


OVERHEARD IN SEVILLE

BULLETIN
OF THE
SANTAYANA
SOCIETY




NUMBER 39
2021

Cover design by Jonathan Wotka. The original cover of *Overheard in Seville*, used in its first thirty-seven issues, showed an enlargement of the figure taken from the emblem on the cover the Triton Edition of Santayana's works. The Triton Edition was named after the Triton Fountain (Fontana del Tritone) by Bernini, which is in the piazza outside the Bristol Hotel, Santayana's residence for many years in Rome. The current design restores the emblem to its approximate original size in relation to the cover, embedding it in a yellow background that recalls the gold of the emblem on Constable version of the Triton Edition. The dark blue color, the color that Santayana preferred, also comes close to the blue background of Constable version.



BULLETIN OF THE GEORGE SANTAYANA SOCIETY

No. 39, 2021



(For electronic distribution—page numbers link to articles)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Announcement of 2022 Annual Meeting Online, *page 3*
- Editor's Notes, *page 4*
- *Life of Reason* Online Reading Group, *page 5*
- Bibliographical Checklist Thirty-Seventh Update, *page 193*
- Some Abbreviations for Santayana's Works, *page 196*
- Critical Editions of Santayana's Works, *page 197*
- *Overheard in Seville* Submission Guidelines, *page 199*
- Announcement of the Angus Kerr-Lawson Prize, *page 203*
- Contributors, *page 204*
- *Overheard in Seville* Publication Information, *page 205*

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

	<i>Santayana 75, 100, and 125 Years Ago</i>	
Glenn Tiller	<i>1896 The Sense of Beauty and Studies in England</i>	7
Charles Padrón	<i>1921 Madrid, Ávila, Paris, Rome ("All Roads Lead There")</i>	15
Richard M Rubin	<i>1946 Part I: Parcels, Family, Visitors, Health, Politics</i>	18

ARTICLES

Charles Padrón	<i>Some Reflections on Santayana's Dominations and Powers</i>	33
Forrest Adam Sopuck	<i>Santayana On Colour: Collisions with Contemporary Thought</i>	40
Nayeli L Riano	<i>An Aesthetic Arbiter of Politics: Revisiting George Santayana's Concept of the Psyche</i>	71
Jessica Wahman	<i>Santayana, Literary Psychologist: A Response to Nayeli Riano</i>	89
Eric Sapp	<i>Reading "The Secret of Aristotle" Part I: Imagined Geographies in Santayana and Ibn Sina</i>	98
Lydia Amir	<i>The Democritean Tradition in Santayana, Nietzsche, and Montaigne Part II</i>	116
Jerry Griswold	<i>George Santayana and Wallace Stevens: "The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain"</i>	141
Richard M Rubin and Phillip L Beard	<i>The Other Side of the Mountain: Wallace Stevens's Poem and "The Watershed of Criticism"</i>	150

REVIEWS

Larry A Hickman	A Life of Scholarship with Santayana by <i>Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr</i>	161
Martin Coleman	Bertrand's Brother by <i>Ruth Derham</i>	173
Alba Stefanelli	The Sense of Beauty in <i>Giuseppe</i> <i>Patella's Italian translation</i>	184

IN MEMORIAM

Herman J Saatkamp, Jr.	<i>Kristine Frost</i>	188
	<i>Henny Wenkart</i>	191

Overheard in Seville is edited, published, and distributed annually by the George Santayana Society and is archived by the Santayana Edition at Indiana University—Purdue University, Indianapolis. Archived issues are available at <https://santayana.iupui.edu/santayana-society/bulletin/>.

The George Santayana Society

2022

ANNUAL MEETING

The annual meeting of the Society—an online session hosted
by IUPUI in Indianapolis.

Chair

Hector Galván

Texas A & M University—Corpus Christ

Speaker

Richard Marc Rubin

George Santayana Society

Santayana's Missing Letter to Dewey

Chair

Richard Marc Rubin

Speaker

Herman J Saatkamp, Jr

George Santayana Society, Founder

The Future of Santayana Scholarship

13:00-15:00 US EST, Sunday, 30 January 2022

Editor's Notes

The George Santayana Society has been especially active during 2021, the second pandemic year. Two online discussion groups that began in the fall of 2020 continued throughout 2021. Each hosted 10–15 active participants twice monthly. The group that read poems by Wallace Stevens in tandem with *Scepticism and Animal Faith* finished in November. The group reading *The Life of Reason* continues in 2022 with *Reason in Art* and *Reason in Science* (see the schedule on the next page). In January 2021, the Society held its annual meeting independently of the APA's Eastern Division meeting for the first time. The meeting included Nayeli Riano's Angus Kerr-Lawson Prize-winning paper (see below), Jessica Wahman's response, and David Dilworth's remarks on the Epicurean roots of Santayana's philosophy. In September, The Society held a joint session with the Bertrand Russell Society, in which Ruth Derham, the author of *Bertrand's Brother*, a biography of Santayana's friend Frank Russell, presented a [discussion of her subject's reputation](#). Tim Madigan of the Russell Society and Martin Coleman were commentators.

This thirty-ninth annual issue of *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the George Santayana Society* is our largest yet. The *Bulletin* strives to be a journal where both new scholars publish and senior scholars pursue further inquiries into Santayana's life and work. Four writers make their *Overheard in Seville* debut in this issue.

In 2021, Santayana scholarship lost two great contributors: Kristine Frost and Henny Wenkart. Herman J Saatkamp, Jr, one of the founders of *Overheard in Seville*, eulogizes both in this issue.

Since I became Editor in 2017, our editorial board members have reviewed and proofread articles. Because we enforce blind reviewing, their work is mostly anonymous. This issue, even more than its predecessors, has relied on their conscientious labor, and I thank them greatly for their diligence. Thanks also go to the authors for their painstaking efforts in producing their contributions and for their patience and persistence throughout the revision process, which in some cases involved several revisions. Above all, I thank the Associate Editor, Hector Galván, whose tireless work has made this issue possible.

In this issue, Lydia Amir continues her series on the Democritean tradition with an analysis of Nietzsche and Montaigne. Editorial Board member Charles Padron writes on *Dominations and Powers*. Nayeli Riano's revised annual meeting presentation, "The Psyche as the Aesthetic Arbiter of Politics," appears with Editorial Board member Jessica Wahman's commentary. The literary critic and emeritus professor Jerry Griswold, who moderated the Santayana-Stevens online group, presents his imaginative idea that Stevens last book of poems *The Rock* was inspired by *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. With Griswold's consent, Phillip Beard and I present an alternative view. Eric Sapp, who proposed the online *Life of Reason* group, examines the characters in Santayana's dialogue "The Secret of Aristotle." This issue marks the first appearance in the *Bulletin* of Griswold and Sapp, along with Adam Sopuck and Alba Stefanelli (see below). Sopuck writes about Santayana and color theory while engaging in a finely tuned exploration of complex essences. Our series of biographical sketches on Santayana 75, 100, and 125 years ago continues with accounts of 1896, 1921 and 1946. This year, former Society president Glenn Tiller pitches in with the story of Santayana in 1896. Martin Coleman, Larry Hickman, and Alba Stefanelli all review books: Coleman reviews Ruth Derham's

Bertrand's Brother. Larry Hickman, the longtime director of the Dewey Center at SIU-Carbondale, reviews *Life of Scholarship with Santayana* by Herman J Saatkamp, Jr, the founder not only of this *Bulletin*, but also of the Santayana Edition. Stefanelli's report of Giuseppe Patella's recent Italian translation of *The Sense of Beauty* nicely complements Tiller's account of 1896, the year Santayana's book was published.

RICHARD MARC RUBIN

Editor and President, George Santayana Society

Online Reading Group on *The Life of Reason*

Begun in the fall of 2020, the *Life of Reason* reading group (LR Group) continues in 2022 with sessions on the last two books of the five-book *The Life of Reason*: *Reason in Art* (LR4) and *Reason in Science* (LR5). The group meets monthly in two sessions: Friday at 11 am US Eastern Time and Sunday at 1 pm US Eastern Time.

Schedule for the LR Group, 2022

Friday 11:00 ET	Month	Sunday 13:00 ET	Chapters
21	January	23	LR4 Ch I-II
18	February	20	LR4 Ch III-IV
18	March	20	LR4 Ch V-VI
29	April/May	1	LR4 Ch VII-VIII
20	May	22	LR4 Ch IX-X
24	June	26	LR4 Ch X-X
15	July	17	LR5 Ch I-II
19	August	21	LR5 Ch III-IV
16	September	18	LR5 Ch V-VI
21	October	23	LR5 Ch VII-VIII
18	November	20	LR5 Ch IX-X
16	December	18	LR5 Ch XI

Announcements about the meetings are sent out approximately one week before with the connection information. These often go to the general George Santayana Society email list (santayanasociety-l@list.iupui.edu) and always go to the email list set up specially for the LR Group (santayana_read_grp-l@list.iupui.edu). This latter email list is not moderated and is open only to those on the list. From time to time it has been the place for lively discussions between meetings. If you would like to join this list, write to info@georgesantayanasociety.org.

Each LR Group session (or pair of sessions) is introduced by a different group participant who typically prepares a set of questions or selected quotations to start the discussion. The Friday and Sunday sessions are separate. There is no presumed continuity from the Friday to the Sunday session.

Report on the Santayana Edition

The Santayana Edition is a center for Santayana scholarship that has been producing critical editions of Santayana's works for more than forty years.

The year of 2022 looks good for the Santayana Edition. We recently:

- Received a one-year grant to fund Faedra Weiss as a full-time editor through October 2022
- Submitted an application to the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) for a three-year grant beginning in October 2022 if funded
- Are finishing up work on the critical edition of *Winds of Doctrine*
- Are focused on the critical edition of *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (SAF)

Work on SAF needs to be completed by October when either we begin NEH-funded work on *Realms of Being* or we run out of money for Faedra.

We are extremely fortunate to have several people helping us with SAF: an experienced textual editor is working with Faedra to complete the critical text, John Lachs is working on an introduction to the critical edition and Founding Editor Herman Saatkamp is providing logistical advice. Hector Galván (Texas A&M University—Corpus Christi) and Ricardo Miguel-Alfonso (University of Castilla-La Mancha) are working with Faedra to research and compose Notes to the Text for SAF. Paul Forster (University of Ottawa) and Glenn Tiller (Texas A&M University—Corpus Christi) are assisting with research for these Notes, and former director Marianne Wocke is coordinating efforts of this international group of collaborating scholars through monthly video meetings. We have established models for the content and form of Notes to the Text that draw on the extensive work already accomplished by the Edition under Herman and then Marianne.

After 2022 the prospects for the Edition are much less certain and the need for support and assistance from readers of the *Bulletin* will be more important than ever. We welcome help from interested individuals with the critical edition of *Realms of Being*. Scholarly expertise can help with researching and composing the Notes to the Text, or specialized editing skills can help us establish the critical text. There may be other ways that working with the Santayana Edition could be part of your research (and possibly fit with your own grant-funded work), for example, researching the history and reception of a particular text. Please contact the Santayana Edition at santedit@iupui.edu if you are interested in learning more about our scholarly editing procedures and how you could volunteer to further our work.

As always, we welcome contributions to fund editors or graduate student interns, and we would appreciate any information you could share on grants for which the Santayana Edition can apply.

Most of all, we appreciate your continuing interest in and engagement with the works of George Santayana.

MARTIN COLEMAN

Director and Editor, the Santayana Edition, IUPUI

Santayana 75, 100, and 125 Years Ago

Santayana in 1896: *The Sense of Beauty* and Studies in England

In January of 1896, much was uncertain in Santayana's life. His career and relations with Harvard were coming to a "crisis," as he put it, and he resolved to resign his instructorship unless he was promoted to assistant professor (LGS 10 November 1895). A critical factor in this decision was the fate of his manuscript, *The Sense of Beauty*. Without a major philosophical publication to his name—his book of sonnets published two years earlier would not do—he was sure not to be promoted and likely not to be retained as an instructor at Harvard. Writing to his friend Charles Loeser, his guide during his first visit to Rome and Venice the previous year, he explained his situation and how he followed Loeser's advice by asking for a year's unpaid leave from Harvard.

You may be interested in news about my personal affairs. My book has been refused by Macmillan and Houghton Mifflin (to whom I was persuaded to send it next) and they both give me little hope of its publication by anyone, except at my own expense. This I can't undertake at present, as my future is uncertain, and I must keep my savings to live upon until I find some other place. For it is almost certain that I bid farewell to Harvard this year. They not only refuse to make me assistant professor, but they hint that I must not expect to stay on indefinitely as instructor. I have followed your advice and asked for leave of absence for a year, but I think it will not be granted. It makes no practical difference, as I shouldn't come back anyhow, but it would be a more graceful and easy way of leaving, and would not annoy my family so much as a sudden rupture. (LL 25 January 1896)

Santayana thus prepared himself for a change of surroundings and a possible change of career. No doubt he partly pined for such changes. Europe's gravitational pull was as constant for him as America's oppositional force, and he had good friends entreating him to come to London, not least among them Earl Frank Russell, who wrote "How nice it would be to have you in London" (McCormick 119).¹ Yet, his plans were vague. After completing the spring term at Harvard, teaching the daunting-sounding courses "General Introduction to Philosophy, Logic, Psychology, Metaphysics and History of Philosophy" (with James and Royce) and "The chief types of Ethical Thought, with special reference to the schools of Socrates and Kant", he would "go to London for a year, and see what will turn up after that" (LGS 10 November 1895). By the end of the year, he was indeed living in England, though at Cambridge and not London, studying Plato and "dining with the dons" (LGS 11 August 1896; LGS 16 October 1896). Judging by his letters from the summer and fall, it was one of the happiest times of his life. The summer spent at Oxford filled him with "great joy," he told Royce (LGS 16 October 1896). And the

¹ For more on Frank Russell see "The Most Extraordinary of Santayana's Friends" p.173 and Ruth Derham's article "Ideal Sympathy? The Unlikely Friendship of George Santayana and Frank, 2nd Earl Russell," *Overheard in Seville* 36(2018):12-25)

course of study he undertook at Cambridge was consequential. It shaped his philosophy, settled his career, deepened friendships, and tilled the ground for his refuge in England during World War I. After his year in England, what turned up for him was a return ticket to America. This time, for the third and final act of his career at Harvard, his slow march from assistant to professor of philosophy.

Three years prior, Santayana had undergone another sort of crisis. The end of his youth, the death of his father, and the unexpected death of his friend Warwick Potter had all conspired to initiate his self-described *metanoia* or change of heart.² After a spiritual “passage through dark night,” he found a kind of philosophical salvation. He would live by the credo: “Cultivate imagination, love it, give it endless forms, but do not let it deceive you. Enjoy the world, travel over it, and learn its ways, but do not let it hold you” (PP 427). Writing to a distraught friend, Henry Ward Abbot, in November of 1896, Santayana dispensed some of his strong spiritual medicine. He wrote:

The world is full of sad and unaccountable things, of which the most hopeless, perhaps, is that unfit persons like ourselves have been brought into it under circumstances that make real satisfaction impossible for us. However, when once the main thing is renounced, there are a variety of compensations and incidental pleasures to be found; and what makes me a little out of sympathy with your state of mind is that while you say you are without illusions you refuse your intelligence its entertainment and your will its hard earned peace. (LGS 19 November 1896)

After his *metanoia*, he rarely wavered from this attitudinal perspective. Of course, as Santayana would be the first to admit, one cannot live on spiritual liberation alone. He made his peace with the world by his early thirties, but he still had to find his way through it. He needed a career and an income.

In the spring, things took a turn in Santayana’s favor. A friendly colleague in the Harvard English department, Barrett Wendell, suggested sending his manuscript to the publisher Scribner. Sometime in early March or late February, he did so, and Scribner elected to publish *The Sense of Beauty*. The possibilities that were closing at Harvard opened up again; the publication of his book earned him a chance to stay on. He signed a contract on May 5, thus “establishing pleasant relations” with Scribner, his primary publisher “for fifty years” (PP 393). He immediately began working on revisions to his manuscript, gladly accepting advice from Scribner’s editors. At the same time, he made corrections for a new edition of his book *Sonnets* and added to it thirty new sonnets. By the end of the year, both *The Sense of Beauty* and the new edition of *Sonnets* were in print, complimentary copies were sent to friends, and review copies of *The Sense of Beauty* were dispatched to major periodicals in America, England, Germany, and France.

Santayana’s first major scholarly publication in philosophy was by all usual measures a success. The subject of aesthetics was still relatively novel in America, and his book “was the first American treatise on [aesthetics], and among the first in Britain or on the continent” (McCormick 127). By producing a treatise on aesthetics, he thereby acquired a philosophical “specialty” as demanded by Harvard

² See “Santayana in 1893: The *Metanoia*,” *Overheard in Seville* 36(2018):4-5

administrators, one that allowed him to carve out a niche within the philosophy department (PP 393). *The Sense of Beauty* also established the philosophical naturalism, albeit in a minor key, that characterized all of his subsequent writings. Echoing Hume's naturalistic, projectivist thesis that *taste* "gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity" and has a "productive faculty" of "gilding or staining all the natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment" (Hume 135), Santayana wrote that "Beauty is pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing" (SB 33) and the "aesthetic effect of objects is always due to the total emotional value of the consciousness in which they exist. We merely attribute this value to the object by a projection which is the ground of the apparent objectivity of beauty" (SB 146).

Contrary to Santayana's assertion that *The Sense of Beauty* did not have "a warm reception from the critics" (PP 393), there was much consensus amongst its reviewers who praised both the book's substance and Santayana's style. E. B. Titchener, in his review for *Mind*—in the same number that F.C.S. Schiller reviewed William James's *The Will to Believe*—began by distinguishing Santayana as a "poet and essayist of no small merit." He went on to say,

he has here laid aside construction for theory; and though his preface modestly declares that the book "simply puts together the scattered commonplaces of criticism into a system, under the inspiration of a naturalistic psychology," the theory shows much of originality, and sets many of the accepted canons in a new and clearer light." (Titchener 560)

Even the most potent criticism, such as the review in *Science* that lambasted Santayana's thesis (inspired more by ancient philosophy than contemporary psychology) that aesthetic sensibilities are influenced by sexual passions, calling it a "thesis so wide of the mark . . . as to be repugnant to the true artists as it is to the clear brained psychologist," was tempered and contextualized by "gratitude for so much that is of value" in the book (C.L.F. 376). It is also fair to call Santayana's first philosophy book a success for the simple reason that it was his only book never to go out of print during his lifetime. This fact was somewhat to his chagrin since, in his estimation, the "humanism characteristic of *The Sense of Beauty*" lacked the foundation of "a more explicit and vigorous natural philosophy" that he supplied some thirty years later in *Realms of Being* (PGS 23-24). Still, the book had foundations of another sort, and he collected the royalties from it for the remainder of his long life.

Santayana accepted the Emersonian notion that the brutal facts of lived experience, once turned into essences in the realm of truth, may become benign objects of contemplation. His account in his autobiography of the circumstances that led to the publication of *The Sense of Beauty*, and its reception by reviewers, is not an instance of this ideal. His later judgments on *The Sense of Beauty* and the circumstances under which it was published have a cynicism absent from his correspondence in 1896. In his autobiography, he states that his book was the product of a "sham course in 'aesthetics'" (PP 393). And in the introduction to the critical edition of *The Sense of Beauty*, Arthur C. Danto reports visiting Santayana in 1950 and discussing the book's origins. According to Danto, when he asked Santayana about *The Sense of Beauty*, Santayana replied: "They let me know through the

ladies that I had better publish a book. On what? 'On art, of course.' So I wrote this wretched potboiler" (SB xvi).

How is it that Santayana later regarded his course on aesthetics, which he taught no less than ten times at Harvard, as a "sham"? And why did he denigrate his treatise on aesthetics by labeling it a "wretched potboiler"? After all, there was no radical change to Santayana's general philosophical vision over the years. The main ideas articulated in *The Sense of Beauty* are of a piece with his later philosophy, even if they are not explicitly grounded in the ontology delineated years later in *Realms of Being*. The fact is that in 1896 Santayana did not have such a dim view of the subject of aesthetics, which he distinguished from the sort of late-Victorian Paterian aestheticism that he disparaged. Even after his manuscript had been rejected twice and before it was accepted, he was giving invited talks on aesthetics and reading from his manuscript. In March, he asked Scribner to send his manuscript back to him. "If it is not now being read," he wrote, "would you be kind enough to send it back to me, as I had promised some time ago to read a portion of it before a club in Philadelphia on April 22, thinking that by that time I should have got it back again." He closed his request by writing, "When I have selected and copied the portions I wish to read, I can send the MS back to you, if you still care to retain it" (LGS 10 March 1896). He evidently retained confidence that his ideas about aesthetics had merit, even if potential publishers declined his work.

In his 1988 review of the critical edition of *The Sense of Beauty*, Willard E. Arnett diagnoses Santayana's reasons for his dismissive attitude toward his book and its subject matter. Santayana's course on aesthetics was a "sham," Arnett writes, "in part no doubt because [Santayana] was convinced that 'a professor . . . has to partly be a sham'" (Arnett 546, PP 189). Along with this reason, Arnett also notes Santayana's distaste for aestheticism and his surprising assertion in *Persons and Places* that "I didn't have, and haven't now, a clear notion of what 'aesthetics' may be" (PP 393). Arnett sums up his diagnosis, writing that "*The Sense of Beauty* was a 'wretched potboiler' because [Santayana] wrote under the pressure of circumstances which demanded that he publish and which denied him time and opportunity to be clear in his own mind about a complex subject" Arnett 546. This summation reasonably explains Santayana's later pronouncements. The only thing missing is the depth of disgust and shame Santayana felt at having to go through the official motions of becoming a philosophy professor when it was not his vocation to be one and, more importantly, when he did not yet regard himself as having earned the venerable title of *philosopher*.

It is hard not to see Santayana's later disdain for *The Sense of Beauty* and aesthetics as almost wholly colored by his retrospective judgments concerning his career at Harvard. He expressed mixed feelings about being a philosophy professor. On the one hand, from a disinterested point of view, he saw the good in teaching. "Teaching is a delightful paternal art," he wrote, "and especially teaching intelligent and warm-hearted youngsters, as most American collegians are" (COUS 42). And he took his teaching seriously. He recognized its performative element and that teaching must be, to use current jargon, "student-centered" and not ego-driven. Writing to his former student, Horace Kallen, who had recently taken a position at the University of Wisconsin, a place Santayana had visited and liked, he advised him:

Teaching must be adapted to the state of preparation and sentiment of the great well-washed that flock to the University. You may guide them in whatever direction you think best, but for their own sake, and starting from their actual condition; it must not be a haughty display of your own sentiments such as might wound and perplex them. It is not their faith that you must be considerate of, but their innocence and their desire to work together and improve themselves in the process" (LGS 1 July 1911).³

However, these virtuous pedagogical ideas are at odds with Santayana's thoughts about being a philosophy professor. In an unpublished letter from 1922, Santayana wrote to one of his best friends, Baron von Westenholz, and in no uncertain terms unloaded his feelings about his chosen career.⁴ He noted that when he was 19, an opportunity arose for him to study painting in Paris rather than philosophy at Harvard. He made his regrets abundantly clear. "I have always felt that to be a professor was a disgrace, and this doubly," he wrote. "It was a sham, because I am not a learned man nor is philosophy a thing that can be taught; and then the whole business of teaching in an institution was not my vocation, it was beneath me, it was a mere concession to convenience, chance, and comparative ease in earning my bread and butter. If I may upbraid myself for lack of courage, it is not having shaken off that connection sooner" (WL 12 May 1922). In response to the thought that studying philosophy at Harvard is precisely what made him a philosopher, Santayana offered a rich retort: "You will say it is just as well, because then I shouldn't have become a philosopher. No: but I might have been one: and it is only now, twenty years later, that I feel I have attained that dignity" (ibid.). For a materialist philosopher like Santayana, these remarks are perhaps best taken as wishful protestations. At the end of the same letter, he gave a more realistic appraisal of the actual conditions that formed his philosophy. "However, I am not sorry on the whole," he wrote, "[since] the long years of lecturing no doubt gave me a technical facility which I should not have acquired so easily—with my laziness—if I had always been free" (ibid.). Santayana's repulsion at his chosen career is stark despite the nod to compensation at the end of his letter. In his unhappy retrospection, *The Sense of Beauty* is a casualty, reduced by time and memory to a mere instrumentality in a "concession to convenience."

³ Santayana shared pedagogical values, especially those of individualism and pluralism, with his mentor Josiah Royce, even though philosophically and temperamentally they were miles apart. Santayana's advice to Kallen is strikingly similar to Royce's views about teaching. In 1893, Royce wrote in the *Journal of Education*:

The teacher should never apply an abstract method of teaching to all alike. He should individualize; and especially when he is engaged in the really higher task of his employment; the development of the character and personality of each of his pupils; he must respect the manifold variety of their individual traits and the personal element in their mental life and growth (Royce 261).

⁴ Santayana wrote of Baron von Westenholz: "Westenholz was one of my truest friends. Personal affection and intellectual sympathies were better balanced and fused between him and me than between me and any other person" (PP 261). He was also one of the "three best-educated" persons, along with Bertrand Russell and Joe Trumbull Stickney, he had ever known" (PP 442).

Whatever Santayana may have felt about *The Sense of Beauty* in later years, he was in excellent spirits in the summer of 1896. He wrote a playful letter to his friend and recent Harvard graduate, Guy Murchie, from the Chateau Frontenac in Québec City en route to England.

Dear Guy,

I can't resist the impulse to write you a line from here, because I am thinking of you, wishing you were here, and wondering where in the world you are. If your father sold the mine in Newfoundland and you bought a farm in New Brunswick, why are you in Newfoundland and not chez toi, if, as they tell me now, you are in Newfoundland? I give it up: but of course it doesn't matter if in some way you are finding what will ultimately satisfy you. Let me know soon what is up, for now when I pass the sad shores of Newfoundland I shall never know whether to gaze upon them with moist eyes and wave a metaphorical handkerchief in that direction, or whether the Mecca lies rather behind my back. You see, in spite of this then [sic] pursuit of vain knowledge, even the faithful need a little geography. (LGS 27 June 1896)

Buoyed by the first taste of freedom and year's reprieve from teaching, he commented favorably about his stop in Québec. "The people are peuple. These are the long-sought peasants of America. I think it might be pleasant to live here: it would be like Europe, in the country" (Ibid.). He also happily related the "great many" social engagements—high-society dinners, farewells, and a wedding—that he managed to enjoy "in the intervals of moving and packing" for his stay in England (ibid.).

By mid-summer, Santayana was ensconced at Oxford. He was "reading in the Bodleian and writing hard" (LGS 11 August 1896). He completed a play, *Marriage of Aphrodite*, the title of which was later changed to *The Marriage of Venus* and published posthumously in *The Poet's Testament: Poems and Two Plays* (1953). He also completed two of his more well-known essays, "Cervantes (1574-1616)" and the very fine "The Absence of Religion in Shakespeare." He also managed to "set down" some paragraphs on morals that were perhaps seeds for *The Life of Reason* (LGS 11 November 1896). Writing to Conrad Slade, another friend, and recent Harvard graduate, he reiterated his appreciation for Oxford. "This place is lovely," he wrote, "and I wish I could tell you how much delight I get from wandering about in it and around it" (LGS 11 August 1896). It was not only the buildings, such as the towers of St. Mary's and Magdalen, that entranced him or the evening prayers at Christ Church that he attended; it was also the surrounding countryside and English towns. "[T]he country about is full of a quiet charm," he enthused.

If you follow the towpath up the river you come to Witham, if you follow it down to Iffley, both lovely villages, the latter for its church the former for everything. You never saw such nests of neatness and foliage; flint walls overgrown with ivy, thatched cottages with climbing rose bushes, little children halfway between Kate Greenaway and Sir Joshua Reynolds, and inns with very refreshing cider and bitters. And beyond the fields in both directions are

low hills, which tempt you to a two-hour walk almost every afternoon (LGS 11 August 1896)

Before and after arriving at Oxford, Santayana seemed to have as many social engagements as when he departed America. He may have been an outsider by birth, but he worked his way well inside English aristocratic social circles, and he enjoyed what he found. He found in England “a distinctive society, a way of living fundamentally foreign to me, but deeply attractive” (SE 4). He went to “Telegraph House” in Hampshire Downs to visit Frank Russell and his “cousin” Mollie (Russell’s eventual second wife), and her mother, who “was there to give respectability to the party” (LGS 13 August 1896). From there, Santayana went to Windsor to spend a week with his friend and relative Howard Sturgis, where he found a house “filled with people, a most entertaining and bewildering lot of them” (*ibid.*). These included the daughter of the famed historian, John Motley, her husband, their daughter, and her fiancé. Santayana satirically described the latter two guests:

he a dapper nice little man of thirty nine with forty thousand pounds a year, she a lazy big society belle of some two and twenty, without the rudiments of anything but a colossal selfishness” (*Ibid.*).

Also in the social mix was the husband of the soprano singer, Emma Eames; the English parliamentarian William Harcourt; “four Eaton boys,” one of them a future member of the House of Lords; and a former professor from Harvard and his son, a student at Harvard. (LGS 13 August 1896)

Along with these visits, Santayana also found time to see “young Bertrand Russell at his father-in-law’s, Mr. Pearsall Smith’s” (LGS 10 October 1896). His description of this visit contains a comical vignette of the sort that Santayana often drew in letters to friends. Russell’s in-laws, he explained

[are] a family of Philadelphia Quakers long settled, or unsettled, in England. When the old lady, who delivers temperance lectures and now has Armenia on the brain, goes off to Evangelize something, the old man at home takes the opportunity to dis-evangelize himself, and declare he is not a Quaker at all, but a Buddhist. For, he says, the suffering in the world is appalling, and the best thing we can hope for is extinction and peace. He has accordingly removed himself as far as possible from earth already by building a hen-coop, covered with glass, up in a tree, where he squats, and, I believe, spends the night. He directed me to the place through the woods, and I had the curiosity to climb up to it, not without imminent danger of transmigration. There are wires stretched all around a circular ladder, by way of balusters in which one is sure to get caught. Perhaps they symbolize the Veil of Maya. (*Ibid.*)

Santayana would not have to brave the hen-coop again. Russell’s marriage would be dissolved by 1901. However, another incident would prove premonitory. In the same letter, Santayana explained how “the Wicked” Earl Frank Russell, embroiled in a lengthy, costly, acrimonious separation from his first wife, Mabel Scott, received a summons for an assault he allegedly committed against a servant nine years earlier. A defense was quickly prepared, and Russell, Santayana, and several others were driven to court by the Vicar of St. John’s. The court was “packed,”

wrote Santayana, “and we,—a dozen of us a [sic] least,—had crowded it still more” (Ibid.). In the end, little drama unfolded that day. The case was dropped because it lay outside the jurisdiction of Winchester. Santayana offered a less technical reason for its dismissal, namely, that

at the time [of the alleged assault] . . . both Burke [a friend] and I were with Russell at Winchester, and he was staying at the College with Mr & Mrs Richardson. With the testimony of other servants, that remained faithful, it would have been possible to prove an alibi, and expose the malice of the accusation. (Ibid.)

This event was far from the end of legal battles for Russell, however. The following year, Santayana would testify on Russell’s behalf at London’s Old Bailey in a successful libel case brought against Lady Scott, Russell’s former mother-in-law.

As fall approached, Santayana was planning to move from Oxford to Cambridge. His enchantment with Oxford was such that he “should remain in Oxford indefinitely were it not that, being a University town every one [sic] says I ought to be in a college” (LGS 13 August 1896). However, he could only join a college as an undergraduate, which he deemed unsuitable given his age and experience. Fortunately, another possibility presented itself. His friend, Nathaniel Wedd, who was a tutor and lecturer in classics at Cambridge, helped secure admission to Kings College “with the MA standing,” permitting him to “dine at high table, and meet the Dons daily on a friendly footing” (LGS 10 November 1896). For lodging, he had comfortable rooms on Silver Street, although he did not share his landlady’s “aesthetic sense” and had to “banish” her “worsted roses under glass bells” (LGS 1 November 1896). He reported that his study was particularly “cheerful, with running windows on two sides looking up and down the main street, in the very midst of things, so that I may not feel out of it” (LGS 10 October 1896). All in all, his situation at Cambridge was “very pleasant” and “well arranged” (LGS 1 November 1896). As always, he set down to work.

The most significant work Santayana did during his post-doctoral year was studying Plato under the tutelage of the classical scholar Henry Jackson, who he described as “courtly, magnificent in his ample stiff silk gown, hospitable, universally informed, and learned” (PP 439). His study of Plato and ancient Greek philosophy would provide the philosophical foundations for *The Life of Reason*, *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, and essentially all of his philosophical writings. Rightly or wrongly, he would often be called a “Platonist.” Equally important were his philosophical friends at Cambridge: Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and John M. E. MacTaggart. Santayana had genuine respect for these philosophers, even if he disagreed with them, as was certainly the case with the Hegelian idealist MacTaggart. Moore and Russell he felt closer to, and they helped him “grind fine and filter Platonic Ideas into my realm of essence” (PGS 587). His respect for Moore and Russell was such that he would return to Cambridge fifteen years later for some productive “three-cornered” talks about the ideas for his book on “Three Realms of Being” (LGS 13 February 1912; and LGS 2 August 1912). His year of study at Cambridge also helped secure his position at Harvard. He would return to the American Cambridge not only with a well-received book in hand but training in Greek philosophy. After 1897, a class in Greek philosophy would be a regular part of his repertoire.

By the end of November, Santayana was making plans for the holidays and the following year. He would “go to Paris for the Christmas holidays and to Italy after the Lent term. In the summer I expect to be still in Italy, possibly Spain, and to be back in Boston in August or early September” (LGS 19 November 1896). He would make good on his plans to go to Paris and Italy, and he would be back in Boston by fall. For the time being, however, all his “exertions” were “directed to Plato.” “It’s hard stuff,” he wrote, “—Parmenides and Philebus—but very interesting to me on account of the deep logical and metaphysical questions involved” (LGS 1 November 1896). These deep logical and metaphysical questions concerning the nature of “Being, the One, the Many, etc.” would command his attention well into the new year (PP 439). His answers to them would help draw out the latent philosophical system within him.

GLENN TILLER

Texas A&M-Corpus Christi

Santayana in 1921: Madrid, Ávila, Paris, Rome (“All Roads Lead There”)

Santayana began 1921 in Madrid, and in a January letter to his publisher he offered his response to the suggestion that he revise his earlier works in light of later developments in his thought. Of highest concern was *The Sense of Beauty* (1896). He noted, as his publisher had already observed, that he had supplemented what he had written there in *The Life of Reason* (1905-06) and also in the “Soliloquies in England” appearing in the *Athenaeum*, which he suggested might make “a small book.” The soliloquies were a series of short essays published in magazines between 1915 and 1920. During the summer he worked earnestly on making them ready for publication as a collection, which appeared in 1922 as *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*. The *Soliloquies* contain intimations of the new articulations of his philosophy that had become the focus of his attention: “I am at work—slowly—on a much more considerable book, in which I endeavour to clear up, as far as I can, all the fundamental questions.” (LGS 23 January 1921). These efforts were to be embodied in *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (1923) and more extensively worked out in *The Realms of Being* (1927-40).

The new year could be understood as an inauguration of a new phase in Santayana’s literary evolution. The dominant interests after 1921 become clearer when compared to the three publications that appeared in 1920: *Character and Opinion in the United States: With Reminiscences of William James and Josiah Royce and Academic Life in America*, *Little Essays* (ed. by Logan Pearsall Smith), and the collaborative *Critical Realism: A Co-Operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge*, to which Santayana contributed “Three Proofs of Realism.” This last one is not discontinuous from what came after, but the professional context of its publication—largely epistemological and academic—suggests interpretations of Santayana’s later work that miss his ontological and spiritual concerns.

By late March he had gone from Madrid to Ávila, where he spent a few days, and then on to Paris, to the apartment of a close friend since college, the philosopher and psychologist Charles Augustus Strong. In a passage that stresses the *new* Santayana (one projected towards the future and the *realms*, superseding the strictly naturalistic lenses of *the life of reason*) he writes to Strong, who was not in Paris at this time:

There is, however, a sentimental self-consciousness in which a man identifies himself, not with this animal psyche in his body, but with his experiences and brooding thoughts, with his inner discourse: and if you call that the Self, the self will be impotent, except vehemently to be what happens to be. Certainly when I was young, even when I wrote the *Life of Reason*, I was given to this “introspective” or romantic way of thinking more than I am now: I lived more transcendently, more egotistically: and I put off to a distance (without denying them) the hypothetical world and the hypothetical psyche that by their interaction produced this life-long dream in me. I am glad that you like my new manner better: I like it much better myself, and think it more respectable. There is something disreputable in sentimental self-consciousness (LGS 28 March 1921).

On this note of moving ahead with his mature philosophy, Santayana wrote to Logan Pearsall Smith, who edited the recently published *Little Essays*, that “I am quite aware that it is my fault if the technical side of my philosophy is not treated very seriously. I haven’t treated it very seriously myself, as yet, but I assure you there is solidity in it, if its skeleton were properly laid bare, as I hope before long to do, as a counter-poise to my excursions into the realm of fancy” (LGS 9 June 1921).

In July Santayana sent to Wendell T. Bush, professor of philosophy at Columbia and editor of *The Journal of Philosophy* in New York, his “long Soliloquy—the longest in the book if I don’t cut it down” (LGS 1 July 2021), “On My Friendly Critics.” It is quite clearly another facet to Santayana’s emotional *farewell* to the United States, and this some nine years after he had sailed on the ocean liner *Olympic*, from Boston to Plymouth (England) on 24 January 1912, never to set foot in the United States again.

Santayana spent a little over seven months in Paris, from late March to late October at Strong’s 9, avenue de l’Observatoire apartment. From there in August he wrote to Pearsall Smith that he was entertaining a return to England “for the rest of my days” (LGS 17 August 1921). Yet, by early November he had made it to Rome, where he confronted a situation of “no trains, newspapers, no trams, fascisti marching about and a general feeling of helplessness” (LGS to Charles A. Strong, 11 November 1921). The *Partito Nazionale Fascisti* (*National Fascist Party*) had been founded in Rome during the three days that preceded this letter at the Third Fascist Congress.

By 16 November, when services had been restored, and the restless fascisti were less evident, he stated that he was beginning a “profound meditation on the Realms of Being” (LGS to Charles A. Strong, 17 November 1921).

The year ended with Santayana in Rome. Passages from two different letters in the last two months of the year suggest changes in Santayana's understanding of his identity. The first concerns his lifelong relationship to his native Spain. He wrote again to Wendell T. Bush, who was in Europe: "It is enterprising of you to plunge into Spain, and I hope your experiences in my native land will be agreeable. . . . Sometimes I love Spain, but not always" (LGS 22 November 2021). In the second, to Pearsall Smith again, he confessed:

It does not seem to me that we can impose on America the task of imitating Europe. The more difficult it can come to be, the better: and we must let it take its own course, going a long way round, perhaps, before it can shake off the last trammels of alien tradition, and learn to express itself simply, not apologetically, after its own heart. (LGS 2 December 1921).

He did not even feel secure as to how many more years, being fifty-eight at this moment, he desired to live: "I don't intend to die for at least ten years" (LGS to George Sturgis, 17 December 1921). The physical space where he wanted to establish a sense of home was itself up in the air. The following years would bring this last uncertainty into even greater focus.

To be sure, Santayana had spent roughly four months of 1920 (January through April) in Rome. But his arrival in November of 1921 was the start of longest stay so far. He remained until late April of 1922. Rome had not yet become his center of gravity, but it had become a very compelling lure. He wrote to Westenholz from Paris, on 13 October, prior to leaving for Rome:

When I walk through the via Sixtina and the piazza di Santa Trinità del Monte, I often remember your sister, who used to stay at a house there. It would be very nice if you and she could both return to Rome this winter. All roads lead there, and from there roads seem to be open to everything, in the past or the future, that is really interesting. (WL 13 October 1921)

And on 21 November he wrote to Strong that in Rome "here is all the country that one can desire, within the walls of Rome" (LGS 21 November 1921). Santayana undeniably had found a needed, somewhat liberating ambience that allowed him to remain solitary within the crowd, and to make headway on his most pressing work at hand: *The Realms of Being*. Or, as he wrote in early December of "this taste of mine for living in the midst of a noisy, vulgar rush of people, most of them ugly, with whom I have nothing to do" (LGS 2 December 1921).

It is in this general frame of mind, living his mostly secluded life and plugging away during his working hours on his mature *œuvre*, that Santayana's 1921 came to a close at the Hotel Marini.⁵

CHARLES PADRON

⁵ Today this former hotel houses the offices of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the Italian parliament.

Santayana in 1946, Part 1: Parcels, Family, Visitors, Health, Politics

*There is so much information about this year in Santayana's life that time and space do not permit us to give a full account. In 1946, although his money in England and America was still tied up, his main financial concerns were resolved: a pension for Mercedes Ruiz de la Escalera (an old family friend in Madrid), money for his assistant Daniel Cory, and a donation to the Little Company of Mary hospital in a southwest Chicago suburb to make up for his stay in the order's Rome branch during the war. Cory managed to make it to England and receive the fellowship Santayana's friend Charles Augustus Strong had set up for him. By April, Scribners published *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*, the book Santayana had written during the war when he was unable to communicate with the Allied countries. The details of these events and others, such as Santayana's continuing relationship with the poet Ezra Pound—by then confined to a mental hospital in Washington DC—will be postponed until the next issue. In this issue, the attention is on Santayana's relationship with his overseas correspondents, especially his family members and, among them, his niece-in-law Rosamond Sturgis and her son Bob; on the poor state of his health at the start of the year; on his continued reception of visitors; and on his renewed work on the decades old *Dominations and Powers*.*

Little luxuries

Santayana has given us a glimpse of his life at the start of 1946 in letter to Rosamond Sturgis. She had been the wife of his then late nephew George Sturgis, who had divorced Rosamond and remarried another shortly before his death at the end of 1944. In his letter, Santayana wrote:

I prefer the sun. I am writing at this moment, 10.30 a.m., by a wide open window, with great comfort, wearing lined boots and a great winter coat, as well as a rug over my knees. (LGS 8 January 1946)

He was in the hospital and convent of the Little Company of Mary (the Blue Nuns) where he had lived since the fall of 1941. He was explaining to Rosamond that the slippers she had sent him did not fit, but his feet were staying warm with the boots that Daniel Cory had sent. The boots were too large when they arrived, but his doctor gave him “a pair of felt soles to put into them, which,” as Santayana put it, “have made them feel quite tight and warm” (Ibid.)

Cory had sent him pajamas in the fall. Cory knew not to send striped pajamas, because, as Santayana reminded him, “I wear pyjamas all day, with a tie like a shirt” (LGS 3 January 1946). Santayana had asked for a solid color but was surprised to find that Cory had sent him white ones. He wrote to Cory that he had expected

some plain colour, grey or dull blue or khaki. I never thought of white, but aesthetically it is just as truly a colour, and you were within my specifications in choosing it. The only objection is that it soils more visibly, and my linen being always scanty, I like to make it serve as long as possible. (Ibid.)

Also, the pajamas had no collars, which did not suit his desire to wear them during the day with a tie, so Santayana had taken to wearing some short sleeve shirts with collars that Cory had also sent him.

Correspondence between Italy and the United States moved faster in 1946 than in the time following Rome's takeover by the allied troops in June of 1944. By 1946 letters could travel by air from America to Italy, but not the other way. In several cases, Santayana responded to letters within two weeks of their being sent, a marked difference from the fall of 1944 when letters often took two months to travel. In late April Santayana wrote to Cory:

Dear Cory: My letter of some days ago had just gone when I received yours of April 14 (postmark April 16) which got here in the record time of four days⁶; and the day before yesterday came, in just one month, your splendid parcel of March 23 with quantities of tea, coffee, dates, prunes, peaches, shaving cream, and soap. (LGS 26 April 1946)

In 1946, it was still difficult to purchase many items in Rome, so Santayana welcomed gifts from his friends and relatives, and had taken to specifying what his special needs were. Cory and Rosamond Sturgis were the two correspondents who most often sent him parcels. He relied especially on Cory, who by then had received some of the royalties Santayana had been struggling to provide him in spite of the meddling by attorneys. He counted on Rosamond for back up. He wrote her in January:

Cory can send me only one parcel a month, and doesn't always do so, because he knows I should ask for things if the need were real. It is the extras and the little luxuries that give one the pleasant excitement of receiving all these presents. (LGS 8 January 1946)

He added that the presents were welcome not just for him alone, but because they enabled him to contribute to his community:

Tea and coffee now count as luxuries here, though I get them daily; but sometimes I feel that I may be sponging on the Sisters' own gifts, and being Irish they love tea, and love it strong.

In 1945, Santayana had used the occasion of the arrival of gifts to reflect on their philosophic significance. Then, it had been tea and the ceremony of taking it in the late afternoon that merited his praise. In 1946, he continued these light-hearted reflections, but took the opportunity to focus on coffee, which he thought to be a passable substitute for an imaginary scientific instrument that could measure his writing proficiency:

⁶ Santayana's previous letter to Cory is dated "April—21—Easter—1946." It is unlikely that mail would have been delivered or picked up on a Sunday, especially Easter. If not, he probably mailed the letter and then received Cory's on Monday, 22 April, six days after Cory's was postmarked. Further investigation may find that there was special delivery on Easter Sunday during the postwar period. The reader might note that the visit of the two soldiers related on p.26 also took place on Easter.

Your parcel of groceries sent from S. S. Pierce on January 10th arrived yesterday, in a little over two months. Everything was most acceptable, especially the generous quantity of coffee, which when I have it in the morning instead of the ordinary extract of brown-beans, stimulates my imagination and probably improves the quality of my writing for that day. I wish we had a medical thermometre for style, so that I could take my literary temperature when I sit down to write, and be reassured when it indicated blood heat, or average rationality, and be warned off and take a rest or a glass of something strong if it indicated dangerous fever, involving bad language, or vitality lower than 36° threatening platitudes and imbecility. Yet in the absence of scientific diagnosis it is a resource to take some good coffee which will probably do good; or at least make foolishness unconscious. (LGS to Rosamond Sturgis, 15 March 1946).

Three weeks later, the arrival of heating pads provided the chance to reflect on the energetic nature of matter and its influence on spirit.

Dear Rosamond: Yesterday came your parcel with heat pads and soap. Thank you very much. Soap is always in season, and not to be bought here except (I suppose) in the black market. The heat pads are late for the winter of this year, but will be useful when the autumn comes and interesting as a mechanical novelty—an application, as it were, of atomic bombs for the home and for the stomach. My critics used to upbraid me, when I said I was a materialist, by urging that matter was something passive and dead, but I hope they are now discovering that it is surprisingly explosive. When I warm my feet or my stomach with your pads, I shall meditate on the kindly way in which iron particles can communicate their secret vitality to torpid old age and to a lazy spirit. (LGS 5 April 1946)

Bob Sturgis

Santayana was fond not only of Rosamond, whom he called his niece-in-law, but also her three sons, Robert, Neville, and Nathaniel. Their aunt Josephine Bidwell, Santayana's niece, also had three children: Arthur Eldridge and David and Jane Bidwell. Santayana welcomed news about all these young people to whom he was a great uncle, but the one who received the greatest share of his attention was Rosamond's eldest, whom Santayana called Bob and whose full name was the same as his grandfather, Santayana's elder brother: Robert Shaw Sturgis. Bob had visited Santayana in Rome three times during the war while he was a soldier.

