos*. Barcelona: Taurus. 1985, 53-66.
- Singer, Beth J. "Naturalism and Generality in Buchler and Santayana." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 3 (Fall, 1985): 29-37.
- Spiegelman, W. "Some Lucretian Elements in Wordsworth." *Comparative Literature* 37.1 (1985): 27-49.
- Wapinsky, David. "Bibliographical Checklist, Third Update." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 3 (Fall, 1985): 42-64.
- Waters, Gregory. "A Basis for Criticism: The Literary Essays of Conrad Aiken." *Midwest Quarterly* 26.4 (1985): 425-445.
- Weinstein, Michael A. *Finite Perfection: Reflections on Virtue*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985, 168.

1986

- Beltrán Llavador, José y Fernando. "Del primer al último puritano: claves conceptuales en la obra de Santayana." *Quart. Congrès de Filosofia al País Valencià, Societat de Filosofia del País Valencià*. Spain, 24 March 1986.
- Fisch, Max H. "Reminiscences." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 4 (Fall, 1986): 35.

Holzberger, William G. "George Santayana." *Dictionary of Literary Biography, American Poets, 1880-1945*. Ed. Peter Quartermain. 3rd ser., vol. 54, pt. 2. Detroit, Mich.: Gale Research Co., 1986, 407-419.

Kerr-Lawson, Angus. "Santayana's Epiphenomenalism." *Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society* 22 (Autumn, 1986): 417-433.

Kerr-Lawson, Angus. "Six Aspects of Santayana's Philosophy." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 4 (Fall, 1986): 28-33.

Levinson, Henry Samuel. "Santayana and the Possibility of Secular Spirituality." *National Humanities Center* 8.2 (Winter, 1986-87): 1-5.

Lyon, Richard C. "Santayana: Some Recollections and Asides." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 4 (Fall, 1986): 7-17.

McDermott, John J. *Streams of Experience: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of American Culture*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986, xxi, 266.

Saatkamp, Herman J., Jr. "Santayana's Autobiography and the Development of his Philosophy." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 4 (Fall, 1986): 18-27.

Sprigge, T. L. S. "George Santayana." Supp. of *Philosophy* 19 (1986): 115-133.

Wallace, Kathleen. "Substance, Ground and Totality in Santayana's Philosophy." *Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society* 22 (1986): 289-309.

Wellek, René. *A History of Modern Criticism, 1750-1950: The First Half of the Twentieth Century, English and American*. Modern Criticism Series 6. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.

Whittemore, Robert C. "Santayana's Neglect of Hartshorne's Alternative." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 4 (Fall, 1986): 1-6.

1987

Epstein, Joseph. "Santayana and the Consolations of Philosophy." *The New Criterion* June 1987, 15-27.

McCormick, John. *George Santayana: A Biography*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987, xv, 612.

REVIEWS OF SANTAYANA'S BOOKS

The Complete Poems of George Santayana, Ed. W. Holzberger.

Library Journal July 1979: 1463(2).

World Literature Today 54.4 1980: 638. (P. Ilie)

The Last Puritan

Book-of-the-Month Club News Jan. (nd). (Christopher Morley)

Columbia Review 17 Commencement, 1936: 49-51.

Persons and Places: Fragments of Autobiography, Ed. W. Holzberger and H. J. Saatkamp, Jr.

"Santayana: The Outsider by Choice." *Boston Globe* 22 Feb. 1987: B106, B108. (Mark Feeney)

Choice May 1987: 1413-1414. (Howard N. Tuttle)

"The Essence of George Santayana." *The Christian Science Monitor* 11 Feb. 1987: 23. (Thomas D'Evelyn)

"The Browser." *Harvard Magazine* March/April 1987: 58. (Richard Marius)

Library Journal Aug. 1986: 141. (Richard Kuczkowski)

"Pilgrim's Progress." *The New Republic* 18 May 1987: 28-33. (Daniel Aaron)

"A Philosophical Farewell." *New York Times Book Review* 17 May 1987: 59.

"Asceticism and Animal Faith." *New York Times Book Review* 26 April 1987: 27-28. (Bruce Kuklick)

"Say Goodnight, George." *Voice Literary Supplement* May 1987: 1-4. (Carlin Romano)

"The Jamesian Philosopher." *The Wall Street Journal* 7 April 1987: 34. (Edmund Fuller)

"The Melancholy Philosopher." *Washington Post Book Week* 8 Feb. 1987: pages 3, 8. (Kenneth S. Lynn)

The Works of George Santayana, Ed. W. Holzberger and H. J. Saatkamp, Jr.

"The Santayana Edition." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 2 Fall, 1984: 33-34; 3 Fall, 1985: 65; and 4 Fall, 1986: 36-37. (Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr.)

REVIEWS OF BOOKS ABOUT SANTAYANA

Cory, Daniel. *Santayana: The Later Years*

The New York Review of Books 26 Sept. 1963: 15. (Irving Singer)

Hughson, Lois. *Thresholds of Reality: George Santayana and Modernist Poetics*

Journal of American Studies 11.3 1977: 428-430. (Ian F. A. Bell)

Lowell, Robert. *Life Studies*

Literary Review 23.3 1980: 293-325. (B. Raffel)

McCormick, John. *George Santayana: A Biography*

"Santayana: The Outsider by Choice." *Boston Globe* 22 Feb. 1987: B106, B108.
(Mark Feeney)

"The Essence of George Santayana." *The Christian Science Monitor* 11 Feb. 1987:
23. (Thomas D'Evelyn)

Library Journal March 1987: 71.

"Pilgrim's Progress." *The New Republic* 18 May 1987: 28-33. (Daniel Aaron)

"Books of the Times." *The New York Times* 26 Feb. 1987: C24. (Christopher
Lehmann-Haupt)

"Asceticism and Animal Faith." *New York Times Book Review* 26 April 1987:
27-28. (Bruce Kuklick)

"Remembering the Past of a Philosopher." *The Philadelphia Inquirer* 17 May
1987: 7. (William G. Holzberger)

Publishers Weekly 26 Dec. 1986: 51(1). (Genevieve Stuttaford)

"Say Goodnight, George." *Voice Literary Supplement* May 1987: 1-4. (Carlin
Romano)

"The Jamesian Philosopher." *The Wall Street Journal* 7 April 1987: 34. (Edmund
Fuller)

"The Life of Santayana." *The Whig Standard Magazine* 16 May 1987: 26. (C. G.
Prado)