On New Year's Day 1946, Santayana made a point of writing his first letter of the year to Bob. Bob, having returned from the army, resumed his studies at Harvard in the fall of 1945. At the end of October 1945, Santayana wrote to him eager for news of his life and of life at Harvard and in Boston. It had been thirty-four years since Santayana had been there. Bob sent him a card for Christmas and Santayana took the New Year as an occasion to reply and, expecting that anything he wrote would be shared with Bob's mother, to reply also to a recent letter from Rosamond. Perhaps knowing that Bob shared an interest in architecture (Bob became

and architect and Santayana in his youth thought he might become one), he launched into a commentary on a photo Rosamond had sent him:

Tell her that the photo of the Park Street Church corner seems to represent something much newer and tidier than the old corner so well known to me seventy years ago. The church was then all painted or whitewashed a dingy grey: now it seems to have been scrubbed to show the red brick—I hope pink brick—and the pure white belfry and trimmings. Very good. There also seem to be fewer trees . . . (LGS 1 January 1946)

When Santayana was an undergraduate and met Frank Russell for the first time, he entertained the wayward young earl by describing the bleakness of the Harvard landscape. In 1946, relying on some recent photos he was able to find something favorable:

I have looked up Leverett House in a book of Harvard Views that an old friend sent me some years ago. It looks pleasant, and the arrangement of most of the Houses with courts open to the south, to let in the sunshine into their depths seems reasonable, especially as the buildings had to be higher than the courts in the English colleges were originally meant to be.

The height of the buildings in comparison with the English colleges led to an unfavorable observation: “In some of these, now that a third storey has been added, the courts look cold and dingy.” This thought brought on a comparison of Harvard with Cambridge in England:

The river fronts here remind one inevitably of the Backs at the English Cambridge; but the Cam is like a canal there—a Venetian effect—except that the banks are green and wooded, as perhaps the banks of the Charles are meant to become in time. Or is the openness and the meandering line of the water’s edge an effect intended to be permanent? I should like to see the colour of these Houses—red brick and white? Pink brick and yellow? Anyhow the scene will always be much brighter and less poetical than the Backs, with their crumbling grey stone and towering dark verdure.

Bob wrote Santayana a letter on 7 January that prompted an enthusiastic reply:

Dear Bob, Your long letter of January 7th leaves me with a desire that it were much longer, because it gives me a panoramic view of what occupies you now but leaves many points of interest unexplained. (LGS 28 January 1946)

Santayana continued, revealing his affection and explaining why he wished to know more:

You see, although I feel that I know you intimately and that in spite of the immense difference in our ages we understand each other easily, in fact most of your life you have been only a name for me, and two days or three that we talked together (under the handicap of my deafness) were not enough to fill a blank of twenty-two years.

In maintaining that their age difference was no barrier to closeness, he also suggested a philosophic affinity:

As to this extreme contrast in age, however, I rather think it is less an obstacle than one would expect, because a very old man is out of the scramble of contrasting plans, friends, and likes and dislikes that separates each generation from those immediately before and after it. Especially when the old man is a philosopher who believes (as apparently you do also) in the relativity of morals, and besides has been living with young friends almost all his life.

Bob had written for the Harvard newspaper, the *Crimson*, in 1941 before the United States entered the war. In his January 7th letter Bob informed Santayana that he had been elected president of the *Crimson* (a title that meant being head of the editorial board). The *Crimson* had suspended publication in 1943 and resumed in April 1946. Santayana was eager to see copies and to read what his nephew had written. In mid-April Rosamond wrote to say she would soon be sending a box with some of Bob's articles in the bottom. On May 3, Santayana wrote:

Dear Rosamond: Another box has arrived from you—you are indefatigable—with a jar of apricot jam and a large fruit-cake. In the bottom was a newspaper—the Crimson, I supposed, with Bob's articles: but no: it looked rather crumpled and the title was The Christian Register. What a disappointment! Perhaps the Crimson will come next time. (LGS 3 May 1946)

In a letter written eleven days earlier, Santayana reflected on the implications of Bob's journalistic advancement:

I am delighted that he has been elected President of the *Crimson*. That proves two things that I daresay were well known, but which I hadn't been told about. One is that he is given to writing for the public. That is excellent, if the public consents; otherwise far from keeping one's mind sane and in sympathy with the age, it confirms one's irritability. The other thing that being elected President of anything proves is that a man is able to recommend himself to others and to take practical responsibilities. I was never elected President of anything, and never learned to write for the public, although so many of my things, written to make myself conscious of my own opinions, have been thrust before the public on spec. (LGS to Rosamond Sturgis, 22 April 1946)

He then added:

If Bob devotes himself to both literary composition and architectural design he will have two strings to his bow easy to play together to advantage. (Ibid.)

In early June the first issue of the *Crimson* finally arrived. Santayana wrote a long letter to Rosamond commenting on Bob's two articles. He ended it saying, "This letter is also for Bob." After sending two long letters in January, Santayana hesitated to write Bob directly, as he presumed he was quite preoccupied. But in October he found a reason to write:

Dear Bob: Soon after getting your letter of Sept. 6 I began an answer, then tore it up and decided not to bother you with a correspondence, since in writing to your mother I could tell you anything that I wished, even more frankly, without laying on you, who are already over-busy with urgent matters, the needless weight of having an unanswered letter from an aged relation hanging over you like an unpaid bill. . . . But now after receiving the two numbers of

the *Crimson*, and reading your leading article . . . I really have something that I want to say. You needn't feel obliged answer at once or at all. I am writing for my own pleasure or impulse to let out what strikes me as true. (LGS 21 October 1946)

The occasion was to offset Bob's concern about encountering despairing attitudes and to argue that pessimism can be a positive way of coping:

You seem to be beset by pessimistic people in regard to public affairs and the future; and as responsible editor and representative of healthy public opinion, you feel bound in any case to be hopeful and encouraged. Now what I feel is that there is never any occasion to deprecate bad omens or unpleasant possibilities. If the apprehension is groundless, it may be disregarded or laughed at—refuted by good sense; but if it is well-grounded, that fact does not undermine your moral principles or opportunity to live up to them. You can do just as much good in bad times as in prosperous times, perhaps more. There is no occasion, therefore, for being confused by the uncertainty of the future. You may be able, when things threaten to disappoint current hopes, the better to revise your borrowed opinions and discover what you really value, even if it should not be destined to prevail. (Ibid.)

Visitors and health

One reason we know a great deal about Santayana's life in 1946 is that several people have left accounts of visiting him. In March Santayana wrote:

I have received a great number of visitors, more than I ever did in my life; chiefly army-men who had read "Persons & Places" or "The Last Puritan", and in one or two cases I have actually made new friends . . . (LGS To Mary Potter Bush, 8 March 1946)

Santayana's previous letter to Mrs Bush was in June 1945, so this report may have included the second half of 1945. In the early months of 1946, Santayana had not been feeling well, yet, as we'll soon see, the visitors continued. But first, let's look at his reports about his health.

Health reports

On his birthday of 16 December 1945 received a package from Horace Kallen. Just after Christmas, Santayana wrote to Kallen that his package "caught me when I was being caught again with a bronchial catarrh that has dogged me for years, but that I had escaped during the four previous winters in this house in Rome" (LGS 26 December 1945). In his New Year's letter to Bob Sturgis, Santayana said:

I have had an attack of my chronic catarrh, lasting the whole month of December, and probably through the winter, but it has not been severe, and I have been able to be up every day and to read a lot: only the writing of anything more than letters has had to be suspended. (LGS 1 January 1946).

On 18 January, Santayana wrote to Rosamond that the catarrh "still drags on mildly." He added,

It hasn't kept me in bed, but it has interfered a good deal with my usual writing, since when the weather is cold and there is no sun, I stay in bed in the morning. But the sun is now on its upward course, and I am almost well again. (LGS to Rosamond Sturgis).

But by early March his health had grown worse. He wrote to Cory:

I have not been very well, and not inclined to sit down to anything in particular. Since the beginning of December I have had a return of my old bronchial catarrh, with fits of coughing; and lately I had another attack of heart failure, or the threat of it, with a desire to vomit on an empty stomach, which Dr. Sabbatucci explained to me for the first time intelligibly, although in all I have had it four times since the winter at the Grand Hotel 1940-41. The heart being weak, he explains, the circulation is arrested, or partly arrested, at the neck (precisely where I have on two of those occasions, but not this last time, felt a sort of seizure); and this somehow provokes nausea and the false effort to vomit: also panting for breath. It is a bad turn, and might I expect be easily fatal; but thanks to injections I have recovered quickly—in half an hour—in all the cases so far: and this time, after a two-hours sleep, I at once felt perfectly well again, and was about much a[s] usual the next day. But of course, such an attack leaves me weaker, and disinclined to make any effort. However, I have been reading book upon book. (LGS 9 March 1946).

Just a week and half later, on 20 March, he was able to write to Cory, "My health is better with the better weather," and a month after that he repeated the report with an additional comment: "My health is much better, as is the weather. Only mankind is incorrigible" (LGS to Cory, 21 April 1946). He wrote of continued improvement to Rosamond in May and by June he could write to Cory, "with the pleasant June weather that has set in after good rains, I have had a decided turn for the better in health and spirits. (LGS to Cory 19 June 1946).

Despite the downturn in his health during the winter, we know that Santayana continued to receive visitors, because he wrote to John Wheelock at Scribners in March to explain his delay in responding to letters:

I have been less well this past winter than on the other winters that I have spent in this house, and also more interrupted by letters and visits; all of which has made me slack and remiss in correspondence and also in regular work. (LGS 22 March 1946)

Visitors

On 8 March, the day before he wrote Cory of the grim state of his health, he wrote the letter to Mary Potter Bush in which he said he had had more visitors "than I ever did in my life." He did not mention his health in this letter, but he did describe his fitness for having company:

I am now not fit for society, having grown deaf in a partial but disturbing way, in that voices deafen me and the more they sound the less I can make out what they are saying. With one clearly speaking person near me, I get on nicely, but a person across the room, or two at once, confuses me completely. (LGS 8 March 1946)

The visitor who might be best known is the literary critic and author Edmund Wilson, who on 6 April 1946 published an account in *The New Yorker* of his pilgrimage to see Santayana in Rome after he received a signed copy of *Persons and Places* a year earlier. Wilson had already reviewed *Persons and Places* for *The New Yorker* on 8 January 1944 (five months before Santayana learned the book had been published). In his review Wilson wrote that Santayana had

an artistic effectiveness so sure that he might have been writing novels all his life. He is able to immerse us so thoroughly in each of the social milieux in turn that the change is like a physical sensation. . . . His prose is here at its best. It is sometimes the privilege of a foreigner who has learned English to write it with a kind of brilliance that a native could hardly achieve. He scrutinizes the words and stores them up as treasures; he slips less easily into the instinctive banalities; and he is aware of values in the language which habit has obscured for the native. (Wilson 1944, 65)

Wilson concluded his appreciative review with a remark about Santayana's persistence in the midst of war:

It is one of the astonishing anomalies of the time that, at the moment when all human purpose seems to have been reduced to the coercion of the body through violence, this aloof and luminous mind should be able to go on living in a realm of contemplation and persuasion that no crashing of bombed cities can jar, and that his loom should keep turning out fabric of the finest color and weave without a dropped stitch or a rip. (Wilson 1944, 66)

"I seem to remember a review of *Persons & Places* by Edmund Wilson," Santayana wrote in a letter at the end of March 1946 (LGS to David Page, 28 March 1946). This uncertain recollection took place some time after Wilson's interview⁷. At the start of that interview Santayana said he had no memory of having sent Wilson a copy of his book, nor of who Wilson was. "I have a poor memory for names," he told Wilson. He attributed the signed copy Wilson had received to the efforts of a soldier who had brought him several copies with a list of people the soldier thought might like to have them. It may well be that Santayana learned of Wilson's review only after Wilson visited, but Santayana's foggiess when they met proved no obstacle to conversation. According to Wilson, "All he felt he needed to know about me in order to talk about himself was that I was one of his readers" (Wilson 1946 60). Wilson had been told that Santayana was something of recluse—"inaccessible"—but found:

One of the wonderful things about him was, on the contrary, the readiness and grace with which he lived up to a classical role: that of the sage who has made it his business to meet and to reflect on all kinds of men and who will talk about the purpose and practice of life with anyone who likes to discuss them—as with me, whom he didn't know from Adam—since these are matters which concern us all. On his dignity and his distinction he did not need to insist: he let them take care of

⁷ Wilson may have visited Santayana in 1945. In the *New Yorker*, he gives eighty-one as Santayana's age. Santayana turned eighty-two on 16 December 1945.

themselves; and his attitude toward a visitor—an attitude rather rare with the literary and the learned—was simply that of a man in the world who was trying to make some sense of it, as you were. (Wilson 1946, 64).

Many of Santayana's visitors were soldiers and former soldiers. Two who visited him were Lt. Lawrence James Wathen and his friend James Turnure, a former sergeant. In a letter to John McCormick,⁸ Turnure described how Santayana appeared to visitors. Wathen had driven them to see Santayana a few times. On the first visit, they offered to take Santayana on an excursion into the city or out to the country. "He refused," Turnure wrote, "nicely, but I recall rather firmly, as if somehow the idea was really quite out of the question." Wathen, being of higher rank, did more of the talking, which might have been an advantage given that Santayana said his deafness made it hard for him to understand more than one interlocutor.

Of Santayana's habitat and dress Turnure wrote:

His room gave out onto greenery, a garden, I think, into which we could and did walk freely. Each of the times that I saw him he wore a comfortable slightly worn bathrobe over a shirt and trousers. Once he wore a necktie; another time he did not.

Turnure quoted the opening lines of Santayana's poem "A Minuet on Reaching the Age of Fifty": "Old Age, on tiptoe, lays her jewelled hand/ Lightly in mine," and then continued his portrait:

He was shortish in height, perhaps 5' 6" or so, somewhat stooped, but he held himself erect. I sensed a certain pride there, a bit of refusal that the jewelled hand had touched him.

This sense of composure continued as Turnure recounted his movements:

Santayana walked slowly and deliberately. But he did not give an impression of frailty, suggesting that he once had been built rather solidly.



Lt LJ Wathen and George Santayana
Photo by James Turnure, Easter 1946

⁸ McCormick quotes parts of this letter of 22 November 1984 in his biography. The Santayana Edition sent me a copy of the complete holograph of the letter. In his biography John McCormick used a phrase from Turnure's letter as the title of the chapter covering this period. Turnure could not remember if he had heard Santayana say it or if he read it elsewhere:

He remarked that the "Tiger of the flesh" (sensitivity/sexuality) never dies. Presumably then it had not died in him, in spite of his advanced age.

For more on Santayana's sexuality, see Rubin 2020, 11-13 and Dawidoff 2011.

There was also a measure of tenacity in conversation:

He was polite to me. He could, however, be crisp in his remarks, direct and highly articulate. I don't remember an example; but I think he could be sharp if provoked.

And then, Turnure described Santayana's laughter:

Oh, yes, one more detail: he laughed frequently, a laugh difficult to describe. It was more in the nature of a high-pitched, nasal remark, as much [a] part of his conversation as his words—and one was expected to join him. It was a laugh as sharply directed as it was frequent, a pointed laugh, composed of a giggle, chuckle, and a bit of neigh, delivered conspiratorially, as if we two shared some secret.⁹

Focus on politics

At least one visitor called attention to Santayana's interest in world affairs. The *New York Times* published an anonymous report with a dateline of 19 October 1946. It appeared under the heading, "Santayana Sees All-Red Europe." The writer quoted Santayana as saying:

I believe that Russia soon may dominate all of Europe, with Germany and France going communistic willingly and other nations following. (*New York Times* 20 October 1946)

Santayana was not thrilled. In December, he wrote:

Several inquisitorial reporters, disguised in the lamb's clothing of soldiers, have inveigled me into "interviews" which I took at first for innocent conversation. No great harm came of it, as far as I know, except that my English was transformed into the dialect of [the] day. You can't catch me so easily in writing. (LGS to Christopher George Janus, 19 December 1946)

The writer of the *New York Times* article reported that Santayana was reading Stalin's *Questions of Leninism* translated into Italian. By the end of March, Santayana had begun telling several correspondents that he was reading Stalin's book. This news is a sign that after many years, he could once again obtain books. In early March he wrote:

In the matter of books my isolation is now over, since I get them again from America and also from England. The Times Literary Supplement to which apparently I was subscribed when war broke out, has spontaneously begun to arrive again . . . I have written to Blackwell in Oxford, where I had an account, asking for particular books and catalogues. This removes one of the greatest privations that I, personally, had to put up with during the war. (LGS to Mary Potter Bush, 8 March 1946)

⁹ For more on Santayana's laughter, see Amir 2019.

The *New York Times* interview had him say, "Russia was the logical nation to lead any move to one world government." His apparent sympathy with the idea of a single government for the world led an officer of the Americans United for World Government to write Santayana and invite him to join their effort. This writer, Arthur J Goldsmith, had taken courses with Santayana at Harvard, but Santayana did not remember him. Santayana wrote back:

Naturally I recognize the good intentions of your movement, but it is not one in which I can take part personally, first because I am not legally an American, and then because it does not seem to me that your methods are applicable to any society beyond the Anglo-Saxon area. Discussion does not lead to agreement but to the discovery of disagreements that perhaps were unsuspected, latent, and harmless. No form of government can be final, or the "right" form for ever and for everybody. (LGS 6 December 1946)

Santayana was reading Stalin and many other books on politics and history because he had begun working on *Dominations and Powers*, the work on politics that he had started three decades earlier before the first World War. As he explained in a letter:

A mass of manuscript exists, and I have now imposed a plan on it which, though an afterthought, I think will help me to arrange and rewrite the whole, if I live long enough. It was always called "Dominations and Powers", the point being to distinguish beneficent from vexatious government. (LGS to Ervin Paul Hexner 21 April 1946)

To this end, Santayana acquired several books. These included two by the recently deceased RG Collingwood, Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, and three volumes of Arnold J. Toynbee's *A Study of History*. Of Collingwood's *The New Leviathan* (1943), he wrote that it is "very interesting and important, and a good check on my Dominations & Powers, the philosophy being opposed to mine, yet the inspiration sympathetic" (LGS to Cory, 21 April 1946). In Popper's book, he found several quotations from Toynbee, whom he had not heard of. Unable to get any of the volumes from Blackwell in London directly, because his London bank account was still controlled by war regulations, Santayana appealed in October to Cory, who by then was in England. Cory sent him the first three volumes (of an eventually twelve-volume work) and they arrived by early November. Soon after, he wrote to Wheelock that Toynbee's book

interests me very much in detail, although the philosophy that guides him seems to me negligible. However, it does not spoil the liveliness of his reflexions on the relation of historical events to one another; and his quotations are very instructive. (LGS 27 November 1946).¹⁰

Santayana's reading of Stalin was, from our perspective seventy-five years later, oddly sympathetic. He wrote that he found him "refreshingly dogmatic" (LGS to Cory 21 April 1946). The October *New York Times* report that he thought "Russia

¹⁰ Katarzyna Krempleska in her recent book, *George Santayana's Political Hermeneutics*, makes much of the influence of Toynbee on *Dominations and Powers*. See Krempleska pp. 108-109, 117-119, and 130-131.

was the logical nation” to bring the world to a unified government must have struck many readers of the *Times* as rather curious. Santayana was surprised to find his stray conversational remarks turned into political commentary for all the world to read. Nevertheless, he assured Goldsmith: “As to this interview, it represents fairly the sense of what I said (though the diction and grammar are not mine) and the spirit of it” (LGS 6 December 1946). This sentiment is especially striking as he had published the essay “Why I am not a Marxist” (1935) eleven years earlier. The Columbia philosopher Ernst Nagel once told me that when he visited Santayana in Rome (most likely around that time), he told Santayana that his own hope for the future lay in Soviet Russia. Santayana said to him that while he did not share that opinion, he understood it to be a natural outgrowth of Nagel’s background and culture. Nagel’s opinion later changed. In the thirties, he was not yet aware of Stalin’s homicidal nature. Much of what we know of the mass murders that took place under Stalin’s rule came to light after his death. Yet, Santayana in 1946 was not oblivious of that aspect of Stalin. He put it rather elliptically in a letter to his former student Andrew Onderdonk: “He paints like the Chinese and Japanese, without shadows. In a picture that seems all right to your old friend.” (LGS 26 May 1946). In an earlier letter, he made the point directly:

I am deep in the works of Stalin, and much impressed. It is a pity they should be cruel. If they were home-staying and peaceful, like Quakers or Boers, they (the Bolsheviks) would be admirable: so clear, so strong, so undazzled by finery! (LGS to David Page, 12 May 1946)

When the then work-in-progress *Dominations and Powers* appeared in 1951, the cruelties and conflicted nature of the Soviet regime had become apparent:

There is a militant thirst for the political assimilation of all peoples to the social regimen of Russia, which in that claim forfeits all rational authority. Rational authority, according to my analysis, can accrue to governments only in so far as they represent the inescapable authority of things, that is to say, of the material conditions of free life and free action. In the Marxist theory this almost seems to be involved in its materialistic character; yet in Russian practice it is not the authority of things but nominally the material class interests and militant Will of the proletariat and really the ambition of the self-appointed inner circle of the Communist party that not only rule absolutely but intend to keep the whole world unanimous by “liquidating” all dissentients. (DP 459)

Having rejected Russia, he then speculated that the nation most fit to take the lead in world affairs was the United States!

But that judgment, like his previous speculations about political direction was a judgment of the moment. His fascination with Stalin was playful engagement with someone he found “refreshingly dogmatic”—rather the opposite of himself. In another article, I said that to appreciate Santayana’s philosophy of art, you often have to bypass many of his egregious judgments about specific works and even whole

genres.¹¹ The same is true of his political philosophy. Santayana knew that his own opinions about concrete matters were a product of his nature, his history, and his circumstances. His philosophic concern was to consider how societies might be best organized to permit the many and various forms of human nature to flourish. In a December 1946 letter, after alluding to the *New York Times* article "Santayana Sees All-Red Europe," Santayana said, "If people really cared to know what I think about politics in America, they would read the last chapter of my old 'Character & Opinion in the U.S.,"' which, he noted had been quoted in another *New York Times* article (LGS to Christopher George Janus, 19 December 1946). That other article summarized Santayana as saying, "English liberty is a progression from our animal will to possess absolute liberty" (Adams 1946) and quoted him saying:

Enthusiasts for democracy, peace, and a league of nations should not deceive themselves; they are not everybody's friends; they are the enemies of what is deepest and most primitive in everybody. (COUS 219, quoted by Adams)

The ideas that governments need to grow out of natural circumstances and that no one form of government is best for everyone are key principles in Santayana's political theory. It follows from this that democracy when imposed militantly on a people may not be the blessing its imposers imagine. Santayana made this clear in his letter to Bob Sturgis in October. After assuring him that he need not despair at the prevalence of pessimistic attitudes, he added something:

There is something else, perhaps, in your feeling: a sort of obligation to believe certain matters of fact, about the triumph of democracy, for instance, even if the evidences were against it. In a little book written by Julien Benda (a French Jewish philosopher) in New York during this war, I have found a clear statement on this point, given in a quotation from our Harvard sage Perry¹². Democratic principles, says Benda, are dictated by the conscience, not by experience or custom. And he quotes Perry to the effect that a 100% American cannot admit the possibility that democracy should disappear. Any suggestion to that effect causes "bitter resentment" . . . Puritan and Jewish sentiments are still prevalent. Politics rests on a "Covenant" with God, so that fidelity to a special revealed law and everlasting, prosperity and victory are inseparable. This is what in the book I am now writing, "Dominations and Powers" I call a militant as against a generative society; that is, one intentionally chosen and imposed, rather than one that has grown up by an unintended concourse of circumstances and interests. In this respect democracy is intolerant and totalitarian: that is, it claims exclusive rightness for its system regardless of natural growths and diverse ideals. Benda, who is a doctrinaire, doesn't mince matters on this point. Nor do the Russians. (LGS 21 October 1946).

RICHARD MARC RUBIN

¹¹ See Rubin 2016.

¹² Ralph Barton Perry (1876-1957) received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1899 while Santayana was an assistant professor. He became Santayana's colleague in 1902 and taught at Harvard until 1946.

The photograph on page 26 is from the José Luis Pajares Collection.

References with Abbreviations

Santayana, George

- DP 1951. *Dominations and Powers*. New York Charles Scribner's Sons.
- COUS 1920. *Character and Opinion in the United States*. London: Constable and Company.
- LGS 1868-1952. *The Letters of George Santayana*. Critical Edition.
- LL 1886-1912. Letters to Charles Alexander Loeser. <https://digitalsantayana.iupui.edu/loeser/index.html>.
- PP 1944-1953. *Persons and Places*. Critical Edition.
- PGS 1940. *The Philosophy of George Santayana*. Illinois: Open Court.
- SE 1922. *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*. London: Constable and Company.
- SB 1896. *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory*. Critical Edition.
- WL 1903-1937. Letters to Baron Albert Wilhelm Freiherrn von Westenholz. <https://digitalsantayana.iupui.edu/westenholz/index.html>.

Other References

- Adams, J. Donald. 1946. "Speaking of Books." *New York Times*, 10 November 1946: 101.
- Amir, Lydia. 2019. "The Special Case of Laughter," *Overheard in Seville* 37: 44-76
- Arnett, Willard E. 1989. Review of *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory*. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* (Indiana University Press) 25 no. 4: 538-48.
- C.L.F. 1897. Review of *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory*. *American Association for the Advancement of Science* 6, no. 140: 375-376.
- Dawidoff, Robert. 2011. "Santayana: Genius of the Closet," *Overheard in Seville* 29: 4-13.
- Hume, David. 1990 [1751]. *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
- Kremplewska, Katarzyna. 2022. *George Santayana's Political Hermeneutics*. Brill.
- McCormick, John. 1987. *George Santayana: A Biography*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- New York Times*. 1946. "Santayana Sees All-Red Europe." 20 October 1946: 41.
- Royce, Josiah. 1893. "Varieties of Individual Temperament," *Journal of Education*, vol.37, no. 23, June 8, 1893.
- Rubin, Richard Marc.
 - 2016. "Santayana and the Arts" *Overheard in Seville* 34: 44-58
 - 2020. "Santayana in 1895." *Overheard in Seville* 38: 7-13

- Titchener, E.B. 1897. Review of *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Aesthetic Theory*. *Mind* 6:559-563
- Turnure, James. 1984. Letter to John McCormick. 22 November 1984. Collection of the Santayana Edition.
- Wathen, Lawrence James. 1946. Letter to E.E. Leisy, 1 May 1946. José Luis Pajares Collection.
- Wilson, Edmund. 1944. "Santayana: A Boyhood Between Spain and Boston." Review of *Persons and Places*. *The New Yorker*, 8 January 1944: 64-66.
- Wilson, Edmund. 1946. "Santayana at the Convent of the Blue Nuns." *The New Yorker*, 6 April 1946: 59-67.

Some Reflections on Santayana's *Dominations and Powers*

Roughly seven months before the armistice was signed that formally ended the hostilities of WWI, Santayana had written from Oxford to Mary Williams Winslow in Cambridge (USA):

Meantime besides my big book I am preparing another little one on the war, or rather on the psychological question, how governments and religions manage to dominate mankind, in spite or (as I shall show) because of their irrationality. I am thinking of calling it “Dominations and Powers.” In view of it I have been reading all sorts of things to fill in the lacunae in my knowledge of which I am made aware of as I write. I am reading the Bible from cover to cover—something I had never done before—and Josephus as a commentary¹ (LGS 6 April 1918).

The “little” book would eventually turn into a 466-page tome! To be sure, throughout the 1940s Santayana would continue reading widely in historical and political sources in order to help him achieve what he slowly discovered what he wanted to achieve in *Dominations and Powers*. On 9 May 1945 he wrote:

I have now taken up an old piece of work that I have had hanging over me for many years—since before the other war—on politics: . . . My ideal would be a much simpler material and social life; and I have no illusions about the happiness or sanctity of home and family; nor does private property seem to me a blessing to the private soul. . . . But my ideal would be a communistic public life, as in the Spartan upper class or as in a monastery, if it went with perfect liberty in thought and in the arts, like painting or writing. And I should limit all the luxuries to public gardens, libraries, churches, theatres and clubs, where each member might satisfy his own taste and develop his own vocation. (LGS to Rosamond Sturgis, 9 May 1945)

Is this simply political naïveté, or wishful, magical thinking, or worse, all three? Santayana does here employ the word “ideal.” In other words, it is an *essence*, and as something definitive of the past (“Spartan upper class or as in a monastery”) it is a Santayanian trope.

¹ In a passage from chapter 7 of *Dominations and Powers* itself, Santayana shared with his readers some of his personal background with regard to the book:

The thought of seeing history in the terms of Dominations and Powers came to me soon after I had completed writing *The Life of Reason*. Before the war of 1914-1918 I had set down various paragraphs or short essays on the subject. Others were included in my *Soliloquies in England*, written during that war; but much as the conflict occupied my thoughts from day to day, it left hardly any residuum of greater enlightenment . . . a more vivid apprehension of the actual impact of Dominations and Powers in the political world was forced upon me by the war of 1939-1945; for I lived through it in Rome in monastic retirement, with the visible and audible rush of bombing aeroplanes over my head, and of invading armies before my eyes. (DP 22)

This is my problem with *Dominations and Powers* specifically. I do read it as serious, probing deliberations of a mind concerned with the socio-political surroundings. But, taken together as an expression of political philosophy, there are gaping shortcomings. They are personal reflections, as the very title of the book suggests. As a matter of fact, I do not even consider it political philosophy at all.² Rather, I read the work very much in the same spirit as when Santayana states in the "Preface" to *Dominations and Powers*: "Neither historical investigation, therefore, nor political precepts are to be looked for in this book. All that it professes to contain is glimpses of tragedy or comedy played unawares by governments; and a continual intuitive reduction of political maxims and institutions to the intimate spiritual fruits that they are capable of bearing"³ (DP ix). The human individual is the centerpiece in Santayana's political reflections. It is only to the degree to which political institutions, through the principles and ideologies which guide their impact on the individual, that Santayana concerns himself with the *forms* of institutions. This is consistent with his thought on the whole. Santayana always gave precedence to the individual over the collective entity, the group, the *social* or the *political*.⁴ In *Dominations and Powers* he gives priority to the *spirit* as that category of human distinction which is able to view, interpret, and analyze the interplay of forces at work in the social and political spheres, over that of the *psyche*, "the agent in politics" (DP 14). Though the *psyche* is the human attribute engaged in political activity, the *spirit* digests that activity and makes sense of it. Those forces that impact and/or

² I admit this debatable. As an enveloping definition of what *political philosophy* aspires to, Leo Strauss in his essay "What is Political Philosophy?" states:

Political philosophy will then be the attempt to replace opinion about the nature of political things by knowledge of the nature of political things. Political things are by their nature subject to approval and disapproval, to choice and rejection, to praise and blame. It is of their essence not to be neutral but to raise a claim to men's obedience, allegiance, decision or judgment. One does understand them as what they are, as political things, if one does not take seriously their explicit or implicit claim to be judged in terms of goodness or badness, of justice or injustice, i.e., if one does not measure them by some standard of goodness or justice. . . . Political philosophy is the attempt truly to know both the nature of political things and the right, or the good, political order. (Strauss 11-12).

³ Beth Singer, in her *The Rational Society: A Critical Study of Santayana's Social Thought*, makes a compelling argument to the contrary.

⁴ In the soliloquy "Society and Solitude" of *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* Santayana writes:

To substitute the society of ideas for that of things is simply to live in the mind; it is to survey the world of existences in truth and beauty rather than in its personal perspectives, or with practical urgency. It is the sole path to happiness for the intellectual man, because the intellectual man cannot be satisfied with a world of perpetual change, defeat, and imperfection. It is the path trodden by ancient philosophers and modern saints or poets; not, of course, by modern writers on philosophy (except Spinoza), because these have not been philosophers in the vital sense; they have practiced no spiritual discipline, suffered no change of heart, but lived on exactly like other professors, and exerted themselves to prove the existence of a God favourable to their own desires, instead of searching for the God that happens to exist. (SE 120-21)

control political forces are neither *dominations* nor *powers*. The qualifying difference between the two, for Santayana, lies in either the *non-maleficent*, or outright *maleficent*, influence that a power exerts, and the “things fatal, frustrating, or inconvenient . . . when they cannot be escaped” (DP 1), and that a domination imposes: “In other words, the distinction between Dominations and Powers is moral, not physical. It does not hang on the degree of force exerted by the agent but only on its relation to the spontaneous life of some being it affects” (DP 1). Human individuals are the forms of “spontaneous life” that Santayana is addressing in *Dominations and Powers*. Let us recall the route, as it were, that Santayana approached the political *from*: “I am writing a book on politics (which is a moral subject as I conceive it) and there I have reduced the authority to which we may appeal rationally (if we wish to be rational) to a combination of two factors, Circumstances, and Primal Will.” (LGS to William Gerber, 31 January 1948). How should we unpack these last two terms, “Circumstances,” and “Primal Will”? I proffer the following: *circumstances* are the material settings of the aleatory, contingent set of factors and realities that we find ourselves amidst at any one moment of life and over we only have a relative and limited sense of control, whereas the *primal will* is, as he writes further in the same letter “Integrity or Will rationalized,” or as he has defined it in *Dominations and Powers* itself: “Will, however, though it does not imply intelligence or premeditation, does imply eagerness to act” (DP 41). In other words, it is an integral, authentic sense of oneself that acts and moves in the physical setting of chance (*circumstances*). And in that constant interaction we live out our lives, define the world and ourselves, and do the best we can to make sense of it.

A third concept that is crucial to the approach Santayana utilizes in discussing political phenomena as the result of a constant, enduring tension, is what he designates the *Virtues*. In his own ontological lexicon, they would correspond in the anthropomorphic embodiment, to *spirit*. He enlightens us:

My subject here is rather the circumstances which, in each case, enable these fruits to mature, or perhaps nip them in the bud. I am concerned with the fortunes of potential *Virtues* in the hands of *Dominations* and *Powers*. . . . By *Virtues*, as opposed to *Powers* and *Dominations*, we might understand spirits having only a vegetative or lyric life, perfect in themselves, and not addressed to exercising any influence over other beings. . . . In mankind the corresponding virtues would be such gifts as health, wit, or poetic inspiration; they might even include pure intelligence and kindness. . . . Human society owes all its warmth and vitality to the intrinsic virtue in its members. Yet in politics we do not dwell on the physical or spiritual life of individuals (DP 2-3).

This is vintage Santayana. There is his naturalism, his essentialism, his overriding concern for the individual vis-à-vis the collective, his recognition that the philosophical life lies apart from the *res publica*, and his cognizance of a tragic tension that undergirds it all. As he writes above, his focus centers on the “circumstances,” which, broadly interpreted, symbolize the material life subject to dominations and powers, i.e., the political playing field, where we as individuals thrive in a relative *eudaimonia* or struggle, even perish, under the boot of an insufferable oppression.

This tension, this contingency,⁵ suffuses the contexts that any given individual confronts in living out his or her life.⁶

The human psyche is the active agent in political life:

There is a double force in repeating the old axiom that man is an animal An animal has inward invisible specific springs of action, called instincts, needs, passions, or interests; and it is only in relation to these psychic springs of action that Powers and Dominations can be distinguished. The criterion in politics is moral; and the agent in politics is not man as he appears to the senses, but an inner proclivity to action and passion that animates him, and that I call the psyche (DP 14).

And here we can bring into the discussion some passages from "Apologia Pro Mente Sua," where he clarifies that in his own understanding "interest," translated as "all passions and valuations, was the *source* of value;" whereas, "interests conceived objectively, as the ends or goals of aspiration were *identical* with value" (PGS 577-78). Santayana's interest in the political realm was primarily spectatorial—outside *activity* itself, and disassociated from any intent to fashion or refashion it. Santayana wrote in 1949:

I think the centre and criterion for moral preference is, in each case, the endowment of the psyche, and its capacities. . . . And I am a naturalist in philosophy, not assigning an absolute authority to any particular form of morals or government, none, for instance, to "democracy." (LGS to William Bysshe Stein, 1 September 1949)

How can an ironic relativist (Santayana), who thinks that no one form of government is basically better than any other, be a *political* philosopher? Plato produced his *Republic* and blueprint for an ideal philosophy-governed city-state, and later modified his normative ambition in his *Laws*. Only after rigorous analysis and

⁵ As Santayana puts it, the "essential contingency of existence keeps every door perpetually open to change." DP 50.

⁶ Two passages by two different scholars, enlarge on this point. The conservative scholar Russell Kirk writes: "Often the imperturbable Santayana, in Boston, Berlin, London, Avila, or Rome, is like Stilbo (described by Seneca), tranquil amid the sack of Megara, indifferent to catastrophe, indifferent to the conquering Demetrius who, enthroned, wonders at the philosopher. What has he lost? Goods, daughters, his house? All these are nothing, only 'the adventitious things that follow the beck of fortune'; permanence is nothing; he retains his self, and all the consolations of natural beauties and mysteries. . . . Beneath this generous tolerance, however, Santayana adheres to a firm and haughty standard for judging dominations and powers: a good society is beautiful, a bad society is ugly." Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago: Regnery, 1986), 444-45. And John McCormick, his biographer claims: "*Dominations and Powers* is a fascinating demonstration of Santayana's strengths and weaknesses. Here he carried forward into politics his fundamental naturalism; in novel historical applications he re-states his alliance of psyche, spirit, and essence; . . . The book as a whole recapitulates previous positions without merely repeating them, a tribute to his philosophy and prose. The weaknesses derive from the forced imposition of order on a mass of material written over a very long time." *George Santayana* (New York: Knopf, 1987), 486.

comparative speculation, Aristotle wound up championing aristocracy as the least reprehensible regime in the last two books of the *Politics*. Machiavelli prescribed a radically new set of practical *Realpolitik* principles that stand in opposition to Aristotle's teleological principles, and aims at nothing short of a political *re-education* of those who would exercise political authority or governance. Even Santayana's beloved Spinoza, in his *Theologica-Political Treatise* (1670) argued for a democratic, philosophy-informed structure between governed and those governing. As for Santayana, *What is he championing, proposing, outlining, prescribing?* Two sentences in *Dominations and Powers* offer us a straightforward, irrefutable expression of how *nonpolitical* Santayana was, even when writing a work that he considered the most *political* of all his writings: "Physical powers—and I think all power is physical at bottom—begin to figure in politics only when they are exercised by persons forming a society, or capable of forming one. In this study we cannot go deeper than the living human individual, his powers and passions, as they work in society and are modified by it" (DP 23).⁷

In Santayana's analysis of the interplay between dominations and powers, with virtues as *subjective* consequences, he structures *Dominations and Powers* by wielding a tripartite conceptual framework. The subtending natural order ("those on which the individual is most radically dependent, and by which his nature is most radically modified" [DP 23]), he calls the *Generative Order*, corresponding to those attachments and loyalties we form from the earliest years on, *viz.*, our biological family, or what we associate with "growth, custom, tradition" (DP 23). With time, as we mature as individuals this order confronts and often clashes with another one, the *Militant Order*, corresponding to those associations we initiate and participate in through the exercise of our autonomy. These include "political parties, religious sects, and parasitical arts" (DP 24),⁸ and one could easily append revolutionary groups, criminal conspiracies, secret societies, and cults.

The regulative arrangement existing in any given socio-political order is what Santayana terms the *Rational Order*. This order attains its ability to hold together a balance, or harmony between both humans and their environments, between humans and other humans, depending on the context. It is in a constant, prolonged state of tension. This cannot be avoided no matter what amount of enlightened social *planning* supervenes as a power, or no matter what extreme of political suppression is at the disposal of any domination. As a constant, Santayana's

⁷ Once more, employing a Straussian claim as a counterpoint, we can gauge just how tenuous Santayana's relationship to political philosophy is, and just how subjective. Strauss claims that to "justify philosophy before the tribunal of the political community means to justify philosophy in terms of the political community, that is to say, by means of a kind of argument which appeals not to philosophers as such, but to citizens as such. To prove to citizens that philosophy is permissible, desirable or even necessary, the philosopher has to argue *ad hominem* or 'dialectically.'" (Strauss 93). First of all, Santayana as a philosopher was never interested in "proofs." Secondly, if Strauss had in mind the Socratic dialectic, a question and answer *agon*, then Santayana fails to meet that criterion also, except perhaps, in a literary way, in his *Dialogues in Limbo*.

⁸ A list of the "parasitical arts" would include the fine arts, sophisticated craftsmanship such as jewelry, clockmaking, certain toys, and luxury items.

ontological *spirit* becomes the tragic spectator (for as the arbiter in the process subject to forces that it cannot control, and thus tragic) of a material unfolding and evolution: “For after all it is the spirit that witnesses and compares all things, and can criticize the Will of the human psyche which is the agent and protagonist in all these dramas” (DP 26).

What can we, collectively speaking, assess about Santayana’s political thought? To begin with, the claim that Beth Singer has put forth (that Santayana was a “systematic social philosopher”), needs to be answered individually by all of us. That is a strong beginning. Santayana shares with Aristotle and John Stuart Mill a conceptual blurring of the boundaries traditionally separating ethical (moral) and political thought. In Santayana’s case, the political *is* moral. They are indissolubly linked, even fused. In our relationship to the political realm we can never be that far removed from trying to think of, work for, and even enact what we consider to be the *good* for that contingent realm, as mistaken or unrealistic as it may be. From the earliest period on (post-1913 in this instance), when he first made a concerted effort to keep abreast of international (wherever he happened to be) political developments, he was always on the sidelines, “in the bleachers,” observing and ruminating. He was the same during the 1939-1945 years, and post-WWII, as he was in the post-1913 period. In a letter of 1949, he wrote about a German review that the American army had sent him:

I find it instructive and refreshing, so that sometimes it sets me writing a fresh chapter for Dominations & Powers (the chapters are very short, five or six usually) and they are not strictly consecutive, but only collected and touched up a little so as to fall into groups and develop the points of my grand general plan, which gives the essential thesis or doctrine of the book: namely, that there are three Orders of Society: the Generative, that grows up of itself: the Militant, which is imposed on mankind in all sorts of contradictory ways by bandits, conquerors, prophets, reformers, and idealists; and the third the Rational order, which doesn’t exist except in the imagination of philosophers” (LGS to Raymond Bidwell, 8 August 1949).

The last sentence in the quote can seem somewhat ironic coming from the individual who wrote a five-volume *œuvre* with the title of *The Life of Reason*. Yet, for Santayana *reason* is never isolated from the comprehensive, unified human being, mind and body merged, and the *life of reason* as a notion is “the happy marriage of two elements—impulse and ideation—which if wholly divorced would reduce man to a brute or to a maniac. The rational animal is generated by the union of these two monsters” (LR1 4). Reason also includes elements of the imagination. Bearing in mind his unwavering relativism, it might even be considered as fortuitous and the result of a great windfall for an individual who could (given the terrible precariousness of life, chance, and history) consider it to be the case that a form of life could be rational. I am emphasizing Santayana’s *nonpolitical* political thinking, in a philosophical sense, in my reading of *Dominations and Powers*, and I think it warranted by a comprehensive understanding of his life.

Leo Strauss is quite helpful in understanding this last point. In the essay cited at the beginning of this piece (“What is Political Philosophy?”), he makes a crucial

distinction between political *philosophy* and political *thought*: “All political philosophy is political thought, but not all political thought is political philosophy. Political thought is, as such, indifferent to the distinction between opinion and knowledge; but political philosophy is the conscious, coherent and relentless effort to replace opinions about political fundamentals by knowledge regarding them” (Strauss 12). Santayana could very well be thought of as a *nonpolitical* political thinker (whenever he thought about the political, which, comparatively speaking, was not that often in his long life) and *not* a political philosopher. This idea could aid us in understanding *Dominations and Powers*, nearly seventy years after his death.

CHARLES PADRON

References with Abbreviations

Santayana, George

- DP 1951. *Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society and Government*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- LGS 1868-1952. *Letters of George Santayana*. Critical edition.
- LR1 [1905] 2011. *Reason and Common Sense*. Critical edition.
- PGS 1940. Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. *The Philosophy of George Santayana*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- SE 1922. *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Other References

- Kirk, Russell. 1986. *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot*. 7th ed. Chicago: Regnery.
- McCormick, John. 1987. *George Santayana: A Biography*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Singer, Beth J. 1970. *The Rational Society: A Critical Study of Santayana's Social Thought*. Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University.
- Strauss, Leo. 1959. *What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Santayana On Colour: Collisions with Contemporary Thought

Introduction

Colour enjoys a special place in Santayana's philosophy. Colour, he notes, is "a most pungent and positive essence" (RB 90), one whose proper station is among what he views as the "aesthetic and sentimental essences which fill human discourse" (RB 131). Recent discussions regarding the so-called "structure of colour" threaten his account of this most basic datum, according to which each distinct colour is in itself a simple essence. In this paper I explore the intersection of this contemporary discussion with the account of colour Santayana presents. My aim is not to weigh-in on one side or the other of this debate, namely, as to whether colours are phenomenologically or intrinsically simple or have, in some or all cases, internal diversity—I follow the convention of treating at least the elementary colours as phenomenologically simple—but rather to demonstrate the relevance and versatility of Santayana's views in relation to this debate, and in the process, deliver a fresh examination of them, one that doesn't so much treat his views in a vacuum or as a hermetically sealed, self-contained corpus, but rather introduces them into a new conceptual environment and observes how they logically behave.

This exercise shows that Santayana has the theoretical resources to accommodate the supposed structure of colour, but also that he has a principled way of rejecting it. His treatment of colours as phenomenological simples is, as such, an amendable feature of his account. What's more, the structure of colour is anticipated by some of his remarks—more precisely, on musical harmony and complex essencehood. In my analysis I distinguish two sorts of complexity, namely *integrational* and *regional* complexity, both of which, as will be shown, Santayana well-understood.

Santayana's Theory of Mind: An Overview

Essences, Santayana explains, "are primordial and distinct forms of possible being" (RB 430). This makes them responsible for the type-individuation of particulars; in this regard¹, essence "is just that character which any existence wears in so far as it remains identical with itself" (RB 23). Essences are universals (Santayana 1920, 168; SAF 77; RB 19; 23; 39) that may be realised in numerous instances; but as *transcendent* universals, they have positive ontological status independent of their existential instantiation.² Moreover, they may be regarded as the blueprints

¹Token individuation or particularization, on the other hand, is contributed by the *substance* of a concrete particular, not the essence it exhibits (see RB 212-213 on substance as the principle of token individuation).

² Cf. Lachs 1967, 286. Santayana affirms that essences are universals (see Santayana 1920, 168; 1925, 284; RB 39), but this is something that is, he thinks, consistent with their also being *individuals* (see RB 18-19; 39).

but not the ontological drivers of existents, just as the design of a car does not make for a car. And just as many designs never make it to the production line, many essences, according to Santayana, are never existentially instantiated, but merely intuited. And still more essences will never be intuited at all, given the absolute infinity of this realm (RB 21) and the finitude of spirit; in either case, we may say that these blueprints never get past the drafting desk.

Appropriating Santayana's term, let us call essences that do not qualify existents but which we nevertheless intuit *specious* ones.³ Because, as we shall see, Santayana thought that human psychology predisposes one to *project* or hypostasize intuited essences, essences merely intuited but never existentially instantiated, while usually playing some vehicular role in the perception of external things, also typically function as imposters.⁴ For example, "specious change" (SAF 25-26; RB 76)⁵ is a visually apparent yet false change, a mere subjective succession at best or a unified image of change that is not "actual change in the given object" (Ibid.).⁶ Yet such false change is one in which we nevertheless have "an animal compulsion to believe" (SAF 30). Furthermore, "[m]athematical space and time", Santayana says, are extrapolations of the "pictorial" extension and specious duration (see SAF 196; RB 249) of human intuition, respectively. These essences, he contends, become hypostatized and equated, most notably by Descartes, with the nature of physical space or time (RE 158-159). But in truth, he argues, they always "remain specious or ideal" (RB 240).⁷ "Specious objects are mere essences" (RB 229), which is to say, are given in intuition but not existentially instantiated.⁸

³ Note that Santayana, irregularly, uses the phrase "specious essence" (RB 207, 229).

⁴ See RB 255.

⁵ See also SAF 30 on the "pictures of motions and ideas of events" and "pictured change". Cf. RB 267; 269; 485-492.

⁶ Cf. RB 272: "Actual succession is a substitution, not a perspective." See also RB 267-268. Cf. CPR B 234.

⁷ See also SAF 63; cf. RB 260.

⁸ This initial characterisation of essences as blueprints is admittedly imperfect, first because, as will be discussed, the phenomenological qualities or qualities of feeling we intuit (e.g., qualities of pain) just are the non-existent essences in themselves, according to Santayana (SAF 39), and thus, in his view, there is no intrinsic difference between, say, a universal quality of pain in the non-existent realm of essence, and that universal quality of pain manifested in consciousness (see Santayana 1925, 284). It is the same mere universal in either case without any token-individuation. Perhaps the "blueprint" moniker, then, is straightaway ill-fitted, since there is nothing for these specious essences—i.e., those only ever manifested in "living intuition" (RB 114)—to be blueprints of, no possible concrete versions or implementation of them. A specious essence cannot be a "blueprint" insofar as that implies, *per impossibile* (RB 131; 136), that it could be filled-out or existentially instantiated, or (formally) realised in some concrete particular. Let us observe that the "*per impossibile*" is the weak point of this objection. It is rash to take a hard stance on the possibility or impossibility of the concrete existence of "specious" essences, insofar as "no essence is non-existent intrinsically" (RB 54). Santayana does qualify this assertion: "[F]or all it [i.e., an essence] contains or suggests it may very well exist; that is, some existence somewhere may for a time embody or manifest it" (Ibid.). The "or manifest" here might be taken as indication that

he is not disbanding from a metaphysical prohibition on the existential exemplification of “specious” essence, since he often reserves the notion of manifestation for the mere spiritual actualisation (or intuition) of essence—see p. 47 below—something that does not rise to the level of existential instantiation. This interpretation, however, does some injury to the cogency of the use of “exist” in the preceding clause. Besides which, Santayana also insists that “‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ . . .” are conventional epithets, and that “in nature they are applicable only in the view of human ignorance or imagination.” (RB 27) This seems to me a psychologising of modality, and in this regard, any absolute metaphysical prohibition on the existential instantiation of some subclass of essences (namely, the “specious” ones) is a bit of puffery. Additionally, Santayana takes as some of the most clear-cut examples of specious essences to be colours, sounds, tactile qualities of hot and cold (SAF 84; RB 351) and the rest of the sensuous qualities. His list of specious essences does not end with the sensuous qualities; mathematical essences and those of formal logic are specious, for instance (see, e.g., SAF 222; RB 28; 434-435; 458), and in some places, he goes so far as to say that “[n]othing given exists” (SAF 84; cf. RB 136). If we take this proclamation uncritically—see footnote 17 on p. 47 below—we are forced to regard all intuited essences as specious. But there are many counterpoints to this austere picture: First, Santayana admits that the existential exemplification of intuited essences is conceivable (RB 135). Second, the speciousness of the sensuous qualities or precepts of sense is a position that requires a careful defence, and this defence is lacking in Santayana. It goes without saying that there is a rather big industry for realist accounts of sensuous qualities in some philosophical circles today—cf. realist primitivist accounts of colour (e.g., Allen, Gert, Stroud, Hacker, Hacker & Bennett, Campbell). And, furthermore, the standard, and in my view discredited, perceptual relativity arguments on which Santayana relies for demonstrating the speciousness of such sensuous qualities (see SAF 84) are not very compelling—cf. Mizrahi on “‘the color unicity error’”, where she problematizes what Durant Drake (Drake 12-13) and G.E. Moore (Moore 35) refer to as the “axiom of uniplicity”, a key tenet of such relativity arguments. But then if the speciousness of these sensuous qualities is not beyond question, and they constitute some of the most clear-cut examples of specious essences, then, *a fortiori*, the speciousness of the other intuited essences is also dubious. To be sure, the qualities of pleasure and pain in all of their various forms, or the “rudimentary vital feelings” themselves, are the last bastion in this regard (SAF 85; RB 131). But even here we must not rush to judgment, since, as I describe elsewhere—see Sopuck 2021, 10-47—Santayana’s doctrine of beauty involves taking the qualities of pleasure that constitute beauty to occur in an “objectified” form (SB 30-35). And this proposal taken in conjunction with the fact that there is some reason to think that he may ultimately have abandoned the subjectivism of his earlier sentimentalist account of beauty (see Sprigge 89-91) seems, after careful consideration, to clear the way for the metaphysical possibility of a passive embodiment of beauty, and *ipso facto* of qualities of pleasure. With the dubiousness of the speciousness of colours (and, correlatively, the intuited quality of visual light (see p. 64 below)) noted, I shall nevertheless proceed to treat their speciousness, in the sense now stipulated, as unproblematic, in accordance with Santayana’s own view. A second objection to the blueprint model for understanding essence runs as follows: How shall something with the vital urgency of pain be anything like a blueprint, which is something towards which it is possible to assume a dispassionate posture? To this it may be responded that the painfulness of the pain we intuit is not a function of its quality or its intuition *per se*, in Santayana’s view. It is rather a consequence of the more comprehensive psychological reaction or feeling in which this spiritual witnessing resides; and it is this more comprehensive reaction that somehow sentimentalises these essences and gives them their visceral, negative charge. This is to say that it is metaphysically possible, in

Whether essences receive existential instantiation at all, according to Santayana, is always a contingent fact: Any essence—including, he adds for good measure, *the essence of existing*, as opposed to *an existing instance of an essence*—is only brought into the realm of existence by some non-logical force perfectly extraneous to it (RB 416):

Something not essence . . . actualises and limits the manifestation of every essence that figures in nature or appears before the mind. To this dark principle of existence we give the name of substance (RB 206).

According to Santayana's definition, the existential instantiation of any essence requires that it be somehow placed or thrown into a situation where it accrues some set of accidental or external relations to another essence (RB 44, 121). External relations are, Santayana reports, "due to the position, not the inherent character, of the terms" (RB 206). Such relations imply an aggregation or collection of separate things—adjacencies—and aggregates occur, he believes, only insofar as essences are corporealised or embedded in a substance (RB 123, 273), which is to say, are imbued with a sort of (spatial and temporal) "thickening" (RE 119) that localises them or renders them commensurable in time or place.⁹

A simple essence is a uniform theme, a "pure unity" (RB 70).¹⁰ The scent of sulphur or the unmodulated sound of a singular musical note, for example, is in itself a uniform quality without any contrasting elements. Lacking internal diversity, simple essences are unanalysable (RB 70). Conversely, complex essences involve an ensemble of elemental themes unified under an organising principle or master theme—e.g., the visual scene of the river bank. They are internally diverse. However, they are not collections of simpler essences; for they have no proper parts (SAF 116-117; RB 71; 89). A complex essence, as Timothy Sprigge sums up, "is an individual unity, identifiable by its unique overall character, which . . . can be analysed into elements [but] cannot be regarded as composed of them" (Sprigge 77-78).

Accordingly, all essences are indissolubly whole (RB 85-91; SAF 116-117), and complex essences are no exception to this rule. They, like all essences, possess a constitutional integrity not found in the composition of the matter or substance by which they may be existentially instantiated or expressed. The latter consists of an accidental aggregation of separate material units each of which in itself

Santayana's view, to have an intuition of the quality of pain (or better, that quality which is experienced as naturally painful in certain organisms) without being pained (RB 679)—see section: "Pure Intuition"; consider also recent discussions on "mindfulness" in relation to the treatment of bodily distress (see, e.g., Fjorback). So, while yes, spiritual manifestations of qualities of pain are a matter of great urgency and emotional suffering for beings like us (by them we are "prodded into madness about nothing" (Ibid.)), they are nevertheless intrinsically inert, and thus, a dispassionate posture towards them is appropriate, just as it is regarding blueprints. Therefore, all in all "blueprint" is a serviceable notion for conceiving of the ontological status of essences in more concrete terms.

⁹ Cf. SAF 217.

¹⁰ Cf. RB 101, where Santayana calls colour a "purest essence".

instantiates its own essence; the former is characterised by, to anticipate, “holistic” relationships among essential elements or constituents (RB 294; SAF 121-124).

Elements of complex essences, therefore, have no *real* identity apart from the wholes in which they are contained, on the relevant view, as these elements and their respective wholes are reciprocally implicative; one cannot *truly* conceive (or have) the one without conceiving (or having) the other.¹¹ From the preceding, Santayana reasons that if, when fixating on an element of a complex essence, one loses acquaintance with the whole, the object of intuition is immediately exchanged, such that the element of that complex (and consequently that complex itself) is replaced by a separate, simpler essence—a new whole unto itself—that especially resembles the original element with which one began. In such, call it, *aberrant abstraction*, a complex essence is replaced by a simpler essence that resembles some subset of its elements (RB 85; 89; 90-91).

When it comes to relations, the only ones that qualify essences intrinsically, in Santayana’s view, are: 1) the relations of similarity and dissimilarity they have to other essences and 2) the constitutive relations (e.g., inner resemblance relations) holding among an ensemble of elements—including the relations each aspect of the ensemble has to the totalising or master theme it in part comprises—within a single complex essence (RB 71; 131). As an example of (2), the length of the diagonal of a square is equal to the square root of twice the square of one of its sides. This internal relationship among a square’s elements is sufficient to identify it as a square and, thus, can be said to constitute it. As an example of (1), a square must have more interior angles than a triangle does. Sprigge calls (1) “contrastive relations” and (2) “holistic relations” (Sprigge 83).

The holistic relations of a complex essence are logically prior to its contrastive relations. The former are constitutive; the latter are metaphysical corollaries. Holistic relations, borrowing Leibniz’s notion, are among the “immediate requisites” of an essence: They are “ingredient[s] of something”, such that “when we posit [them] . . .” we *ipso facto* “[have] posited the [thing] . . . as well” (PPL 667). The priority of holistic over contrastive relations is indicated in the following:

Had each term no private, indefinable, positive essence of its own, it could not justify those exclusions by which we define it, nor could it fill its appointed place and spread out its eternal intrinsic relations in the realm of essence. (RB 56)

Since holistic relations are a subset of the constituent elements of a complex essence¹², they factor into its private character, and this character is the precondition of its contrastive relations.

¹¹ Clarification on how elements of a complex essence can, in a sense, be *independently identifiable* without having *independent identities* is provided below—note that the qualifiers, “real” and “truly” in the above are designed to create the logical space for an *identification of elements* that does not amount to the observance of their ultimate identities.

¹² They cannot be its only elements, since this would, barring an infinite regress of holistic relations, amount to relations without terms or relata. Rather, a precondition of an essence’s

It is a rather curious feature of Santayana's view that complex essences are atomic individuals and yet internally diversified. This is a matter of ontology (namely, that of the prospective *non-mereological composition* of *structural universals*¹³) that must be settled before any ultimate evaluation of the intelligibility of his doctrine occurs. For present purposes, let us put this hard ontological problem aside and assume that a cogent explanation can be given in this regard.¹⁴ Instead, I will focus on a distinct, though related question, namely, how complex essences do not contain proper parts—which is to say, separable units with independent identities—but nevertheless submit to *analysis*.¹⁵ A full accounting of this

holistic relations is that the essence is internally diversified or has differentiable attributes—in one of two basic senses to be specified in the later section, “Regional Complexity vs. Integrational Complexity”—which is to say, the essence must be *complex*.

¹³ See Forrest, Bigelow and Pargetter, and Lewis on, what Lewis (derisively) coins, the “magical conception of structural universals”. I respond to Lewis’ objection to this conception from a Santayanian perspective in an article that is forthcoming in *The Pluralist*, Fall 2022.

¹⁴ Mind you, this prospective explanation is a tall order, and would have broad implications if carried-out successfully. The view in need of defense is not unlike that which Jonathan Schaffer identifies as the crux of monist cosmology in its, in his view, bastardised or misinterpreted formulation, according to which “the whole has no parts.” (Schaffer 2010, 33) This formulation of monism is, he argues convincingly, distinct from the more defensible thesis that the whole is *prior* to its proper parts (Ibid.). The relevant thesis is not specific to bastardised monism; it also has its theological iteration (i.e., the problem of the Trinity), for example. Note that Santayana grounds this principle of a diversification without individuation in his observations on artistic composition. In a painting, for example, each aspect, including the whole, intrinsically implicates (or is the immediate requisite of, or is imminently contained by) the rest (RB 85). Accordingly, there is no plurality of individuals but only an implicate order of elements eternally bound together in a single, totalizing system (see RB 75)—cf. RB 70 on quantitative and formal unity. Whether the analogy to the arts makes more intelligible the relevant thesis (regarding a diversification without individuation), or if, for instance, it instead only motivates the less exotic view that the whole is prior to its parts, is a question for another paper.

¹⁵ See RB 89: “As a thing is not a compound of its appearances, so an essence is not a compound of the terms into which it may be analysed.” Confusion on this point can be detected in the secondary literature. For example, Marjorie Miller rightly notes that “complex essences are not additively produced out of parts, for Santayana” (40). Nevertheless, she makes the mistake of thinking that “complex essences may include parts which are also essences.” (38) Santayana is somewhat at fault for this confusion. In some places, the non-mereological compositionality of essences seems, at first glance, to be put into question—e.g., see RB 85–86: “The triangle, in so far as its three lines are included in the intuition which defines it, involves the lines so enumerated and synthesised; and each of these lines, as found in that concretion and as parts of that essence, implies the rest. . . . But the moment the given concretion is dispersed, the elements which were parts of it stand alone, and no one of them implies that whole any longer, or implies any of the other parts. . . . [E]ach element is now a complete essence, open to separate intuition, and not manifesting any need or proclivity to be united with any other essences into a whole centred elsewhere.” And in a number of cases, he does speak as though complex essences have “parts” (e.g., see RB 71; 85; 91; 419). However, at least at RB 419, where he returns to the nature of logical

epistemological or methodological question will ultimately require a response to the abovementioned hard ontological issue, but some provisional clarification of it is possible at the periphery, so to speak, of this hard problem. To this end, let us, for illustrative purposes, consider the case of holistic resemblance relations, and in particular, the resemblance relations that hold among the elements of a complex essence.

An element of a complex essence will *ultimately* resemble another element within that essence in virtue of their mutual containment and logical reduction to the whole¹⁶—identity is characteristic only of an atomic unit in its completeness. However, the elements of a complex essence must, in some sense, be differentiated. Otherwise, the essence would not be complex, but would rather constitute a pure unity.

Complex essences can be analysed despite being atomic individuals. In such a nominal analysis—*nominal* because it doesn't resolve the thing into parts *proper*—elements are treated *as if* they have identities of their own. This, as Santayana would say, is a “trick of discourse”; it is the inverse of “the act of calling one essences which are individually two” (RB 88)—i.e., the act of calling *two* an essence that is actually one.

It is this nominal analysis that prepares the ground for discourse regarding the varying resemblances of elements—a conceptual requirement of which is that the elements are treated as though they were distinctly identifiable. Once the recognition that the elements or subordinate themes are all mutually contained (and that the elements are not conceptually independent) is allowed to fully dictate the terms of one's thinking, there is a cognitive movement away from nominal analysis and towards the holistic appreciation of the essence as an atomic individual.

But if the retreat from this analysis is delayed, the variations in degrees of resemblance among the regions or diverse elements of the complex may come into account. Such resemblances are, Santayana would say, “enumerated successively, [and] lie in the essence together, and lie there from the beginning, even if my intuition is slow to disentangle them, or never does so at all” (SAF 116-117). In this sense, the atomic simplicity of a complex essence is “a pregnant simplicity” (SAF 117). Resemblance conceived under the cognitive weight of nominal analysis, we

implication, and in particular, “the systems of relation discoverable amongst essences”, it is clear that Santayana is relying on his notion of “figurative” or *virtual* containment: It is not that simpler essences are proper parts of complex essences; rather, to anticipate later discussion, elements that are *virtually equivalent* to such essences factor as their “parts”, which is to say, their subordinate themes. And, again, it is not that the elements of a complex essence are “parts” in the sense of being independent and separable units aggregated together to form a mereological whole. Rather, they are “parts” only in the sense that they are differentiable attributes or features of that complex. Cf. RB 57, where Santayana uses “virtually” within a discussion of the “figurative” containment of all special essences within the essence of “pure Being”. The nature of such virtual containment/identity will be discussed in some depth in the last section.

¹⁶ I defer to the historical precedent for the view that identity is a limiting case of resemblance (i.e., *perfect resemblance*), and also that identity is a limiting case of relation (i.e., reflexive relation)—see Rodriguez-Pereyra 70.

may say, is *restrictive* as opposed to *ultimate*. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same process of nominal analysis holds in the case of recognising any holistic relation.

At the bedrock of thought or consciousness, according to Santayana, are imagistic presentations of non-existent essences (SAF 74-75)¹⁷, and the receptive faculty of spirit that *actualises* them or brings them into “living intuition” (RB 114).

Operations of intuition, as Santayana understands them, are dyadic, which is to say, have act/object structure. They consist of an instance of spirit or mind, and as such, exemplify the essence of spirit, but they also realise an object of intuition, i.e., a non-existent essence.¹⁸ Accordingly, intuition consists of the existence of a certain state of mind that has for its object a nonexistent, inert¹⁹ essence:

There are . . . two disparate essences exemplified in every instance of spirit; one is the essence of spirit, exemplified formally and embodied in the event or fact that at such a moment such an animal has such a feeling; the other is the essence then revealed to that animal, and realised *objectively* or imaginatively in his intuition. (RB 130)

Spirit, as Santayana says, is “a special instance” of existence, the intrinsic nature of which, as is true of any existence, “cannot itself be an object of intuition” (RB 129). The essence of spirit, Santayana explains, is “to think” (RB 331), and in this respect, spirit is immaterial (RB 234); Santayana likens spirit to an evanescent flame (SAF 287), and proclaims that “spiritual facts are utterly alien to the pedestrian flux of the materially successive”, and moreover that they are “an imponderable and invisible fact” (RB 134-135). Yet, spiritual moments (consciousness), we are told, are at once “manifestations” of matter (RB 219-220) and mental *facts* with material situation (SAF 231).²⁰ Unsubstantial themselves, they are, again, mere “manifestations of substance” that are “created and controlled by the flux of substance beneath.” (RB 233-234)

There is some instability in Santayana’s characterisation of this primitive relationship between spiritual witness²¹ and datum as what Russell means by “knowledge by acquaintance”, but he does ultimately adopt this notion: “That we

¹⁷ See Sprigge 46: “It is Santayana’s claim . . . that though something is immediately given [in intuition], this something does not, so to speak, carry its own existence, or the existence of anything else, with it. . . . [G]iven essences cannot exist, cannot be in external relations. It is their very nature to be self-complete and isolated forms of being.” I must add the following qualification: “[G]iven essences cannot exist” *in their givenness*. Whether essences that happen to be given can be existentially instantiated *elsewhere* is, I think, a distinct question (see footnote 8 starting on p. 41 above).

¹⁸ As Santayana would say, the object of intuition possesses the “specious actuality of a datum” (SAF 273). Santayana’s use of “specious” here is consistent with the one I’ve stipulated; a “specious actuality” is a subjectively apparent yet, in some sense, false actuality—cf. SAF 56. Intuition, as Santayana explains, lends intuited essences their “specious actuality” (SAF 177).

¹⁹ See RB 276.

²⁰ See also RB 29; 205; 600.

²¹ Cf. RB 562.

possess . . . knowledge of acquaintance with immediate appearance . . . is true enough" (LSK 422). And later in the same paper,

Any intuition gives knowledge of acquaintance with an essence, not subject to error, since the intuition chooses its object in the act of determining itself, and asserts no existence of that object. (LSK 432)

Russell describes knowledge by acquaintance in the following remarks:

I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself . . . [T]he relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S. (Russell 1910–11, 108)

Peter Hylton adds some further clarifications:

There is little more to be said about acquaintance than that it is an immediate relation between a mind and an object . . . Russell appeals to sensory knowledge, however, because it is the most plausible case of knowledge which lacks presuppositions . . . It is not only simple sensory states with which we can have direct acquaintance, but entities of all kinds, including those that we should call abstract. In particular, we have this kind of knowledge of propositions and relations. (Hylton 111)

Acquaintance is understood as a "nonpropositional knowledge of things" that delivers infallible certainty regarding the intrinsic nature of its object (Gertler 95). Moreover, acquaintance delivers *complete* knowledge of this intrinsic nature. Regarding his acquaintance with colour, for instance, Russell maintains:

I know the colour perfectly and completely when I see it, and no further knowledge of it itself is even theoretically possible . . . [T]hings with which I have acquaintance [are] things immediately known to me just as they are. (Russell 1912, 73–74)

As we shall see, Santayanan intuition complies entirely with these two conditions of Russellian acquaintance.

The instability of Santayana's employment of the Russellian notion of acquaintance in his exposition of intuition stems from Russell's classification of acquaintance as a species of knowledge:

[The] intuition of essence, for all its infallibility, is a mockery. We might almost say that sure knowledge, being immediate and intransitive, is not real knowledge, while real knowledge, being transitive and adventurous, is never sure. (LSK 432–433)²²

As it happens, "knowledge" is not exactly the right word for intuitions straightaway, insofar as a proper epistemic relation (in this case, a non-intellectual intersection of the ontological and the epistemic in virtue of immediate presentation)

²² Cf. SAF 170: "[I]ntuition is not knowledge."

delivers something that could, at least in principle, be converted into a true proposition, or, at the very least, presents something that *is* true. The apprehension of truth, properly speaking, consists in the reception of those essences that are also existentially instantiated, according to Santayana (SAF 227).²³ However, he also insists that the essences that receive existential instantiation are likely so utterly distinct from, and infinitely more complicated than, any of the essences we conceive let alone intuit (LSK 434-435; RB 126), that it is hardly possible that we shall ever intuit truths, and if any acquaintance relation must deliver knowledge, and knowledge delivers the truth of things, intuition, it seems, cannot be a matter of acquaintance, properly speaking.²⁴

However, I think this matter may be largely side-stepped. For, at least in *The Principles of Mathematics*, Russell affirms acquaintance relations with things that do not exist, but which only have mere *being* (Hylton 172).²⁵ And Santayana would agree with Russell that “[w]hatever can be thought of has being, and its being is a pre-condition, not a result, of its being thought.” (PM 427) All objects of intuition, according to Santayana, have reality (being) independently of their being intuited. Though acquaintance with an essence is not acquaintance with an existent, it certainly presents a *reality*, which is to say, a positive *being*, in Santayana’s view. As he says, “[P]eople suppose that whatever is non-existent is nothing—a stupid positivism, like that of saying that the past is nothing, or the future nothing” (SAF 129). And whether or not we may say that we intuit truths when we apprehend this reality or being, intuitive presentation in itself is nevertheless an infallible, nonpropositional apprehension that delivers the complete nature of some reality independent of itself (LSK 433; SAF 76), and this is enough, in my view, for it to qualify as knowledge by acquaintance in Russell’s sense.

Overlaid upon these presentations of non-existent essences are perceptions, that is, judgments or beliefs spawned by intuited presentations that function as symbols which suggest the conception of existent things (SAF 81):

Any given essence is normally a true sign for the object or event which occupies animal attention when that essence appears. . . . The environment determines the occasions on which intuitions arise, the psyche—the inherited organisation of the animal—determines their form, and ancient conditions of life on earth no doubt determined which psyches should arise and prosper (SAF 88).

It should be stressed that sensory presentations, according to Santayana, have no, to borrow Ryan Nichols’ terminology, *intrinsic representational capacity* (Nichols 92), such that the perceptions they initiate are logical or rational consequences of them (LSK 438). Rather, the connection is semiotic in nature (LSK 435-438):

²³ See also RB 486; 847.

²⁴ Cf. SAF 180: “[K]nowledge is true belief grounded in experience” Cf. Lachs 1964, 428.

²⁵ Incidentally, this fact runs contrary to the characterisation of acquaintance as an “existence-entailing relation” (cf. Cummins 319).

The mind. . . if it is animated, as it usually is, by some ulterior interest or pursuit. . . takes the essences before it for messages, signs, or emanations sent forth to it from those objects of animal faith; and they become its evidences and its description for those objects. (SAF 179-180)

Connections between signs and their significates (e.g., the word “bird” and a living bird) are external or based in some auxiliary fact (about our psychological constitutions or conventions and the world).²⁶ As Santayana puts it, “The bond between the individuality of the symbol and its significance is indeed an external one, based on an instinctive or a conventional association” (LSK 438).²⁷ This is to say that perceptual relations are not properly speaking *representational*, i.e., consisting of a triadic relation involving the mind, the object, and a representational entity (i.e., an *epistemic* rather than merely causal or vehicular intermediary) the apprehension of which is required if the awareness of the object is to occur. The judgments or beliefs that constitute perceptions are *intentionally* or *judgmentally direct*, i.e., are about physical objects and not the sense data or given essences. A given essence is merely the occasion of perception or plays a predominantly vehicular role in the perceptual process.²⁸

Our perceptions of the world are, however, rife with reference failure, in large part because they are seen as plastered with the sensuous or aesthetic qualities of intuition (like colours, sounds, flavours, and even pains) that semiotically implicate them; these are naively taken to reside in or clothe the external objects perceived. Moreover, we view these external objects through the filters of our animal interests and prejudice, which impose their own contortions. As Santayana explains,

²⁶ Cf. SAF 88; 101-102; 180; Lachs 1967, 290: “The foundation of symbolism [and Santayana’s in particular, Lachs is here inviting us to consider] is . . . the natural or dynamic correspondence of certain material objects with certain intuitions. Any essence may become the sign of any substance. . . so long as (1) the presence and activity of a substance regularly evokes . . . intuitions of that essence, and (2) the absence or inactivity of the substance is regularly accompanied by the absence of intuitions of that essence, and (3) relevant changes in the substance regularly evoke changes in the intuition of that essence.” Cf. IHM 6. XXII. p. 177-8.

²⁷ See also LSK 425.

²⁸ See LSK 437-438: “Here, as I conceive it, is the element of truth in the theory of representative knowledge. There is certainly a vehicle in the perception and conception of natural objects, a sensuous and logical vehicle quite unlike the efficacious thing. . . . But there is no screen of ideas; there is no arrest of cognition upon them.” Cf. Mackie (73): “[W]e do not normally make judgements (verbal or non-verbal) about what retinal images etc. we have and thence infer, by some explicit process of reasoning, what the outside world is like. Our naïve judgements are already about external things, and, I imagine, were so already before we learned to speak. We can sum up the truth of this matter by saying that our perceptions of material things are causally mediated but judgementally direct.” Judgmental directness, I propose, is the sort of directness achieved in Santayanan perception. This sort of directness should not be confused with, as it is sometimes called, the “presentational directness” (Alston 36-37) that is involved in acquaintance relations. In my opinion, “direct realism” is a name best reserved for accounts that secure presentational directness—cf. Sopuck 2017, 73; 75.

Having. . . . a real world to explore, the mind begins to lay on such colours as its palette supplies [P]ure essences . . . are turned into predicates of substance [or] objective qualities (RB 458).²⁹

The ideas we have of things are not fair portraits: they are political caricatures made in the human interest, but very often, in their partial way, masterpieces of characterization and insight. (LSK 436)³⁰

The conceptions of external objects proper to our perceptions have practical value in the regulation of animal activity, and constitute a significant part of “the machinery of animal response”, given that without any systematic connection between them and physical reality, the locus of their functionality would remain utterly unintelligible (LSK 434). In this sense our perceptions are *true signs*.³¹ But as far as *literal knowledge* goes, which is to say, as far as any isomorphic or formal correspondence between the external thing and our conception of it, our perceptions constitute a groping in the dark; they do not intentionally relate us to the universal forms of things in existence. And Santayana doubts that such literal knowledge of existents would serve our practical needs; our strictly erroneous perceptual or original conceptions of physical reality are uniquely suited for our animal purposes (LSK 436).³² As he later writes,

[Knowledge of existences] is symbolic initially, when a sound, a smell, an indescribable feeling are signals to the animal of his dangers or chances; and it fulfils its function perfectly—I mean its moral function of enlightening us about our natural good—if it remains symbolic to the end. (SAF 101-102)

²⁹ See also LGS to Charles Augustus Strong, 23 November 1926.

³⁰ See also LSK 439-440; 443; LRI 88.

³¹ Cf. SAF 180: “A sensation or a theory, no matter how arbitrary its terms (and all language is perfectly arbitrary), will be true of the object, if it expresses some true relation in which that object stands to the self, so that these terms are not misleading as signs, however poetical they may be as sounds or pictures.” Intuited essences, then, may be true signs of outer-worldly objects, and our perceptual conceptions are “true” insofar as they are adequate for navigating this actionable world of substance. Of course, as Santayana notes, the symbols on a map may be adequate for navigation and yet utterly dissimilar in nature from those topographical features to which they correspond. There is merely “an appropriate correspondence” (SAF 180)—not in the perfect pictorial sense—between them and the world that makes them operationally effective (see LSK 437-439). This operational effectiveness is that in which the truth of our perceptions largely consists, on the relevant view.

³² Santayana’s suspicion regarding the practical unfitness of literal knowledge is perhaps not universal, as literal knowledge, he thinks, is operative in the case of our knowledge of other minds vis-à-vis the power of sympathetic imagination (SAF 106-107), and surely this imagining has a practical function. Thus, sympathetic imagining, when accurate, could be understood as an example of literal knowledge that has a practical function.

Pure Intuition

It is clear that Santayana considers intuitional objects—sensory impressions, intensive qualities—to lie at the bedrock of thought.³³ This intuitional bedrock of thought in itself (i.e., when uncontaminated by concurrent operations of thought) infallibly reveals a variety of non-existent essences. At the same time, however,

pure and infallible intuition is an ultimate and practically unattainable clarification of the human mind. It would require the suspension of all practical reactions, interpretations, inferences, and presumptions; it would require a mind in no way confusing or overlapping its chosen object of attention. (LGS to Charles Augustus Strong, 3 November 1913)³⁴

“Objects become pure,” Santayana informs us, “when intuition permeates them and rests in them without the intervention of any ulterior intent or cross-lights” (RB 49). Pure intuition he describes as “merely the light of awareness lending actuality to some essence” (SAF 150).

Santayana does not completely rule-out the undergoing of such purification of intuition, however, such that access to the raw, original, intuitive inputs as they are in themselves, that is, apart from all extraneous conceptualisation, intent, distraction, or interrogations of judgment, is impossible. He provides some description of the nature of such pure intuition, which he likens to a sort of Zen-like blending or merger of intuition with its object, that is, of witness with thing witnessed, one that is proper only to the highest of contemplative minds:

If I confine myself to the given essence without admitting discourse about it, I exclude all analysis of that essence, or even examination of it. I must simply stare at it, in a blank and timeless æsthetic trance. (SAF 121)

At the vanishing-point of scepticism, which is also the acme of life, intuition is absorbed in its object. For this reason, philosophers capable of intense contemplation—Aristotle, for instance. . . . have generally asserted that in the end essence and the contemplation of essence are identical Thought as it sinks into its object rises in its deliverance out of the sphere of contingency and change, and loses itself in that object, sublimated into an essence. This sublimation is no loss; it is merely absence of distraction (SAF 126-127).³⁵

The domain of pure intuition is regarded as a stronghold of “immense cognitive certitude”, wherein “scepticism at last has touched bottom, and my doubt has found honourable rest in the absolutely indubitable.” (SAF 74) He continues:

Whatever essence I find and note [in pure intuition], that essence and no other is established before me. I cannot be mistaken about it, since I now have no

³³ See SAF 81-82: “[I]ntuition of essences first enables the mind to say something about anything, to think of what is not given, and to be a mind at all.”

³⁴ See also LGS to Charles Augustus Strong, 28 February 1924; LGS to Charles Augustus Strong, 17 April 1928.

³⁵ Cf. Russell 1921, 234, where he describes knowledge by acquaintance as “something like a mystic union of knower and known.”

object of intent other than the object of intuition. . . . To this mirage of the non-existent, or intuition of essence, the pure sceptic is confined. . . . [T]he most radical sceptic may . . . take hold of the quite sufficient assurance that any essence or ideal quality of being which he may be intuiting has just the characters he is finding in it, and has them eternally. (SAF 74-75)

As we observe, the absolute certitude of pure intuition of essences derives from the fact that the being (i.e., reality) of a given essence is completely exhausted in its intuition:

Essences alone are intuited so that error about them is impossible, since whatever quality the mind has before it is, in intuition, the only object we profess to know.

Any essence is a model of explicitness; it is all surface without substance. When it appears, it appears entire.” (RB 81)³⁶

In essences actually given the complexity possible is limited by the intellectual scope of the thinker; and this is not great. (RB 72)

There is nothing hidden from the subject in dreams—something behind that wall of the dreamscape, or in that imagined man’s pocket, say—since the phantom qualities one apprehends therein are only manifested insofar as one is conscious of them. Similarly, the actualisation of essence in intuition is completely transparent to that intuition. But this transparency has an ontological basis that is not Berkeleyan in nature. It is not, contra Berkeley, that intuition is revelatory of the complete nature of its object because its object’s existence and being are co-extensive with its perception or intuition. On the contrary, the objects of intuition have a reality (being) independent of their spiritual actualisation and independent of the existence of any thing or event they might be signs of. They have their station in the eternal catalogue of essence, which is a realm consisting of an infinite plenum of distinct forms of being without repetition (RB 35; 71). Accordingly, every inner alteration of quality constitutes a substitution wherein one essence is swapped for another for which that alteration is essential (SAF 112-114; RB 122). Therefore, no quality or feature of an image can be missing or left out of view in pure intuition, since however sparse, unidimensional, or seemingly occluded the image is, it will constitute a complete essence unto itself, just as “the right half of a picture is to the right and is a half only when the whole is given with it; otherwise it makes a whole picture by itself, and its centre is in the middle of it, not at the left-hand edge.” (RB 91)

The Faculty of Intent

Intuition is not the only faculty of spirit, according to Santayana. For the mind does not simply consist of undergoing some specious succession of images in a blank, aesthetic trance (Lachs 1964, 427). As Santayana notes,

³⁶ See LSK 432 (p. 48 above). See also SAF 70; 92; RB 147.

[B]esides a series of intuitions we must admit a power in thought which is not intuition but intent, since its object is something not given, but posited at a distance and identified in character only, not in position, with the given term. (RB 96)³⁷

While intuition plays a role in all thought, on Santayana's view, it is not the sole faculty of thought. There is also what he calls *intent*.

John Lachs notes that there is a paucity of explanation within Santayana's account of intent (Lachs 1964, 428). Lachs defines "intent" as "the factor which is present in all experiences that are symbol-cognitive and in no experiences that are not" (Lachs 1964, 427). He continues:

[I]ntent is the expression on a mental plane of the outdirected concerns of the psyche. Intent is the counterpart in consciousness of animal fear and the psyche's natural urge to live. The hidden agencies of the environment must be feared and fought: animal life is eternal preparation for the impending blow. This preoccupation of the psyche with the distant, the absent, and the latent is reflected in the mind in our tendency to take the qualities of the given as revelatory of what is not presented. Intent thus is an agent of animal faith: it is external reference, unthinking belief in the not-given. (Lachs 1964, 427-428)

Accordingly, intent is the expression in consciousness³⁸ of the material psyche's posture towards its environment. It therefore naturally produces an intentional directedness to that which is not given. Its primary expression is in perception, or in that "stretching forth of intent beyond intuition" (SAF 282) to "substances", which is to say, the objects "posited by animal faith" (RB 112). However, it should be noted that the symbol-cognitive is not limited to perception or even to the suggestion of existents. For, as Santayana notes,

Even such acquaintance with the realm of essence as constitutes some science or recognisable art—like mathematics or music—lies in intending and positing great stretches of essence not now given, so that the essences now given acquire significance and become pregnant, to my vital feeling, with a thousand things which they do not present actually." (SAF 168)³⁹

A complementary operation of spirit is *attention*. Ordinarily, spirit is engaged in multiple mental operations. Anywhere there is a division of objects or aspects of which one is conscious, shifts in attention or focus may become operative. For instance, our concentration may be directed outward to the objects of perception, and in this moment we may to some extent overlook the corresponding objects of intuition:

³⁷ See also SAF 275.

³⁸ See LGS to Charles Augustus Strong, 17 April 1928: "My own definition [of intent] . . . make[s] it entirely spiritual, although, like all phases of spirit, [intent is] founded on an animal reaction and [is] . . . expressing . . . a moral attitude."

³⁹ Cf. RB 114-115.

[T]he most fervent and contemplative idealist is still a man and an animal, and nature has initially directed his attention and passion not on essence, but on fact, on power, on the factors of his material destiny. (RB 383)⁴⁰

But attention can also operate in the experience of a singular complex essence. For, Santayana admits that non-aberrant forms of abstraction are possible, according to which one's attention is focused on some subset of the elements of a given complex essence in such a way that one does not lose sight of the rest of the essence. As he says, the elements of one and the same essence can be surveyed in piecemeal fashion or selectively attended to:

Thought. . . . means nothing more than the fact that some essence is contemplated, and discourse means only that this essence is approached and surveyed repeatedly or piecemeal, with partiality, succession, and possible confusion in describing it. . . . [E]ven when no change is perceived in the image before me, my discourse changes its phases and makes progress in surveying it (SAF 121-124)⁴¹

[T]he mere prolongation of this presence, the recognition of this essence as identical with itself, *and the survey of its elements in various orders*, very soon impose upon me a distinction between this essence and my intuition of it [my emphasis]. (SAF 272)

When attention is divided and not fully absorbed in a singular object of intuition, or surveys its intuitive object in piecemeal fashion, intuition is impure.

Colours as Simple Essences

Colours, along with things like pains, are not attributes of existent objects, Santayana holds, but are specious. Specious essences, again in the sense I have stipulated, receive no existential instantiation; they are those that intuitions "make manifest" namely, "the logical, aesthetic or moral universals . . . often impulsively taken for parts of the objects which evoke them" (RB 370), and, crucially, "the aesthetic aspects which aggregates may wear to the human eye" (RB 187):

[P]leasure and pain, hunger, lust, and fear, do not first reside in external objects. . . . All the rest—colours, sounds, shapes, specious spaces and times and sensations of motion—is hatched in the same nest (RB 351).

Accordingly, colours are primitives, since they are mere essences. Colour is an "intensive quality, aesthetic and emotional" (RB 237), an "immaterial absolute theme" (SAF 39).

Santayana holds that colour is a "purest essence" (RB 101) separate from the "extension, form, [and] position" with which it is presented in intuition (RB 102). Though he never, as far as I can see, explicitly calls colour a simple essence, the weight of textual evidence strongly suggests that he maintained that it was. For

⁴⁰ See also RB 41.

⁴¹ See also SAF 272-273.

instance, colour's simplicity is, I take it, an implicit assumption in his discussion of colour as "in itself . . . a most pungent and positive essence" (RB 90) that is independent of extension and figure, and that has a strong affinity to a musical note—something which he does explicitly consider as in itself a pure unity (see page 43. above). Moreover, immediately after discussing colour, he goes on to say that "all essences, however complex, are individuals, and they are individuals, however simple." (Ibid.) It strikes me that he has colour in mind in the last half of this statement, given the discussion preceding it.

A more definitive piece of textual evidence for colour's simplicity is that Santayana enlists the affective intensity of "blank light" as an example of the intuition of a simple essence (RB 146). Presumably blank light is another name for phenomenal brightness or bright white, and thus, in this passage Santayana is tacitly regarding colour as a simple essence.

And finally, in a passage that will be considered below, Santayana identifies isolated colours as "elements" and "separate simples" which may be composed by the eye into a complex essence or visual scene (RB 70). Again, this strongly suggests that he regards individual colours *per se* as simple essences.

He calls the intuition of simple essence "feeling" (RB 146), and reasons that while our childhood experiences initially involve intuitions of simple essences (RB 146-147), we likely don't intuit them beyond this phase (SAF 116). Even in the appearance of a single musical note, or scent, he observes, some internal diversity will often be present: "[A] pure quality may pervade a continuum: the scent may be diffused, the note prolonged A continuum offers an opportunity for a variation and the interweaving of qualities" (RB 70).

The Structure of Colour

Colours resemble each other to differing degrees. Alex Byrne and David Hilbert think it is implausible to reject such resemblances (2003, 13). Colours, ostensibly, resemble along three axes: *hue*, *saturation*, and *lightness*. Let us borrow C.L. Hardin's exposition of these three defining features of colour:

The *hue* of a color is its redness, or greenness, or yellowness, or blueness. White and black and the grays are the colors with zero hue. . . . Colors with the same hue may differ in the strength of that hue. . . . [T]hese colors differ in *saturation*. . . . Objects that are not seen through apertures or perceived to be self-luminous vary in *lightness*. (Hardin 25-26)

Putting aside aperture colours and the finer distinction between "lightness" and "brightness," a colour resembles another in virtue of being similar in saturation, lightness—i.e., in how much black or white is visually mixed in to it—or by being similar in hue.

Theorists like Adam Pautz and Hardin draw a distinction between elementary and binary colours. Elementary colours are those that do not "contain a hint of any other colour" (Pautz 537)—i.e., green, blue, red, yellow, black, and white. Colours that appear like a mixture of two colours are called *binary* colours (Ibid.).

Hardin speaks of binary colours as literally having elementary colours as constituents (Hardin 120-128). Accordingly, purple (reddish-blue) has blue and red as constituents; orange has red and yellow as constituents; grey has black and white, etc. Generally, colours that appear as perceptual mixtures of other colours are called *compound* colours (Allen 114).

Some distinguish “elementary attributes” from elementary colours. Pär Sundström explains this distinction:

The *attribute* redness is a component of all shades of red [and any colour shades] . . . that have [even] a tiny bit of red in them . . . [whereas] the elementary *colour* pure red . . . is not a component of any of these shades. It is a distinct shade that is composed of redness and no other elementary attribute. (Sundström 631)⁴²

The structure of colour is exhaustively detailed in the Natural Colour System (NCS), according to which “there [are] . . . six ‘elementary attributes’, blackness, whiteness, redness, yellowness, greenness and blueness, and . . . each shade of colour [is] . . . composed in a quantifiable way by 1-4 of these attributes” (Sundström 628).⁴³ Sundström emphasises that NCS describes colour as a phenomenological quality. Models that concern the technical processes involved in bringing about these qualities address a separate domain of inquiry (Ibid. 628-629).⁴⁴ NCS is empirically well-supported (Ibid. 629-630).

It should be noted that the structure of colour does not disrupt the fact that colours appear as phenomenologically continuous hues (Hardin 121). Binary colours, for instance, are not like cobblestone, or visually distinguishable pockets of colour stuck together. One cannot see, e.g., the bluish and reddish of purple as phenomenologically distinct units or regions of purple. Colour’s structure is compatible with each distinct colour’s having a homogeneous or continuously similar appearance.

The structure of colour seems to clarify some of colour’s resemblances. For example, one may say that purple more closely resembles blue than it does yellow because purple has a blue constituent but not a yellow one. Likewise, orange more closely resembles yellow than it does green because it has a yellow but not a green constituent (Hardin 120). After all, resemblance is a function of things sharing similar characteristics; Jack and John might resemble because they have similar noses, for instance.

But not every observable resemblance between colours, it seems, can be explained in this way (i.e., in virtue of homogeneous constituents amongst resembling colours), at least, this is so if we accept the common view on the structure of colour presented above. As it has been often remarked, resemblances amongst the elementary colours are manifest. As Hardin insists regarding the resemblance relation between blue and green, “the similarity is difficult to deny” (Hardin 128). And it is a common observation that blue and green are more alike in that they are “cool”

⁴² Cf. Dorsch on “superdeterminables”.

⁴³ See also Hård and Sivik; Hård et al.

⁴⁴ See also Byrne 642.

colours, whereas red and yellow are more alike in that they are “hot” colours.⁴⁵ But explaining colour’s resemblances in terms of its structure implies an internal diversity in one of the resembling colours, and this seems not to exist in the case of blue/green resemblance or yellow/red resemblance. Hardin argues that either we must 1) deny the relevant resemblances, 2) consider them explanatorily basic, or 3) locate the explanation of the resemblances in something that “come[s] [from] outside the phenomenal domain” (Hardin 132).⁴⁶

To anticipate, Santayana is put in a similar position regarding colour’s resemblances, since his official view is at odds with the internal diversity or structure of each distinct colour. However, there is *prima facie* textual support and theoretical motivation for thinking that Santayana held resemblance relations between separate colours (and essences more generally) to be explanatorily basic, and that resemblance is therefore a primitive notion. I will return to this interpretive issue and the matter of colour resemblance in the final section.

Regional Complexity vs. Integrational Complexity

A complex essence necessarily contains multiple elements, and these elements are inseparable from the whole. But there are two types of such internal diversity. In one type, the elements are unevenly distributed across the regions of the whole. In another type, the distinct elements are evenly distributed across the whole. The former type may be called *regional complexity*; the latter may be called *integrational complexity*. A visible landscape (see RB 71), for instance, is defined by a particular uneven distribution of elements in a (specious) spatial field (see RB 249–250). It is regionally diverse.⁴⁷ But compound colour does not have an uneven distribution of elements; its contrasting elements are rather continuously present. If such colours are internally diverse, this is a distinct type of internal diversity; it is similar to a complex flavour like sweet and sour, which is not sweet in one spot and sour in another, but continuously sweet and sour. If compound colours are internally diverse, they must be integrationally diverse. Santayana tends to neglect the distinction between these two forms of complexity, but his recognition of it is textually supported.

Regional complexity requires a “common medium or field,” something which provides an “opportunity for variation” (RB 70). In the landscape example, were

⁴⁵ Hardin (Hardin 129) discusses these tactile associations: Are these observable resemblances between blue and green on the one hand and red and yellow on the other a function of mere psychological association (e.g., the equating of red and yellow with fire or heat; the equating of blue and green with water, for instance)? If they are, then they are external relations; i.e., they are a function of accidental constraint—namely, their matter of fact associations in human psychology—and do not derive from the intrinsic nature of the colours themselves, given that heat and colour are metaphysically discrete qualities.

⁴⁶ Hardin opts for the third option after sketching a number of prospective physicalist explanations for such resemblances (see Hardin 134).

⁴⁷ Cf. Schaffer 59–60 on “regionalization”.

the visual field instead fragmented into disconnected, insular pockets each devoted to its own singular element, no inner diversity could result, as the “elements would then remain separate simples, like colours in tubes; before they can form any picture a canvas or an eye must compose them into a complex essence” (RB 70).

The sort of spatial regionalization involved in visible landscapes is one form of regionalization, but it’s not the only one. Regionalization has a temporal expression; it is at play in Santayana’s abovementioned examples of very rudimentary complexity. Regional complexity in such examples involves a quantitative continuity or prolongation of the quality—the note sustained and modulating across a measure, the scent progressively neutralised.

Integrational complexity, on the other hand, requires no such quantitative continuity or spatial regionalization: The sweetness and sourness of sweet and sour candy hit one all at once. Much the same is true of the harmony of musical chords. The tonal qualities of a musical chord are distributed across the whole of that complex evenly. Chordal harmony can be intuited in a single mental glance, unlike melody, which can only be intuited progressively or across a measure.

Nevertheless, chordal harmony requires a “common medium or field” in the sense that sounds played in disconnected soundproof rooms or actualised separately in distinct ears would never harmonise together. Moreover, harmonised tones of a chord are inextricably connected *qua* the elements of *that* harmony. Thus, chordal harmony conforms to Santayana’s general characterisations of complex essencehood, i.e., the nature of complex essences.

Santayana recognises the internal diversity of a musical chord, as his treatment of the nature of melody indicates:

[M]elody. . . is a chord rendered piecemeal. Time intervenes, and the harmony is deployed; so that in melody rhythm is added, with its immense appeal, to the cumulative effect already secured by rendering many notes together. (LR4 32)

Santayana here is in agreement with the common distinction in musicology between “vertical” and “horizontal” harmony. *Vertical harmony* is defined as “a simultaneity of three or more notes” (Parncutt 2). *Horizontal harmony*, on the other hand, “refers to the successive coincidence of pitches (harmonic progressions)” (Lahdelma and Eerola 38).

Part of the internal diversity of melody consists of the contrast between its tonal content and its rhythmic content, but there is unquestionably diversity within the tonal content itself, otherwise melody would be indistinguishable from a single note set to rhythm. But then, given the relationship between a melodic arpeggiation of a chord and that chord as a vertical harmony, the tonal diversity in such a melody must likewise in some sense be present in a chord played in a block or concurrently, or that melody, minus rhythm, reconstructed back into a vertical harmony. Such a vision of chord-based melody attains a concrete expression in Missy Mazzoli’s “The Primal Chord” (Mazzoli 2020).

However, integrational and regional complexity are distinct, since the notion of diverse regions of visual space is easily understood, and so too is the notion of

distinct regions of a measure or “specious duration” (SAF 196). But an intuition of regional diversity that does not intrinsically require the intuition of (specious) extension or duration is, to mind my mind, unintelligible.

A Simplicity Illusion?

If colour has a structure in the way described, human beings appear to be prone to a “simplicity illusion” (Sundström 631). The illusion is this: Despite the above-mentioned structure of colour, there is a tendency to judge compound colours as phenomenologically simple (Ibid.).⁴⁸ Santayana treats colours *per se* as simple essences or pure unities that lack internal diversity. Was Santayana subject to a simplicity illusion regarding colour? I cannot provide a definitive answer to this question. However, the mechanics of such an illusion are explicable along Santayanan lines.

Recall that even though intuited essences are transparent to consciousness, they are not normally given apart from interpretive or attentional operations that threaten to introduce errors in judgment regarding their true nature. Pure, infallible intuition is an intuition *sans* judgment. It is a sort of trance-like state the contents of which cannot be reported or introspectively analysed without compromising its purity. It requires a sort of clinical, Husserlian “epoche” or “suspension of animal faith” which brackets-away the given from its natural significance and purges its consciousness of all distraction and extraneous interest (RB 172-173). As we have seen, Santayana thinks that our awareness of the given is rarely pure. As he says, “[I]ntent precedes pure intuition, if the latter ever emerges at all: animals presumably don’t stop to study colours or sounds for their own sake” (LGS to Charles Augustus Strong, 17 April 1928).⁴⁹ In this respect, Santayana is leaning on a distinction between the ontological givenness of intuitive appearance and the given as it appears in full-blooded, judgmentally loaded experience.

A brief inspection of the notion of *presentation* helps to elucidate this picture, as the notion has an epistemological and ontological formulation. Objects of intuition are immediately ontologically present within intuitive acts.⁵⁰ There they are encountered “in themselves” and are not “estranged” from the experiencing subject. But how they are presented to full-blooded experience is not simply an epistemic imprint of the essence in itself. Rather, the filters of intent and attention affect the way we understand or judgmentally experience what is before us. Such filters, plausibly, interpose a *soft* veil—rather than a *hard* phenomenological veil—between the experiencing subject and the data of intuition.⁵¹ Distortions in our experience of the given may arise from concurrent, higher order acts of judgment and attention.

⁴⁸ Cf. Allen 144-145.

⁴⁹ Cf. IHM 4.II 29: “Judgment and belief in some cases precede simple apprehension.”

⁵⁰ Cf. Roberts (para. 34) on “non-epistemic acquaintance relation[s]”; Dretske 29; 40 on “non-epistemic seeing”; SAF 169: “[I]ntuition, which reveals an essence directly, is not knowledge”

⁵¹ Cf. Heidegger I.2.XII. p. 86: “[E]ven though Being-in-the-world is something of which one has pre-phenomenological experience and acquaintance . . . it becomes *invisible* if one interprets it in a way which is ontologically inappropriate.”

One sort of error would be that of experiencing, in the judgmentally loaded sense, a complex essence as simpler than it actually is. This could proceed in one of two basic ways, depending on the sort of complexity being considered. With respect to a regional complex, a simplicity illusion will arise insofar as one focuses on a subset of its elements and ignores the rest. This sort of error, it seems, happens with some frequency in the case of experiencing pain. When I have had a tooth ache, say, or stubbed my toe, it is as if my somatic field condenses to a single point, and that my whole world consists in nothing more than the throbbing localised in some portion of that field. But surely I still feel, for instance, the inside of my mouth when I scream out in pain in moments of profound dental pain—otherwise I might accidentally bite my tongue or drool uncontrollably in the process (and conversely, it seems implausible that the pain vanishes from consciousness in the moment one begins hollering).⁵² Provided that all that is intuited at any given moment, according to Santayana, is a single (most likely complex) essence⁵³, since otherwise we should intuit an aggregation of essences or essences in an external relation—of simultaneity—(cf. Sprigge 84; 162), and thus, *per impossibile*, an existent essence. At the moment of pain, often one is attending to a subset of the total object intuited or somatic profile presented. At least, this is true until selective attentiveness rises to the level of aberrant abstraction, in which case the object of intuition (the complex psycho-somatic profile) is exchanged for a simpler one (the simple sensation of pain).

A perhaps less controversial case of this sort of simplicity error—less controversial because pain might be thought to be so engrossing that it naturally induces aberrant abstraction—arises in the case of background noise. When I used to go to the laundromat, I would bring along a book. I read to the tune of the droning and sloshing sounds of the machines. Eventually, it was as if the droning and sloshing of those machines faded away, and all that filled my field of intuition were the symbols and patterns on page and the imaginings they evoked. It seems implausible that in that moment the sounds of those machines were erased from my consciousness. Rather, I propose, I was still intuiting them, but in an inattentive enough way such that it was *as if* they had disappeared from my auditory field. Again, since everything belonging to the field of my intuition at one moment constitutes a single,

⁵² A good indication of the importance of oral feeling for speaking is the common experience of coming back from the dentist after being injected in the mouth with a local numbing agent (e.g., novocaine). Quite often before the numbing agent wears off completely, I am liable to bite the inside of my cheeks or my tongue (or drool) when speaking or eating. This is not a case of full or even partial paralysis; paralysis is a distinct phenomenon that involves both loss of sensation and movement—consider, for instance, the phenomenon of lying on one's arm and afterwards not being able to move it until blood flow is restored. It is just that I cannot feel, from the inside, my mouth, and because of this, the perceptible boundaries of my mouth normally indicated by these inner feelings are obscured and therefore easily infringed upon during speech or chewing.

⁵³ See RB 260-261: "Spirit, however scattered its occasions and instances may be, is always synthetic in its intellectual energy or actuality: it gives the form of totality to its world. The frontiers may be vague and the features confused, but they could not be confused or vague if they were not features and frontiers of a single scene."

synthesized and complex psycho-somatic profile, what we have in such cases is a simplicity illusion of the first sort.

The second form of simplicity error, that which involves mistaking integrational complex essences for simple ones, is less clear-cut. Roughly, an integrational complex may be experienced, in the judgmentally loaded sense, as simple insofar as one might confuse continuous similarity across all regions with simplicity. It often requires a refinement of the powers of discrimination to disentangle, for instance, the inner diversity of a complex flavour, and this, I take it, is because integrational complexity is a more subtle form of inner diversity. My scotch-drinking friends will testify that their favourite scotch has “undertones” and “overtones” of such and such flavours (e.g., smoke, oak, floral, etc.). The *tonality* terminology here suggests that what they are detecting are the elements of a kind of harmony. And while, I suspect, there is often a (specious) temporal dimension to the discrimination of such inner diversity—in the order of discovery, one might first detect or survey the oak, then the smoke, then the floral flavour, etc.—this is consistent with the integrational complexity of the flavour as a whole; for, even to a musical ear, discerning the specific notes in a vertical harmony, for instance, is very often a successive affair.⁵⁴ But, music aside, to the unrefined palate, drinking scotch is usually experienced as an unpleasant flood of sensation with no recognisable inner diversity—just as the simple feeling of a bad burn at the point of contact with a hot iron, for example, is experienced as having no perceptible inner diversity.

Since the distribution of elements in a mere integrational complex is even, and the regions of that complex are continuously similar, it is difficult to conceive how selective attention could result in aberrant abstraction, except insofar as one may focus on a portion of something that is continuously similar to the exclusion of the rest of it. But this will not be the intuition of something simple, given that each region of an integrational complex is itself internally diverse.⁵⁵ It is not as though I do not hear the rest of the chord when I attend specifically to the root of it, for instance. The chord in its entirety is still there before me no matter “where” or how I direct my auditory attention.

Moreover, it is plausible that in this case we have animal intent working against us. It is rather unnatural that we should be primed to recognise the inner diversity of elements in integrational complexes, given that we are, plausibly, habitually disposed to believe that the parts of continuously similar things have continuously similar effects. As Hume wrote:

[N]otwithstanding . . . [our] ignorance of natural powers and principles, we always presume, where we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and lay our account, that effects, similar to those, which we have experienced, will follow from them. (EHU 4.2.16: 77)

⁵⁴ Note that while fully identifying the elements of an integrational complex might occur successively, those elements were nevertheless there all at once from the very beginning of the intuition (see SAF 116-117 given above on p. 46)—the phenomenon of “aftertaste” (which, if it belongs to the same flavour as the one initially experienced, constitutes a regional complex) notwithstanding.

⁵⁵ Cf. Macpherson 43-45 on the implausibility of the attention model of memory colour.

The inner diversity of integrational complexes is a diversity without a material difference—and we are preoccupied with things that make such differences. When something is genuinely continuously similar (that is, in reality or intrinsic nature and not merely in appearance), it stands to reason that each part of it will have the same range of effects. This is an article of our animal faith or naive beliefs about the world. Thus, it is understandable how the inner diversity of integrationally complex essences would naturally escape our notice. The above constitutes what I take to be a plausible Santayana-style explanation à la Hume of the simplicity illusion Sundström identifies.

However, the structure of colour is not a foregone conclusion, and Santayana could just as well have joined the detractors of the view. As Keith Allen (2016) notes,

[There] is widespread disagreement about the nature and extension of the elementary-compound distinction. . . . [E]ven after careful reflecting on their experiences of colour, participants in the debate consistently reached conflicting conclusions. . . . [P]sychologists Külpe, Titchener, and Ebbinghaus, denied that *any* colours are phenomenally composed, even orange or purple. On their view, all talk of phenomenal composition can be explained purely in terms of facts about similarities between the colours A common debunking explanation of the claim that green is phenomenally composed of yellow and blue, for example, is that judgements about phenomenal composition have been influenced by knowledge about physical composition, and the fact that yellow and blue pigments, when mixed, produce green paint . . . (144-145)⁵⁶

The point is well taken. It is a matter of great controversy that any distinct hue truly has a sort of inner diversity. But simply rejecting the structure of colour without providing an explanation as to how people are led to believe in it will not do. So, what could Santayana say in this regard? Does he have the theoretical resources for explaining this, *ex hypothesis*, complexity illusion?

I think he does. Santayana admits a quasi-identity relation that holds between two separate essences, e.g., a simpler essence and a constituent of a more complex one (RB 88-89). Sprigge explains:

Santayana recognizes that . . . one can make a detail in a complex pattern an object of attention on its own, but he insists that, strictly speaking, we are then intuiting a different essence with an especially close affinity to the detail, such as makes it proper to call it the 'same'. . . . [C]all such essences *virtually identical*. (74-75)⁵⁷

Because no essence can literally be or contain another essence, such identification is approximate and fictitious; i.e., in any uncritical appeal to such identification, the philosopher fails to "describe the truth" (RB 100): "[A]ll identifications are matters of discursive impulse, intentional and poetical" (RB 90).

⁵⁶ Cf. Jan Konenderink 579: "I fail to see RED and BLUE in Pure Purple, just as I fail to see RED and GREEN in Pure Yellow."

⁵⁷ See RB 419.

One thing that is inseparable from colour in itself, Santayana writes, is light (RB 56), which is to say, the sensuous or affective intensity of brightness. Such affective intensity, in Santayana's view, is a specious quality—since it lacks any formal (rather than merely causal) correspondence to what exists⁵⁸—that we nevertheless intuit when physical light impinges on our visual systems; it is, as he puts it, the “the moral echo” of physical light (RB 243).⁵⁹ It is common to colours, he suggests, in the same way that pure Being is common to all essences (RB 45). “Pure Being, like any other essence . . .”

is individual and distinguished by exclusions, for it excludes those limitations which render all other essences specific; somewhat as light, which fills up and dynamically constitutes all colours, nevertheless excludes each particular tint. (RB 56)

Briefly, pure Being is typically defined as that positive quality that all essences possess that distinguishes them from non-being⁶⁰; it “supplies, as it were, the logical or aesthetic matter which all essences have in common, and which reduces them to comparable modes on one plane of reality” (RB 45). Santayana unequivocally affirms pure Being's status as a simple essence (RB 69).

Concentrating on the analogy he draws between pure Being and specious light, we may say that specious light supplies the aesthetic matter colours have in common that makes them comparable realities and constitutes their family resemblance. However, because no essence can literally be or contain another essence, and given that colour is a simple essence, the inclusion of specious light in all colours (and, for that matter, pure being in all other essences) is merely virtual.

Given that pure being is *virtually* contained in all, to borrow Santayana's phrasing, “special forms of being” (RB 57), some of which are simple essences, it follows that an essence that virtually contains another essence is not for that reason internally diverse. Virtual containment can involve correspondences between simple essences (Sprigge 76). Santayana's discussion of the relationship between the simple essence of unity and that of pure Being is a case in point:

[P]ure Being includes unity and . . . unity includes pure Being; yet if pure Being were a part of unity, unity would not be one; and if unity were a part of pure Being, pure Being would not be pure. . . . [T]he being included in unity is not the individual essence of pure Being [and] . . . the unity included in pure Being is not the individual essence of unity, but an inseparable pervasive and unique something found in pure Being by human intuition and identified abusively . . . with the essence of unity (RB 88)

Thus, Santayana, plausibly, could construe the structure of colour along the lines of virtual containment, and in so doing, preserve the simplicity of colour. Accordingly, blue is not literally in cyan, for instance; rather, binary colours like cyan

⁵⁸ See SAF 85-6.

⁵⁹ See also RB 243.

⁶⁰ Note that Santayana also uses “[p]ure” as “an epithet proper to all essences. . . . [A]ll [essences] are pure in so far as they are considered in their proper character” (RB 49).

contain elementary colour analogues. Given that virtual containment does not require that one of the related terms involved is a complex essence, this proposal is neutral regarding the simplicity or complexity of compound colours.

To reiterate, Santayana admits of the possibility of virtual containment obtaining in the case of simple essences, like in the case of a specific simple essence's virtual containment of pure Being, or like in that of a specific colour's virtual containment of (specious) light. Virtual containment does not imply internal diversity. As such, apart from relying on some of the same sort of "debunking" explanations noted above (e.g., conflating physical composition with phenomenal composition), he may view the (proposed) complexity illusion as resting on a basic confusion wherein the virtual containment of one essence in another is taken to imply an internal diversity in the latter essence. Note that this proposal seems to accord with the relevant suggestion noted above (in the quotation from Keith Allen on page 63) that one might explain-away "talk of [colour's] phenomenal composition" in terms of colour's resemblances.

One worry with this proposal is that virtual constituency is too weak to do the work required, at least insofar as the explanation of colour's resemblances is concerned. Resembling things resemble insofar as they share similar characteristics. But if such similarities are a function of virtual identification, then they appear to be grounded in nothing more than contingent psychological facts or acts of "abusive" identification. Such identifications do not derive from the intrinsic nature of the essences, but rather from the nature of "the mental habits of mankind" (RB 83) or our "animal discourse" (RB 89). In short, the proposal seems to psychologise colour resemblances.

However, while the relevant equivalence of one essence and another is merely figurative, the resemblance between two separate essences virtually equivalent, plausibly, is not. For an equivalence to be "approximate only" (RB 88), after all, suggests some imperfect resemblance between the terms. Thus, even if virtual identification is fictitious, this does not disrupt the reality of resemblances across separate essences such identifications might exploit.

A second related worry concerns the explanatory bankruptcy of virtual constituency. That an element of a complex essence is virtually identical to a separate essence depends on, as Sprigge says, its "especially close affinity" to it. By extension, that purple has something in it virtually identical to blue already presupposes that there is a resemblance between purple and blue. Thus, the account of resemblance vis-à-vis virtual constituency seems question-begging.

If, instead, virtual identity has no basis in the related terms, but is fully absorbed by abusive identification, then we have escaped question-begging at the expense of lapsing into full-blown anti-realism regarding resemblances amongst separate essences.⁶¹ For in this case, the relevant resemblance relations would be mere beings of reason or idealities created by the mind that beholds them; that is to say, the reality of such resemblances would be exhausted by the acts of virtual identification that "discover" them.

⁶¹ Cf. Sprigge 89.

Such worries, it seems to me, supply theoretical motivation for interpreting contrastive resemblance relations as explanatorily basic; that is, to borrow Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra's words, "If *a* and *b* resemble each other, there is no other fact to which the resemblance between *a* and *b* reduces." (Rodriguez-Pereyra 63) For, virtual identity or equivalence cannot explain contrastive resemblances if it presupposes them; and if contrastive resemblances are grounded entirely in virtual equivalences,⁶² then they are reduced to the psychological incidents of an animal mind.

Fortunately, we get an indication that Santayana was inclined to treat resemblance as a primitive notion from his remarks on the indefinability of *similarity*:

What is similarity? What is duration? What is space? What is existence? I know that an algebraic logic can give various answers; but they seem merely to be translations of these categories into terms which may express some abstract characteristic of them, while simply dropping their specific essence. If we continue to envisage this essence or the new essence substituted for it, the question arises: What is this? We can only point and direct our attention upon it anew, saying: This is this; and I know well enough what I mean, when you don't ask me. (LSK 432)

As can be observed, Santayana thinks that the unrestrained attempt to arrive at some ultimate explanation of similarity in terms of appealing to a more fundamental notion leads to an infinite explanatory regress. What is clear from other contexts in which Santayana discusses the prospect of infinite explanatory regress (in particular, regarding the explanation of *fact*, or why this set of facts obtains in the world as opposed to some other set of facts), however, is that he considers them to be non-explanatory altogether (see SAF 284). Whether the postulation of primitive notions beyond identity is preferable to the admission of an infinite explanatory regress, I leave it to the reader to consider. Nevertheless, it strikes me that Santayana held that resemblance was a primitive notion, and that this is a coherent position for him to hold if he was a realist about contrastive relations, given the above.⁶³

⁶² David Armstrong's following remarks on identity threaten to problematize such virtual equivalences altogether from within a realist account of universals: "Partial identity, as when two things overlap but do no more than overlap, or when two things have some but not all the same properties so that their nature 'overlaps', can be understood readily enough. But identity is just identity. If there is another, associated, notion we can demand that it receives its own name and that the laws with which it is associated be stated. But I cannot see what this notion could be, nor what laws we could associate with it. . . . I take it that the realist ought to allow that two "numerically diverse" particulars are *not* wholly diverse. They are partially identical in nature and so are partially identical. . . . [F]or the Realist [about universals], the universe is *unified* in a way in which the Nominalist denies that it is unified. (1978, V.1, p. 112) Santayana thinks there *is* an associated notion of identity, or a way in which a thing can be the "same" that is less than strict numerical identity and that does not imply common constituency, and the analysis of this paper has taken for granted that this is an admissible postulation on his part, but this is a point of contention.

⁶³ It should be noted that there is one further option that may be considered regarding colour's resemblances insofar as this topic is treated in relation to Santayanan thought: namely, we may bypass the bugbear of contrastive relations entirely and construe colour

On my reading, virtual identities are parasitic on real, primitive relations of resemblance.

Conclusion

Santayana's analysis of the internal diversity of musical harmony shows that he was mindful of the sort of complexity that the compound colours are thought to have. And his views on the relationship between the data of intuition and our interpretive understanding of it pave the way for a coherent explanation of why this sort of complexity often goes unrecognised in the case of colour. Yet, he is also in a position to explain-away the "structure of colour", given his commitment to the compossibility of virtual containment and simple essencehood. In any case, it is undeniable that Santayana delivers a rich repository of theoretical resources that tend to graft rather well onto contemporary discussions of the nature of colour; further investigation into this intersection is warranted.⁶⁴

FORREST ADAM SOPUCK

References with Abbreviations

- CPR Kant, Immanuel. 1787/1998. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Eds. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- EHU Hume, David. 1759/2011. *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Ed. Lorne Falkenstein. Toronto: Broadview Press.
- IHM Reid, Thomas. 1764/1997. *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense*. Ed. Derek R. Brookes. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- PM Russell, Bertrand. [1903]1937. *Principles of Mathematics*. London: Allen Unwin.
- PPL Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1689. *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 2nd edition. Ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker. Vol. 2. of *Synthese Historical Library*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Santayana, George.
- LGS 1868-1952. *The Letters of George Santayana*. Critical edition.
- LR1 [1905]2011. *Reason in Common Sense*. Critical edition.
- LR4 [1905]2015. *Reason in Art*. Critical edition.

resemblances in terms of holistic relations, the reality of which in accordance with Santayana's account is not suspect (Sprigge 86). Ultimately, such a strategy would involve maintaining that what are normally considered discrete ontological units of colour are actually elements of a single, indissoluble holistic totality (i.e., a complex essence). I find this strategy theoretically attractive, consistent with colour primitivism (see p. 55), and defensible, but for reasons that largely take us into metaphysical speculations going beyond the scope of this paper.

⁶⁴ I wish to thank the reviewers and editors for their astute commentaries as well as the General Editor for his guidance and critical input throughout the review process, all of which were instrumental to the development of this paper. I also must thank Derek Brown for his valuable feedback on some of my preliminary research on the nature of colour.

- LSK 1918. "Literal and Symbolic Knowledge." *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* 15, no. 16: 421-444.
- RB [1937]1972. *Realms of Being*. One-volume edition, with a new introduction by the author. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc.
- SAF [1923]1955. *Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy*. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.).
- SB [1896] 1988. *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Theory*. Critical Edition.

Other References

- Allen, Keith. 2016. *A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Alston, William P. 1989. "Reid on Perception and Conception." In *The Philosophy of Thomas Reid*, edited by Melvin Dalgarno and Eric Matthews, pp. 35-47. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Armstrong, David. 1978. *A Theory of Universals: Volume 1: Nominalism and Realism*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Bigelow, John and Robert Pargetter. 1989. "A Theory of Structural Universals." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 67, no. 1: 1-11.
- Byrne, Alex. 2003. "Color and Similarity." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 66: 641-645.
- Byrne, Alex & David Hilbert. 2003. "Color Realism and Color Science." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26:3-21.
- Campbell, John. 1993. "A Simple View of Colour." In *Reality, Representation and Projection*, edited by John Haldane and Crispin Wright, pp. 257-268. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cummins, Phillip. 1974. "Reid's Realism." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 12, no. 3: 317-340.
- Dorsch, Fabian. 2010. "Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism." *Rivista di estetica* 43, no. 1: 85-108.
- Drake, Durrant. 1920. "The Approach to Critical Realism." pp.1-32 In *Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-Operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge*. London: MacMillan and Co., Limited.
- Dretske, F. 1969. *Seeing and Knowing*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Fjorback, Lone Overby. 2012. "Mindfulness and Bodily Distress." *Danish medical journal* 59, no. 11: B4547. URL=https://ugeskriftet.dk/files/scientific_article_files/2018-11/b4547.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2021.
- Forrest, Peter. 1986. "Ways Worlds Could Be." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 64, no. 1: 15-24.
- Gert, Joshua. 2017. *Primitive Colours: A Case Study in Neo-pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gertler, Brie. 2012. "Renewed Acquaintance." In *Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview*, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 93-128. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Hacker, P.M.S. 1987. *Appearance and Reality: A Philosophical Investigation into Perception and Perceptual Qualities*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Hacker, P.M.S. & M.R. Bennett. 2003. *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Hård, A. & L. Sivik. 1981. "NCS — Natural Color System: A Swedish Standard for Color Notation." *Color Research and Application* 6:129-138.
- Hård, A., L. Sivik, G. Tonnquist. 1996. "NCS, Natural Color System: From concept to Research and Applications, parts 1 & 2." *Color Research Application* 21:18-220.
- Hardin, Clyde .L.1988. *Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Heidegger, Martin. [1927]1962. *Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper-Collins Publishers.
- Hylton, Peter. 1990. *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Koenderink, Jan. 2010. *Color for the Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lachs, John.
 1964. "Santayana's Philosophy of Mind." *The Monist* 48, no. 3; *American Philosophy*: 419-440.
 1967. "The Proofs of Realism." *The Monist* 51, no. 2; *British and American Realism, 1900-1930*: 284-304.
- Lahdelma, Imre & Tuomas Eerola. 2016. "Single Chords Convey Distinct Emotional Qualities to both Naïve and Expert Listeners." *Psychology of Music* 44, no. 1: 37-54.
- Lewis, David. 1986. "Against Structural Universals." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 64, no. 1: 25-46.
- Mackie, John. 1976. *Problems from Locke*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Macpherson, Fiona. 2012. "Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 84, no. 1: 24-62.
- Mazzoli, Missy. 2020. Interview with Jad Abumrad (at 53:42), RadioLab WNYC Studios, podcast audio, April 18, 2020 <https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/articles/cataclysm-sentence>.
- Miller, Marjorie. 1994. "Essence and Identity: Santayana and the Category of 'Women.'" *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* vol. 30(1): 33-50.
- Mizrahi, Vivian. 2006. "Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism." *Dialectica* 60, no. 3: 283- 306.
- Moore, G.E. 1953. "Sense data." In *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 28-40. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Nichols, Ryan. 2007. *Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Parncutt, Richard. 1989. *Harmony: A Psychoacoustical Approach*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Pautz, Adam. 2006. "Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience?" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 84: 535-564.
- Roberts, Pendaran. 2018. "Another Look at Color Primitivism." *Synthese*, Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1821-9>.

- Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2002. *Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Russell, Bertrand.
 1910–11. “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 11:108–28.
 1912. *The Problems of Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
 1921. *The Analysis of Mind*. London: George Allen & Unwin LTD.
- Santayana, George.
 1925. “The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories.” *The Philosophical Review* 34, no. 3: 281–291.
 1920. “Three Proofs of Realism.” In *Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-Operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge*, pp. 163–186. London: Mac-Millan and Co., Limited.
- Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010. “The Priority of the Whole.” *The Philosophical Review* 119, no. 1: 31–76.
- Sprigge, Timothy. 1974. *Santayana: An Examination of His Philosophy*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Stroud, Barry. 2000. *The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sopuck, Forrest.
 2017. “Locke’s Challenge: On Why the Success of the Acquaintance Interpretation of Reid is Important.” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 34, no. 1: 57–78.
 2021. *The Aesthetics of Horror Films: A Santayanan Perspective*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sundström, Pär. 2013. “Are Colours Visually Complex?” pp. 627–639. In *Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday*. Eds. Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng, and Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson. Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Books.

An Aesthetic Arbiter of Politics: Revisiting George Santayana's Concept of the Psyche

George Santayana's concept of the psyche is among the most enigmatic within his philosophy. His seemingly scattered use of the term has led scholars to criticize its invocation as marked by ambiguity (MacDonald, 291-292). The psyche, nevertheless, is a prominent concept in Santayana's works, which appears in his treatment of aesthetics, morality, naturalism, and political thought. Santayana himself, moreover, maintains that his philosophy is coherent, and scholars have insisted on the singularity of Santayana's philosophy.¹ This discrepancy leaves us with the question of how the psyche can operate as a uniform concept that reveals uniform principles about human existence and the natural world. This paper thus aims to unriddle the psyche's role by reconceptualizing it as an aesthetic arbiter of politics.

A quick word on the term *aesthetic arbiter of politics* is in order. The term adapts Santayana's own description of the psyche's role as an "arbiter of morals" (RM 148) but unpacks what it means to be an "arbiter." The ability and proclivity to arbitrate is the result of the psyche's foothold in the natural world; but the natural world—as Santayana understands it through his naturalism—also resonates with the psyche through the psyche's inherent aesthetic sensibility. This sensibility allows the psyche to perceive the organizing principles of nature and project them outward through a form of moral judgment. Santayana conceives of moral judgment as something dually aesthetic and natural, both forms of which the psyche interprets. In this sense, the psyche is an "aesthetic arbiter" of morals. Aesthetics, then, must be properly understood through Santayana's naturalism. The psyche's role in the natural world, moreover, is best demonstrated when Santayana discusses politics. Political judgment, for Santayana, is derived from aesthetic and moral values. This derivation is the basis for my analysis of the role of the psyche as an aesthetic arbiter of politics.

I conclude this paper by positing that a proper understanding and discovery of the psyche's aesthetic—and necessarily naturalistic—predilection leads to what Santayana would consider sound political judgement. The psyche as an "aesthetic arbiter of politics" is, thus, a way of theorizing within Santayana's philosophical framework about these elements that shape our political judgment, and the term should be considered my own description for a form of Santayana's thought that makes sense of two connected elements: the psyche's naturalistic aesthetics and its connection to moral and political matters.

¹ Cf. Charles T. Harrison and Angus Kerr-Lawson, for example, and Santayana's own preface to *The Works of George Santayana* (Triton Edition, Vol. 7) titled, "On the Unity of My Earlier and Later Philosophy" (New York: Scribner's: 1937).

An initial question is reasonably prompted: if Santayana's naturalism is the basis of his theory of aesthetics, why focus on *aesthetics*, and not naturalism? Santayana's writings on aesthetics demonstrate a distinct view about a typically metaphysical topic: it renders beauty not at all abstracted from the natural world, for Santayana is clear that his philosophical system is "*not metaphysical*," although it does concern "immaterial things" such as essence, truth, and spirit (SAF vii). There is no contradiction in this statement, as Santayana teaches us that to analyze an immaterial subject-matter does not imply metaphysics, since metaphysics is really "dialectical physics, or an attempt to determine matters of fact by means of logical or moral or rhetorical constructions" (SAF vii). Aesthetics, then, provides an example of a topic that Santayana understands as naturalistic, but that also needs to grapple with the complexities not only of the material world, but also of the mind's creative and imaginative faculties; all of which inevitably pertain to the psyche.

The Psyche as a Natural Fact of the Mind

Santayana's concept of the psyche should not be considered a spiritual entity that behaves independently from worldly phenomena; quite the contrary, he writes near the end of his academic career that the psyche thrives in its interaction with the material world that is more proximate to man's senses (DP 14). Santayana defines the psyche as a *material system* to express the idea that the psyche is the form, "the organizing principle," of a living being and modifies Plato's conception of the psyche as presented in the *Phaedo*—that is, as a soul-like entity that inhabits the body but also transcends it. Santayana describes it as a material system *without* separate consciousness, calling the psyche "that habit in matter which forms the human body and the human mind" (SE 221).

The psyche is not simply a synonym for our consciousness or mind. Santayana makes a distinction between the psyche and the realm of spirit. The realm of spirit consists of our mental processes like thinking, feeling, intuition, or intent, but Santayana diverges from the Kantian understanding of *Geist* that renders spirit into a purely metaphysical concept. Santayana's criticism of Kant focuses on Kant's theory of knowledge, in which he recognizes that perceptions have "organs and objects beneath and beyond them," but still manages to eliminate them from his system and, instead, forges others, "artificial and metaphysical," such as the "transcendental ego, the categories of thought, and a disembodied law of duty" (SAF 299). To wit, "instead of natural substances [Kant] posited the unknowable" (SAF 299).

Santayana's philosophical system precisely aims to avoid theorizing about the unknowable. His concept of the psyche, conversely, is "a natural fact," the outcome of heritable or acquirable traits: it is physical and mechanical in its bodily manifestation through "the machinery of growth, instinct, and action, like the machinery of speech" (RM 140) and is "manifested in all action and thought" (RM 208).² Our actions, moreover, are caused by our psyche, not reason (Saatkamp 231). Even when Santayana treats immaterial topics like spirit, he connects them to the

² Index reference to RM 143-145.

psyche's material basis: "Spirit in man is an animal spirit, transitive like the material endeavours which it expresses" (SAF 125). Spirit, then, is connected to our animal instincts, which are embodied in the psyche and its material, natural world. In the chapter of *Scepticism and Animal Faith* where he discusses essence and intuition, Santayana writes that "the roots of spirit, at least in man, are in matter" (SAF 126). This remark clarifies a later statement by Santayana that, were it not for the psyche, "spirit would have no place in time or in nature, no relevance to existence, and indeed, no existence of its own" (RM 162). The psyche is that part of realm of matter that generates spirit.

To understand this relationship between the psyche and spirit, between the realm of matter and the realm of spirit, Santayana tells us that we must understand "the nature of intuition" (SAF 126). Briefly engaging with Santayana's discussion of essence and intuition in *Scepticism and Animal Faith* will help us to understand subsequent points about the psyche. Santayana begins by telling us that essences are contingent on our intuition of them. He writes, "essence without intuition would be merely non-existent . . . it would be the object of no contemplation, the goal of no effort, the secret or implicit ideal of no life" (SAF 128-29). In this same chapter, we see Santayana deride people who consider immaterial (or "non-existent") things to be "nothing," and calls their argument a "stupid positivism" that excuses ignorance through disbelief (SAF 129). Santayana concurs with Leibniz, for whom the non-existent is "infinite," "everything," "superior," and "worthy of eternal contemplation," and concludes that the interest we take in essences demonstrates their subjective value, since "if the organ of this life comes to perfect operation, it will reach intuition of that relevant part of essence" (SAF 129-30). Essences, moreover, are "suffused with a general tint of interest and *beauty*," and "the life of the psyche, which rises to this intuition, determines all the characters of the essence evoked, and among them its moral quality" (SAF 129-30, emphasis mine).

The more we read Santayana's writings on the psyche in his early works on aesthetics, the more his explanations can be seen to make an important point about the connection between the natural world and aesthetics. As his statement above specifies the "life" of the psyche "rises to" an *intuition* about the beauty and moral quality of an essence. Consider his word choice: intuition plays an indispensable role in the material world, and our ability to contemplate things immaterial (essences) is largely contingent on our material, natural world, because what we find beautiful or moral is shaped by our animal instincts; to believe otherwise is to uproot the intuition of essences from their origins in our minds and our minds from their contingent relationship to the natural world.

On this last point we can look to Santayana's essay on the psyche in *Soliloquies in England*. Santayana defines the psyche as the principle of the relation between automatic(physical) life and mental discourse, which he describes as "the system of repetitions, correspondences, developments, and ideal unities created by this march of human life in double column" (SE 218). Santayana recognizes the inescapability of Cartesian dualism but corrects it by reminding us that our mental discourse is not independent of our automatic life. More importantly, our automatic life is not at all internal: it is dependent upon and derived from the external world. How do we understand this relation? Santayana tells us:

That this order of human life is something natural, and not a fiction of discourse, appears in many ways. The relation of discourse itself to physical life is one proof of it. Mental discourse is the inner luminosity or speech that accompanies dramatic crises in the fortunes of the body; it is not self-generated; it is always the *expression* of another event, then occurring in the body, as is a cry of pain; and it is usually, at the same time, a *report* of still another event that has already occurred beyond the body, as is a memory or a perception. Feeling and thought are perpetually interrupted and perpetually renewed by something not themselves.

The mind cannot be separated from the body, since its activity (feeling and thought) stem from physical life. Santayana echoed this thought in a later review essay, criticizing John Dewey's philosophy. Dewey's alleged "naturalistic metaphysics" combines two concepts that Santayana considers contradictory. Naturalism, Santayana explains, is a "body of beliefs," both "spontaneous and inevitable," in which beliefs are "extensions," "interpretations," or "denials" (DNM 673-74). Such breadth of beliefs is what allows naturalism to encompass "psychology, poetry, logic, and theory" but only "if they are content with their natural places" (DNM 673-74). The qualification is essential: not only are our varied beliefs connected to the natural world, but they are degraded when abstracted from the material world from which our minds first perceive them because we, in consequence, lose a most important source for our beliefs. The problem for Santayana is not faith in something transcendent. As he says, transcendentalism is *not* metaphysical if it is simply a method for the mind to understand the world. The problem starts when man thinks that the mind's proclivities towards belief of any sort betray a superiority about the faculties of the mind over the body, causing him to consider the mind "absolute, single, and without material conditions."³

Through a painting metaphor, Santayana tells us that the strength of a philosophical system depends on the elements that are dominant in the foreground. The foreground of human life must be "moral and practical," even for artists; likewise, philosophy should focus on "clarifying moral perspectives" (DNM 683). Yet, Dewey (like Kant) inserts metaphysics into his philosophical system. In this case, Santayana regarded Dewey as taking the *immediacy* of experience—that is, thoughts, feelings, and actions—as the primary focus of his metaphysics. The error here is relational: immediacy of experience compels us to consider what something is *to us* or to value how *we* experience *it*, thereby rendering the objects of experience subjective. The center of the world, in this act, is man. Santayana believes that this mistake turns experience into something "mystical" insofar as it loses a clear distinction between subject and object. While the immediacy of experience may be the source of "[a]esthetic contemplation," it eventually needs grounding in the natural world to understand its sources (DNM 683-84).

³ Santayana makes a very similar argument regarding mystics in the first chapter of *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*.

The Psyche and Aesthetic Perception

The natural, aesthetic life

The previous section explained Santayana's conception of the psyche as a natural fact of the mind, but, as we saw, the psyche does not limit itself to matters of the natural world. There is a relationship between Santayana's naturalism and his "idealism." The latter term requires qualification, given Santayana's wariness about idealist thinkers. John Herman Randall Jr. described Santayana's idealism through the words of F. J. E. Woodbridge, as a "'realm of the imagination,' with the ideal products of human vision, with the commentary of the spirit of man on its encounters with nature . . ." (Randall 50). He understands Santayana's naturalism as "a sober recognition of Idealism's natural conditions and limitations, of the natural basis of those ideal fulfillments, disclosed not so much to science—for the details of which he always had little interest—as to common sense" (Randall 50-51). To this extent, Santayana "naturalized the human imagination," by giving "a natural status and function to the wealth and variety of man's imaginative experience" (Randall 52). What Randall describes is a balancing act on Santayana's part during a time in which the intellectual climate was split between scientific and idealistic camps, and Santayana was able to show that imaginative vision plays a central role in the Life of Reason.

Naturalism, then, does not deprive life of wonder. Surely, humans have values and ideals which are not entirely material. There are aesthetic qualities to life that merit exploration, for they "make life worthwhile, festive, and dramatic" (Saatkamp 88). This point opens us to the way in which Santayana conceives of aesthetics and the psyche's relation to it. Santayana's early writings discuss man's primordial aesthetic inclinations and how these inclinations weave their way into other facets of our existence. An inchoate version of the psyche can be traced back to his work, *The Sense of Beauty* (1896). Although he wrote the book before specifically addressing a "psyche," it is the first instance where Santayana explores the relationship between aesthetics and the natural world by tying man's appreciations of beauty to natural, mechanical processes. Santayana's philosophy, furthermore, has been described as an attempt to prove the "requisite incorporation" of a mechanistic materialism in a "rationally humane system of art and morals" (Harrison 207). One of the ways in which Santayana begins to convey his effort is by connecting aesthetics to our everyday lives.

In one of the subchapters of *The Sense of Beauty*, "Social Instincts and their Aesthetic Influence," Santayana writes that man's attraction toward social concepts like family and country possess inherent value that stems from biological processes. He writes, "[t]he function of reproduction carries with it not only direct modifications of the body and mind, but a whole set of social institutions, for the existence of which social instincts and habits are necessary in man" (SB 42). From this statement, we see that reproduction is not only something that affects the "body and mind" of its constituents but also a function that carries a "set" of social institutions. These institutions, he tells us, could not exist if we *did not have* these intrinsic social instincts and habits: they are "necessary." Santayana draws a line from man's social

nature to the world and institutions that man has created to satisfy said nature. These social institutions, moreover, inculcate our social affinities for concepts he calls “the parental, the patriotic” (SB 42).

These concepts may not be aesthetic in and of themselves; yet they influence those expressive impulses we call art. Santayana writes a couple of lines after this previous statement that the effect of poetry, for example, comes not from what it offers to our “sense”—our reasoning mind—but from the symbols that its verses convey and how they speak to our own values (SB 42). Man dually obtains these values from natural social instincts and the conceptual affinities that are inculcated by our social institutions, which are themselves the products of our making. Through this connection, Santayana is expressing a relationship between aesthetics and social institutions that is derived from our nature, reminding us that the resonance of symbols or verses in art is the result of a process that starts with man’s biological functions.

While Santayana recognizes that beauty is certainly important for the artist and poet who are only preoccupied with beauty, the values that speak most to the “worldly mind” are often social values (SB 44). Values such as “friendship, wealth, reputation, power, and influence,” are combined with our biological inclination towards family life, and, together, they “constitute surely the main elements of happiness” (SB 43). The elements of happiness, thus, are in large part social, for man is “pre-eminently a political animal, and social needs are almost as fundamental in him as vital functions, and often more conscious” (SB 43). In *The Sense of Beauty* Santayana discusses the role of happiness and its connection to aesthetics to emphasize that the happiness we derive from social institutions and social values is connected to aesthetics. He writes, “our happiness has the same substance, the same elements, as our aesthetic delight, for it is aesthetic delight that makes our happiness” (SB 43).

From closely reading *The Sense of Beauty*, we are able to glean Santayana’s perceived continuity of man’s natural functions and his aesthetic sensibilities. Although the psyche has not yet been mentioned, the takeaway from this subchapter of *The Sense of Beauty*—and the reason it is placed in this section—is Santayana’s consistent emphasis on a biological (or natural) cause of aesthetic sensibility that is distinct from an understanding of aesthetics that is purely abstract. It is possible to distinguish some of the aesthetic qualities of life that shape what social realities we consciously experience as beautiful through their composition (e.g., unified, orderly, balanced, etc.), which mirror the natural world. We must now explore them.

Two motifs in the natural, aesthetic life

Santayana holds that social instincts are influenced by aesthetics. A following subchapter in *The Sense of Beauty* extends this sequence by connecting our aesthetic values to political systems. In the subchapter titled “Aesthetics of Democracy,” Santayana argues that political systems are reflections of man’s aesthetic ideals during a given period and within a particular culture. If our political systems are created from our social instincts, and our social instincts are influenced by (naturalistic) aesthetics, then our political systems are also a mark of our aesthetic sensibility. He states that democracy is “the leading political and moral idea of our

time" because it contains "a strong aesthetic ingredient" that has a powerful hold on the imagination; that is, the "effect of multiplicity in uniformity" (SB 72). Santayana believes that man's mind is aesthetically inclined towards uniformity, writing:

Such aesthetic love of uniformity, however, is usually disguised under some moral label: we call it the lore of justice, perhaps because we have not considered that the value of justice also, in so far as it is not derivative and utilitarian, must be intrinsic, or, what is practically the same thing, aesthetic. (SB 72)

Multiplicity in uniformity is an ongoing motif in the natural, aesthetic life. Of course, there is no such thing as complete uniformity within man's diverse society, so what Santayana describes as uniformity resembles an order arising naturally from our differences, hence the word "multiplicity." Even as it relates to our mental faculties, Santayana's view is that the imagination is formed by what it senses from the material world because "an order and sequence is established in our imagination by virtue of the order and sequence which in the corresponding impressions have come to our senses" (SB 1936, 118). Still, as we know, this common sense that establishes order and sequence does not translate to utter uniformity. This point is understood in Santayana scholarship; for example, Herman Saatkamp has written that "to the extent that psyches have a similar natural history, their moral outlooks are likely to be similar, but given the variability of nature one should not expect a convergence of views" (Saatkamp 39).

In the above excerpt, Santayana notes that the value of justice is intrinsic, and that intrinsic values are aesthetic; thus, our intrinsic aesthetic values eventually develop into political and moral ideals. The fundamental point elaborated in a following section is that, for Santayana, our aesthetic values are derivatives of the natural world and any aesthetic theory that ignores this fact will result in misconceptions not only about what constitutes beauty, but also how naturalistic aesthetic sensibilities truly influence our moral and political judgment. Santayana also distinguishes man's intrinsic (aesthetic) value of justice from one that is "derivative and utilitarian," implying that it is possible for men to share the same value, such as justice, but for it to be derived from entirely different sources. Is there a difference to valuing justice from an aesthetic perspective versus a practical one? Santayana provides sufficient textual evidence for us to believe that there is.

A common, and explicit, element throughout Santayana's works is the role of the poet in society. Santayana talks about poets as individuals who struggle to stay true to their dedication to beauty while living in a society whose values are largely unaesthetic, but he also notes that the poet is not always at odds with society; in fact, he is our best access towards understanding the aesthetic elements of our social systems, which is why Santayana introduces the psyche in the same spaces where he also talks about poets. *Another motif in the natural, aesthetic life, then, is the role of the poet in society.* This person need not be a literal poet; rather, "poet" conveys the mentality or outlook that best interprets the connection between the material (natural) world and aesthetic values. In *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, Santayana reminds us that the mind "has infinite trouble to keep a true

reckoning of its outward perceptions" (IPR 16). Our imagination, moreover, is a double-edged sword because if it is not properly attuned to the inner man and his dependence on the natural world, it leads us to illusions. Santayana writes, "if the imagination merely alienates us from reality, without giving us either a model for its correction or a glimpse into its structure, it becomes the refuge of poetical selfishness. Such selfishness is barren, and the fancy, feeding only on itself, grows leaner every day" (IPR 17). In this sense, our faculties like imagination and intuition are riddled with what Santayana calls an "aesthetic attitude," but that attitude needs to be disciplined—we might recall Santayana's unique description of the psyche as the "mother" to intuition, and intuition is a "child" who "is a poet" (SE 223).

The analogy remains consistent throughout Santayana's thought. The psyche is a disciplining mother to our otherwise whimsical intuition and imagination, but our aesthetic attitude holds a central place in this relationship because when the roots of this aesthetic attitude are properly understood they provide us with an outlook of the world that retains the poetic elements without the idealism. The role of the poet, then, is critical for the psyche because the poet's mentality exhibits these two qualities: creativity and humility. Santayana tells us that "the poet and the mathematician"—two people who work primarily with abstract concepts—"do not imagine that their pursuits raise them above human limitations and are no part of human life, but rather its only goal and justification" (IPR 16).

These qualities of the poet reemerge in *The Realm of Matter*, Book the Second of *Realms of Being* (1927) where Santayana discusses the psyche at length. Santayana mentions the role of the poet again to explain the realm of matter because the poet's conception of this realm is closer to what Santayana means by matter. Matter for Santayana does not carry a strictly physical connotation: he begins his book by arguing that what separates man from animals is that man professes to describe the material world, but to do so, man needs to consider elements of heterogeneity, hierarchy, and succession to understand how matter is "the principle of existence" that requires "spirit, truth, and essence" (RM v). These three elements are also the other three realms that comprise the *Realms of Being*. The realm of matter is not independent from these other realms because it combines these them with the "events, space time, or evolution" of the physical world; this combination is synonymous with what the poet might call "nature" (RM v).

But Santayana identifies a problem that will reiterate the importance of the poet to us. While our intuition contemplates these realms during an initial "physical moment," this moment is only "a passing condition of the psyche" (RM 62). He writes that truth, spirit, and essence are concepts that are often represented as being "physical, temporal, instrumental, and practical" and are, consequentially, "zealously espoused" and taken "apostolically" by most people (RM vi-vii). This problem adds another layer to the one that has been already introduced: in the instance of some philosophers, they misunderstand the realms of spirit, truth and essence because they lack common grounding in the realm of matter. This problem is historic, Santayana argues, in large part because of Democritus and Descartes' influence on the topic. Our understanding of the realm of matter has mistakenly prioritized function, which is derived from reason. The two extremes, then, are an egotistic idealism and a utilitarian idealism: The former refuses to reconcile abstract

concepts with the natural world by claiming the human mind the greatest and only faculty for philosophy; the latter tries to justify abstract concepts only through their practical use. Both misunderstand nature. As in his criticism of Dewey and Kant, Santayana advocates an *intuitional* approach instead of a *rational* approach like the one Descartes offered us, but this act can only take place, Santayana writes, “when the psyche *becomes a poet*, and learns to transcribe her material passions and experiences into terms of essence” (RM xi, emphasis mine). We can gather from this statement that the poet is not simply he who writes poetry: it is a *type of person* whose aesthetic worldview successfully combines the realms of being without leading him into the errors of rationalists like Descartes or strict materialists like Democritus.

The solution to the common misunderstanding about the realm of matter requires the psyche to *become* a poet to help it evolve from its focus on mere action and circumstance. In other words, Santayana is asking us to sophisticate our conception of the material world. The word *become* is telling of Santayana’s view that the psyche’s role is malleable and must therefore be formed in order to reach the status of poet, much like his earlier statement that the psyche must “rise to” intuition. Another way to phrase this statement is that to understand our physical world and its social organization beyond mere function, we are in need of the aesthetically sensible psyche to truly capture the vastness of nature and all it encompasses.

Other scholars concur that there is reason to believe that the psyche’s development is dependent on attaining aesthetic perception. Aesthetics is sometimes treated as its own, idle branch of philosophy, but it is not so for Santayana. In his philosophy aesthetics plays an integral role in his ontology. Thomas Alexander offered the approach of what he calls Santayana’s “sage”—the route towards a “liberated spirit”—as a way of reading Santayana’s “explicit works in aesthetics as central parts of his ontology rather than as mere discussions of a topic somewhat marginal to ‘serious’ philosophy, for an understanding of the aesthetic is the clue to the mystery of Being” (Alexander 345-349). Alexander poses that the dominating focus of Santayana’s ontology is “a kind of life governed by the figure of the Santayanan sage, who is initially designed to appeal to us as a *literary figure* that is an aesthetic construct” (Alexander 350). Alexander’s theory examines the sage’s tropes as a way to identify the moments where “the possibility for genuinely aesthetic insight can be recognized” (Alexander 345). Santayana writes, after all, that the “generative and practical functions” of the psyche must combine their original “aesthetic spectrum and moral range and values incommensurable with anything but themselves” to be able to become a moral arbiter (RM 162). For this reason, Alexander, likening Santayana to William James, argues that Santayana’s philosophy is “radically oriented toward an aesthetic ontology of the human existence” (Alexander 334).

Here, we can reiterate the importance of these two motifs of the natural aesthetic life: our aesthetic attitude facilitates a form of perception that a) identifies an underlying uniformity—which is an inherently aesthetic value—amidst the multiplicity in the world, and this perception b) is most easily obtained by the poet’s disposition because he can perform the essential task of c) seeing the natural world in its totality. Readers may have noticed by now that when Santayana speaks of the

relationship between nature and aesthetics, he also speaks of morality. Given the relationship between morals and aesthetics through a naturalistic unity, it is also essential to explore the moral dimension of the psyche and its connection to nature.

Nature's connection to morals

Santayana tells us that psyche is perpetually distinguishing between “good and bad, right and wrong;” “choice is the breath of her nostrils” (SE 222). Charles T. Harrison has described the psyche as a part of Santayana’s attempt to “erect a catholic and traditional humanism” that was “fully cognizant of moral and aesthetic demands, on a naturalistic base” (Harrison 207-209). Angus Kerr-Lawson has written that the psyche’s role is to discern and reconcile the various ideals to which it is attached, so as to form “a fully unified person” that enables man to “achieve a good and virtuous life” (Kerr-Lawson 1986, 424). Kerr-Lawson’s emphasis on unity in the person is yet another iteration of Santayana’s concept of multiplicity in uniformity (i.e., although all men strive to be unified persons, they do so in different ways but towards the same goal) but now we also see a moral dimension. Morality matters to the psyche insofar as it is the source of man’s commitments “to material and to spiritual pursuits” (Kerr-Lawson 1986, 424).

We must unpack Santayana’s views on morality further. In his essay, “Hypostatic Ethics,” Santayana criticizes Bertrand Russell’s writings on morality, explaining that “good” is “not an intrinsic or primary quality, but relative and adventitious” (WD 147). Our ability to sympathize, for example, requires an appeal predicated on an initial resonance to our “own persons” and “our own good” (WD 149). What Santayana calls a hypostasis in ethics is indicative of a wider problem in philosophy, in which philosophers try to group different entities into one, thus falsely coming up with “The” good as a reified concept when it is actually comprised of various goods. The problem of this “abuse” is that “it substitutes for things the limits and distinctions that divide them,” preventing spectators from seeing the world in all its various—but unified—components (WD 154).

Although man is born dependent, Santayana notes that man possesses a latent “impulse to isolation” that takes the form of a “dream of independence, be it through the possibility of living alone with God, with nature, or with thought” and that “has the deepest biological roots,” all of which corroborate the “organic unity” of the person (“The Unit in Ethics is the Person” POML 195). Nature demonstrates the balance of the truth of individuality within a wider natural organization bent towards unity. These *biological* roots, moreover, are what supply the moralist with his “ultimate criterion,” which Santayana divides in two directions: in *politics* for judging the justice and rationality of institutions, and in *spiritual* matters for opening the gates to freedom in art, love, and religion (Ibid.). Notice how Santayana places politics (which includes concepts like justice and morality) and spiritual matters (which includes art) as two outgrowths of the same seed that share the same biological origins. This point provides insight as to why the psyche’s naturalistic origins precede and also influence its aesthetic and moral judgment. Aesthetics and morals, then, are mutually connected to nature; the relationship between Santayana’s writings on aesthetics and morals is their shared basis in his naturalism.

Santayana offers yet another answer to the problem of the relativity of morals, and it is found in his framework of naturalism. Were morals not altogether bound within an all-encompassing universe, then surely they would be a “dissolving principle” that encourages loose relations between people, but “human nature is distinguishable, and it's innate demands constant;” granting a possibility for a “nucleus of principle and aspiration common to all men” (“Relativity of Morals” POML 206). Nature is a check to radical individualism, then, because it reminds us that amidst our diverse and varied interests, even as it relates to morals, there is a cohesive unity that we must discern since that “nucleus of principle” is not itself an abstract entity, but one that is formed through our “common dependence on the medium” in which we live: nature (Ibid.).

Let us remember, furthermore, that Santayana does not draw a line between moral and aesthetic values, even as it relates to his own relationship to philosophy. Santayana considered himself a moralist in the sense that he sought to understand “the resource of values in human experience” (Harrison 210). To borrow Harrison's example, *The Sense of Beauty* “ends in an identification of the beautiful with the good,” and *Dominations and Powers* becomes, paraphrasing Santayana a “quest for the political forms ‘in whose train the beautiful lives and in whose decline it withers’” (Harrison 210). It is clear from the preface of *Dominations and Politics* that the topic of the beautiful and good carries out to Santayana's political thought. We must now incorporate politics into this analysis.

The Aesthetic Psyche and Politics

This paper has presented Santayana's concept of the psyche as one in which aesthetic sensibility is inherent and in which aesthetic perception provides us with a wider view of the natural world and our place in it. Aesthetics, moreover, is not understood by Santayana in abstract or metaphysical terms. As he writes, “aesthetics and other interests are not separable units, to be compared externally,” they are “strands interwoven in the texture of everything” that qualify our allegiances, shape our thoughts, and modify our behaviors (LR4 183). He concludes that beauty is an influence, a “bias” that is primordial and native to man that no amount of practical reason can undermine (LR4 185). Santayana's defense of an aesthetic sensibility, and consequential aesthetic ontology of human life, describes a natural world where reason and consciousness spring instinctively from our acting in it and whose scope entails both material and immaterial things. Understanding the vast scope of this natural world is an essential task for Santayana because it is also connected to achieving the Life of Reason. Santayana stresses this importance when he asks how harmony in living should be achieved “if the inward spirit is distracted and the outer conditions of existence are unknown?” (“A General Confession” PGS 22-23). It is not possible, he concluded: they need to be united.

Our inward spirit and our outer conditions cannot be divided, which is to say that our self-understanding cannot be estranged from the natural world and philosophy should not aim to heighten man's reason above it. Politics comes into the equation of this philosophical enterprise because it also entails questions about the role of reason in private and public life and the ends of man. For example,

Santayana agrees with Aristotle that moral judgment is a part of politics because its foundation is human nature and its "criterion" for judging truth is "harmony in living." Harmony in living, after all, requires "soundness in natural and spiritual philosophy" and it is "requisite" for "soundness in politics" (PGS 23). We can see in this statement an extension of the philosophical task to unite our inward spirits with outer conditions. It is now possible to posit how Santayana understands the relationship between his naturalist aesthetics and political thought.

Our ability to see beauty in the natural world is an extension of harmony in living. Santayana writes that this ability is a "poetic reverberation of a psychological fact—of the fact that our mind is an organism tending to unity" (SB 101). In a later essay, he writes that harmony is "the principle of morality, as well as of beauty," for it is "what in modern language we call organization" ("Paradise Lost" POML 251). In *The Sense of Beauty*, Santayana places a great weight on the material, natural world since he considers it to be organized in such a precise way that it becomes the source of "apperceptive forms" (SB 96). It is that organization, visible in external nature, that provides "an order and sequence" that can later be remembered, reproduced, and varied in our own creations (SB 96). The world is not chaotic for Santayana. As we will see in the last section, Santayana carries this view even to political philosophy, writing in his preface to *Dominations and Powers* that he is an advocate of "harmony and strength, no matter how short lived" since "the triumph of life lies in achieving perfection of form" (DP viii). After all, both political thought and art, both grow from man's desire to understand human nature and create order in our visible world. The role that the psyche plays in our political deliberation is influenced by the psyche's aesthetic disposition, which allows it to see beyond utilitarian arguments and also to view the world in this natural (non-idealistic) way.

The role of the poet emerges when the psyche begins to deliberate politics, for without an aesthetic sensibility (which is necessarily connected to questions of morals, properly understood), the aims of politics become incapable of achieving human ends. Santayana tells us that the psyche has a choice between assuming the frameworks of either a poet or statesman. He describes the statesman, moreover, as someone "for whom perception and theory might be expressed and rewarded in action" (LR4 172). Santayana then contrasts the practicality of politics with the "symbolic and vicarious" dignity of art (LR4 172). While the statesman sees the natural world for what it is and *acts* upon it, the poet sees the world for what it is and *depicts* it in this natural form. The latter approach may seem pointless, but we must view it as the first step in a sequence. Man must obtain and create for himself a working image of the world in which he lives before he can act upon it. The less realistic the image, the more pernicious the politics. The poet creates the more accurate image of the world because of his proximity to nature. In a later essay, "The Ultimate Aim of Politics," Santayana is again clear that politics is meant to "secure the best possible order of society," which, contrary to modern belief, has "nothing to do with reason" since reason alone cannot supply the criteria for a particular judgment on any given factor; instead, these factors "are judged by someone's instinctive sympathy or aversion" (POML 261). Santayana's wager, then, is that the poet is the better judge, and his point that we must become the poet.

A reasonable question at this point would be to ask if such a task is feasible. As Randall has written, one can hardly think of someone, save Santayana himself, “dwelling without chafing within the world it beheld” (Randall 50). By becoming poets and seeing the world through a naturalistic and aesthetic dimension, Santayana is setting a task before us that appears to be didactic, but, as this study of the psyche has set out to demonstrate, the psyche’s intuitive perception of the world is natural, inherited, and innate. The task of learning to view the world in its totality and forming the psyche, then, is not an extravagant odyssey; it is the essential task of living. Indeed, Santayana’s sharpest criticism of highly abstract philosophy is precisely that it removes the naturalness and intuitiveness of most of life’s lessons.

To be sure, our modern predicament—an (accruing) overabundance of information, metaphysics, and “reason”—makes naturalism feel all the more unnatural. But the antidote for Santayana is, we might guess, found in nature and in poetry. To illustrate this point, Santayana introduces once more the role of the poet. Beauty, he explains, gives men “the best hint of the ultimate good which their experience as yet can offer,” this is why he believes that “the most lauded geniuses” in history have been poets (LR4 172). He remarks that people consider poets geniuses because they are “seers, rather than men of action or thought,” who have “lived ideally and known what was worth knowing” (LR4 172). Fortunately, we have the ability to gain insight into the poets’ views of the world through their writings, which act as guides for our own shaping of our psyches. Santayana tellingly describes literature and literary philosophy as “the most natural and eloquent witnesses to the life of the psyche” (RB Bk. 2 154).

Santayana argues that the popularity of learning about the world through novels, for example, lies in its greater aesthetic appeal than learning about it through history books. He concludes that art—its study or creation—is “a rehearsal of rational living” that “reveals the glories of a possible performance” better than the statesman’s “miserable experiments until now executed on the reality” (LR4 172). Thus, Santayana believes that the study of art leads to a life of reason and proper political judgment, for he finds art to be a better judge of reality than *realpolitik*. In the latter, the state of government and religion is “distracted,” which is enough to turn man to art, “where what is good is altogether and finally good, and what is bad is at least not treacherous” (LR4 173). The role of politics should be oriented towards achieving the ends of man, which requires knowing the limitations of man’s pure reason. To know what these ends and limits are, we must know the natural world in this aesthetic dimension because this perception prevents us from resorting to a form of reason, in politics or any other matter, that is detached from and dominant over reality. We may call this perception “aesthetic arbitration,” and the final section explores its role in Santayana’s final work.

Aesthetic Arbitration of Politics in *Dominations and Powers*

All the aforementioned points that were meant to synthesize Santayana’s concept of the psyche as an “aesthetic arbiter of politics” must be placed in relation to

his final (and most overt) work on politics to demonstrate how these same themes reappear. It must be clarified that Santayana does not have a “political philosophy” *per se* and he warns readers from the outset to look “neither for historical investigation nor political precepts” in *Dominations and Powers* (DP ix). For Santayana, everything is connected. Whatever seemingly political statements he makes are really iterations of his wider philosophy. He makes clear that men’s political errors share their origin in similar yet widespread misconceptions about the world and man’s place—we should say, man’s *minuscule* place—in it.

What, then, is the point of political philosophy—in which man is typically the central focus—if man’s place is so insignificant and dependent on nature in Santayana’s naturalism? Here is one of those instances where the answer is found in the question. For Santayana, man’s dependency on a greater natural world is an answer, not a problem posed to the political animal. Santayana’s point in criticizing current state of politics (and of political philosophy by extension) is to reveal its disconnection from the natural world. Nature places limitations on what man can do, and this fact upholds the relevance of naturalism for political deliberation. Man’s perception of limitations, after all, translates to his values: A person who perceives the world as it *is* will yield different values than one who perceives the world as it *should* be. For this reason, the psyche must derive its knowledge of the self from nature. The “self,” Santayana asserts, possesses an intuition that depends on the material world because it requires “experience of shock” from the external world to be animated (SAF 146-147). Santayana sustains this same view throughout his life: The agent in political deliberation cannot be “man as he appears to the senses,” but man as “an inner proclivity to action and passion that animates him” (DP 14).

It is no surprise, then, that the fifth chapter of *Dominations and Powers* is titled “The Agent in Politics is the Psyche” and presents the role that Santayana envisions for the psyche within the sphere of politics. He writes that the criterion in politics is morality and that the conception of morality, moreover, is based on a philosophical understanding of ethics. Santayana establishes the psyche as an agent in politics because he believes that contemporary political discussions erroneously assume that thought is “substantial and self-developing,” without origin “except in other thoughts” (DP 15). The origin is the natural world, not the isolated mind. Despite his insistence that there are no political views in *Dominations and Powers*, Santayana’s writings on the relationship between nature and spirit, in their varied iterations, provides textual evidence for Santayana’s criteria for political society. He draws the connection between nature and spirit clearly, after all: The “biological status of perception, opinion, and moral judgment” is what renders spiritual events “necessarily relevant to their occasion” and “to the character of the organ that produces them . . .” (DP 302).

Consider, moreover, his chapter on the “Confusion about Progress,” in which he writes that only Aristotle “placed progress where it is at once *morally* real and *physically* possible” (DP 337, emphasis mine). Santayana describes Aristotle’s notion of progress as unidealistic; there are no “evils to be escaped,” only “perfections to be achieved” (DP 337). It is equally important to recognize that morals are not considered by Santayana to be a central foundation for politics, since man and nature precede them. For Santayana, it is futile to establish a political system based

on a select set of moral values. He writes in his preface to *Dominations and Powers* that the tendency of "industrial liberalism" to "level down all civilizations to a single cheap and dreary pattern" signaled a drastic problem in man's understanding about the nature of things (DP vii). Morals are, however, an outgrowth of the naturalistic and consequentially aesthetic elements of the psyche, and we can therefore discover certain moral sympathies through a study of man and his interaction in the natural world. The psyche's role as an aesthetic arbiter of politics, then, is a *process* and *formation*. With the right perception of the world, the psyche can become a form of "directive imagination" that, combined with external circumstances, supplements the primal will to "determine the true interests of each person" (DP 128).

A final remark with regards to Santayana's emphases on harmony, unity, and multiplicity in uniformity and their relation to politics is in order. In his essay, "Inhuman Society," Santayana shows that his naturalistic aesthetic theory wisely avoids the type of uniformity that seeks to "humanize" and "rationalize" the world, for this is only an "illusion" (POML 247). He contests the attempts to establish "ruthlessly a particular national and social order" that insisted on an inhuman "artifice" through political unity (POML 247). Santayana's specific reference to fascism and Nazism puts to rest any concerns that the aesthetic love of uniformity we see first emerge in *The Sense of Beauty* could be misconstrued to mean political uniformity in the form of totalitarianism, for it is a mark of the Romantic, idealistic egotism that he so abhorred. Santayana uses an apt metaphor that is worth repeating, no less because it is expressed through natural imagery: speaking about totalitarianism, he writes that "All the wanton branches of the human tree were to be cut off in order that one vertical stem should flourish in solitary perfection" (POML 247). A similar point is made in *Dominations and Powers*. Santayana is also explicit on his point that there is "no fixed ideal of society" precisely because there is no unified moral value; to believe otherwise is "moral horticulture" bent on "militancy" (DP 363).

The image of a rigid branch is antagonistic to the naturalistic beauty of Santayana's aesthetic theory. After all, Santayana's concept of multiplicity is not only about diversity; it is also a restatement of another feature of natural life: change. The psyche's own encapsulation of multiplicity in uniformity lies in its potential and tendency for alteration. Not by coincidence, Santayana reiterates the psyche's natural and aesthetic origins in the very first chapter of *Dominations and Powers* to emphasize its potential for change. Beauty, like nature, is generative: it declines, withers, and grows again in a different form each time.

By affirming the role of the changing psyche within political arbitration, Santayana is also criticizing the possibility for a purely rational account of politics in large part due to the inherent diversity of psyches, which is the result of the diversity of experience. For example, on the topic of "the relativity of knowledge and morals" he writes that the varied experiences of individuals that stem from the "biological status of perception, opinion, and moral judgements" causes the "degree of truth in ideas and beliefs, and the degree of justness in our judgments" to be mainly derived from "the character of the impression we receive and the complex reaction and radiation of that impression within the life of the psyche" (DP 302-303).

Just one page before, while describing the “mistakes and failure of reason,” Santayana remarks that mankind will never be “rational” in choosing a political party or choosing the man that our supporters must vote for. These major matters would all have to be decided “by habit, accidental impressions, or mysterious intuition” (DP 301). Compare this statement with what Santayana wrote in *The Sense of Beauty* (discussed in section 2.1): Our social institutions are “necessary” because they are “carried” biologically through the function of reproduction insofar as they convey and prove our social affinity for the “the parental, the patriotic,” which, like art, has an effect on us due to its symbolic impression on our psyches, *not* our reasoning minds (SB 42). He writes elsewhere in *Dominations and Powers* that the primary force in a rational order of society is the “vegetative growth of the psyche” that itself spreads to other psyches, and that the “germ of this political growth” is “not itself political but biological and moral” (DP 295-96) with nature (biology) and morals grouped into a common sphere.

The connection seems to me rather consistent: a rationality in politics that is derived from isolated reason is not possible because of the varied experiences of psyches that are rooted in the natural world; that which we value morally in social institutions and political judgement, moreover, is a result of the symbolic impression of biological processes, not pure rational deduction. The problem with “modern speculation” about politics, Santayana writes, is that it is “introverted” in the sense that the man who espouses it believes in his or another man’s “sentiment and intention” *first*, without initially analyzing this other man’s vision of the world (DP 301). Santayana notes that “at least in politics, the first commandment of the conscience in a responsible statesman would be to *understand the world* in which he was playing a part, and the capacities and genuine needs of the people in whose interest he was acting” (DP 301, emphasis mine).

Santayana makes clear in his final work that a problem of contemporary politics lies in its estrangement from the natural world, which has broken this chain of effective arbitration. After all, the psyche’s aesthetic arbitration is grounded in a form of naturalism that sees the world as vast, dynamic, yet still unified. Santayana’s writings teach us, then, how our political values stem from moral values, which stem from aesthetic values that, in turn, stem but cannot be reduced to animal interests that “confirm our initial naturalism” (DP 14).

Recognizing this conceptual link is no easy task. An important aspect of Santayana’s thought is to cultivate an aesthetic perception and interpretation of the world that remains attuned to the realm of matter in order to achieve the liberated spirit and the good life, but without going too far down a road of idealism that resulted, as he argued, in the disastrous political movements of recent history. The takeaway from Santayana’s treatment of aesthetics is that it is central to his overall ontology through the psyche’s use of it *within* the natural world. Aesthetics should not be understood as an abstraction, nor should politics be based on abstract reason. In both of these cases, we forget the importance of the realm of matter because we replace the outside world with the isolated mind. The solution is one of opening our minds to a greater understanding of human reasoning that truly sees the influence of the natural world in its totality. Santayana’s concept of the psyche as an aesthetic arbiter widens the panorama: As he writes, “a man harnessed to affairs or

intent on his own passions will not see those obvious [aesthetic] qualities in their rational logical order, but will see rather their irrational comings and goings . . .” (DP 299). The message in this passage is nearly identical to what he wrote over fifty years back in *The Sense of Beauty* with regards to the natural force of gravity, thus demonstrating the coherence of his thought on this topic: Gravity pulls particles together, thereby implementing order, regardless of “the wholes into which the human eye may have grouped them” (SB 98). In other words, the natural order of the world exists regardless of our ability to discern it. Political judgment is no exception to this rule. The psyche’s aesthetic arbitration corrects misguided and extrapolated judgments not only about morals, but also about politics and any other concept that man has primarily approached through a deracinated form of reason or imagination. The better alternative is one of adjustment in perception. Through its broadening of vision, Santayana’s concept of the psyche inculcates an intellectual humility by compelling us to recognize our minor place in the natural order of the world, to understand it, and *then* to act.

NAYELI L RIANO

Georgetown University

The author would like to thank Jessica Wahman, Herman Saatkamp, Richard Rubin, and the late Nicholas Rengger for their helpful comments in earlier versions of this article.

References with Abbreviations

Santayana, George.

DNM 1925 “Dewey’s Naturalistic Metaphysics.” *The Journal of Philosophy* 22, no. 25 (1925): 673–88. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2013919>.

DP [1951] 1954. *Dominations and Powers*, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

IPR 1900. *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*. Critical edition

LR4 1905. *Reason in Art*. Book IV of *The Life of Reason*. Critical edition

PGS 1940. *The Philosophy of George Santayana*. *The Library of Living Philosophers*, Vol. II. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. Evanston, Chicago: Northwestern University.

POML 1969. *Physical Order and Moral Liberty: Previously Unpublished Essays of George Santayana*. Edited by John Lachs and Shirley Lachs. Charlotte, North Carolina: Vanderbilt University Press.

RM 1930. *The Realm of Matter: Book Second of Realms of Being*, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

SAF 1923 *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

SB [1896] *The Sense of Beauty*. Critical edition.

SE. 1922. *Soliloquies in England*. London: Constable and Company LTD.

WD [1913] *Winds of Doctrine*. The Project Gutenberg EBook, accessed 10 February 2021, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17771/17771-h/17771-h.htm#four>.

Other References

- Alexander, Thomas. 1997. "Santayana's Sage: The Disciplines of Aesthetic Enlightenment." *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 33, No. 2 (Spring 1997): 328-357.
- Harrison, Charles T. 1953. "Santayana's 'Literary Psychology.'" *The Sewanee Review* 61, No. 2 (Spring, 1953): 206-220.
- Kerr-Lawson, Angus. 1986. "Santayana's Epiphenomenalism." *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 22, No. 4 (Fall 1986), 417-433.
- Kerr-Lawson, Angus. 1989. "Santayana's Non-Reductive Naturalism." *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 25, No. 3 (Summer, 1989): 229-250.
- Kerr-Lawson, Angus. 1991. "Toward One Santayana: Recent Scholarship." *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 27, No. 1 (Winter, 1991): 1-25.
- MacDonald, Douglas M. 1976. "Matter over Mind: Santayana's Concept of the Psyche." *Transactions of the Charles Peirce Society* 12, No. 3 (Summer 1976): 291-310.
- Randall, John Herman. 1954. "George Santayana—Naturalizing the Imagination." *The Journal of Philosophy* 51, no. 2 (1954): 50-52.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2020853>.
- Saatkamp, Herman J. 2021. *A Life of Scholarship with Santayana: Essays and Reflections*. Edited by Charles Padrón, and Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński, Value Inquiry Book Series, volume 362. Leiden, Boston: Brill Rodopi.
- Santayana, George. 1936. *The Works of George Santayana*. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.
- Singer, Irving. 2000. *George Santayana: Literary Philosopher*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Santayana, Literary Psychologist: A Response to Nayeli Riano

Nayeli Riano has made an important contribution to Santayana scholarship by demonstrating the significance of the concept of psyche to Santayana's philosophy. Her carefully argued essay locates early and implicit signs of the idea in *The Sense of Beauty*, traces its development through his explicitly ontological works, and closes with an analysis of the politically engaged psyche as it appears in *Dominations and Powers*. In doing so, Riano demonstrates the way in which this principle pervades Santayana's work, thus giving the lie to any notion that *psyche*, for Santayana, could be peripheral or incidental to other subject matter. In making her argument, Riano helps to reveal how thoroughly Santayana practiced what he preached about philosophy—namely that, at its best, it is a form of literary psychology, “the art of imagining how [animals] feel and think” (SAF 252). Whether Santayana is communicating his own philosophical stance or critiquing the positions of others, he always presents a worldview as the imaginative—and, as Riano reminds us, aesthetic—product of a biologically and socially situated animal. Santayana's work gives poetic voice to what he takes to be a sane outlook on life and analyzes (sometimes diagnoses!) other theoretical outlooks as evidence of the psychological underpinnings of their proponents. Ultimately, the concept of psyche is not a haphazardly presented notion but is absolutely central to both the content and method of George Santayana's philosophy.

The Psychic Origin of Aesthetic and Political Judgments

The specific thesis presented in Riano's essay is that the psyche is an “aesthetic arbiter of politics,” by which she means not only that both aesthetic and political concerns emerge from our psychological preferences but that aesthetic attention to unity within multiplicity shapes both the formation and appreciation of our explicit moral and political principles. This thesis marks an improvement over the one delivered to the annual Santayana Society meeting in January of 2021, where Riano presented the psyche as primarily and fundamentally aesthetic in orientation and, as such, the ultimate source of both moral and political opinion. At that point, she appeared to make preferences for biological and social survival parasitic on a desire to surround oneself with beauty. While nothing in principle prevents the existence of such a psyche, and while we have no doubt evolved into the kinds of beings who may rather die than be immersed in ugliness, Darwin's theory of natural selection, an influence on Santayana's position, indicates that it is more likely that aesthetic preferences co-evolved with social ones as a means of maximizing the biological survival of both individuals and species.

Of related concern is that Riano originally appeared to treat aesthetics as the germ rather than the ultimate spiritual fruit of psychic life. She argued, essentially, that what the psyche experiences as beautiful is then perceived as moral or just, and so aesthetic judgments serve as the basis for ethics and politics. This gets some key

aspects of Santayana's philosophy right (psyche and her preferences do serve as the origin of human judgment, whether they are aesthetic or moral, and there is an aesthetic dimension to moral and political essences) but it inverts the genealogy, making aesthetics the parent rather than the offspring of animal preference. For Santayana, aesthetics is not the basis of all judgment but the realization of judgment on an ideal plane and is thus primarily a spiritual rather than a practical psychological matter. In my response to Riano's presentation in January, I stressed psyche's generative relationship with regard to spirit and clarified how organic habits and functions give rise to a conscious life capable of experiencing beauty. Insofar as the aesthetic appreciation of moral and political essences remains a key aspect of Riano's essay, that response is worth repeating here.

As the organizing principle of any particular form of life, psyche has its instinctive preferences and interests, generally geared toward that organism's own survival and flourishing. Psyche's preferences, then, are what the organism *values*. As the type of organism becomes more complex, so do the requirements for its well-being, and thus a vast range of epistemic, emotional, and social concerns unfold to join the more basic appetitive ones. In generating conscious awareness, furthermore, psyche gives rise to spirit, and that which psyche values (among other things) is perceived as an immediate object of attention—an intuited essence or datum. This datum, as an appearance, is the proper object of aesthetic appreciation, for in order for something to appear beautiful or ugly, it must, in the first place, *appear*. Thus, it is not so much that an individual finds the ideal of justice noble and right because the psyche finds it beautiful in its unity. Rather, it is more likely the case that psyche values unity within—or harmony across—multiplicity (for it is far easier to navigate this sort of environment than a chaotic and cacophonous one) and thus spirit, in perceiving this unity in ideal form—whether in natural vistas, paintings, music, or moral and political ideals—finds it beautiful.

It is not my point here to reduce the spiritual act of contemplative reflection to the psychic drive for self-survival. Santayana is clear that our attachment to various ideas at work in practical affairs is very different from the disinterestedness characteristic of the spiritual life. Rather, it is to restore aesthetic considerations to the spiritual plane of existence and, at the same time, to recognize—as Riano does—that a corporeally tethered spirit (there is, for Santayana, no other kind) can never be wholly disinterested in the essences it contemplates. Spirit's parent is the psyche, and however elevated the child's reflections may be, his preferences emerge from the depths of the soul.

In the current version of her essay, Riano builds on her sound understanding of the psyche as material in nature to assert that psyche and its biological principles are the source of *all* preferences—whether aesthetic, social, moral, or political (or, I would argue—though Riano does not—rational). This common origin of valuation provides the basis for her well-supported claim that Santayana finds these various sorts of normative judgments to be less distinct or compartmentalized than other philosophers make them out to be. In making her case, Riano provides ample textual evidence that Santayana thinks beauty is at the root of moral and political ideals, and in one sense, she is utterly correct. Once animal preferences become realized on an ideal plane and articulated as principles, they take on an aesthetic

dimension. It is the beauty of the ideals that, Santayana thinks, charms us more immediately than does the logical force of an argument or the inferred practical consequences of a proposal's implementation in action. Indeed, Santayana might say that the elegance of an argument appeals to our sentiment more immediately than the logic does to our reason, and Riano does bring our attention to places where Santayana stresses that habits and feelings rather than reasons dominate our political lives (p.86). That said, we should be clear (and Riano is not always so) that Santayana would not bifurcate sentiment from reason so cleanly, for he notes that "rationality depends on distinguishing the excellent; and that distinction can be made . . . only by an irrational impulse" (LR1 29). Ultimately, sentiment, rationality, and the appreciation of aesthetic, moral, and political ideals are interconnected precisely because they co-emerge from their common source in the single and systematic organization of living matter that is an existing human psyche.

What Is the Psyche?

Despite her considerably developed and improved argument, there remain confusions in this essay about what, exactly, the psyche *is*. As Riano herself notes, previous scholars have found the concept enigmatic and even ambiguous, so making sense of psyche appears to be no small challenge. Santayana's characterization of it as an organizing principle of life seems to perplex scholars, despite the concept's clear ties to Aristotle's psychology, and to leave them puzzled about just where and how psyche could fit into the natural world. Thus, it is worth carefully analyzing Santayana's characterizations of the psyche, not only to better understand the concept but to assess why it might generate the misunderstandings it seems to among many readers.

Two passages, taken together, can give us a solid understanding of what Santayana means by psyche. In *Realms of Being*, Santayana states that "by the psyche I understand a system of tropes, inherited or acquired, displayed by living bodies in their growth and behaviour. This psyche is the specific form of physical life, present and potential, asserting itself in any plant or animal" (RB 331). From this definition we can understand psyche as a poetic name for the basic organizing principles of life in nature. Psyches are systems of patterned behaviors that cause matter, in these cases, to function as a living being. These patterns can be genetically encoded or learned over the course of a life span. Whether we are talking about the simplest single-celled organisms, plant life, reptiles, mammals, or human beings, each existing living thing owes its being alive to a functioning psyche.

The second characterization to attend to is from *Soliloquies in England*, a passage also cited by Riano in her essay. Here, Santayana calls a psyche "that habit in matter which forms the human body and the human mind" (SE 221). Santayana is focusing on human life here, but we may see this as a special case of his more general definition, for it is entirely consistent with the one provided in *Realms of Being*. Taken together, these accounts of psyche provide us with significant information. The first thing to note is that a psyche is a system of tropes or habits, an automatic and patterned sort of functioning, that is responsible for a given life. Furthermore, a psyche is not just an aggregation of habits but a *system*—it refers to the

working together of the multiplicity of functions that enables an individual organism to survive and flourish. Next, we should note that Santayana identifies the psyche as a physical, or material, principle—a habit within matter. This implies that matter organizes itself into various configurations; the forces by which it concentrates itself in different ways or enacts repeated patterns come entirely from within this ontological plane. There is, then, no sense in which ideal principles impose a structure on existing things.

Finally, and perhaps somewhat confusingly, in these passages Santayana identifies psyche as a form of a physical being and as that which forms both body and mind. It is this aspect of the description that most resembles Aristotle's notion of the psyche, or soul, as the form of a living thing. Here, Santayana picks up on Aristotle's association of *form* with both structure and function, for it both *is* a form of physical life and actively *forms* matter due to its nature as a system of patterned events. At the same time (and this may be one cause of confusion), Santayana distinguishes his own concept from Aristotle's by insisting that psyches, like other physical forms, are habits within matter and not essences that realize matter's potentiality: "Essences are not substances containing a matter that can assume a different essence" (RB 31). In addition, Santayana's use of both *form* and *trope* to describe the material psyche can be confusing due to the fact that he equates tropes with essences and often treats *form* as equivalent to essence. It can thus be tempting to read him as asserting that essences have causal power over matter. However, this seems unlikely, due to the fact that Santayana denies essences any "magic powers" (SAF 77–78), frequently refers to them as inert, and claims that tropes are "no part of the moving substance executing . . . patterns and overflowing them" (RB 305). But this clarification gives rise to yet another question: if a psyche is a system of tropes, and tropes are essences and not part of the moving substance executing patterns, then how can we make sense of what Santayana says about psyche as the form of a living thing or a habit in matter that is responsible for making matter come alive?

The best way I can see to make sense of Santayana's use of *form* and *trope* to describe the material psyche is to note his characterization of the *form of a thing* as an "intermediate object" not synonymous with the being of essences (RB 26). That is to say, Santayana recognized the ambiguity in the traditional concept of a form—it both refers to a power to structure and a discernable shape or pattern—but he breaks from tradition by separating these aspects into different realms of being, relegating *power* to the realm of matter and *characteristic* to the realm of essence. In doing so, Santayana distinguishes those material principles that bring about patterns in matter from the ideal representations that describe them. Thus, when Santayana speaks of a psyche as the *form* of a living physical thing that *forms* the human body and mind and, at the same time, as a set of tropes, which he identifies as essences, we can understand him as using *form* in different senses. Thus, he does not mean to claim that a psyche, as a set of existing habitual events that exemplify

a trope, is itself an essence (though the poetic term, *psyche* is one).¹ Any explicitly observable form (shape, structure, pattern) is an eternal and causally inert essence that is ontologically distinct from the material powers that bring matter into some specific organizational relation.

None of these clarifications about matter, habits, tropes, and essences, however, directly address the few misconceptions about psyche and its relation to conscious spirit that are specifically articulated by Riano. Hers are of an entirely different order. For example, in an earlier version of the essay, Riano reversed the ontological dependence of body and mind on the psyche that forms them by claiming that the psyche is “dependent on our body and mind for its survival,” suggesting that psyche is a part of the mind-body composite. This has since been removed, but it reflects a common misinterpretation of psyche and so is worth discussing. In the present work she lumps together and attributes to spirit “mental processes like thinking, feeling, intuition, or intent” (p. 72). To be sure, the realization of each of these events is a datum of intuition, and it is spirit’s attention to the objects of psyche’s concern that “turns . . . substances or essences into objects of actual thought” (SAF 245). Conscious thinking and feeling is, for Santayana, the *sine qua non* of spiritual life and, even when more pragmatically engaged, is never to be reduced to biological processes. In short, thinking, actualized, is a phenomenon of spiritual attention. And yet, it is psychic cognitive and emotive processes that are responsible for generating the awareness of thoughts and feelings that fall under the purview of spirit. It can become tempting to imagine a sort of parallel processing between biological brain function and spiritual mind function, but this interpretation is belied by Santayana’s insistence that spirit has no causal power. Its only function is to illuminate essences, which is a function only in the poetic sense of the word.

These sorts of confusions—where the psyche is treated as an aspect or part of a mind-body composite and where spirit is awarded mental faculties or powers—are not at all uncommon, which is noteworthy when one considers the pains Santayana has taken to clarify his position on the distinction between psyche and spirit. What could best account for such interpretations? One likely explanation for these sorts of misunderstandings about Santayana’s concept of psyche is that readers are falling prey to *category mistakes* and that the culprit behind all this is Cartesian metaphysics. Now, in drawing on the error identified by Gilbert Ryle, I do not mean to suggest that readers necessarily make a spiritual substance of psyche (though some lean this way) in the way that Descartes made an immaterial substance of the mind. Rather, these problems in making sense of psyche emerge because of the ontological categories—transcendental mind, with its faculty psychology, and mechanistic matter—that Cartesianism has bequeathed to us. When readers encounter Santayana’s concept of psyche today, they understandably assume it must be something either mental or physical, a transcendental power of experience or a physical component of the bodily machine. Some—Riano among them—correctly attest that

¹ If my assertion that a psyche *is* a trope but *is not* an essence still seems confusing, I would remind the reader of Santayana’s own disambiguation of the word “is” into seven distinct connotations (OS 189–212). A psyche may easily be a trope in one sense of the word *is* and not in another.

psyche is material, but since that which is material has become equated with the mechanical—and since a machine is nothing other than the sum of its parts—they try to make psyche a kind of part, giving it a specialized physical place or role alongside the other organs of the body or a general dependence on the body for its existence. A psyche is not a part of the bodily machine, however. It is the systematic functioning of the entire organism, responsible for both its bodily integrity and the emergence of conscious experience. Furthermore, this is not to say, as Ryle might have, that an existing psyche is nothing more than a logical category for the sum total of organic functions, even though the concept of psyche is itself an essence. For Santayana, psyche is a basic aspect of natural being, an eddy within the material flux. It is, as Aristotle noted, the functional form of a living thing (though again, in this case, the functions are entirely material), incorporating matter into and expelling it from its vortex for as long as the system continues to whirl. Santayana recognized the physicalism of his time as impoverished in comparison with the natural ontologies of the ancients, and his own work, particularly his use of *psyche*, is an attempt to recover something of Greek cosmology. To make sense of Santayana's worldview, then, we must reflect on a very different sense of reality from that which has become customary to us.

Aesthetic Judgments about Politics

Even if there are aspects to her account of psyche that do not entirely link up with what Santayana had in mind, and while she does make aesthetics more of a psychic than a spiritual affair, Riano's careful attention to Santayana's treatment of psyche across his philosophy nicely demonstrates a relation among aesthetic, moral, and political preferences and reveals their common psychological source. This is, as I have mentioned, an important contribution to scholarship. Her claims about the specific relation between aesthetic and political judgments—that aesthetic appeal forms the basis of sound political opinion—seem more dubious, though she provides solid evidence that Santayana indeed thought this way. Santayana's argument that our instinctive appreciation of certain ideas generates greater political wisdom than do abstract theoretical arguments marks a familiar conservative and traditionalist posture against modern forms of political organization, whether they be progressivist, communist, or fascistic in nature. It does not follow from such a position, however, that beauty forms the basis of our political preferences nor that this sort of political judgment would in any way be sound.

As Riano explains the matter, Santayana thinks that the psyche finds unity within diversity beautiful and that "a proper understanding and discovery of the psyche's aesthetic—and necessarily naturalistic—predilection leads to what Santayana would consider sound political judgement" (p. 71). Even if this were so and Santayana thought this way, it is hard to see how the focus on unity and multiplicity gets us very far in thinking about what sorts of ethical norms and political systems are more aesthetically pleasing or ought to prevail. The multitudes can be unified in all sorts of ways—communism, fascism, and monarchy all advocate for some unifying socio-political principle—and so the focus on a balance between unity and diversity, by itself, can hardly be an argument for liberal democracy (especially

considering, as Plato noted, democracy's tendency to become disunified and thus to fall prey to tyranny). Similarly, the principle of unity in diversity cannot help us determine, in general, which political works of art are better or are more expressive of justice. It is commonly agreed, among artistic cognoscenti, that Goya's *Third of May, 1808*, Picasso's *Guernica*, and Jasper John's *Flag* represent aesthetic excellence. But what about Judy Chicago's *Red Flag*, in which a woman removes a tampon? Or Thornton Dial's use of torn and tattered cloth in *Don't Matter How Raggy the Flag, It Still Got To Tie Us Together*? The latter two are certainly considered art—they appear in museum collections—but the appreciation of them may be less widespread. Furthermore, the ability to represent a political standpoint artistically can hardly, by itself, help us to determine which positions we ought to prefer. Which song best represents the United States? Irving Berlin's "God Bless America," Billie Holliday's "Strange Fruit," Neil Young's "Ohio," NWA's "Fuck Tha Police," or Sadler and Moore's "The Ballad of the Green Berets" (the top number one Billboard hit of 1966 [University of Maryland 2021])?

Now, Riano correctly notes that Santayana thinks the psyche is naturally inclined to prefer a democracy grounded in cultural tradition over ideologically driven political forms that fail to recognize our general psychological needs for both individual liberty and social stability. Given his demonstrated focus on the psyche as the source of both preferences and the expression of those values in philosophical form (i.e., literary psychology), Santayana is stressing that social structures function best when they fall in line with the natural habits of the human animal—both rational and irrational in nature—rather than when they aim to reconstruct human nature from the top down by way of overarching and abstract theoretical principles. Santayana's form of conservatism demonstrates yet another similarity between him and Hume, whom Santayana was said to have "in [his] bones," despite his own failure to recognize it (PP 238). Hume, in his own arguments from tradition, was criticizing social contract theory, while Santayana aims at such otherwise divergent twentieth century constructions as Soviet communism, National Socialism, and American progressivism. Nonetheless, both sought to justify political structures in terms of their ability to reflect longstanding habits and traditions of human family life and other social arrangements.

To be fair, I don't believe Riano is suggesting (or is claiming that Santayana is arguing) that we can settle all political or aesthetic disputes by appealing to psyche's penchant for unity. She very clearly explains the fact that unity in diversity produces a rich variety in human preferences and allegiances. But she does appear to claim that aesthetic appeal can help us to recognize the justice or injustice in political structures and to thereby distinguish better from worse. My point is to assert that, if psyches are arbiters of politics (and of morals, aesthetics, and so on), then identifying a general aesthetic preference for unity does not take us very far in our attempts to discriminate among which sorts of political judgments existing psyches are likely to make much less which judgments are the better ones.

Santayana, Literary Psychologist

In stressing the significance of psyche to Santayana's philosophy, Nayeli Riano offers Santayana scholars important food for thought. She demonstrates the continual presence, in Santayana's work, of an organic basis of human valuation, and she shows how this concept—whether tacitly or explicitly—shapes so many aspects of Santayana's thought: aesthetics, morals, politics, and even his claims about the nature of philosophy itself. Furthermore, she importantly stresses Santayana's correction to the specialists of both his and future generations: aesthetics cannot be so easily teased apart from ethics, politics, psychology, or any other philosophical subfield. For Santayana, a specific philosophical position, if it is sane, reflects a general worldview and should be consistent both with other subject matter and within the context of that overarching viewpoint. Thus, there can be no ethics that ignores psychology, no politics that ignores both the emotional and aesthetic appeal of moral ideals, and ultimately, no psychology that ignores the place of living things within the broader context of nature.

Realms of Being was Santayana's presentation of his own broad cosmological vision, poetically rendered, in an era of increasingly narrow specialization and abstract argumentation. What Riano most significantly brings forth about this ontological perspective, however, is the extent to which Santayana approached philosophical topics from the point of view of a lay psychologist. Santayana presents himself as a poetic naturalist, but this ultimately means that he expresses his take on nature from his own psychological vantage point and from the imagined points of view of others. He thought of philosophy as properly an act of literary psychology, an imaginative art about the felt lives of other souls, rather than a logical system of ideas or a scientific doctrine regarding material things. In *Dialogues in Limbo*, a creative rendering of his own imagined conversations with ancient philosophers, Santayana states that the purpose of his text is to "confirm the scientific psychology that [he has] put into the mouth of Democritus," indicating both that psychological concerns were his primary aim in those pages and that his version of the Greek atomist represents Santayana's own poetic interpretation of the psyche's material nature and a general recipe for a sanely lived life (DL ii).

Perhaps this attention to psyche is why so many of Santayana's analyses of other philosophers and their positions read like psychological diagnoses: the egotism of German philosophy, the narcissism of empiricism, the arrogance of humanism, or even the agoraphobia of Bergson (Pinkas 28–29). Santayana may have diagnosed himself as "an ignorant man, almost a poet" (SAF ix), but his poetry is shot through with psychological motivations. Nayeli Riano has caught onto this fact and noted it well.

JESSICA WAHMAN

Emory University

References with Abbreviations

Santayana, George.

- DL 1948. *Dialogues in Limbo, With Three New Dialogues*. Enlarged edition. New York, NY: Scribner's.
- LR1 [1905]. *Reason in Common Sense*. Critical edition.
- OS 1936. *Obiter Scripta*. Charles Scribner's Sons.
- PP [1944-1953] *Persons and Places*. Critical edition.
- RB 1940. *Realms of Being* (one-volume edition). Charles Scribner's Sons.
- SAF 1923. *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. Charles Scribner's Sons.
- SE 1922. *Soliloquies in England and Other Soliloquies*. Charles Scribner's Sons.

Other References

- "Green Berets." 2021. *University Libraries*, University of Maryland. accessed September 6. <https://exhibitions.lib.umd.edu/songsofwar/vietnam/recordings/berets>.
- Pinkas, Daniel. 2016. "Unmasking Bergson: Cosmic Agoraphobia, Literary Psychology and Death." *Overheard in Seville* 34: 23–34.

Reading “The Secret of Aristotle”

Part I: Imagined Geographies in Santayana and Ibn Sina

In Santayana’s dialogue “The Secret of Aristotle,” the *Metaphysics* is like a solar eclipse, the attraction of which spectacular object lies in its illumination being occulted. The collection of Aristotle’s ontological and theological books is spoken of as a coherent unity¹ and framed as the written vessel of an esoteric doctrine, to access which “we need to consult and to ponder [the Philosopher’s works] unceasingly” (DL 244). Yet, despite the Stranger’s urging that the doctrine propounded seems inconsistent with the Aristotelian text, the interlocutors persist in pondering meaning without examining textual evidence. The text disappears in the act of deciphering its meaning. The task of textual examination remains for the reader, who, if adopting a critical attitude, cannot avoid doing what the Avicenna character calls for: consulting the texts.² First, however, the dialogue’s literary framing must be considered in order to make sense of its rhetorical status as an ironic satire of historiography.

The relation of author to *dramatis personae* is not straightforward. While the Stranger, as usual for the *Dialogues in Limbo*, is in some sense Santayana’s stand-in, it does not follow that we can simply read off, from the Stranger’s lines, the author’s views; nor, even if we could, would the interest of the text reside solely in its author’s intent. The exposition of doctrine in this dialogue is largely expressed through a fictional Avicenna,³ whose relation to the real Ibn Sina will be explored in the present article (and its sequel). The device of fictionalizing a pivotal figure in the history of philosophy sets the dialogue in a crossing of liminal spaces: not merely between earthly life and the least-infernal realm for the inferno’s dead; not merely between ancient and modern Eurocentric philosophy as in most of the dialogues; but between the imagined Avicenna’s views on Aristotle and the real historical reception of Aristotle—hence, between medieval Islamic philosophy’s attitudes toward Greek metaphysics and modern Western appropriations of both. The author’s literary device does not relieve the critical reader of the task of measuring the fiction’s distance from and distortion of history; rather, classifying is *as* a fictionalization presupposes, in principle, the possibility of that inquiry. At the same time, Santayana’s representation of Avicenna participates in a genre of literature

¹ The *Metaphysics* is an instance of “secondary concretion in discourse” that Santayana defined as the “embodied spirit” of proper names in *Reason in Common Sense* (LR1 111 footnote).

² If Richard M. Rubin is right that a thorough, repeated consultation of philosophical texts is the interpretative principle urged in the dialogue (Rubin 24), it is noteworthy that that is not what the interlocutors *do* in their conversation.

³ Except where context or benign ambiguity dictate otherwise, I will use the name “Avicenna” in this article to refer to the character within the diegetic world of Santayana’s *Limbo*. I will use “Ibn Sina” to denote the real philosopher-physician from medieval Bukhara who flourished at the turn-of-the-millennium.

that, following Edward Said⁴, can be called modern Orientalism: representations of the cultures and inhabitants of the "East", as produced by institutionally-powerful scholarly, artistic, and administrative discourses in a general political context of Western imperialism and colonial domination. It is not that Santayana intends any disrespect toward the great physician-thinker; yet the cavalier treatment of factuality and deployment of literary tropes is readable as a symptom of a phenomenon bigger than Santayana himself. "The Secret of Aristotle" provides an especially piquant demonstration of Western philosophical historiography's implicit Orientalism; the latter, in turn, is a special case of a broader form of historical narrative that can be called *imagined geography*.

From Diogenes Laertius's organization of the history of philosophy to Heidegger's eschatological questioning of the *Abendland*, or the West as the "evening-land" at the twilight of our epoch of metaphysics and technology, the narrative of philosophy has been structured around an imaginary source somewhere in the world of Greece (Diogenes Laertius 1:Prologue; Heidegger 580). Elsewhere, Santayana frames a Northern-Southern dichotomy in a Eurocentric history of Christianity, whereby the "Teutonic temperaments" of the "northern soul" are contrasted with the, let us say, Mediterranean outlooks of "Roman and Judean" forms of Christianity and of neo-Platonic theology (LR3 68-70, 103 (punctuation modified)). Diogenes Laertius opens *Lives of the Philosophers* by recording, and taking sides as a partisan in, a debate from the dawn of late antiquity (and well before that) over the Greek or "barbarian" origins of philosophy. Who are these barbarians? We immediately learn they include Zoroastrian Persians, Indian gymnosophists, Egyptian priests, and also Gauls and Celtic Druids. Diogenes's division here is not that of East and West but one of ethno-linguistic cultures viewed Greco-centrally.⁵ His intra-Greek framing of Ionian and Italian Schools, however, is based on the geographic places of inhabitation of their founders, Thales and Pythagoras, respectively, with results such as that, according to his classification, Plato becomes an Ionian and Epicurus an Italian (Diogenes Laertius 1: Prologue). The meanings of such organizing devices as imagined geographies will depend on their uses and abuses in the narratives they enable. They are complex instances of what Santayana in a

⁴ One of the most influential literary studies of the late 20th century, Said's critical diagnosis of Orientalism challenged the ways that Western cultural and scholarly production represent (especially, but not limited to) Arab and Muslim societies; his approach emphasized the *worldliness* of texts, how they interact with broader socio-cultural and political institutions. Born in Jerusalem, Palestine in 1935, educated there, in Cairo, and in the U.S., Said taught for most of his academic career at Columbia University till his passing in 2003.

⁵ Authors advocating non-Greek philosophical origins "forget that the achievements which they attribute to the barbarians belong to the Greeks, with whom not merely philosophy but the human race itself began," in Hick's translation (Diogenes Laertius, 1:Prologue). A tighter formulation of the sense of Diogenes's assertion would be: *it is hidden from those authors that the Greeks, by their achievements, were the leaders of philosophy and of humanity*—construing the ἀρχὴ (árkhō), in inflected form ἡρξῆ (êrkhe), as to lead or to rule. Augustine follows Diogenes's framing of major philosophical schools and says of Greek literary language that it "has the highest international reputation" in the early 5th century CE (Augustine 299, parentheses removed).

draft paper describes as “[m]oral geography. . . compacted of myths” to which category is assigned a membership as seemingly ontologically diverse as colors, the gods of Olympus, and the practical attribution of causes (POML 30).

In the present article I discuss the literary-formal relation of author and dramatis personae in order to consider the relationship of Santayana’s text to a history of Orientalism. In the sequel⁶ to the present article, the dialogue’s principal speculative contents, the theory of causality, will be examined in light of its metaphorical expression of Islamic imagery and the way that Santayana’s fictionalization of Avicenna fictionalizes in turn Aristotle’s doctrine. Also in the sequel, I consider various conceptualizations of causal concepts in prominent ancient Greek and Latin texts so as to assess the dialogue’s argumentative move of reducing *cause* to one concept thereof, and I offer reflections on the dialogue’s relations to ancient materialism and its implications for late modern materialism.

Bíos párodos ⁷

In correspondence to Max Fisch, Santayana proposed selecting “The Secret of Aristotle” to represent the “more humanistic side” of his writings to be included in a “Source-Book” that the younger scholar was preparing (LGS to Max Howard Fisch, 17 April 1937). That he would be proud of the text is not hard to fathom: it is written with exquisite craft and develops its themes with patient precision. A didactic dialogue, it contains a controlled poetic beauty. Consider the passage in which the persona Avicenna describes his dash through numerous mosques in search of an old man who gave him a book of commentary on Aristotle’s metaphysical doctrine; he imagines that observers asked themselves: “Was it a ray of sunlight between two cypresses severed by the breeze?” (DL 235). “It” is the philosopher in motion; this fleeting vision might have been difficult for the observers to grasp. The sentence has a delicate grammatical ambiguity making for a vivid clarity of image. A first and obvious reading of the sentence construes “cypresses” as the noun modified by “severed”; a second reading views “ray” as the noun so modified, thus taking the sentence as a hyperbaton.⁸ Oscillation between these two possible readings itself enacts the breeze’s kinesis. In the dialogue, a fictionalized Avicenna converses about Aristotelian metaphysics with a Stranger—although not so strange to the philosopher that he had not conversed with him twice before (i.e., in the previous dialogue in *Dialogues in Limbo* and in a supposed conversation that a footnote indicates is not to be found in the collection). There is a secret teaching

⁶ The sequel will be titled “Reading ‘The Secret of Aristotle’, Part II: Causality as Radical Instability”.

⁷ The expression *bíos párodos* can be rendered as: (that which is a) life makes its appearance (on the cosmic scene) — from *Ho kosmos skene ho bíos párodos*, Democritus, DK B115.

⁸ The obvious reading of the syntax would take “cypresses” as that which is severed. The second reading I claim is also viable — because the semantic content of the sentence can best be visualized as positing an image of swaying cypresses severing a ray of light, by obstructing its path along a line of sight — would sever the term “severed” from the noun phrase it modifies, with a prepositional phrase “between two cypresses” in between; the modifier’s stepping over that intervening phrase is an instance of the rhetorical figure called hyperbaton.

which Aristotle "intentionally disguised," a tactic which Avicenna repeated (DL 230, 237). The dialogue takes place in limbo, where Dante had assigned the enlightened, unbaptized dead (TPP 66).

The dialogue did not make the cut for what became *Classic American Philosophers*; from the short writings listed by Santayana in the letter, "Ultimate Religion," on Spinoza, was chosen. Nor did "The Secret" get singled out in the editorial team's suggestions for further reading; the book *Dialogues in Limbo*—without referring to this particular dialogue—was mentioned as appropriate for "[r]eaders with little formal training in philosophy" on account of its being among the "more literary and less systematic writings" (Fisch 476). Another piece that Santayana had recommended in the 1937 letter, identifying it as representing his "most technical side," the article "Some Meanings of the Word Is", was described by the collection editors as among Santayana's sketches-in-brief of his system (Fisch 477). However, in the 1937 letter, Santayana's contrasting of these pieces was not between systematic and non-systematic but between technical and humanistic; arguably "The Secret of Aristotle" is more systematic than "Some Meanings" which tersely presents key (onto)logical distinctions without developing their fuller philosophical significance (Santayana 1915, 66-68). What makes this dialogue humanistic is not lack of systemic import but rather its complicated layers of indirection through imagination as distinct from straightforward expository discourse.

That the indirection was effective beyond intent can be seen by comparing two interpretations of what Santayana was up to. In the bibliography after his Introduction to *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, Richard McKeon mentions two works specifically devoted to the *Metaphysics*, one of which is surprisingly, Santayana's dialogue. Beyond surprising, however, is the summary that McKeon provides of Santayana's text: "An imaginative guess without pretensions as history, which nonetheless does not depart far from what could be found in histories" (McKeon xxxviii). It is unspecified what the contours of the "guess" are, nor which histories McKeon has in mind. As to the former, the suggestion may be that the conclusions, at least some of them, on which Avicenna and the Stranger come to agreement present a true interpretation of Aristotle. This view of Santayana's intent, which I ascribe to McKeon, is not shared by a subsequent commentator on the dialogue, namely, Santayana himself. The first edition of *Dialogues in Limbo* in 1925 had no preface; in the Preface to the later expanded edition, he writes that he:

ventured, under the mask of a supposed Arabic attempt to discover a secret doctrine in Aristotle, to regret that the latter, so naturalistic in his concrete observations, should still have followed Plato in ascribing eternal fixity and magic power to the categories of Greek grammar and ethics (DL, Preface).

According to this statement, the author considered some of the views propounded by the characters as not reflecting the actual doctrines of Aristotle. Exactly what the later Santayana understood to be the relationship between the dialogue and the Aristotelian books is difficult to decipher from that summation. First, because the meaning of eternity is one of the topics under discussion in the dialogue, we might wonder which definition of eternity is the one being "regret[ted]"—the Preface may or may not be saying that the understandings of eternity posited by the

characters do not correspond to what he assumed Aristotle's view on eternity to have been. The "magic power" of grammatical and ethical notions leads straight to the second difficulty (I leave aside the confusion that the word "categories" used in this context invites, for the metaphysical, physical, and psychological concepts discussed thematically in the dialogue are not strictly speaking treated as categories): what is this supposed "magic power"—which we are told is Platonist—that Santayana is ascribing to the views of the real Aristotle? Regarding magic, there is the following exchange:

The Stranger: . . . 'Tis love that makes the world go round, and not, as idolatrous people imagine, the object of love. The object of love is passive and perhaps imaginary; it is whatever love happens to choose, prompted by an inner disposition of its organ. You are a believer in automatism, and not in magic.

Avicenna: Excellent. If the final cause, or the object of love, bears by courtesy the title of good, believe me when I tell you that the efficient cause, the native impulse in matter, by moving towards that object, bestows that title upon it. (DL 242-243)

Magic, the Stranger implies, is an object-driven theory of love; not only do the interlocutors prefer a subjective theory, but the mechanism of the subject's object-choice is determined by organic or other material factors. In Platonic metaphysics, Santayana had written elsewhere, "[e]verything becomes magical, and a sort of perpetual miracle of grace" (SE 215). What about the "power" in the later Santayana's statement about magic power? The dialogue speaks of force as how *not* to interpret causes in the famous Aristotelian fourfold analysis of causes. The "ignorant" or "learned babblers" understand the traditional four causes of Aristotle—formal, material, efficient, and final cause—as "forces mutually supplementary, combining to produce natural things" (DL 238-239). In contrast, the book⁹ that the old man gave to Avicenna, as the character explains, entitled *The Wheel of Ignorance and the Lamp of Knowledge*, provides an alternative interpretation whereby what the tradition calls "causes" are really four principles of interpretation or observation that yield a quite different theory of causality from that of Peripatetic tradition. I examine this argument in detail in the sequel; at this point I note that the faulty interpretation of "forces" can be related to the "magic powers" of which the later Santayana spoke.

The Avicenna character mocks the notion—i.e., that of formal cause—according to which "the form which things happen to have could be one of the causes of their having it" (DL 239). Similarly, he derides final cause—"as if perfection could be one of the sources of imperfection"—"this guiding influence," in the case of a chicken egg hatching, "of the divine idea of a perfect cock or of a perfect hen, presiding over the hatching, and causing the mere eggness in that egg to assume the likeness of the animals from which it came" (DL 239). Such magical explanation can be overcome by a proper interpretation of Aristotle, enabled by the book of the

⁹ Ibn Sina's Autobiography explains that he only finally understood Aristotle's *Metaphysics* after reading al Farabi's *On the Purposes of the Metaphysics* (AAT 17). Al Farabi, however, unlike Santayana's old man, had died long before Ibn Sina was born.

old benefactor. The Stranger arrives well-disposed to listen to the teaching on the esoteric Aristotle for, while he has some doubts about its conformity with the language of Aristotle's extant texts, the Stranger already holds to an anti-Platonist philosophical position:

The Stranger: . . . Of all men, I am the last to belittle the world of matter or to condemn it. . . . I know that matter, the oldest of beings, is the most fertile, the most profound, the most mysterious; it begets everything, and cannot be begotten; but it is proper to spirit to be begotten of all other things by their harmonies, and to beget nothing in its turn. (DL 230)

Genesis proceeds from the womb, the *matrix*, of matter. Etymologically, *materia* derives from *mater*; ontically, like all else, mothers are borne by and born from matter—hens and Gaia alike.

On the discrepancy between McKeon and Santayana, I offer the following mediation. McKeon reads the character Avicenna as though he were a mouthpiece for Santayana; that would require that we construe the dialogue as depicting a doubling of Santayana's mind—either the Stranger and Avicenna represent phases of Santayana's developing reflection or the latter stands for a sort of ideal ego supplementing the former, his ego. That is if we take it seriously as a "guess" as to the meaning of *Metaphysics*. Later Santayana, on the other hand, views the problem ironically: the mask of what Aristotle should have thought only highlights what he didn't say. For, at least in the books as they were transmitted by Alexandrian scholars, and as Aristotelian metaphysics travelled its circuitous route eastward and westward, it did not have the meaning ascribed to it in "The Secret." The secret of "The Secret" is—of course—that there is no secret.

If the esotericism is ironic, this only makes the historicity of the dialogue more intriguingly complicated. The historical plausibility "without pretensions as history" that McKeon found in the dialogue does still apply—not so much to Aristotle as to Avicenna. It is precisely the relationship to medieval, as well as to late antique, receptions of Plato and Aristotle—and their enormous, semi-unknown impact on later medieval and early modern philosophy in the West—wherein resides the main importance of Santayana's dialogue. "The Secret of Aristotle" enacts, dramatizes, the errant path of metaphysics; at the same time, it satirizes the parochialism of modern Occidental views of the history of thought.

Neither, yet both¹⁰

If a simplified *mouthpiece* theory¹¹, familiar from scholarship on Plato's middle dialogues, tempts us to ask which character speaks for the author, a Venn diagram

¹⁰ "The Stranger: Do you encourage me to approach? Or am I warned that I should be disturbing the sweeter society of your thoughts? Avicenna: Neither, yet both." (DL 229)

¹¹ "According to Nehamas, the Mouthpiece"—Socrates in transitional, middle, and late dialogues by Plato—is a metaphysician, but the Reflection"—Socrates of the early dialogues—"is a consummate ironist" (Anderson and Landy 39). This summary is an oversimplification

yields five plausible options: one or another of the interlocutors, or both, or their overlap, or neither of them serve as a mouthpiece.¹² But this two-dimensional, static, binary approach needs to be replaced by one that finds meaning not merely in authorial intent but in the position and operation of the text within a layering of historical contexts.

The problem of how to assess the author's distance from, and insertion into, a text—which goes beyond but includes the varied questions sometimes simplified into that of authorial intent—is part of what Edward Said called “strategic location.” Together with its counterpart, called “strategic formation,” they comprise two “methodological devices for studying authority” (Said 20). Strategic formation provides “a way of analyzing the relationship between texts and the way in which groups of texts, types of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large” (Said 20). The process of this referential power of texts is mediated through institutions, discourses, precedent works. The choice of the term “strategy” is explained as follows:

I use the notion of strategy simply to identify the problem every writer on the Orient has faced: how to get hold of it, how to approach it, how not to be defeated or overwhelmed by its *sublimity*, its scope, its awful dimensions. Everyone who writes about the Orient must locate himself vis-à-vis the Orient; translated into his text, this location includes the kind of narrative voice he adopts, the type of structure he builds, the kinds of images, themes, motifs that circulate in his text -- all of which add up to deliberate ways of addressing the reader, containing the Orient, and finally, representing it or speaking in its behalf. (Said 20, italics added)

The reference to “sublimity” combines both Kantian classes of the sublime: the mathematically and the dynamically sublime (Kant 131, Ak. 5:247). The “scope” and “dimensions” of “the Orient”—this putative object of research that modern Orientalist artists and scholars, analyzed in Said’s meta-analysis, undertook to study and represent—does not simply exceed by quantity the capacities to grasp it, but it threatens to “overwhelm[m]” and to “defeat[t]” those authors; as “awful” in this way, connoting power, it is dynamically sublime. As Said’s description suggests, strategic location depends on (prior) strategic formations and, dialectically, may affect the (subsequent) formations. The object of research and/or imagination is approached, and the subject situates herself regarding it, based on others’ authoritatively transmitted ways of approaching it. These ways may make the object appear more or less “awful” and more or less eligible for being submitted to domination (Said 3-4).

To what extent, if any, is “The Secret of Aristotle” an Orientalist document? I stress that this does not turn on any animus, in the hostile sense; it can well be that well-meaning portraits are prejudicial in their effects. So, the claim in the Preface to *Dialogues* that the “normal madness in living animals,” subjectivity, “should be

of Plato’s treatment of Socrates; within the mouthpiece set, finer distinctions could be drawn and moments of irony discerned. My interest here is in the concept *mouthpiece* not its application by Nehamasians.

¹² Three more options are logically possible but implausible: one or the other or both characters *except* for their points of agreement could stand for the author.

discounted . . . in the philosophy of the West, as it has always been discounted in that of the East" is intended as a panegyric to Eastern thought (DL, Preface). But, as it implies a lesser importance of subjectivity in a timeless, unchanging, impersonal, homogenous East, the statement readily fits in with a broader, all-too-prevalent discourse of negative stereotypes. The question of Orientalism in Santayana leads, however, to more complex historiographic questions: was Ibn Sina an Orientalist? What role do cardinal directions play in orienting the cultural history of philosophy?

Most philosophers and intellectual historians in the Eurocentric tradition are in the position, with respect to medieval Arabic philosophy, of Borges's narrator at the end of "Averroes' Search"—"narrat[ing] the process of a defeat" (JLB 155). Or they would be if they possessed the latter's self-consciousness. Having related most of the tale in the third person—describing the 12th century Andalusian's conversations with colleagues and his struggle, in composing commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics*, with how to decipher the sense of tragedy and comedy—in the penultimate paragraph the narratorial first-person enters, not to clarify the scene but to dissolve it. The story's historical premise—that Averroes would have neither directly experienced theatrical practices nor received reliable reports about them—could be tested; the improbable claim that Averroes would have had no way to surmise "what a theater is" (JLB 155)—likewise for drama—is less an empirical hypothesis about the real Averroes, Ibn Rushd, than it is an expression of the narrator's struggle with his own presuppositions. "With firm and careful calligraphy," Averroes judges that *tragedy* signifies panegyrics and *comedy* satires and anathemas. Tired and cold, Averroes

unwound his turban . . . he looked at himself in a metal mirror. I do not know what his eyes saw, because no historian has ever described the forms of his face. I do know that he disappeared suddenly, as if fulminated by an invisible fire, and with him disappeared the house and . . . the books and the manuscript . . . (JLB 155)

The story concludes with a coda in which the narrator explains "I tried to narrate the process of a defeat," specifically, "the case of a man who sets himself a goal which is not forbidden to others, but is to him" (JLB 155). Averroes seemed to fit the description, being "closed within the orb of Islam" somehow barring access to the secrets of Attic drama and its worldly echoes; but the narrator continues, "I felt that the work was mocking me" insofar as trying to imagine Averroes, on the basis of a few Christian and/or Orientalist scholars' reports, was no less absurd than the task ascribed to Averroes in the story (JLB 155). Hence, the disappearance of Averroes's image is not due to the character's hermeneutic error but due to defeat of the narrator's attempt; and here it would be appropriate to identify the narrator with Borges. A curious parenthetical remark concludes the coda:

(The moment I cease to believe in him, "Averroes" disappears.) (JLB 155)

This seemingly unnecessary summary would appear to mar the storyteller's art by stating what had already been amply shown, or overstating what had already been stated. But there is a non-redundant detail: the quotation marks call attention to the name—Borges began the story by listing, in a parenthetical remark embedded

in the first sentence, the various names that Ibn Rushd received in his reception history. Averroes must disappear so that Ibn Rushd may appear.

That is the best case scenario. The typical case is rather: the Arabic thinker simply disappears. They don't cease to subsist in the Eurocentric history but do so having been absorbed; scholasticism is literally unthinkable¹³ without the influence of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd; and Cartesian philosophy is impossible without the basis of scholasticism. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find fundamental themes in Spinoza's or Santayana's own ontology that do not have antecedents in theirs. Yet, despite the tribute paid to Avicenna in *Dialogues in Limbo*, it is difficult to place the practitioners of *falsafa* in Santayana's "Progress of Philosophy": in that essay, which appeared a few years prior to the dialogues, a global history of philosophy is sketched with the conceit of a library bookcase with four shelves.¹⁴ On the highest shelf, "out of reach, since I can't read the language" (SE 209), Santayana adds parenthetically, is placed Indian philosophy, which he goes on to credit with the discovery of spirit; but, he claims, "[t]he Indians did not study the movement and mechanism of nature: they had no science" (SE 210). On the second shelf, within reach, Santayana places the Greek naturalists: "Sanity, thy name is Greece" (SE 212). Since the extent documents of those natural philosophers are few, renaissance natural philosophy "leading up to Spinoza" and "all modern science" are added, such that this collection exceeds the one shelf, spilling out into a whole library unto itself. The third shelf receives Platonism, *including Aristotle*, the Fathers, the Scholastics, and all honestly Christian theology" (SE 209, italics added). Presumably *some* of Aristotle had to have been included on shelf two, because aside from Aristotle's own voluminous contributions to natural philosophy, he is also the doxographer who has enabled later scholars to reconstruct several pre-Socratic or other non-Platonist views.¹⁵ The metaphysical Aristotle, at least, belongs on the Platonic shelf. Modern, subjective philosophy, which is psychological and

¹³ "The two most celebrated Islamic philosophers of the Middle Ages are [Ibn Sina], belonging to the eastern group, and [Ibn Rushd], belonging to the western group. . . . [Ibn Sina's] distinction between essence and existence in creatures, together with their identification [in] God, was adopted by William of Auvergne (d. 1249); and it formed an important feature of the philosophy of St. Thomas" (Copleston 62-63). Copleston emphasizes that the Greek—Syriac—Arabic—Latin transmission "channels" from the 8th century through the 13th, together with gaps in information, meant there were some creative, massive misprisions. He is not correct, however, in attributing the neo-Platonic elements, such that there be, in Ibn Sina to a confusion about the authorship of the apocryphal *Theology of Aristotle*, really based on Plotinus (Copleston 61). Ibn Sina's Letter to Kiya states that "the *Theologia* is somewhat suspect" (AAT 58).

¹⁴ Flamm calls Santayana's overall approach "an indisputably rich reading of the history of philosophy" (Flamm §4).

¹⁵ Heidegger chides Hegel for viewing nearly all philosophy before Aristotle as pre-Aristotelian thought; he observes that Aristotle's student Theophrastus could be regarded as the founder of a "doxographical tradition in philosophy," surviving "even beyond Hegel" (Heidegger 579). Heidegger claims that the trouble with doxography, as a reporting of the history of views held by thinkers, is the same as that with historiography generally: it neglects to think the priority of Being over "the essence of history" and thereby contributes to a forgetting of the history of Being and to neglecting to think its destiny (Heidegger 581-582). I favor the opposite method: history has priority over concepts like *being*.

obsessed with reflective epistemology at the expense of ontology, is on the bottom shelf; we must infer that the older someone gets, the less inclined they will be to bend down that far to pick up those books. Santayana's contemporaries, whose books are hyperspecialized and disoriented "like children playing blind-man's-buff," even though they have "lively wits," are of "doubtful destination"—they don't get a shelf (SE 209-210). Whatever local progress occurs in philosophy does not imply an overall, continuous progress; rather there are bursts of insight, such as that of Ionian naturalism and Plato, and then "[w]hat follows is more valuable in this respect or that; it renders fitly the partial feelings and *varying fashions of a long decadence*; but nothing . . . can ever equal their first exuberance" (SE 209, italics added). Is Arabic and Islamic philosophy of the medieval period, say from Al Kindi to Ibn Rushd, a historical moment of exuberance or a part of the centuries-long decadence of Platonism? In lieu of tackling that, let us consider the narrower question of where Ibn Sina's oeuvre belongs in Santayana's bookcase. As a theologian-metaphysician, he belongs alongside the Scholastics and "honestly Christian" philosophers; indeed, as already suggested, he is there already in some of *their* works, such as Aquinas. As a physician, to say nothing of his physics and astronomy, he belongs surely on Santayana's shelf/library devoted to natural science. The *Canon of Medicine* is one of the most influential textbooks of all time and, among other things, is considered the foundation text for the theory and practice of quarantines (Sepehri, unpaginated). The exclusion of non-Christian medieval thought cannot be justified by the criteria of Santayana's account.

Recall why the Stranger encounters Avicenna in limbo—Dante put him there. The *Inferno* is part of the textual formation that makes *Dialogues in Limbo* what it is. The character Avicenna, however, in the dialogue "Homesickness for the World," laments his condition, not being in "The Paradise of the Prophet, reclining on silken cushions and sipping delicious sherbets . . . Some tender young maid, wide-eyed and nimble as a gazelle, should be not far from me" so as to be touched (DL 218). Instead, "the Omniscient looked into my secret heart, and perceived that I was no believer, and that whilst my lips invoked his name and that of the Prophet, my trust was all in Aristotle and in myself" (DL 219). There is a dramatic irony here, which cannot be unintended by Santayana, an astute reader of Dante; for Dante depicted the Prophet, not in Paradise, but in the depths of the *Inferno*, suffering an especially cruel form of punitive torture (Lippi et al. 1838-1842). Religious schism is replicated on Muhamad's fractured body. Said notices in this Canto that, over and above the matter of religious convictions, by making the Prophet ask the diegetic Dante to warn one Fra Dolcino, a supposedly lascivious and "renegade priest whose sect advocated community of women and goods," Dante is comparing the Prophet to Dolcino's "revolting sensuality" (Said 69).

Of the myriad details about Avicenna, Santayana selected sexuality, associated with an objectification/commodification of women, to appear in the two dialogues he wrote as well as in one he didn't! Sexualizing Avicenna is not unique to Santayana; it is something of a stock anecdote of the tradition that Ibn Sina liked wine and women. "The Secret" opens with Avicenna "smiling at those old feats of lustiness and prowess which I was recounting — and with rare pleasure — when you were last here" (SE 229). A footnote indicating this "allusion is to a conversation

not reported in this volume" appears in both editions (DL 1957, 229; DL [1925], 173), suggesting that no such dialogue was ever intended to be completed. It is a joke at the border of the extra-diegetic; the nonexistent conversation is improper for public consumption. This is confirmed by the almost bawdy repartee that immediately follows:

The Stranger: It was a rare pleasure to listen.

Avicenna: Doubtless a purer pleasure to listen to such exploits than to remember them. I pine for my splendid past, and you seem hardly to envy it.

The Stranger: . . . The flight of eagles and swimming of porpoises are admirable to me in the realm of truth; I rejoice that there are such things in the world, but I am not tempted to experiment in those directions. (DL 229)

The Islamic philosopher is exoticized; it is not that he is of the Orient but that he is of *the wrong Orient*, the Middle East, say, and not the spiritual, body-renouncing India of Santayana's "Progress" soliloquy's transparently selective account of worldwide intellectual history.

Said goes on to critique the "ahistorical vision" of Dante's gathering of "pre-Christian luminaries" and post-Christian Muslims in the same category of "heathen" and, in parentheses, compares this to Archbishop Fénelon's *Dialogues des mortes*, from the early 18th century (Said 69). The model for the genre is Lucian. Said's comment misses the point; Fénelon's aim, at least in the subset of dialogues that juxtapose chosen figures from radically different eras and cultures, is precisely to de-naturalize the historical context each represents, to highlight their distinctiveness through contrast.¹⁶ An example is Solon and Justinian, who debate the features appropriate to law, meeting from the distance of a millennium. The theme of historical method is expressly treated in the dialogue between Herodotus and none other than Lucian. The latter says:

Lucian: You argue much better now than you did whilst travelling; however, the truth of the matter is, I was too faithless, and you were too credulous.

Herodotus: You are the same man still, making a jest of everything; 'tis time that your shade, Lucian, should have a little more gravity in it. (Fénelon 53)

The character Lucian proceeds to mock the Pythagorean theory of reincarnation, to which Herodotus responds by exhorting the gods to punish the satirist by "send[ing] your soul to animate the body of some traveller; then you would be convinced of the truth"—i.e., oral testimony and ethnographic evidence Herodotus used in his research—"of what you call fabulous" (Fénelon 53). The subsequent reply is sarcastic:

Lucian: And then enter the body of some philosopher of each different sect, one after another, that I might be of the several opinions which I have ridiculed. A very pretty thing faith! but all of a piece with several other things you have advanced. (Fénelon 53-54)

¹⁶ Steinkraus describes Fénelon's dialogue between Socrates and Confucius as "ingenious but odd" (Steinkraus 261).

Herodotus gets the last word, reminding Lucian that he has received the art of the dialogue ultimately from Plato and, ungratefully, used it to mock its maker.

One could imagine new dialogues of the dead, wherein Fénelon and Said debate history, the Stranger is confronted by Aristotle, and Averroes composes a commentary on *El Aleph*. But how might a subsequent conversation between Avicenna and Santayana, now become a shade, proceed on the matter of Orientalism, assuming that both have also become acquainted, in limbo, with Said's work?

Santayana will undoubtedly express a certain *metanoia* regarding the overtly racist attitudes expressed in his early work, *Reason in Society* (LR2 105). Avicenna, being an agile learner and expert in the art of conjecture, will wonder whether a more muted but no less effective racism is not still to be found in Santayana's late work *Dominations and Powers*—whereby a sort of natural segregation theory is sketched and painted with a slogan "Vital liberty differentiates" (DP 357-358). However, being disposed to avoid entering into controversy, Avicenna might not raise the matter forcefully but instead "concea[l] [his disagreement] with the veils of feigned neglect" as Ibn Sina described his disagreement with certain positions of the Peripatetic school (AAT 38). Being proud of his encyclopedic knowledge, Avicenna will surely demand to know why his interlocutor did not devote more attention to studying *The Book of the Cure* (*Kitab al Shifa*) and especially its metaphysics, or science of divine things. To which Santayana might plead that life on earth is short and he had not enough time to pursue all philosophies. He might add in jest, "I wasn't an Oriental specialist. Besides, I heard it was *you* rather than me who was the Orientalist!"

Though not a *modern* Orientalist in the sense defined in Said's study, nor Islamophobic like Dante, Ibn Sina could be ascribed a certain pre-modern, affirmative Orientalism. He constructed an imaginative geography of the philosophical field in terms of East and West. The quote above concerning concealment of opinions is from the Ibn Sina's Prologue to *The Easterners*, the rest of which text is now lost. Just what it contained, and what the meaning of the East is in his thinking, are subjects about which scholars do not concur. Over centuries, there are those who have held that it and/or other late texts reflect a mystical doctrine of some sort, perhaps Sufi-like or proto-Illuminationist or neo-Platonist. The dominant interpretation instead sees Ibn Sina as a rationalist of a strict Aristotelian stripe. Dimitri Gutas, whose formidable *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* is part treatise, part collection of source texts he translated, represents the rationalist view. He is vehemently opposed to the attribution of an "esoteric, mystical and 'Oriental'" side to Ibn Sina, and he even asserts that Said's conception is applicable to such attribution (AAT xxi-xxii)—although without explicating *how*. On the other side, Aminrazavi wrote: "For those who question the presence of a mystical dimension, or 'Oriental Philosophy,' in Ibn Sina's thought, *On the Stations of the Knowers* leaves no doubt" (Aminrazavi 2003, 211). The latter is a section of Ibn Sina's late work *Pointers and Reminders* (*al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbihāt*). Aminrazavi more recently, while still citing his prior article as a reference, seems to have modified his view: maintaining the thesis of Ibn Sina's defense of a "gnostic and Sufi method of attaining truth," based especially but not exclusively on the *Stations*, Aminrazavi now says "the presence of an 'oriental philosophy' . . . in his writing in all

likelihood [is] apocryphal” (Aminrazavi 2021, §1). In fact, both of these scholars overstate their positions in arguing against maximalist images of their opponents. Gutas insists on rejecting the mystical as well as the esoteric; but he admits, as he must, that Ibn Sina, notwithstanding the preponderance of logical and experimental techniques, brags about using some non-rational epistemic methods. In the *Autobiography*, Ibn Sina relates that while studying at night as a young man—it should be noted that he claims to have mastered the entire core of the philosophical sciences, i.e., all the sciences, by age eighteen—he drank wine to stay awake and vigorous and when he fell asleep he solved problems in his sleep (AAT 17-18). Such an, as it were, oeno-oneiric method¹⁷ is a far cry from Aristotle, who held that states like sleep or passion obscured the intellect (*De Anima* 429a). On the other hand, Aminrazavi, while rightly not resting his case on speculation about the contents of lost texts, need not go as far as to deny the imaginative geography of the East in Ibn Sina’s thought.

In the Prologue to the *Easterners*—which ascribed title is not Ibn Sina’s own, since the references to the work in other texts by him describe it, informally, as a book on Eastern philosophy (*falsafa*) or wisdom (*hikma*) but do not necessarily name it—Ibn Sina says that the Easterners may have a different name for “the sort of science which the Greeks call logic” (AAT 38). He also says of the philosophical sciences that it is “not unlikely that” they “may have come to us from a direction other than that of the Greeks” (AAT 37). On the basis of these two statements, at the bare minimum, we can say that Eastern means *non-Greek*. What more it means is up for grabs. Gutas in a footnote argues that the claim about the arrival of learning from *another direction* means the acquisition of knowledge not by tradition or book-learning but by independent thinking (AAT 37 n. 12). The orientation metaphor should not be taken literally as having any significant bearing on geography or geographically-associated cultures, on that interpretation. The problem with Gutas’s interpretation is that it seems to suggest that Ibn Sina is identifying with the *other direction* and that the text seems to imply—although it doesn’t quite state—that this other direction corresponds to the Easterners, that the other direction is the East; no other direction is mentioned in that text. However, elsewhere Ibn Sina does not restrict the options to a binary choice between East and West (Greek) but rather identifies himself with a third position: that of an adjudicator between them. In his Letter to Kiya, Ibn Sina describes a book of his called *Fair Judgment* that, at the time of the letter, was already lost; at an impossibly large scale—covering “approximately twenty-eight thousand questions” is surely an exaggeration—he writes that the thought of re-composing it is oppressive (AAT 57-58). In the lost book, he divided scholars into Easterners and Westerners and, where their disputes were real, he “intervened” as judge. If Ibn Sina is neither Westerner nor Easterner, he still might be coming from another direction, a third one. However, Gutas’s argument that the book known as *The Easterners* centers on the restatement of Ibn Sina’s familiar Aristotelian views is undercut.

¹⁷ Cf. Plato’s *Laws*, Book I: “*Clinias*: You are implying, my friend . . . that the convivial gathering [through an “institution of drinking” (641a)], when rightly conducted, is an important element in education. *Athenian*: Assuredly.” (Plato, *Laws* 641c-d).

The most prominent text describing the Eastern philosophy—I follow Gutas and most commentators in assuming that the Eastern philosophy is the philosophy pertaining to the Easterners and vice versa—is the Prologue to *The Cure*. Ibn Sina there refers to a different book, “my book on Eastern philosophy,” in which is “presented philosophy as it is naturally . . . and as required by an unadulterated view which neither takes into account the views of colleagues in the disciplines, nor takes precautions . . . against creating schisms . . . ; this is my book on Eastern philosophy” (AAT 44, modified). *The Cure*, its Prologue tells us, is both more elaborate and more accommodating, but the other book presents “truth without indirection” (AAT 44-45, bracketed interpolation omitted). Gutas indicates in a note that he opted for “indirection” for *majmaja* rather than negative-sounding “equivocation” and “prevarication” and says “circumlocution” was an option—without saying why he preferred the litotes of “without indirection” instead of “without circumlocution” (AAT 45 n. i). This non-indirect, non-circumlocution just is the Eastern philosophy on this reading; in which case there is a discrepancy between the attitude in *The Cure* Prologue and *The Easterners*, on the one hand, and *Fair Judgment*, on the other. Against this interpretation, if one wanted to square all of those works, one would have to hypothesize that the work of philosophy that *The Easterners* the book *is* remains distinct from the Eastern philosophy that *The Easterners* is about. (In the same way that Marx and Engels’s *German Ideology* is about ideology; its title isn’t intentionally self-referring *even if* one thinks their position is itself a form of ideology.)

Borges’s fantasy about Averroes on *Poetics* had a counterpart in reality: the search for the meaning of Ibn Sina’s Eastern philosophy. Ibn Rushd’s famous rebuttal of al-Ghazali’s *Incoherence of the Philosophers* was titled *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, usually translated as *Incoherence of the Incoherence*; Borges radicalizes *Tahāfut* into *Destrucción* (Borges 93). The rebuttal becomes a destruction of the destruction of philosophy. One of Ghazali’s prime targets had been Ibn Sina. Ibn Rushd writes:

In our time we have seen many of the followers of [Ibn Sina] ascribe to him this view regarding this aporia, saying that he is not of the opinion that there is something separate [viz. separability of the divine necessary existent and the bodily world]. They say . . . that it is the import of what he set forth in his Eastern philosophy, adding that he called it Eastern philosophy only because it is the doctrine of the people of the East [Gutas interpolates that East refers to Khorasan], for they are of the opinion that the divine is the celestial bodies as [Ibn Sina] himself had come to believe. (AAT 124, brackets mine)

For Ibn Rushd of the Islamic West, Ibn Sina is an Easterner. Would it be too hyperbolic to claim, that Ibn Rushd, with his contemporary Maimonides, both from Córdoba and eventually migrating to Morocco, represents the furthest westward, geographically, classic philosophy ever got (unless a young Eriugena visited the west coast of Ireland)? Ibn Rushd’s picture of Ibn Sina’s divine-celestial identification resonates with this passage from Santayana’s dialogue.

Avicenna: . . . the divine intellect is the music of this particular world. . . . The Philosopher would never have so much as mentioned a divine intellect—the

inevitable note, eternally sustained, emitted by all nature and the rolling heavens—if the rolling heavens and nature had not existed. (DL 246)

To Aristotle is here ascribed a traditional Pythagorean theme, the musical harmony of the cosmos. The Pythagorean adventure is, in several ways, also that of Santayana and of Ibn Sina: geographic exile combined with spiritual peregrination, a self-consciously philosophic project. In the case of Pythagoreanism—like Ibn Sina's followers according to Ibn Rushd, but unlike Santayana and unlike Aristotle—philosophy and the esoteric go hand in hand.

With Pythagoras of Samos, we reach back to the supposed coining of the name *philosopher*. “[T]he first to use the term, and to call himself a philosopher or lover of wisdom, was Pythagoras; for, said he, no man is wise, but God alone” (Diogenes Laertius 1: Prologue). The Athenians inscribed it for all time, but an Ionian—not in Diogenes Laertius's sense¹⁸ but in the strictly geographic sense of someone from Ionia—invented it. The Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean could be seen as a microcosmic space of repeated Occidental/Oriental journeys; after Pythagoras moves westward to Italy but also makes a (mythical?) sojourn in Egypt where he learns, according to Isocrates, religion (Joost-Gaugier 16). About a century before Isocrates's report, Heraclitus was not buying Pythagoras's shtick. Whoever would be a philosopher requires much historical fact-gathering which Pythagoras has done to a superlative degree¹⁹, according to Heraclitus (DK B35, B129); *polymathy* doesn't guarantee intellectual insight (*nous*, inflected *nóon*), an attainment expressly denied to Pythagoras (Heraclitus, DK B40). Ionian naturalists and their southern Italian extensions fell into ditches or volcanos²⁰ or vows of silence and secrecy; in-between East and far West, Athenians talked endlessly (and later the Romans furthered the conversation). *This* is what, according to its own traditions, written on the surface but unspoken, Occidental philosophy originally was: wannabe sages into math and reincarnation or other forms of immortality. Philosophy being the strangest cult among naturalists, the *aspect of the esoteric*, or the arcane, is not merely an effect of the fragmentary record of pre-Socratics, though that contributes. Pythagoreans cultivated it (Joost-Gaugier 17).

¹⁸ One could say that Diogenes Laertius's “Italian” school is an Ionian philosophical tradition in exile, whereby it encounters an influx of new ideas.

¹⁹ Granger observes that Heraclitus's depiction of Pythagoras as a *histor* is idiosyncratic (Granger 237). Granger takes this to be part of a polemic of Heraclitus against both polymathy and history. Instead, I think Heraclitus's point is that polymathy is insufficient for insight rather than an impediment; and that the empirical, historical fact-gathering that characterizes the activity of a *histor* is necessary for insight, even if requiring polymathy as Granger has it.

²⁰ “The story of Empedocles and Etna,” says Deleuze, is, as a “philosophical anecdote” capturing “the gesture of philosophers,” “as good as the death of Socrates but . . . operating in another dimension” (Deleuze 128). For Deleuze these are imagined as geo-spatial dimensions. The Platonic image of philosophy is one of *conversion* by an ascent to heights of ideal thought and the pre-Socratic is one of *subversion* in the depths; whereas the Cynic-Stoic line “expect[s] salvation” “laterally, from the event, from the East” (Deleuze 129) and is one of *perversion*—which for Deleuze is not a derogatory term—through a “system of provocations” and “an extraordinary art of surfaces” (Deleuze 133). The one major division in Diogenes Laertius's account not covered by Deleuze's three philosophical images is, notably, the Peripatetic.

A millennium and a half of philosophical tradition did not eliminate the dialectic of illumination and obscurity but saw new varieties of chiaroscuro. Ibn Rushd writes, in *Questions in Physics*, that, according to followers of Ibn Sina, his Oriental philosophy inclined toward the view that "there is no being . . . not a body, subsisting in itself, separate from the celestial bodies, which is itself a principle of those bodies and what exists through them" contrary to Peripatetic tradition (AAT 124). Ibn Rushd continues, in a manner anticipating Santayana's "Secret":

With all this, they think that this was the opinion of the Philosopher [Aristotle] himself, and that what is to be found in his books is only by way of that concealment which was the custom of the ancient philosophers, who followed it because of the prevalence of ignorance. (AAT 124)

That is, the supposed ignorance of non-philosophers. In Ibn Rushd's *On the Separateness of the First Principle*, a North African scholar of Ibn Sina is said to have

thought it was impossible to prove that there is some being separate from matter which is not a body nor in a body, and that this was the opinion of *Ibn Sina*. [That man] believed that that is what *Ibn Sina* demonstrated in *an occult fashion* in his Eastern Philosophy, in which he had uniquely explained the truth, and that the many things he *posited* in his books he did so in order to agree with his contemporaries. (AAT 124, modified in italicized portion)

Thus, in the century following his own, an esoteric materialism was ascribed to Ibn Sina.

We can provisionally answer with deliberate ambivalence the questions posed above as to whether Santayana and Ibn Sina are Orientalist philosophers. Neither is, and yet both are.²¹

ERIC SAPP

References with Abbreviations

Borges, Jorge Luis.

JLB 2007. "Averroes' Search." trans. James E. Irby. *Labyrinths*. eds. Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby. New York: New Directions.

Diels, Hermann and Walther Kranz

DK 1960. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. 2 vol. Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Gutas, Dimitri

AAT 2014. *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*. Second, Revised and Enlarged Edition. Leiden: Brill.

Santayana, George.

DL 1957 [1925,1948]. *Dialogues in Limbo*. London: Constable & Co.,1925. *Dialogues in Limbo. With Three New Dialogues*. Charles

²¹ In the sequel to this article, I return to the dialogue's central discussion of causality and the relation between the concepts of cause and matter.

- Scribners' Sons, 1948. Reprinted by Ann Arbor: U. Michigan Press, 1957.
- DP 1995 [1951]. *Dominations and Powers*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- LGS [1886-1951] *Letters of George Santayana*. Critical edition.
- LR1 [1905] *Reason in Common Sense*. Critical edition.
- LR2 [1905] *Reason in Society*. Critical edition.
- LR3 [1905] *Reason in Religion*. Critical edition.
- POML 1969. *Physical Order and Moral Liberty*. Edited by John and Shirley Lachs. Vanderbilt University Press.
- SE 1922. *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*. London: Constable & Co.2
- TPP [1913] *Three Philosophical Poets*. Critical edition.

Other references

Aminrazavi, Mehdi.

2003. "How Ibn Sinian is Suhrawardi's Theory of Knowledge?" *Philosophy East and West* 53, no. 2: 203-214.

2021 "Mysticism in Arabic and Islamic Philosophy. " *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/arabic-islamic-mysticism/>

Anderson, R. Lanier and Joshua Landy. 2001. "Philosophy as Self-Fashioning: Alexander Nehamas's Art of Living." *Diacritics* 31: 25-54.

Aristotle

1907. *De Anima*. With Translation, Introduction and Notes by R. D. Hicks. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

1924. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[This reference is for the Greek edition; for Ross's English translation, see: McKeon]

Augustine. 2003. *City of God*. trans. Henry Bettenson. London: Penguin.

Borges, Jorge Luis. 1972. *El Aleph*. Madrid: Alianza.

Copleston, Frederick C. 2001 [1952]. *Medieval Philosophy: An Introduction*. Mineola, NY: Dover.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1990. *The Logic of Sense*. trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. New York: Columbia University Press.

Diogenes Laertius. 1925. *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, vol. I. trans. R.D. Hicks. London: William Heinemann.

Fénelon, François. 1760. *Dialogues of the Dead. Fourth Edition*. trans. anonymous. London: D. Brown, J. Jackson, and C. Corbett.

Fisch, Max H. 1966 [1951]. *Classic American Philosophers*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Flamm, Matthew Caleb. "George Santayana (1863-1952)." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://iep.utm.edu/santayan/> (accessed June 24, 2021)

Granger, Herbert. 2004. "Heraclitus' Quarrel with Polymathy and "Historiê." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 134: 235-261.

- Heidegger, Martin. 1973-4. "The Anaximander Fragment." trans. David Farrell Krell. *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics*, (New Series) 1: 576-626.
- Joost-Gaugier, Christiane L. 2006. *Measuring Heaven: Pythagoras and His Influence on Thought and Art in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. 2000 [1790]. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, New York: Cambridge UP.
- Lippi, D., Charlier, P., Bianucci, R. et al. 2020. "The Autopsy of the Prophet Muhammad in Dante's Inferno." *Journal of Religion and Health*, 59:1838–1842.
- McKeon, Richard (ed.). 1941. *The Basics Works of Aristotle*. New York: Random House.
- Plato. 1967-68. *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vol. 10 and 11. trans. R.G. Bury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rubin, Richard M. 2014. "McKeon, Lamm, Levi, and Kerr-Lawson on Santayana." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 32: 19-25.
- Said, Edward. 1979 [1978]. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage.
- Santayana, George
 1915. "Some Meanings of the Word Is." *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 12, no. 3: 66-68.
 1925. *Dialogues in Limbo*. London: Constable & Co.
- Sepehri, Darius. 2020. "Avicenna: the Persian polymath who shaped modern science, medicine and philosophy." *The Conversation*. 29 September 2020. <https://theconversation.com/avicenna-the-persian-polymath-who-shaped-modern-science-medicine-and-philosophy-142667> (accessed June 20, 2021)
- Steinkraus, Warren E. 1980. "Socrates, Confucius, and the Rectification of Names." *Philosophy East and West* 30, no. 2: 261-264.

The Democritean Tradition in Santayana, Nietzsche, and Montaigne Part II

The article, published in three parts, aims at finding laughter, laughing at oneself (self-referential laughter or self-laughter), cheerfulness, and *metanoia* from the tragic to the comic in the thought of Democritus, the laughing philosopher, and of his followers, the modern laughing philosophers Montaigne, Nietzsche and Santayana. The findings hopefully shed light on the thought of each philosopher; they also enable to generalize the commonalities found among them and articulate the thread that connects the notions of laughter, self-laughter, cheerfulness and *metanoia*. Thus, the aim of the three-parted article is to understand the underlying logic of laughter which is at work in the thought of laughing philosophers.

In the first part of the article, I noted the relationships between the three modern philosophers that may ignite an initial interest in the topic; I argued for the significance of Democritus for Santayana, and I presented laughter, self-laughter, cheerfulness and *metanoia* as expressed in the thought and the life of Democritus and Santayana.

In the second part of the article, I investigate the relation with Democritus that Nietzsche and Montaigne respectively entertain, and I probe the evidence supporting the four notions I am investigating, laughter, self-laughter, cheerfulness and *metanoia*, in each philosopher's thought and life. I begin with Nietzsche and follow with Montaigne.

I. Nietzsche

In the first chapter of his study of the young Nietzsche, Paul Swift probes in depth the attitude of the professor of philology toward Democritus (Swift 2008). This topic is also enlightened by Dale Wilkerson's *Nietzsche and the Greeks* (2006), Nietzsche's own *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (1996 [1873]) and the recently published lectures of the young Nietzsche on the Pre-Socratics (*The Pre-Platonic Philosophers* [Whitlock 2001]).

Swift notes Nietzsche's early interest in Democritus—soon replaced by Nietzsche's predilection for Heraclitus—as an opponent of teleology and a thinker who intimidated Plato by proposing a viable alternative to his philosophy. In relation to the Pre-Socratics, Nietzsche's arguments are not always consistent nor is his scholarship always sound,¹ as he is forcefully using these philosophers to advance his own nascent philosophic views. However, Swift unravels the interest that Nietzsche expressed from 1866 to 1868 in Democritus, which is minimized in subsequent work, and the way in which Democritus anticipates Nietzsche's own views:

¹ See Thomson (2003) for the former and Whitlock (2001) for the latter.

In Democritus, Nietzsche has discerned a kindred spirit, a philosopher associated with laughter who was also a poet, free from academia, scholastic philosophies, spurious teleologies, and a model of self-sufficiency and wisdom. Such a figure provided an image of what philosophy could be, a hope for a philosophy from antiquity that could be in the service of life in the present. (Swift 2008, 32)

Whilst Platonism is other-worldly and escapist, Democritus represents a this-worldly alternative that can be recognized once we rescue his ethical writings, the kernel of his philosophy, from the tragic oblivion in which they fell. Nietzsche admires the poetic quality of these fragments, which lies not only in their aphoristic style but also in Democritus's freedom from any fanaticism or zealotry. Not only is Democritus the first to strictly exclude the mythical in his investigation of the world, Nietzsche argues there is "great poetry in atomism" that lies in the faith which fastens it with Democritus's enthusiasm for the redeeming effect of a scientific life, a paradoxical notion at his time.² Furthermore,

Nietzsche rejects foundational atomistic materialism, but never rejected the philosophical mentor who claimed, "We know nothing in reality, for truth lies in an abyss." The deep skepticism built in Democritus's theory of perception need not imply a self-refuting paradigm, but may suggest a poetic view of the world that acknowledges how little humans know. As one of the greatest masters of the aphoristic style, Democritus was able to write poetry and philosophy simultaneously as a hybrid art. Democritus inspired Nietzsche like no other thinker could. (Swift 2008, 121)

Being a philologist, Nietzsche refers to the historical philosopher rather than to the posthumous, and rather late, legend of the laughing philosopher that has been ascribed to Democritus.³ Nietzsche has only the following comment on the (even later) opposition between Heraclitus and Democritus as the weeping and the laughing philosophers, respectively: "How does the story come from that Democritus used to laugh at all things? Someone had thought Democritus and Heraclitus were in opposition!"⁴ As these thinkers do not partake in the history of Platonism, Nietzsche uses both as his mentors, one as a paragon of health and simplicity and the other as a paragon of perpetual change or becoming. While Nietzsche does not elaborate on the laughing philosopher, he endorses the attitude associated with Democritus and recommends it to others.

When addressing laughter, self-laughter, cheerfulness and the metanoia from the tragic to the comic in Nietzsche's thought and life, we may wonder about the initial relevance of these topics to Nietzsche. This is so because Nietzsche famously

² BAW 4 63; see BAW 3 332; 3 348–50; translated by Swift 2008, 25–6.

³ Democritus the Laughing Philosopher was described at length in part one of the article. He was a character widely known in the ancient world as several sources discuss his tendency to laugh on any and all occasions. See Amir 2013 and 2014 for fuller accounts of Democritus the laughing philosopher, the tradition that he inaugurates, and the relations that he entertains with Democritus the atomist philosopher of the 5th century BC.

⁴ BAW 3 333; quoted in Swift 2008, 120.

saw himself as the first tragic philosopher. However, by this he meant that he associated the most fearful, cruel and terrifying aspects of reality, and the deepest suffering with the most affirmative joy. It is not sufficiently emphasized, however, that Nietzsche fought laughter's battle by criticizing the attitude of both philosophy and Christianity toward it. To counterbalance the alleged Western hostility to laughter⁵, Nietzsche sanctifies laughter and urges the forefathers of our future, the higher men, to learn to laugh. He points to laughter's future, as part of the Dionysian wisdom that should replace Western civilization. Dionysus, the Greek god of laughter, tragedy and comedy should substitute for Christ, the dead God, and a gay science should replace philosophy and science as we know it. Tragedy, taken by Nietzsche out of the theatre into life, becomes thereby a tonic for strong natures. The proper response to the tragic may be affirmative and generative forms of joy and laughter, but our human-all-too-human nature cannot achieve the Dionysian attitude that defines Nietzsche's mature philosophy, the view that Nietzsche formulated after his change of heart. We can destroy all Western values through laughter, as Nietzsche urges us to, but the all-affirming laughter that he proposes from a certain point of his life onwards remains the crown of the overman. Let us see these arguments in detail, beginning with Nietzsche's view of laughter, following with his views of self-laughter and cheerfulness, and concluding with the evidence for metanoia or change of heart from the tragic to the comic.

1. Laughter:

Nietzsche criticizes all Western values, including the value ascribed to laughter by both philosophy and Christianity, the predominant Western religion: "As long as there have been men, man has felt too little joy: that alone, my brothers, is our original sin" (Z II 3).⁶ Quoting inaccurately Thomas Hobbes's definition of laughter, "'Laughing is a bad infirmity of human nature, which every thinking mind will strive to overcome' (Hobbes)," Nietzsche protests against "that philosopher who, being a real Englishman, tried to bring laughter into ill repute among all thinking men" (BGE 294). The Platonic Socrates laughs only twice, both times on the day of his death (Phaedo); Jesus praises tears and promises laughter to those who wait for heaven: "Blessed are you that weep now, for you shall laugh" (Luke 6: 21).

Nietzsche's criticism of this attitude is interesting as he uses an unmistakably religious language to denounce it: "What has so far been the greatest sin here on earth? Was it not the word of him who said, 'Woe unto those who laugh here He did not love enough: else he would also have loved us who laugh' (Z IV 13, 16). He recommends laughter "out of the whole truth," and offers to rank philosophers according to the vigor of their laughter, up to the "golden laughter." Aligning himself with laughing philosophers, he nevertheless boasts that no one till now has had sufficient power to do what he requires.

Within the Nietzschean project of reversal of all values, Nietzsche sanctifies laughter if only because the West has treated laughter with contempt. Among other reasons, laughter, as a bodily phenomenon, has been rejected because of the de-meaning of the body (WP 1016). Stanley Rosen thus interprets Zarathustra's

⁵ For the attitude of Western civilization to laughter, see, for example, Morreall 1989.

⁶See "References with Abbreviations."

laughter as the reversal of Platonism and Christianity, and his crown of roses as the opposite of the weeping Christ's crown of thorns.⁷

The reason that Nietzsche endorses laughter can be found as early as his first work, *The Birth of Tragedy*, where he introduces the idea that the world is justified as a comedy rather than as a tragedy. "It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified . . . the entire comedy of art is neither performed for our betterment or education," he writes, but rather for "that being which, as the sole author and spectator of this comedy of art, prepares a perpetual entertainment for itself" (BT 5).⁸ In Section 24 of *The Birth of Tragedy*, he introduces the "game" of the world, and in *The Gay Science* art and the fool's cap are singled out as necessary for bearing life, let alone for justifying it (GS 107). It seems, then, that the world is an aesthetic phenomenon more akin to comedy than to tragedy, and that it is as a comedy that the world is justified. Indeed, Nietzsche begins *The Gay Science* with an explicit reference to the eternal comedy of the world:

The short tragedy always gave way again and returned to the eternal comedy of existence; and "the waves of uncountable laughter"—to cite Aeschylus—must in the end overwhelm even the greatest of these tragedians. (GS 1)

This idea is repeated in the *Genealogy of Morals*: "Our old morality too is part of the comedy! . . . and one can wager that the grand old eternal comic poet of our existence will be quick to make use of it" (GM, P 7). Elsewhere Nietzsche mentions "Fortuna's farcical comedy" (HH II 226), and, echoing Plato in the *Laws* (644 d and 803 c), he describes human beings as "God's buffoons" (BGE 223) or God's apes, whose tragedy is the delight of their creator (HH II WS 14).

Mirroring the comedy of existence, Nietzsche explicitly states in *The Gay Science* that he is searching for a comic solution to his philosophy:

I myself, having made this tragedy of tragedies all by myself, insofar as it is finished—I, having first tied the knot of morality into existence before I drew it so tight that only a god could untie it (which is what Horace demands)—I myself have now slain all gods in the fourth act, for the sake of morality. Now, what is to become of the fifth act? From where am I to take the tragic solution?—Should I begin to think about a comic solution? (GS 153)

According to Horace, no god should be introduced, no *deus ex machina*, unless the knot is such that no one else could untie it.⁹ Claudia Crawford explains, "Tragic solution would not be a solution, all gods dead and nothing to succeed them. A comic solution, on the other hand, is what he [Nietzsche] wants, what he has tied into the logic of the drama."¹⁰ The 122 short aphorisms that follow (sections 154–275) hardly provide a "comic solution," but there is a distinct break at this point and the tone of the third book of *The Gay Science* is different. Indeed, we see a

⁷ Rosen 1995, 234–8.

⁸ In two other instances in which Nietzsche repeats that the world is justified as an aesthetic phenomenon, he uses notions and ideas reminiscent of comedy rather than tragedy.

⁹ Horace, 1989, *Ars poetica*, line 191f.

¹⁰ Crawford 1999, 103.

humorous, laughter-oriented, satirical style of writing that Nietzsche practices openly from *The Gay Science* onwards.¹¹

Zarathustra also exhorts us to overcome tragedy (Z II 14): "Whoever climbs the highest mountains laughs at all tragic plays and tragic seriousness."¹² In a note from 1888 (between March and June), Nietzsche announces a "new order of rank of spirits: the tragic natures no longer to the fore" (WP 992). Spirits should be ranked instead according to the quality of their laughter, as Nietzsche "should actually risk an order of rank among philosophers depending on the rank of their laughter—all the way up to those capable of golden laughter" (BGE 294). George Allen Morgan sees in the golden laughter "the laughter of the superman for which Nietzsche longs, the laughter of one who is beyond tragedy."¹³

However, laughter is not merely a characteristic of the Nietzschean redeemed person. A comprehensive account of laughter in Nietzsche's thought should not only take into consideration its place in the redeemed state, as Zarathustra announces and Gilles Deleuze notes (1983 194). While the Dionysian arts of dancing, singing, and silence only characterize the redeemed person (Crawford 1998), laughter accompanies the entire Nietzschean path to redemption. Its role in Nietzsche's thought is both destructive and regenerative. Laughter kills (Z I 7; Z IV 1, 18), but it is also the sign of a radical freedom, of a second birth (Z III 2, 2; Z IV 20).

Those two contexts of destruction and rebirth parallel the way ancient religions make use of laughter. Nietzsche partakes in the concern of his age, which is to provide a new mythology to rejuvenate art and life in Germany. Thus, the study of religions and mythologies may provide a better context than philosophical theories of laughter do for the understanding of Nietzsche's view of laughter. This is so especially since Nietzsche does not consistently theorize his view of laughter.¹⁴ Thus, in *Laughing Gods, Weeping Virgins: Laughter in the History of Religion*, Ingvild Gilhus explains that in the Near Eastern mythology, when divine laughter was used in a purposeful way, its contact with the irrational was kept under control.

¹¹ Del Caro 1998, 87.

¹² Z, I, 7; it is also the motto of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, part III.

¹³ Morgan 1943, 312–13.

¹⁴ Nietzsche's two definitions of laughter, which are found in his relatively early works, do not fully explain the significant role it plays in his thought. One definition associates laughter with *Schadenfreude* or rejoicing at another expense (GS, 200). Another identifies the origin of laughter in release from fear ("This transition from momentary anxiety to *short-lived exuberance* is called the *comic*" [HH I 169]). Nietzsche here endorses Immanuel Kant's description of laughter as a sudden release from tension that Friedrich Schelling repeats and Arthur Schopenhauer intelligibly alters and develops (Schopenhauer 1969, II, chap. 8). Kant defines laughter as "an affection arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing" (Kant 1911, 54). In a note from 1879, Nietzsche's leaning on Kant is obvious: "Everything *sudden* pleases if it does not *harm*; hence wit . . . for a tension is thus released" (GW, IX, 413). Hobbes explained laughter by invoking the will to power, albeit without using that term. This is known as the superiority theory of humor. Nietzsche surprisingly rejects Hobbes's view of laughter but makes ample use of it. Instead of the Western attitude towards laughter that is exemplified in philosophic and religious virtues, he proposes "the Olympian vice" (BGE, 294, Title), which consists of "unquenchable laughter," the derisive laughter of the Olympian gods as described by Homer.

But as we move to Greek sources, laughter becomes a prominent and alarming vehicle for the unthought and a force that transcends the limits of culture and society.¹⁵ Because of its violent, eruptive character, it tends to be perceived as powerful, either destructive or life-giving. Yet it does not point to one ultimate meaning; it is rather a sign that embraces various meanings. Despite laughter's lack of fixed semantic content, its meanings in religion are often clustered into two opposing phenomenological fields, constituted roughly by creation and birth, joy, sexuality and eroticism; food and intoxicating drinks; feasts and comedies; dancing; ecstasy, madness and wisdom, on the one hand; and on the other, destruction and death; derision and shame; ridicule and blasphemy; tragedy.¹⁶

In Greece, the god of laughter was Dionysus. Beside the mythology of Hesiod and Homer and the cult of Demeter, Dionysus's cult is the third great context of religious laughter in ancient Greece. Not only regenerative laughter of the erotic and comic variety, but also derisive and tragic laughter found their special forms in his cult.¹⁷

Nietzsche uses laughter in all those various meanings. Particularly, "those two kinds of laughter" which are identified in ancient religions (Gilhus 1996, 26) and the cult of Dionysus (Henrichs 1982) exactly parallel the two main uses of laughter in Nietzsche's thought. "The laughter of derision" characterizes his critical philosophy as a means of destruction, whilst "the laughter of regeneration" characterizes his positive philosophy.

Moreover, Nietzsche attempts to synthesize the destructive and regenerative laughter in order to simultaneously destroy the foundations of Western civilization and establish the overman.¹⁸ This synthesis is realized in the idea of self-overcoming, which is destructive at the same time that it establishes a new freedom. The higher men of the future will learn the art of destructive and creative laughter which is lacking today: "In Germany, higher men lack one great means of education: the laughter of higher men" (GS 177).

Thus, laughter is no mere means to self-overcoming; being indistinguishable from courage, laughter *is* self-overcoming. Learning to laugh is learning to overcome or transcend oneself. Zarathustra implores the higher men: "*learn* to laugh away over yourself!" (Z IV 12 20). This clarifies Zarathustra's concern that "if they learned to laugh from me, it still is not *my* laughter that they have learned" (Z IV 16, 1). This also enlightens Nietzsche's careful optimism, that "perhaps, even if nothing else today has any future, our *laughter* may yet have a future."¹⁹

2. Self-laughter:

Nietzsche recommends laughing at oneself; he sometimes refers to self-laughter as "self-parody." The latter notion significantly enriches the former and enlarges the scope of self-laughter both from a theoretical and practical point of view. Not

¹⁵ Gilhus 1996, 27.

¹⁶ Gilhus 1996, 4.

¹⁷ See Henrichs 1982.

¹⁸ Philonenko 1995, 212.

¹⁹ BGE, 223; see also GS, 1: "Even laughter may yet have a future."

only is the fourth part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* set as a parody of various themes, including of the rest of the book, as most commentators have noticed²⁰; self-parody is also a significant Nietzschean theme in other works. Nietzsche asserts that a great artist reaches the pinnacle of his greatness when he can laugh at his creation, for the “secret laughter of superiority at himself” is “the triumph of his ultimate artist’s freedom and artist’s transcendence” (GM, Third Essay, 3). He explains:

Was this Parsifal meant *seriously*? For one might be tempted to suppose the reverse, even to desire it—that the Wagnerian *Parsifal* was intended as a joke, as a kind of epilogue and satyr play with which the tragedian Wagner wanted to take leave of us, also of himself, above all of *tragedy* in a fitting manner worthy of himself, namely with an extravagance of wanton parody of the tragic itself, of the whole gruesome earthly seriousness and misery of his previous works, of the crudest form, overcome at long last, of the anti-nature of the ascetic ideal. This, to repeat, would have been worthy of a great tragedian, who, like every artist, arrives at the ultimate pinnacle of his greatness only when he comes to see himself and his art beneath him—when he knows how to *laugh* at himself. (GM, Third Essay, 3)

This applies to Nietzsche too, for he identifies himself with Wagner. Indeed, commenting on the essay “Wagner in Bayreuth,” he confesses in *Ecce Homo*: “Wagner and Schopenhauer *or*, in *one* word: Nietzsche” (EH III UM 1 3). Moreover, as *The Gay Science*’s new motto indicates (1886), he endorses Democritus’s habit to laugh at others because they do not laugh at themselves²¹: “I live in my own place./ Have never copied nobody even half./ And at any master who lacks the grace/ To laugh at himself —I laugh. **OVER THE DOOR TO MY HOUSE.**” Finally, in a letter to Franz Overbeck dated 23 February 1887, he claims that the new prefaces of 1886 not only bring his pre-Zarathustrian project to completion but also supplied him with the required critical space:

In the past fifteen years I have set an entire literature on its feet and finally “completed” it with prefaces and additions, so completely that I consider it as

²⁰ See, for example, Cauchi 1998; Gilman 1976. A note in Nietzsche’s *The Will to Power* cryptically reads, “Presupposition [the destruction of ideals, the new desert]: bravery, patience, no ‘turning back,’ no haste to go forward. (N.B., Zarathustra adopts a parodic attitude toward all former values as a consequence of his abundance)” (WP, 617).

²¹ As we have seen in Part one of the article (Amir 2020), Democritus ridicules our incapacity to laugh at ourselves and recommends self-referential laughter. I have presented this as the gist of Democritus’s argument as formulated in the *Novel of Hippocrates*:

Why did you criticize my laughter, Hippocrates? You people do not laugh at your own stupidity but each laugh at another’s, some at drunk people, thinking themselves sober, some at lovers, though they have a worse disease themselves, some at sailors and some at those who practice farming. (Hippocrates 1990, L. 17.5)

Along the same lines, in the extant fragments of the treatise *On Cheerfulness*, the historical Democritus severely condemns those who find faults with their friends (Diels 1901, 405, 19), admonishing us, “Do not laugh at the misfortunes of men, but pity them” (Diels 1901, 405, 15, frag. 107a), and suggesting that it is better to reprove one’s own faults than the faults of one’s neighbors (Diels 1901, 405, 15). This idea is later reprised by Horace, who quips: “Why do you laugh? Change the name and the story is about you” (Horace, *Satires*, bk. I, Satire 1, “Against the Greedy”).

quite detached from me, and can laugh about it, as I laugh fundamentally at all literature-making. (SBKS VIII 29n804)

Self-laughter, as exemplified in antiquity by the satyr-play, the fourth part added to a tragedy, is the highest virtue of the human ideal (in contradistinction to the over-human) that Nietzsche sets before us, and of Nietzsche as a thinker and artist. As we have seen, neither the higher men in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* nor the higher men in Germany possess self-laughter. Of special interest is Nietzsche's regret that philosophers lack self-laughter: While they are "wily spokesmen for their prejudices which they baptize 'truths'," they do not have "the good taste or the courage which lets this be known, whether to warn an enemy or friend, or, from exuberance, to mock itself." This is "what provokes one to look at all philosophers half suspiciously, half mockingly" (BGE 5).

In contrast to the philosophers which he criticizes, Nietzsche is committed to self-laughter lest he falls prey to self-contradiction.²² Nietzsche claims, therefore, that "we should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one laugh" (Z III 12 23), and he yearns "to laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh *out* of the whole truth" (GS 1). Indeed,

To do that even the best so far lacked sufficient sense for the truth, and the most gifted had too little genius for that. Even laughter may yet have a future. I mean, when the proposition "the species is everything, *one* is always none" has become part of humanity, and this ultimate liberation and irresponsibility has become accessible to all at all times. Perhaps laughter will then have formed an alliance with wisdom, perhaps only "gay science" will then be left. (GS 1)

In the language of *The Gay Science*, Zarathustra is the creator of a "short tragedy" (GS 1), which was revealed as a parody of other tragedies because it is self-conscious. In the new ending of *The Gay Science*, it is clear that he is the prophet of the "great comedy." The epilogue begins as follows:

Another ideal runs ahead of us, a strange, tempting, dangerous ideal to which we should not wish to persuade anybody because we do not readily concede *the right to it* to anyone: the ideal of a spirit who plays naively—that is, not deliberately but from overflowing power and abundance—with all that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine; for whom those supreme things that the people naturally accept as their value standards, signify danger,

²² For one thing, Nietzsche holds two contradictory views about truth. His whole critical philosophy makes sense only when undertaken in the name of truth; however, he seems to hold a perspectival view of truth, which empties the content of his attack. Along the same lines, Nietzsche's project can be described as replacing the figures he criticizes, such as Socrates and Christ, yet by doing so he makes himself vulnerable to the very criticism he voices. This constitutive contradiction, however described, can be overcome only by self-referential laughter, otherwise the entirety of the Nietzschean edifice collapses. Commentators have attempted to solve this conundrum by dividing Nietzsche's philosophy into periods or by maintaining that Nietzsche actually did hold one or the other theories of truth, objective or perspectival, but not both. On this issue, see the Prologue of Amir 2022.

decay, debasement, or at least recreation, blindness, and temporary self-oblivion; the ideal of a human, superhuman well-being and benevolence that will often appear inhuman—for example, when it confronts all earthly seriousness so far, all solemnity in gesture, word, tone, eye, morality, and task so far, as if it were their most incarnate and involuntary parody.

The child who embodies the “great health” (GS 347) is the one who can proclaim the “sacred Yes” in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Z I 1). Nietzsche characterizes the affirming spirit in terms of a kind of childlike play. *The Gay Science* ends as follows:

But as I slowly, slowly paint this gloomy question mark at the end . . . I hear all around me the most malicious, cheerful, and koboldish laughter: the spirits of my own book are attacking me, pull my ears, and call me back to order, “We can no longer stand it,” they shout at me; “away, away with this raven-black music!” (GS 383)

An invitation to joy and gaiety, singing and dancing follows.

In Section 212 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche claims that in Socrates’s days, among men with tired instincts, perhaps irony was necessary for nobility. Based on that section, Daniel Conway suggests that the self-parody of the satyr play is a sort of irony. Although self-parody is inferior to the greatness of *amor fati* (EH IV 10), it can be a “lesser” ideal of greatness. This can be “the higher ideal of heroism we late moderns can aspire to legitimately.”²³

It seems that Nietzsche did not attain to this lesser ideal. Immediately after complaining about the earnestness with which philosophers treat themselves, he writes: “Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir” (BGE 6). If we rank Nietzsche’s thought as great philosophy, this sentence explains the bitter taste left by his philosophy, as well as the doubt some commentators express about the presence of Nietzsche’s self-referential laughter.²⁴ Nietzsche feeds this doubt in many places, as will become clear in the following section which probes his view and practice of cheerfulness.

3. Cheerfulness:

Cheerfulness (*die Heiterkeit*) is a significant notion for Nietzsche. In the face of uncertainty, cheerfulness is his philosophical, physical, and mental response to the experiences of illness and pain (GS P 4). Hence,

Maintaining cheerfulness in the midst of a gloomy affair, fraught with immeasurable responsibility, is no small feat; and yet what is needed more than cheerfulness? Nothing succeeds if prankishness has no part in it. Excess of strength alone is the proof of strength. (TI P)

²³ Conway 1997, 126.

²⁴ E.g., Blondel 1999, 171–2; Santayana 1968, 143; Higgins 2000, vii; see also Cioran 1997, 767, 977: “Nietzsche was too carried away by a tragic breeze to be capable of that form of skepticism which presupposes humor.” Cioran sees in “Nietzsche’s lack of humor” one reason of his success among the young (see Regier 2005, 82).

Cheerfulness is associated with self-mockery in *Ecce Homo*: “To be cheerful in such cases, genially mocking oneself, too—*ridendo dicere* severum when the *verum dicere* would justify any amount of hardness—is humanity itself” (EH III CW 1; also CW’s motto). Yet he confesses,

I learned the art of *appearing* cheerful, objective, inquisitive, above else healthy and malicious—and this, it seems to me, constitutes “good taste” on the part of an invalid . . . [h]e [is] a sufferer and self-denier [who] speaks as though he were *not* a sufferer and self-denier. (HH II Preface 5)

It seems that Nietzsche knew that his philosophy entails self-referential laughter, as I explained above, lest it contradicted itself beyond all coherence. While arguing forcefully for laughter and cheerfulness, he may have found them very difficult to implement. He may not have passed the test he set in “Schopenhauer as Educator,” to possess “a cheerfulness that really cheers,” as did Schopenhauer and Montaigne. According to his own testimony in the Preface to *Human, All too Human*, he had the second kind of cheerfulness that he describes in this untimely meditation, which “is vexing” because the thinker “is deceiving us: he wants to make us believe that victory has been fought and won. For at bottom, there is cheerfulness only where there is a victory” (UM III 2). Thus, he writes, “There are ‘cheerful people’ who employ cheerfulness because they are misunderstood on its account—they *want* to be misunderstood And occasionally even foolishness is the mask for an unblest all-too-certain knowledge” (BGE 270).

4. Metanoia:

Various interpretations disclose the importance of comedy in Nietzsche’s thought. Peter Heller believes that Nietzsche “would like to look upon all existence as an eternal comedy” and Lawrence Hatab deems “the intersection of the tragic and the comic . . . the single most important element in Nietzsche’s overall thought.”²⁵ Ran Sigad explains:

Nietzsche saw the tragic and the comic as identical . . . the identification of the meaning of drama, tragedy, and comedy was one of Nietzsche’s main goals. He attempted . . . to show that this was the goal of philosophy as expressed in the overman’s activity The identity of tragedy and comedy as the true meaning of drama is the apex of Nietzsche’s philosophy, which began with Greek civilization but also ended with it in a new way. (Sigad 1990, 19, 18, 8; my translation)

How are we to account for the significance of comedy in the tragic philosopher’s thought? The character of Dionysus himself, whom Nietzsche took as the principle of his philosophy, may illuminate this feature, as we have seen above, for he is the god of laughter, comedy and tragedy.²⁶ One of the characteristics of the god is a disheveled laughter, a medium through which Dionysus expresses his divinity and attracts disciples: A burst of the divine in life, “strange and inexplicable, it opened up a channel into the chaotic dimensions of being.” His companion was the satyr,

²⁵ Heller 1976, 130; Hatab 1988, 68.

²⁶ Gilhus 1997; Bauemer 1976; Kerényi 1976.

the only character in Greek mythology that laughs heartily.²⁷ The satyr constitutes the passage from the tragic to the comic in ancient theatre: the parodic satyr play was added as a fourth part to tragedy's three parts, and some scholars believe this mixture of comedy and tragedy to be the most ancient dramatic form.²⁸

It seems that Nietzsche has privileged Dionysus's association with tragedy over his association with comedy up to a certain point in his thought. After years of neglect, however, the comic/satiric dimension of Dionysus surfaces.²⁹ True, it is important to differentiate between the mythological god Dionysus and the philosophical principle that Nietzsche proposes in its name. This is why Nietzsche's reference to the laughter of Dionysus as philosopher is important: "I am a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus; I should prefer to be even a satyr to being a saint" (EH F 2). Indeed, immediately after his reference to the golden laughter of the new philosophers, Nietzsche adds:

And supposing that gods, too, philosophize, which has been suggested to me by many an inference—I should not doubt that they also know how to laugh the while in a superhuman and new way—and at the expense of all serious things. Gods enjoy mockery: it seems they cannot suppress laughter even during holy rites. (BGE 294)

Laughter was not marginal in the Greeks' conception of their gods. Considering how it surfaces again and again in the context of myths and ritual, it must rather be seen as a defining characteristic of the divine world.³⁰ Humor and immortality are intimately related in Homer, as comedy is a defining feature of the Olympian privilege. Immortality promotes hilarity, and mortality seriousness. Greek gods laugh at each other, and they laugh heartily at the foibles of mortals. Walter Burkert explains how

The laughter of the gods was mocking, mirroring a society where public ridicule was used for ethical sanctions and social control. But even as the laughter of the gods reflected the norms of Greek society, it also set the gods apart from human beings and underscored their divinity and immortality. (Burkert 1960, 140)

In Euripides's *Bacchae*, human tragedy is described as a divine comedy: that which amused the god did not necessarily amuse men.³¹ To laugh at human life, then, is a matter of perspective³²; tragedy is the human perspective whilst comedy is the divine perspective.³³ In the acceptance of this simple fact lies the entirety of Nietzsche's Dionysian wisdom. Accepting the comic perspective of one's life is the tragedy Nietzsche announces, for there is nothing more tragic than the knowledge that one's life, with all the suffering it generates and the immense effort it requires is nothing but a comedy. Enjoying one's life as a comedy is possible

²⁷ See Gilhus 1996, 42, 39.

²⁸ E.g., Henrichs 1982.

²⁹ See Del Caro 1998, 86.

³⁰ See Gilhus 1996, 32.

³¹ See Gilhus 1996, 39.

³² See Higgins 2000, 200.

³³ See Gilman 1976, 76.

only if one adopts the perspective of the whole with all its cruelty, which is the Dionysian perspective.

The change of heart that the self-appointed "first tragic philosopher" (WP 1029; EH III BT 3) underwent from tragedy to comedy, laughter, and parody is palpable and easily dated. Between 1883 and 1887, Nietzsche adds a parodic fourth book to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in which Zarathustra sanctifies laughter: "Laughter I have pronounced you holy; you higher men, *learn to laugh!*" (Z IV 13 20). He also writes a new preface for *The Gay Science* in which parody appears as the tragedy he announces (section 1); he exchanges the initial motto, which was dedicated to Voltaire, for a eulogy of self-laughter; he adds an opening of parodic songs, "Joke, Cunning, and Revenge: Prelude in German Rhymes," and a fifth book that begins with "the meaning of our cheerfulness" and ends with the statement that the ideal he proposes is unwillingly parodic (section 382). In addition to the preface to *The Gay Science's* preface, he writes numerous new ones: with the exception of *Daybreak*, they all emphasize the significance of laughter.

The purpose of the prefaces and book parts added by Nietzsche between 1883 and 1887 is to unify his thought, as expressed in the writings that precede *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and, after criticizing some elements in it, to present it as antedating his rebirth as the last disciple of the laughing philosopher Dionysus.³⁴ In his intellectual biography, *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche asserts that he prefers to be a satyr (EH F 2) or a buffoon (EH III 1), rather than a saint. Heinrich Heine replaces Johann W. Goethe as Nietzsche's ideal, because Heine is endowed with the "divine sarcasm" without which Nietzsche "cannot imagine perfection," now that he "cannot conceive the god without the satyr" (EH I 4).²⁷ This ideal is mirrored in Nietzsche who praises his own "wicked laugh" (HH P 3), and in Zarathustra who praises his own "laughing sarcasm" (Z III 16 6) or "gay sarcasm" (Z I 7).

In "Attempt at Self-Criticism," the new preface to *The Birth of Tragedy* (1887), Nietzsche emphasizes the Dionysian principle as the origin of both the tragic and the comic, and stresses in particular the figure of the satyr. He asks, "What then is the significance, physiologically speaking, of that madness out of which tragic and comic art developed—the Dionysian madness? . . . Where does that synthesis of god and billy goat in the satyr point?" (BT, A, 4). The answer is that the satyr points toward laughter, which replaces the earlier justification of tragedy as providing "metaphysical comfort" both in the original *Birth of Tragedy* (section 18) and in "The Dionysiac Worldview" (1999). In this new preface, which quotes at length from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, tragedy as the art of metaphysical comfort is replaced by "the art of this-worldly [*disseitigen*] comfort," that is, by laughter (Z IV 13, 17).

Nietzsche quotes Zarathustra's sanctification of laughter and his prescription to the higher men to learn to laugh. In the name of both Zarathustra and Dionysus, Nietzsche urges us to learn the comfort of this world, to learn to laugh. Yet he does not elaborate on this laughter and leaves to his readers the reconstruction of the underlying philosophical position from which this "holy" laughter may erupt. In

³⁴ See Conway 1999.

his later writings, however, he revises his appraisal of tragedy, its justificatory power being now identified as its capacity to refuse all “metaphysical comforts.”

II. Montaigne

Democritus appears in the *Essays* as a metaphysician, moralist, and naturalist.³⁵ Democritus the metaphysician, according to Montaigne, locates the soul in the entire body and holds that all things result from fullness and emptiness, or the void (“plein et vide”) (II 12: 539).³⁶ Montaigne makes him endorse skeptical positions (II 12: 502, 515, 587). This is partly accurate from an historical point of view, as out of the Hellenistic schools not only the Epicureans, Democritus’s followers, were influenced by him, but the Pyrrhonists and the Stoics as well, insofar as the goal of all these philosophies was *ataraxia* or peace of mind.³⁷ The French Renaissance had access to a newly translated edition of the studies of the Pyrrhonist Sextus Empiricus. But Montaigne also projects unto Democritus his personal, skeptical, interests. Democritus the naturalist is repeatedly invoked by Montaigne (I 54: 311; II 12: 597, 464, 557) and a skeptical reading of his view of phenomenological, rather than ontological, knowledge is extolled. Finally, Montaigne dedicates one essay to Democritus the Laughing Philosopher (and to Heraclitus, the Weeping Philosopher), where the laughing philosopher is presented as Democritus the moralist, and “various times in the *Essais*, a topical figure condenses the power of laughter according to Montaigne, the figure of Democritus.”³⁸

Democritus, along with Lucian and Aristotle,³⁹ is one of the three sources of laughter in the Renaissance. That the Renaissance had a special interest in laughter is the thesis of Mikhail Bakhtin’s study (1984). However, scholars diverge in their account of the reasons for this interest. Bjørn Bredal Hansen argues that it is fear that is at the origin of Renaissance laughter (1985) and Daniel Ménager identifies the love of paradox as its core (1995). Jean Starobinski maintains that it is the

³⁵ For the place Democritus the metaphysician and naturalist holds in Montaigne’s thought, see Mathias 2004, 244–5.

³⁶ References are to Montaigne’s *The Complete Essays* as translated by Donald Frame (1958), and occasionally to the French version (1965). Roman numbers refer to books and Arabic numerals to chapters and pages.

³⁷ For Democritus the skeptic, see Berry 2004.

³⁸ “A plusieurs reprises dans les *Essais*, une figure topique condense la force du rire selon Montaigne, celle de Démocrite ...” (Balsamo 2010, 228).

³⁹ In his work on Renaissance laughter, Mikhail Bakhtin identifies Lucian of Samosata as one of the sources of Renaissance laughter. This 2nd century AD philosophical satirist, satirist of philosophy, and inventor of the laughing philosopher Menippus has influenced the Renaissance through his “Dialogues,” but especially through his image of Menippus laughing in the kingdom of the dead in “Menippus, or the descent into Hades” (Lucian 1905; Bakhtin 1984, 69). The third source of the philosophy of laughter in the Renaissance is Aristotle’s famous formula: “Of all living creatures only man is endowed with laughter” (1995; *De Anima*, III.10). “It has enjoyed immense popularity and has been given a broader interpretation: laughter was seen as man’s highest spiritual privilege, inaccessible to other creatures” (Bakhtin 1984, 68). It also concludes Rabelais’s introductory poem to *Gargantua* (“Mieux est de ris que de larmes escrire/ Par ce que rire est le propre de l’homme”: Better to write about laughter than tears, for laughter is inherent to man.)

melancholy that characterizes the Renaissance that accounts for its interest in laughter and in Democritus, as the laughter of the latter was deemed melancholic (1989). The author of *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1989–2000), Robert Burton, calls himself the Young Democritus, and *The Novel of Hippocrates* (1990) has received special recognition and notoriety at the Montpellier Medical School. A member of this school, the famous physician Laurent Joubert, published two works on laughter (1560; 1579), the second being a French translation of the last part of the “Hippocratic novel.” Democritus also appears in Desiderius Erasmus, a laughing philosopher who credits in the dedication of *Praise of Folly* his friend, Thomas More, with being a Democritus.⁴⁰ Montaigne studied the writings of Erasmus at school and is certainly a laughing philosopher, who endorsed some of Democritus’s doctrines, especially those that represent him as a skeptical philosopher.

1. Laughter:

Montaigne saw in Democritus “a renown and great philosopher,” and followed Cicero in dedicating to the laughing philosopher an entire essay. In “on Democritus and Heraclitus,” Montaigne compares laughing with weeping at the human condition, and as Santayana does, prefers “the first humor.” The reason he gives is of interest, however:

not because it is more pleasanter to laugh than to weep, but because it is more disdainful and condemns us more than the other; and it seems to me that we can never be despised as much as we deserve. . . . the things we laugh at we consider worthless. I do not think there is as much unhappiness in us as vanity, nor as much malice as stupidity. We are not so full of evil as of inanity; we are not as wretched as we are worthless. . . . Our own peculiar condition is that we are as fit to be laughed at as able to laugh. (Montaigne, *Essays*, I 50: 221)⁴¹

Montaigne does not get to the Democritus/Heraclitus comparison at the beginning of his essay. When he does, it’s merely to ask what’s better: to laugh at the “vain and ridiculous condition of man” or to lament and pity it. He sides with the former, figuring that laughter shows more disdain for humankind (we mock only things that we consider to be without value, Montaigne adds), while pity endows it with some esteem: “We are not so full of evil as of inanity; we are not as wretched as we are worthless.” Montaigne’s explanation of Democritus’s laughter gives his own twist to the story: instead of being a condescending laughter, Democritus’s laughter is a moral attitude which indicates the value of things, which denotes our

⁴⁰ Democritus is mentioned in Erasmus, “Christiani matrimonii institution,” 1703–1706, V, 560. The credit to Thomas More can be found in Erasmus, Epistle 999, *Opus epistolarum*, 1906–58, 4: 16 lines 121–30. In Erasmus’s letter to Ulrich von Hutten More is also likened to Democritus, a reputation that was corroborated by the seventeenth-century clergy, Jean-Baptiste Thiers. For Erasmus as a laughing philosopher, see, among others, Kallen 1968.

⁴¹ André Comte-Sponville notes that Montaigne relies here on Juvenal, and refers us to Villey’s note on page 1261 of vol. 2 of the Villey-Saulnier edition of the *Essais* (1965). See Comte-Sponville 1995, 278.

worthlessness rather than our wretchedness. Humankind is not only the laughing animal, as Aristotle presumably said and as we saw above, but also the laughable, or ridiculous human being. This qualification of Aristotle's device changes everything, because as noted by Hugo Friedrich,

delusion that knows itself and its delusional objects has understood itself as a condition of existing. . . . Montaigne pushes out with the highest degree of reflection into the totality of the human essence, which is so indefinable and astonishing that it equals senselessness. But the same reflection works its way back to the point where it can lead into naivety. It completes the circle and itself heals the break it caused in the life drive through knowledge of what is delusional. (Friedrich 1991, 306)

The wisdom of delusion was addressed before in the sixteenth century, notably by Erasmus, Friedrich notes, whom Montaigne knew from his school days and whose traces are found in *Essays*. It amounts to this:

The wise man rouses himself to carry out what he has seen through in his delusional state. He suspects in the pleasure of subjective delusion the compensatory gift for the objective triviality of which the stuff of life consists.

These thoughts echo the proverbs of Ecclesiastes. Both Epicurus and Horace may have also played a part in encouraging in Montaigne "an attitude that spanned possible reasonableness and possible foolishness like two games, one of which counts for as little as the other," Friedrich notes (Friedrich 1991, 306–7)

In a nutshell, this is the philosophy of humor that Montaigne's work advances. The rest of the many studies of laughter, satire, humor, puns and in general the comical in Montaigne are mostly literary.⁴² Unlike many theorists from Aristotle to Bergson, Cassie Miura notes (2016), Montaigne has little interest in defining the laughable. His view of it is un-essential. His conception of laughter consists much more in a way of seeing or representing. While the detailed expositions contribute to our understanding of Montaigne's comical manoeuvres, the reason he undertakes this at all is not clarified until his philosophic thesis is formulated. It is time to see what the role of self-laughter in this operation is.

2. Self-laughter:

We cannot get rid of our inanity yet we should be aware of it and correct it, if possible, for humor is the only remedy. We should not hate ourselves, but gently despise ourselves, as Democritus does. The best criticism is humorous, as Montaigne states; however, humor is also renowned for its capacity to handle conflict. The wise man is in perpetual conflict with his necessary foolishness, a conflict that should be enjoyed rather than hated, graced rather than discarded:

In truth there is no greater, more constant, and more uncouth absurdity, than to become worked up and stung by the absurdities of the world. For it irritates us chiefly with ourselves; and that philosopher of times past [Heraclitus] would never have lacked occasion for his tears as long as he considered

⁴² See Gray 1958; Samaras 1970; Lestringant 1985; Roger-Vaselin 2000, 2003.

himself. Myso, one of the Seven Sages, of Timonian and Democratic humor, when he was asked what he was laughing at to himself, answered: "At the fact that I am laughing to myself." (Montaigne, *Essays*, III 8: 708)

In the same way that Myso was laughing at himself, Montaigne explains that he is talking to himself, apostrophizing himself, calling himself names:

How many stupid things I say and reply every day, in my own judgement; and so assuredly how many more in the judgment of others? . . . Let us always have this saying of Plato in our mouths: "If I find a thing unsound, is it no because I myself am unsound? Am I not myself at fault? May not my admonition be turned around against me?" . . . we run ourselves through with our own weapons . . . Every man likes the smell of his own dung [adapted from Erasmus]. . . . A hundred times a day we make fun of ourselves in the person of our neighbor and detest in others the defects that are more clearly in ourselves, and wonder at them with prodigious impudence and heedlessness. (Montaigne, *Essays*, III 8: 709)

Montaigne quotes Seneca (1995) on Harpaste, his wife's fool: "If I have a mind to laugh at a fool, I do not have to look far for one, I laugh at myself. . . . Let us not look for our disease outside of ourselves; it is within us, it is planted in our entrails" (III 8: 522). The significance of this procedure is not to focus on a localized mistake, but to understand the general lesson. "To learn that we have said or done a foolish thing, that is nothing; we must learn that we are nothing but fools, a far broader and more important lesson" (III 13: 822). Thus:

If others examined themselves attentively, as they do, they would find themselves, as I do, full of inanity and nonsense. Get rid of it I cannot without getting rid of myself. We are all steeped in it, one as much as another; but those who are aware of it are a little better off—though I do not know . . . "Except for you, O man," said that God [at Delphi], "each thing studies itself first, and according to its needs, has limits to its labors and desires. There is not a single thing as empty and needy as you, who embrace the universe: you are the investigator without the knowledge. The magistrate without jurisdiction, and all in all, the fool of the farce." (Montaigne *Essays*, III 13: 766)

3. Cheerfulness:

"The surest sign of wisdom is constant cheerfulness," Montaigne writes (I 26: 119):

I, who boast of embracing the pleasures of life so assiduously and so particularly, find in them, when I look at them thus minutely, virtually nothing but wind. But what of it? We are all wind. And even the wind, more wisely that we, loves to make a noise and move about, and is content with its own functions, without wishing for stability and solidity, qualities that do not belong to it. (Montaigne *Essays*, III 13: 843)

There may be many reasons both to laugh and to weep, but Montaigne courageously chooses laughter over tears.

As philosophy teaches us how to live and how to die, and Montaigne's last words in the *Essays* qualify the required wisdom as a "gay and sociable wisdom" (III 13: 857), his view of philosophy follows: Rather than being a melancholy and severe mistress, philosophy "makes it her business to calm tempests of the soul and to teach hungers and fevers to laugh, not by some imaginary epicycles, but by natural and palpable reasons."⁴³

A genuine proponent of a gay science, Montaigne tells us that he learns better by refutation and oppositions. He rejects all sadness and melancholy as useless for the arts of living and dying, and puts cheerfulness to work by redefining philosophy as cheerful and pedagogy as discipline that should teach children to laugh.

If Friedrich notes Montaigne's debt to Erasmus, Michael K. Kellogg notes in *The Wisdom of the Renaissance* (2019), the "unacknowledged debt to Rabelais" that "pervades the *Essays*" (2019, 220). Thus, Nietzsche may have been right in recognizing in "Schopenhauer as Educator," the "cheerfulness that really cheers" that defines Montaigne (and Schopenhauer). But could Schopenhauer have written the following?

It is an absolute perfection and virtually divine to know how to enjoy our being rightfully. . . . there is no use our mounting on stilts, for on stilts we must still walk on our own legs. And of the loftiest throne in the world we are still sitting only on our own rump. (Montaigne, *Essays*, III 13: 857)

This kind of cheerfulness, the surest sign of Montaigne's wisdom, has still been puzzling for many commentators. This leads us to the thesis of the *metanoia* that Montaigne underwent, which will also explain how the movement from laughter to self-laughter yields generalized cheerfulness once our common humanity is acknowledged.

4. Metanoia:

In order to judge whether a transformative change of heart from the tragic to the comic took place in Montaigne's case, we need to establish that a tragic view of life existed in the first place. Yet this is not an easy endeavor as the existence of the tragic in the *Essais* is the matter of controversy. "No tragic tone emerges in the *Essais*. Not, admittedly, does an enthusiastic one," Friedrich explains. "Instead of these extremes, what prevails is the conciliatory idea, though it also casts a shadow, of how delusional everything is" (Friedrich 1991, 306). Along the same lines, Erich Auerbach says of Montaigne that "among all his contemporaries he had the clearest conception of the problem of one's self-orientation; that is, the task of making oneself at home in existence without fixed points of support." Still, "the tragic is not yet to be found in Montaigne's work" (Auerbach 2003 [1946]).

Ann Hartle, who has rekindled the philosophic interest in Montaigne in the US, argues that "there is in the *Essays* nothing of the modern sense of the tragic, the highly personal tragedy of the individual unrestricted by ideas of the cosmos and fate" (Hartle 2003, 171). Whilst Auerbach tends to attribute the absence of the tragic to Montaigne's temperament, she argues that "it may be equally true that Montaigne's character is what it is because the tragic has been, in some ultimate

⁴³ Montaigne I 26: 119; quoted in Basu 1999, 384.

sense, transformed within his self-understanding. Expressed in religious terms, he is presenting us with a picture of what it means to hope.” While the first assertion may be true, that the tragic has been transformed within Montaigne’s self-understanding, the second which states that he presents us with hope, is less so, I believe, because there is no account of hope in the *Essays* as there is no feeling of fear, its opposite. Let Donald Frame, the translator of the *Essays*, sum up the argument about the tragic in Montaigne:

He is almost incredibly free from anguish (*angoisse*, or *Angst*: or what you will); this is one of the really scandalous things about him; yet for all that it is not at all superficial; the impact of his sense of our absurdity is not comic. For many Elizabethans and Jacobean it seems to have been a source of a cosmic malaise, the kind of thing Shakespeare sums up so beautifully in Hamlet’s “quintessence of dust” or Lear’s “poor, bare, forked animal.” For Pascal it constitutes man’s misery, toward which our only defensible attitude is anguish, and which (in his eyes) fully justifies his famous “wager” of faith. For many thinkers since his time faith has been a man’s only answer; for others, like Sartre and Camus, it has been untenable; nearly all, however, seem to have shared with Sartre a bleak, if not tragic, sense of man’s estate here below. [Camus is one of the few I know of who still gelds to a stubborn sort of confidence rather analogous to that of Montaigne]. (Frame 1971, 123)

Yet Marcel Conche, the French contemporary philosopher whose expertise is Montaigne, emphasizes in all of his publications the tragic wager that Montaigne’s philosophy is (1995; 1996; 2002). Comte-Sponville concurs, emphasizing the themes of nothingness, which are associated with time, of constant changing, of lack of being, or death within life and at its end (2020; entries “tragique,” “temps”). Many point to the tragic in Montaigne’s epoch (the wars of religion and the repeated bouts of the plague) and to the tragic in Montaigne’s life as the starting point of the *Essays*, as Montaigne retired to his castle in the second part of his life to put to rest his imagination after renouncing the public service that occupied him in the first part. Thus, Michael Screech notes that Montaigne began as a melancholic (2000), as does Starobinski (1982). The death of his friend, Etienne de La Boétie, and of many of his children, his loveless marriage, the disinterest he had in his own affairs and his propensity to run, to move, to travel, just for the sake of change and novelty—all these point to his restlessness. Yet he died cheerfully, according to the letter written by his friend, Pierre de Brach (Friedrich 1968, 300, n230) and the *Essays* recommend cheerfulness, as we have seen, that is, a gay and sociable wisdom.

Montaigne himself testifies to his melancholy as well as to his animosity toward this mood, which he describes as opposite to his nature. Yet Montaigne also describes how addictive sadness can be, how sweet its bite can be. Montaigne’s ambivalence towards melancholy is well described by Miura (2016), and we can identify the beginning of the project of the *Essays* as an attempt to overcome the desperate loneliness and the fear of wild imaging which lied at the root of this melancholy. To describe this melancholy and its workings is the entire project of Pierre Leschemelle’s books, *Montaigne ou le mal à l’âme* (1991) and *Montaigne ou la*

mort paradoxe (1993), who does not hesitate to define as depression the reigning mood of Montaigne at the beginning of his work (others write of his defensive attitude slowly changed into more playful ones). The “gay wisdom” which succeeds to the “tragic joy”—the subtitle of Leschemelle’s third and final book, *Montaigne, Le badin de la farce* (1995)—does not get rid of the tragic but preserves it as joy within the sociable and gay wisdom which is the goal of Montaigne’s philosophy.

Yet the essay “How We Weep and Laugh of the Same Things” testifies to the change of mood that laughter and weeping operates: “Nothing has changed,” writes Montaigne, “but our mind contemplates the matter in a different light and sees it from another aspect: for everything has many angles and many different sheens” (I 38). The thesis of a change in Montaigne is held by many commentators. Indeed, as Miura notes (2016), the substantial C level additions that Montaigne makes to this essay (I 38: 173) suggest that he became more and more invested in the idea of laughter as a faculty of the soul.

Richard Popkin emphasizes the human comedy that Montaigne depicts (1967), others note the influence of Terence and of theatre in general in Montaigne’s view of the world. Nature is comedic more than anything else, and humans should be playful in their games, roles and masks. Frame notes that Montaigne could take the comic view of himself and of the human being in general, that he could not only sense human absurdity but also enjoy it. This is made possible because he ascribed it to human vanity, which he perceived as more inane than sinful, and moreover as necessary because it cannot be totally exterminated. It is intricately within consciousness as folly is within wisdom (Frame 1971).

Thus, to sum up Montaigne’s view, to educate our judgement we must look within rather than outside (“Let us not look for our disease outside of ourselves; it is within us, it is planted in our entrails” [III 8: 522]) in order to understand that “A hundred times a day we make fun of ourselves in the person of our neighbor and detest in others the defects that are more clearly in ourselves, and wonder at them with prodigious impudence and heedlessness (III.8, 709). Laughter becomes self-laughter, which becomes cheerfulness, from a certain point on, when we can stomach the chilling lesson, made palatable if not pleasant by humor “To learn that we have said or done a foolish thing, that is nothing; we must learn that we are nothing but fools, a far broader and more important lesson” (III 13: 822) since we are “all in all, the fool of the farce” (III 13: 766).

Conclusion

Montaigne’s views set the stakes high for both Nietzsche and Santayana.⁴⁴ It is interesting to attempt to compare the three modern philosophers on the topics we have broached so far whether in this part of the article or in the former one. But this will have to wait for the final part of the article (forthcoming 2022), where I will use the arguments advanced in *Philosophy, Humor, and the Human Condition*:

⁴⁴ The thought of Montaigne and Nietzsche are the objects of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, respectively, of Amir’s *Laughter and the Good Life* (work under contract for SUNY Press). Chapter 3 addresses Santayana on the tragic and the comic, on laughter, humor, satire, wit and irony. Santayana’s view of laughter is also the topic of Amir 2019a.

Taking Ridicule Seriously (Amir 2019b) to unravel the logic that ties up laughter, self-laughter, cheerfulness and the *metanoia* it requires. I intend to enlighten in this way not solely the thought of the three modern philosophers, but also the contribution of Democritus to this topic, and taking the analysis beyond these four thinkers, I hope to clarify what it means to be a laughing philosopher.

LYDIA AMIR

Tufts University

References with Abbreviations

Santayana, George

EGP 1915. *Egotism in German Philosophy*. New York, NY: Scribner's.

Nietzsche, Friedrich.

I use the following abbreviations of Nietzsche's writings: Unless stated otherwise, Arabic numbers refer to sections and Roman numbers to books or parts. For example: GS 3, stands for The Gay Science, section 3; and GM III 1, for The Genealogy of Morals, Part III, section 1. When referring to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the first Arabic number indicates a chapter and the second a section. For example: Z II 4 2 means Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part II, chapter 4, section 2. P stands for Prologue in references to Zarathustra and for Preface in references to other books.

GW 1920–29. *Gesammelte Werke*. 23 vols. München: Musarion Verlag.

Z 1954. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. W. Kaufmann. New York, NY: Vintage.

BGE 1966. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York, NY: Random House.

BT and CW 1966. *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York, NY: Vintage.

GM 1967. *The Genealogy of Morals*. Trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York, NY: Vintage.

WP 1968. *The Will to Power*. Trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York, NY: Vintage.

GS 1974. *The Gay Science*. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York, NY: RandomHouse.

EH 1979. *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books.

UM 1983. *Untimely Meditations*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Contains David Strauss, *The Confessor and the Writer*; *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*; *Schopenhauer as Educator*; *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

HH 1986. *Human, All Too Human*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SBKS 1986. *Sämtliche Briefe, Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 Bänden*. Eds. G. Colli and M. Montinari. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter/Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.

Other References

Amir, Lydia

2013. Philosophy's Attitude towards the Comic. A Reevaluation. *European Journal of Humor Research* 1(1): 6–21.

2014. Taking the History of Philosophy on Humor and Laughter Seriously. *The Israeli Journal of Humor Research: An International Journal* 5: 43–87.

2019a. I Stand in Philosophy Exactly where I Stand in Daily Life: The Special Case of Laughter. *Overheard in Sevilla: Bulletin of the George Santayana Society* 37: 49–76.

2019b. *Philosophy, Humor, and the Human Condition: Taking Ridicule Seriously*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

2020. The Democritean Tradition in Santayana, Nietzsche, and Montaigne. Part I. *Overheard in Sevilla: Bulletin of the Santayana Society*, 38: 74–92.

2022. *The Legacy of Nietzsche's Philosophy of Laughter: Bataille, Deleuze, and Rosset*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Work under contract. *Laughter and the Good Life: Montaigne, Nietzsche, Santayana, (Bergson)*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Aristotle. 1995. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Auerbach, Erich. 1946. "L' humaine condition" (on Montaigne). In *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, trans. Willard Trask. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2003. (Originally published, Bern: Francke).

Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1984. *Rabelais and His World*. Trans. Hélène Iswolsky. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Balsamo, Jean. 2010. *Les rires de Montaigne*. In *Rire à la Renaissance*, "Colloque international de Lille, Université Charles de Gaulle-Lille 3, 6-8 novembre 2003," ed. Marie-Madeleine Fontaine, 219–32. Genève: Droz ("Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance," CDLXIX). Basu, Sammy. 1999. Dialogic Ethics and the Virtue of Humor. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 7: 378–403.

Bauemer, Max L. 1976. Nietzsche and the Tradition of the Dionysian. Trans. Timothy F. Sellner. In *Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition*, eds. James O'Flaherty, Timothy F. Sellner and Robert M. Helm, 165–189. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Berry, Jessica N. 2004. Nietzsche and Democritus: The Origins of Ethical Eudemonism. In *Nietzsche and Antiquity: His Reactions and Responses to the Classical Tradition*, ed. Paul Bishop, 98–113. Rochester, NY: Candem House.

Blondel, Eric. 1999. Nietzsche and Freud, or, How to Be within Philosophy While Criticizing It from Without. In *Nietzsche and Depth Psychology*, eds. Jacob Golomb, Weaver Santaniello, and Ronald Lehrer, 171–80. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Burkert, Walter. 1960. Das Lied von Ares und Aphrodite, Zum Verhältnis von Odyssee und Ilias. *Reinisches Museum für Philologie* 103: 130–44.

- Burton, Robert. 1989–2000. *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. Eds. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling, Rhonda L. Blair, with an introduction by J. B. Bamforth. 6 volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Cauchi, Francesca. 1998. *Zarathustra contra Zarathustra*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Conche, Marcel. 1995. Préface. In Pierre Leschemelle, *Montaigne: Le badin de la farce*, 7–11. Paris: Imago.
1996. *Montaigne, Le badin de la farce*. Paris: PUF.
2002. *Montaigne ou la conscience heureuse*. Paris: P.U.F., “Quadriga”.
- Comte-Sponville, André.
1995. L’humour. In *Petit traité des grandes vertus*, 276–90. Paris: P.U.F.
2020. *Dictionnaire amoureux de Montaigne*. Paris: Plon.
- Cioran, Emil. 1997. *Cahiers 1957–1972*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Conway, Daniel W. 1997. *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1999. Annunciation and Rebirth: The Prefaces of 1886. In *Nietzsche’s Futures*, ed. J. Lippitt, 30–45. New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Crawford, Claudia.
1998. Nietzsche’s Dionysian Arts: Dance, Song, and Silence. In *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, eds. S. Kemal, I. Gaskell and D. Conway, 310–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1999. Nietzsche’s Psychology and Rhetoric of World Redemption: Dionysus versus the Crucified. In *Nietzsche and Depth Psychology*, eds. J. Golomb, W. Santaniello and R. Lehrer, 271–94. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Del Caro, Adrian. 1998. Nietzschean Self-Transformation and the Transformation of the Dionysian. In *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, eds. S. Kemal, I. Gaskell and D. Conway, 70–91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles. 1983. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Originally published as *Nietzsche et la philosophie*. Paris: P.U.F., 1962.
- Diels, Hermann. 1901. *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*. Berlin: Weidmann.
- Erasmus, Desiderius.
- 1703–1706, *Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami Opera omnia*. Leiden: Brill.
- 1906–1958. *Opus epistolarum de Erasmi Roterodami*. Eds P. S. Allen, H. M. Allen, and H. M. Garrod, 12 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1971. Praise of Folly (1509). In *Praise of Folly and Letter to Martin Dorp* (1515), trans. Betty Radice, with intro. and notes by A.H. T. Levi. London: Penguin.
- Frame, Donald M. 1971. Montaigne on the Absurdity and Dignity of Man. In *Renaissance Men and Ideas*, ed. Robert Schwoebel, 121–35. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
- Friedrich, Hugo.
1968. *Montaigne*. Translated into French by Robert Rovini. Paris: Gallimard.
1991. *Montaigne*. Edited and with an Introduction by Philippe Desan. Translated into English by Dawn Eng. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Gilhus, Ingvild Saelid. 1996. *Laughing Gods, Weeping Virgins: Laughter in the History of Religion*. London: Routledge.
- Gilman, Sander L. 1976. *Nietzschean Parody*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Gray, Floyd. 1958. *Le Style de Montaigne*. Paris: Nizet.
- Hansen, Bjørn Bredal. 1985. *La Peur, le rire et la sagesse. Essai sur Rabelais et Montaigne*. Etudes Romanes de l'Université de Copenhague. Revue Romane numéro supplémentaire 28. Copenhagen: Munksgaards Forlag.
- Hartle, Ann. 2003. *Michel de Montaigne*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hatab, Lawrence J. 1988. Laughter in Nietzsche's Thought, A Philosophical Tragicomedy. *International Studies in Philosophy* 20(2): 67–79.
- Henrichs, Albert. 1982. Changing Dionysiac Identities. In *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition*, eds. B. F. Meyer and E. P. Sanders, vol. 3, 137–60. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press.
- Heller, Peter. 1976. Nietzsche and His Relation to Voltaire and Rousseau. In *Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition*, eds. James O'Flaherty, Timothy F. Sellner, and Robert M. Helm, 109–33. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Higgins, Kathleen M. 2000. *Comic Relief: Nietzsche's Gay Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hippocrates. 1990. *Pseudepigraphic Writings*, trans. and ed. by Wesley D. Smith. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Horace. 1989. *Epistles. Book II and Epistles to the Pisones ("Ars poetica")*. Ed. N. Rudd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Horace. 2012. *Satires*, Book I. edited by Emily Gowers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Joubert, Laurent.
 1579. La cause morale du Ris, de l'excellent et très renommé Démocrite, expliquée et temoignée par ce divin Hippocrate en ses Epitres. Paris.
 1560. Traité du Ris, contenant son essence, ses causes, et merveilleux essais, curieusement recherchés, raisonnés & observés. Paris.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1911. *The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. Trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Kallen, Horace M. 1968. *Liberty, Laughter and Tears: Reflections on the Relations of Comedy and Tragedy to Human Freedom*. De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Kellogg, Michael K. 2019. *The Wisdom of the Renaissance*. Amherst, NY: PrometheusBooks.
- Kerényi, Karl. 1976. *Dionysus: Archetypal Image of Indestructible Life*. Trans. Ralph Manheim. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Leschemelle, Pierre.
 1991. *Montaigne ou le mal à l'âme*. Paris: Imago.
 1993. *Montaigne ou la mort paradoxale*. Paris: Imago.
 1995. *Montaigne: Le badin de la farce*. Préface de Marcel Conche. Paris: Imago.
- Lestringant, Frank, ed. 1985. *Rhétorique de Montaigne*. Paris: Honoré Champion. Préface de Marc Fumaroli. Conclusions de Claude Blum.

- Lucian. 1905. *Works*. Trans. H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler. 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mathias, Paul. 2004. Démocrite. In *Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne*, ed. Philippe Desan, 244–5. Paris: Editions Champion.
- Ménager, Daniel. 1995. *La Renaissance et le rire*. Paris: P.U.F.
- Miura, Cassie M. 2016. *The Humor of Skepticism: Therapeutic Laughter in Early Modern Literature*. Ph.D. thesis. University of Michigan.
- Montaigne, Michel de.
1958. *The Complete Essays*. Trans. Donald Frame. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
1965. *Essais*. Ed. P. Villey and V. Saulnier. Paris: P.U.F.
- Morgan, George Allen. 1943. *What Nietzsche Means*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Morreall, John. 1989. The Rejection of Humor in Western Thought. *Philosophy East and West* 39(3): 243–301.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich.
1934–40 *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, edited by Hans Joachim Mette and Karl Schlechta, 9 vols. Munich: C.H. Beck'sche
1982. *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1996 (1873). *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*. Trans. Marianne Cowan. Gateway editions.
1999. The Dionysiac Worldview. Trans. R. Speirs. In *The Birth of Tragedy*. Ed. B. Leiter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Philonenko, Alexis. 1995. *Nietzsche: Le Rire et le tragique*. Paris: Librairie générale française.
- Plato. 1997. *Complete Works*. Ed. J. M. Cooper. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
- Popkin, Richard. 1967. Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de. In *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Paul Edwards, 366–8. New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Rabelais, François. 2006. *Gargantua. Gargantua and Pantagruel*, trans. M.A. Screech. New York, NY: Penguin Classics.
- Regier, Willis G. 2005. Cioran's Nietzsche. *French Forum* 30(3): 75–90.
- Roger-Vasselín, Bruno.
2000. *L'ironie et l'humour chez Montaigne*. Paris: Thèse de doctorat.
2003. *Montaigne et l'art de sourire à la Renaissance*. Paris: Nizet.
- Rosen, Stanley. 1995. *The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathustra*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Samaras, Zoe. 1970. *The Comic Element of Montaigne's Style*. Paris: Nizet.
- Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1966. *The World as Will and Idea*. 2 vols. Trans. E. F. J. Payne. New York, NY: Dover.
- Screech, Michael A. 2000. *Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the Essays*. London: Duckworth.
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. 1995. *Moral and Political Essays*. Edited and translated by John M. Cooper and J. R. Procope. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sigad, Ran. 1990. *Truth as Tragedy: Nietzsche, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Marcus Aurelius*. Jerusalem: Bialick Institute. (In Hebrew)

Starobinski, Jean.

1982. *Montaigne en mouvement*. Paris: Gallimard. Translated by Arthur Godhammer as *Montaigne in Motion*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

1989. Démocrite (Mélancolie et réflexion). *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie* 83(1): 1–20.

Swift, Paul A. 2008. *Becoming Nietzsche. Early Reflections on Democritus, Schopenhauer, and Kant*. Lanham, MD: Lexington.

Thomson, Iain. 2003. Interpretation as Self-Creation: Nietzsche on the Pre-Platonics. *Ancient Philosophy* 23: 195–219.

Whitlock, Greg. 2001. *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers: Friedrich Nietzsche*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Wilkerson, Dale. 2006. *Nietzsche and the Greeks*. London: Continuum. Cowan. Gateway editions.

George Santayana and Wallace Stevens: “The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain”

There it was, word for word,
The poem that took the place of a mountain.
He breathed its oxygen,
Even when the book lay turned in the dust of his table.
It reminded him how he had needed
A place to go to in his own direction,
How he had recomposed the pines,
Shifted the rocks and picked his way among clouds,
For the outlook that would be right,
Where he would be complete in an unexplained completion:
The exact rock where his inexactnesses
Would discover, at last, the view toward which they had edged,
Where he could lie and, gazing down at the sea,
Recognize his unique and solitary home.
Wallace Stevens

Several years ago, I noticed striking resemblances between George Santayana’s *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (1923) and Wallace Stevens’ *The Rock*, the poet’s last book of poems which appeared in Stevens’ *Collected Poems* (1955). In fact, the resemblances were so extensive that I was willing to experiment with a hypothesis: Santayana’s philosophical classic provided inspiration for Stevens’ book of twenty-five poems on a more or less chapter-for-poem basis. During the Covid-19 quarantine and after, I have been testing this thesis in the company of some two dozen experts in literature and philosophy via Zoom discussions hosted by the George Santayana Society.¹ What follows might be regarded as a preliminary report and an example of what I have gleaned from those discussions.

To begin with, I should say that the connection between Santayana and Stevens has been widely recognized and frequently discussed; by 1990, for example, there were more than three dozen books or critical essays that examined, in passing or in detail, the influence of the distinguished philosopher on the celebrated poet.²

¹ You can review the work at this blog site:

<https://j-griswold.medium.com/stevens-santayana-aaldef54325d>.

² See the section “References to Santayana in *Wallace Stevens: An Annotated Bibliography of Secondary Sources* (as of 1990)” on the aforementioned blog:

<https://j-griswold.medium.com/references-to-santayana-in-wallace-stevens-65660ebcabcba>.

These references are derived from the work in the section heading (Serio 1994) and supplied at the kindness of Serio. The entries are described in helpful annotations and vary from: passing references; discussions of certain Stevens’ poems as inspired by Santayana (e.g., “The Comedian as the Letter C,” “Notes to a Supreme Fiction”); monographs on Stevens that mention Santayana (Kermode, Doggett, Morse, et al.); examinations of Stevens in terms of several philosophers including Santayana; as well as articles, books, and dissertations devoted

According to Samuel French Morse, Steven's literary executor, the poet owned all of Santayana's books.³ And in the view of Holly Stevens, the poet's daughter, "It is obvious that Santayana had a lifelong influence on my father" (Holly Stevens 69).

Stevens encountered Santayana, the poet and popular young professor, when Stevens was an undergraduate at Harvard (1896–1900); the two met now and then, and once exchanged sonnets.⁴ For the next forty or so years, Stevens' letters and essays do not mention Santayana but that started to change about the time that Edmund Wilson published in *The New Yorker* a portrait of the old philosopher in his declining years in Rome (Wilson 1946). Stevens would eventually publish a moving homage to Santayana in his poem "To an Old Philosopher in Rome" (1952).

During these years of rekindled interest in Santayana, Stevens gave a lecture at the University of Chicago (November 1951) that would later be published as "A Collect of Philosophy" (OP 267–280). In those remarks, Stevens repeats his contention that poets could find many inspiring ideas in the work of philosophers; among others, he mentions as examples the notion that perception always involves a delay between the event and conception, and Whitehead's observation that a system of location means that every point is related to every other point. In an indirect way, "A Collect of Philosophy" seems to confirm Holly Stevens' portrait of her father's compositional techniques: that he would return home from work in the afternoon, retreat to his library, and hunt in his readings and commonplace books for subjects on which to compose his poems (Holly Stevens 1946, *passim*).

In that regard, let me say that Stevens would have found in Santayana's *Scepticism and Animal Faith* a goldmine of inspiring epistemological ideas. But let me be clear: I can point to no mention of Santayana's book by Stevens, nor can I offer any other proof that he read or consulted it. But that it is to be expected.

While James Joyce made no secret of the fact that Homer's work provided the structure for his *Ulysses*, Stevens bristled at any suggestion that he was influenced by others because that seemed a challenge to his originality. He grew testy, for example, when a graduate student asked about the philosophers who had influenced him, and he hotly insisted in a letter that he had no interest in systemic philosophy and would be "bored to death" by it (LWS 636). Well, he "doth protest too much." A list of philosophers mentioned in Stevens' essays alone would be longer than his denial: Plato, Locke, Hobbes, Croce, Kierkegaard, Schlegel, Bergson, James, Whitehead, Aristotle, Focillon, Russell, Descartes, Kant, Maritain, Pascal, Cassirer, Ayer, Bruno, Nietzsche, Leibniz, Lucretius, Hegel, Santayana, Schopenhauer, Berkeley, Planck, *et al.*

entirely to Stevens' indebtedness to Santayana (Burney, Young, Fuchs, Hughson, Griswold, and Sawaya). [Editor's note: *Volume 23* (2005) of *Overheard in Seville* has articles on the Santayana-Stevens relationship by Porte, Seaton, and Dilworth. *Volume 35* (2017) has David Dilworth's "Santayana's Anti-Romanticism versus Stevens's New Romanticism"]

³ I had this information from Morse.

⁴ See, for example, Buttel 1962.

In Stevens' prickly denial, we can see what Harold Bloom called "the anxiety of influence."⁵ And given that defensive manner, it is important to understand what kind of evidence can be adduced of Stevens' use of Santayana's book.

My contention is that Stevens used ideas from Santayana's book as jumping-off points and that he exemplified Santayana's more general philosophical concepts. Let me explain by way of example. When Santayana describes the processes of memory in detailed but general terms in Chapter XVII of *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, Stevens illustrated those processes in his poem "The World as Meditation" by picturing Penelope remembering the absent Ulysses.⁶

The kind of evidence that suggests Stevens' use of Santayana's book is, then, of a certain kind. To be sure, circumstantial arguments are abundant: Stevens' familiarity with and admiration of Santayana and his work; the connections between the two that dozens of others have identified; and what is known about Stevens' other "borrowings" and his habits of composition. But *The Rock* is not a verse pony to *Scepticism and Animal Faith*; indeed, in an interesting (and perhaps revealing) comment, Stevens once observed that Santayana's pages "do not offer themselves for sensational summary" (OP 270). There is no way to stress the following enough: In playing his variations upon Santayana's ideas, Stevens is not paraphrasing; he brings his own genius and originality to this endeavor and, in many ways, the son surpasses the father.

Stevens' relationship to Santayana may be understood in terms of an essay where Stevens turns to painting and distinguishes between "identity" and "resemblance" (NA 73). The first amounts to imitation and might be seen as the domain of forgery and impersonation. To explain the concept of resemblance, Stevens mentions how various Western painters have addressed the subject of "the Virgin crowned by angels" and concludes: "The variation in these themes were not imitations, nor identities, but resemblances" (NA 73). In that regard, Stevens' poetic responses to ideas taken up in Santayana's book fall in the second category and should be seen as resemblances not imitations.

Tracing the connection between *Scepticism and Animal Faith* and *The Rock*, then, means noting similarities as they pass through transformations from prose into poetry, and from philosophic generalizations into particularized exemplifications. Like DNA research employed in revelations of ancestry, this means noting, over the long course of both works, tiny strands of resemblances that cross over from one to the other until their plurality and sometimes identical sequencing point to paternity—while allowing, all the while, for the originality of the poet and genetic contributions from others. As the example in this article shows, evidence of the connection between the two books is largely textual and suggestive.

⁵ See Bloom 1973.

⁶ See my essay "Santayana on Memory and 'The World as Meditation'" (Griswold 1979).

Similarities and differences

The similarities between Santayana's Chapter XI ("The Watershed of Criticism") and Stevens' "The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain" (CP 540-541) go far beyond their titles. In fact, the resemblances are so extensive that I am surprised that no one, as far as I have been able to discover, has noticed and remarked on them:

- Both the poet and the philosopher use the alpine metaphor as their major image to organize their respective works from start to finish. For example, in the first sentence of his chapter, Santayana pictures himself at a height and surveying opposite valleys (SAF 99), while in the last sentence he notes that "a mountain-top" affords "a good point of view in clear weather from which to map the land and choose a habitation" (SAF 108).
- Santayana announces and employs a three-part structure in his chapter: 1) discussing scepticism, 2) then knowledge, and then 3) showing their compatibility. Organizing his poem, Stevens follows this same structure—even, at one point, using Santayana's transitional word *direction* when moving from one section to the next.
- In their matching sections and with surprising frequency, a number of the 96 words of Stevens' short poem (excluding articles and conjunctions) are exact or close matches to Santayana's word choices. (To indicate this, I have employed **bolded** emphases below.)

But before going any further, we should acknowledge the nature of analogies and put on the table the obvious differences in kind, purpose, and tone between the chapter and the poem:

- One is a work of prose, while the other is poetry; though the former does, in passing, celebrate poetry *per se* and employs extravagant metaphors in what might be described as a poetic style.
- Most importantly, one is a straight-up work of philosophy that is an important step in Santayana's presentation of his system, while the other is more like a verse narrative describing the activities of a metaphoric mountaineer. In other words, the student of philosophy will not learn much in Stevens' poem about, say, Santayana's notion of essences; instead, to such a person, the poem might seem like lyrical journalism.⁷
- Finally, we might say that with Santayana the ideas come first though they are sometimes presented in poetic language; while for Stevens, the poetry comes first and we have to tease out the ideas behind them.

There is, however, one phenomenon that presents both similarities and differences. Throughout his chapter, Santayana uses the first person to describe the

⁷ This literature professor wishes to gratefully acknowledge how much he has learned by engaging with experts from the George Santayana Society and others who have been willing to take on poetry and Wallace Stevens. A list of these individuals can be found at: <https://j-griswold.medium.com/contributors-29b5e9b66552>.

development of his ideas: “**I see now,**” “**I need not,**” “**I could,**” and so forth. Stevens, however, uses the third person when presenting the experience that is the basis of his poem: “**it reminded him,**” “**he had needed,**” “**where he could,**” etc.

While the following suggestion is controversial and without proof, I am inclined to think of Santayana as the “he” and subject of Stevens’ poem; in other words, besides conveying the philosopher’s ideas, the poem presents a portrait of Santayana, himself, engaged in the various actions he describes in his chapter and arriving at certain conclusions. Such a suggestion may not be farfetched: some two poems earlier in *The Rock* in “To an Old Philosopher in Rome,” a character appears who is not identified and referred to only by pronouns but is readily recognizable as Santayana. Nonetheless, lacking sufficient proof for such an identification in “The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain,” I put forward this possibility only as a suggestion.

The limit of scepticism

Chapter XI marks an important change in the direction of *Scepticism and Animal Faith* and it would be wise, consequently, to place it in its context. In previous chapters Santayana has exercised his scepticism to its limits and disposed of all questionable epistemological beliefs. Having cleared the ground in this fashion, in this chapter Santayana pauses before beginning to construct his own system. In the chapters that follow, Santayana will add, piece by piece, the different articles of animal faith that make up his own epistemological system.

Here is how Santayana begins this chapter where he pivots from scepticism to the animal faith:

I have now reached the culminating point of my survey of evidence, and the entanglements I have left behind me and the habitable regions I am looking for lie spread out before me like opposite valleys. (SAF 99)

Looking backwards from his mountaintop, Santayana summarizes what his scepticism has brought him to. A sceptic, he says, does not believe in an external world but sees in its place that realm of images, ideas, and feelings that Santayana calls “essences.” These are the data given to the mind in intuition. But they do not exist. The sceptic is a kind of aesthetic spectator who, instead of “hard facts,” focuses on the pageant presented to him and sees it as something like a “literary fiction” (SAF 99). And to this intuition of essences an honest sceptic is confined, though Santayana hardly sees this as confinement:

I do not mourn over this fatality, but on the contrary rather prefer speculation in the realm of essence—if it can be indulged without practical inconvenience—to alleged information about hard facts. It does not seem to me ignominious to be a poet, if nature has made one a poet unexpectedly. (SAF 100)

Stevens exemplifies this observation in his first stanza:

There it was, word for word,
The poem that took the place of a mountain.

If in becoming a sceptic, "nature has made one a **poet** unexpectedly," then in place of "**hard facts**" one sees a "**literary fiction**."

But Santayana goes on to add that such scepticism must be thorough, "not allowing exceptions" (SAF 100). This statement is meant to recall his discussion of solipsism in his third chapter where Santayana dismisses a certain kind of solipsist as "a secondary mind fed on **books**" because such a person embraces scepticism only on a part-time basis (SAF 19).

Understanding Santayana's caveat, Stevens goes on, then, to compliment the literary mountaineer who now appears in his poem:

He breathed its oxygen,
Even when the book lay turned in the dust of his table.

No part-time sceptic, no "secondary mind fed on books," Stevens' thinker is, without exception, acquainted with the thin, alpine air of the realm of essences.

Change of direction

At this juncture (the fourth paragraph of Chapter XI), Santayana turns to the next point in his developing argument. That change is marked by the phrase "If I now turn my face in the other **direction** and consider the prospect open to animal faith . . ." (SAF 101). Santayana's transition is echoed in Stevens' third stanza:

It reminded him how he had needed
A place to go to in his own direction

In the previous chapter, Santayana now reminds his readers, he had described knowledge. Beyond intuition, faced with something unfamiliar, the mind proposes certain comparable essences, adjusts and corrects its suggestions, and tries to achieve a satisfactory description of the unfamiliar thing; knowledge uses essences like words in a vocabulary to coin its own version of ulterior things. In this way, knowledge differs from intuition since the mind does not simply receive essences but uses them to create its own version of things. "Above all," Santayana stresses, these ideas "are obtained by **labour**" (SAF 104).

The labor of the mind in the act of knowledge is what is pictured in Stevens' next lines:

How he had recomposed the pines,
Shifted the rocks and picked his way among clouds,

Here is the knowledge at work, not taking things as given but recomposing them to create the mind's own version.

In a curious way, for the working mind creating its own versions of things, objects become dispensable. Shifting attention from the external world and "the diffuse processes of nature," the working mind sees, instead, the realm of essence or the "symbolic" versions of the objects. In fact, for the purposes of knowledge, the symbols are sufficient and the objects may largely be forgotten:

The human medium of knowledge can perform its pertinent synthesis and make its pertinent report all the better when it frankly abandons the plane of its object and expresses in symbols what we need to know of it. (SAF 102)

To say it again: word by word, a poem takes the place of a mountain.

Getting to know things: the leap to completion

Seeking knowledge, the mind approaches the unknown by **laying "siege to it from all sides"** (SAF 106), closing in on its quarry until the mind feels satisfied that it knows what the unfamiliar is. Then knowledge "will be as **complete** and adequate as knowledge can possibly be" (SAF 107). And Santayana appends the caveat "**as can be**" because knowledge is always only **a view** of what the object seems, not an explanation of what it actually is: "The most perfect knowledge . . . is perfect only **pictorially**, not evidentially" (SAF 107).

Stevens refers to these actions as his poem continue—now describing his metaphoric mountaineer engaged in the endeavors the philosopher has described. He is seeking knowledge:

For the outlook that would be right,
Where he would be complete in an unexplained completion:
The exact rock where his inexactnesses
Would discover, at last, the view toward which they had edged

The successes that knowledge wins, Santayana had said, "are obtained by labour" as the mind transforms "hard facts" into essences, reckons with the unfamiliar, trying this and that. So, in the poem, Stevens thinks of these labors and "how he had recomposed the pines, / Shifted the rocks and picked his way among clouds."

The "inexactnesses" of the poem's seeker are so much beating around the bush, a way of closing in on his quarry until he can discover "the exact rock." This is the point where Santayana writes knowledge "will be as **complete** . . . as knowledge can possibly be," and where Stevens writes that the person celebrated in his poem "would be **complete** in an unexplained completeness." And Stevens call this an "unexplained" completion to suggest that the recognition is intuitive, not demonstrable; all his poem's persona can achieve is the right "**view**" or "**outlook**" because knowledge, as the philosopher had noted, "is perfect only pictorially, not evidentially."

The turn toward home

In the third and final section of Chapter XI, Santayana announces his intention "to abandon [scepticism] for common sense" (SAF 108). His prior discussions of knowledge have suggested a way for him to return to the world, that same world which his scepticism and the arguments of his prior chapters have driven him to dismiss. Ultimate scepticism, he suggests, can be likened to a "vertical station" (SAF 107); it allows the sceptic to rise above dubious beliefs, but at that altitude the sceptic sees only drifting images or essences, and all the while he is remote from life and daily living—what Santayana, on four occasions, calls "**home**" (SAF 105, 106). But knowledge, with its trial-and-error attempts to make sense of the world, suggests "graphic symbols for **home** and the way there" (SAF 106). From

this point onwards, Santayana announces, he will be pursuing a new topic in his book:

I propose now to consider what objects animal faith requires me to posit, and in what order; without for a moment forgetting that my assurance of their existence is only instinctive, and my description of their nature only symbolic. (SAF 106)

Santayana is eager to leave the sceptic's heights and begin the exercises of the subsequent chapters that will bring him "**home**," but he cannot refrain from making one last observation about the value of scepticism in the final words of this chapter:

An impossible dwelling-place may afford, like a mountain-top, a good point of view in clear weather from which to map the land and choose a habitation. (SAF 108)

Likewise, as "The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain" concludes, Stevens continues describing the previously mentioned "**outlook**" or "**view**" towards which his poem's character has now edged:

Where he could lie and, gazing down at the sea,
Recognize his unique and solitary home.

The pinnacle of scepticism provides the two—the philosopher engaged in the exercises of Santayana's Chapter XI and the character in Stevens' poem who does something similar—with a vantage point to descry what both call "home." And "home" is the region of animal faith that Santayana is bound for in succeeding chapters. Stevens, I suggest, follows suit.

JERRY GRISWOLD

San Diego State University (Emeritus)

References with Abbreviations

- SAF 1923. Santayana, George. *Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons., 1923.
- Stevens, Wallace.
- CP 2015. *The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (Corrected Edition)*. Ed. John N. Serio and Chris Beyers. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
- LWS 1966. *Letters of Wallace Stevens*. Ed. Holly Stevens. New York, NY: Knopf.
- NA 1951. *The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination*. New York, NY: Knopf.
- OP 1989. *Opus Posthumous by Wallace Stevens*. Ed. Milton J. Bates. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Other References

- Bloom, Harold. 1973. *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry*. Oxford University Press.
- Buttel, Robert. 1962. "Wallace Stevens at Harvard: Some Origins of his Theme and Style." *ELH* XXIX (March 1962). Reprinted in Roy Harvey Pearce and J. Hillis Miller, ed. *The Act of the Mind: Essays on the Poetry of Wallace Stevens*. Baltimore, 1965.
- Griswold, Jerry. 1979. "Santayana on Memory and 'The World as Meditation,'" *The Wallace Stevens Journal*, vol. 3, 3/4 (Fall 1979), 113–11. A revised version appears on the blog: <https://j-griswold.medium.com/the-world-as-meditation-draft-jg-c59c31ee8d1b>.
- Serio, John, ed. 1994. *Wallace Stevens: An Annotated Secondary Bibliography*. Pittsburgh, PA: U. of Pittsburgh Press.
- Stevens, Holly. 1977. *Souvenirs and Prophecies: The Young Wallace Stevens*. New York, NY: Knopf.
- Wilson, Edmund. 1946. "A Reporter at Large: Santayana at the Convent of the Blue Nuns." *The New Yorker*, 6 April 1946: 55–62. The essay later appeared in Wilson's *Europe Without Baedeker* (London, 1948).

The Other Side of the Mountain: Wallace Stevens's Poem and "The Watershed of Criticism"

Jerry Griswold's inspired view of the relationship between George Santayana's *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (1923) and Wallace Stevens's *The Rock* has caused us to reflect on the nature of the relationship between the poet-philosopher Santayana and Stevens, the poet under philosophy's influence. We think a clear understanding what Santayana was up to in "The Watershed of Criticism" (SAF Chapter XI) leads to a different reading of Stevens's "The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain." We come to this conclusion by considering the context of both Santayana's other writings, including the rest of *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, and of how Stevens approached similar topics in other poems.

The notion that Stevens based his poem on one specific chapter in Santayana's book suggests several possibilities. Professor Griswold has enumerated several similarities between the poem and the chapter, including word choice and the metaphor of the mountain. He suggests, without wholly embracing the idea, that Stevens had in mind Santayana himself as the persona of his poem—that the 'he' in the poem corresponds to the 'I' of the chapter. We think this is extremely unlikely because the poem and chapter have quite different content. Yet there are intriguing parallels. We do agree with Griswold (and others) that the ideas in Santayana's works can be useful instruments in elucidating Stevens's often-enigmatic poetry. Although we have some explicit disagreements with Griswold, we think that letting Santayana speak with less of a filter, amplifies what Griswold has suggested. If we let ourselves imagine that Stevens started with Santayana's chapter as he began to compose his poem, we prefer to think of the persona as someone undergoing a change in focus analogous to the change described in "The Watershed of Criticism." The *he* of the poem is then someone tracing Santayana's footsteps, picking up the philosopher's ideas and carrying them where the poet's imagination takes them. Although it would be hard to claim that Stevens was painting a picture of Santayana himself, as he did in "To an Old Philosopher in Rome," the ideas, transitions, and images in "The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain" evoke residual echoes of what is found in "The Watershed of Criticism."

The Centrality of the Imagination In Stevens

The imagination is of the utmost interest to both Santayana and Stevens. It is an incessant theme in Stevens's poetry and may even be said to be a driving concern.¹ His collection of essays *The Necessary Angel* (1951) is subtitled *Essays in Reality and the Imagination*. In the poem "Puella Parvula" (CP 456), Stevens speaks of the "mighty imagination." The "Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour" (CP 524)

¹ For a thorough examination of the imagination and the many nuanced forms it takes in Stevens's writings see "Santayana's Anti-Romanticism versus Stevens's New Romanticism" (Dilworth 2017).

has the line: “We say God and the Imagination are one.” The same phrase, “God and the imagination are one,” is also found in his notebook, *Adagia* (OP 202). His works are filled with many nuanced views on the imagination. For example, the *Adagia* has: “Imagination applied to the whole world is vapid in comparison to imagination applied to a detail.” In “The Plain Sense of Things” he finds after trying to observe things bare, without an imaginative layer, he cannot escape the imagination’s operation, because even “the absence of the imagination/ Had itself to be imagined” (CP 503). These few selections only give an inkling of the broad sweep of the imagination across Stevens’s work. The interplay between imagination and reality is found throughout his poetry even when not explicitly mentioned. David Dilworth reads “The Man with the Blue Guitar” as saying, “the world as it is is not accessible to us as it is in itself, but as only as it is constructed by the imagination” (Dilworth 45)—an idea straight out *Scepticism an Animal Faith*. In “Owl and the Sarcophagus,” a long meditation on the imagination’s struggle with the harsh reality of death, Stevens ends with a reflection on how, even though imagination in one sense constructs the people one lives with, it cannot control their destiny and must come to terms with the reality of their dying:

the beings of the mind
In the light-bound space of the mind, the floreate flare . . .
It is a child that sings itself to sleep,
The mind, among the creatures that it makes,
The people, those by which it lives and dies. (CP 436)

In Santayana

At the start of his philosophic career, Santayana formulated a motto that started: “Cultivate imagination, love it, give it endless forms, but do not let it deceive you” (PP 427).² Three ways to see the importance of the imagination to Santayana are his own production of many imaginative works, his astute criticism of literature and the arts, and the extensive treatment of the imagination in Santayana’s philosophic writings. Santayana’s first published work was a book of poetry. He wrote three plays toward the start of his career and in his seventies published a best-selling novel. He died working on translation of poems by Lorenzo de’ Medici and left the manuscript of a movie scenario. His criticism includes analyses of such literary masters as Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, Whitman and Browning and also visual artists like Picasso and Sargent. The imagination is a major component of Santayana’s theory of knowledge, as it plays a crucial role both in understanding others and in scientific investigation. The references to the imagination throughout his works are so numerous and extensive that Justus Buchler wrote: “His contribution to the philosophic heritage and to the idiom of the human imagination is enormous” (“One Santayana or Two?” AFSL 71).³

² See p. 8.

³ For a more extensive consideration of Santayana and the imagination see “Character and Philosophic Creativity—the Example of Santayana” (Rubin 2018).

The imagination in *Scepticism and Animal Faith*

The imagination plays a pivotal role in *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. After plunging so deeply into skepticism that he doubts that anything whatsoever exists, including himself, Santayana is left only with the appearance before him that purports to tell him that there are things, events, and a world that they make up. But what appears is a panorama of images, ideas, and feelings given to the mind—not things, not events, not the world. To what appears immediately Santayana gives the name essence. Essences are what they are by definition and never change. But that means they don't exist, because Santayana uses the word existence "to designate such being as is in flux, determined by external relations, and jostled by irrelevant events" (SAF 42). Think of numbers or colors as examples of things that don't change, but the complex image present to the mind at any moment—whether it represents something actual or something the mind invents—is also an unchanging essence, even though at the next moment it is replaced by another. The recognition that essences don't exist and are therefore independent of any worldly event is a discovery that gives the imagination its freedom.

If nothing that appears exists, anything may appear without the labour and expense of existing; and fancy is invited to range innocently—fancies not murdering other fancies as an existence must murder other existences. While life lasts, the field is thus cleared for innocent poetry and infinite hypothesis, without suffering the judgement to be deceived nor the heart enslaved. (SAF 55)

The infinite realm of essence is open to exploration and these explorations are harmless as long as you don't think of the places and things you imagine as existing. The watershed of "The Watershed of Criticism" is the divide between entertaining the impressions and ideas that come to you as non-existent essences and taking them as signs for things that do in fact exist. Because we are creatures living in the natural world, there are things we need to know in order to eat and find our way around. These are the initial beliefs of animal faith. This chapter makes explicit several key concepts of Santayana's epistemology. The first is that we know things through symbols (essences) that have no obligation to resemble things they stand for. The second is that science and the arts represents different approaches to knowledge, but—and this is the third key concept—the bridge between them is that both involve the imagination.

Santayana makes the connection between the imagination and knowledge clear in a passage Griswold paraphrases. Let's look at the whole passage.

Signs identify their objects for discourse, and show us where to look for their undiscovered qualities. Further signs, catching other aspects of the same object, may help me to lay siege to it from all sides ; but signs will never lead me into the citadel, and if its inner chambers are ever opened to me, it must be through sympathetic imagination. I might, by some happy union between my imagination and its generative principles, intuit the essence which is actually the essence of that thing. In that case (which may often occur when the object is a sympathetic mind) knowledge of existence, without ceasing to be

instinctive faith, will be as complete and adequate as knowledge can possibly be. (SAF 106-107)⁴

There are several things worth noting in this selection. The first is that you build knowledge of objects by repeated observations (laying siege from all sides). This is the beginning of both everyday common sense knowing, but also—when observation is controlled and measured—of scientific investigation. The second thing is that observation alone is not enough. You assemble your observations in your imagination and then make a sympathetic leap to imagine what the object in itself might be—what it is apart from your observations. The result is that you start to have a feel for the way things are. The third thing is that this leap is most often successful when the object is a “sympathetic mind.” When you actually understand someone else—when you get what your companion is thinking and feeling—it is because the essences you use to represent the other’s emotions and thoughts are the same ones that he or she is intuiting. You can never prove that you are right, but quite often you are. Imagining what goes on in another’s mind—or reconstructing what you yourself experienced at another time—is what Santayana calls *literary psychology*, an idea he develops later in *Scepticism and Animal Faith* and in subsequent works. He distinguishes literary psychology from scientific psychology, which is restricted to observation of behavior. (Today we might extend it to the study of neural activity.)

Is the poem about knowledge?

When Griswold paraphrases the passage just quoted, he does it this way:

Seeking knowledge, the mind approaches the unknown by laying "siege to it from all sides" (SAF 106), closing in on its quarry until the mind feels satisfied that it knows what the unfamiliar is. Then knowledge "will be as complete and adequate as knowledge can possibly be." (p. 147, boldface dropped)

Notice that he filters out any reference to the imagination or to the privileged place of literary psychology in achieving complete and adequate knowledge. In a communication to us, he said that this is because he wants to emphasize the labor involved in the process of knowing. The pared-down paraphrase also has the effect of indicating that, by engaging in some process analogous to a hunt, the mind can achieve the highest possible knowledge of anything—a mountain for example. There is some support for that assertion in Santayana’s text, because it says that knowledge restricted to observation alone is incomplete. It appears that Griswold is asserting that the completeness of knowledge that Santayana described is also found in the fifth stanza of poem, which has:

Where he would be complete in an unexplained completion:

⁴ Santayana was a sympathetic reader of Schopenhauer. In *The World as Will and Representation* (1818) you can find the following similar passage:

A way *from within* stands open to us to that real nature of things to which we cannot penetrate *from without*. It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which, as if by treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could not be taken by attack from without. (Schopenhauer II:195)

We wonder what form of knowledge Stevens is describing, or even if the poem depicts a quest for knowledge. To investigate this question, it will help to pursue Santayana's notion of literary psychology further.

Literary psychology and fictional expression

Knowledge of the experience of others is not limited to conversation. An elaborated means of knowing others is through the fine arts. In *The Realm of Truth* there is chapter called "Dramatic Truth." There Santayana starts with the ordinary process of having a "sympathetic intuition . . . of consciousness in another person" (RB 466) but then moves to examine how under the sway of the passions complex emotions get formulated and expressed. In trying to express a strongly felt emotion, a man may try to put it into words, but the passion runs "deeper than his consciousness of it" and "he is driven to dramatic fictions." And then: "In a fable, or in a logical trope, he imaginatively draws the outline and traces the movement of that mysterious influence which troubles him . . ." (RB 467).

The result is that truths about passions are best expressed in ideas and figures that are not literally true.

The accuracy possible in prosaic literary psychology is sacrificed to a summary eloquence. Yet not without compensation in the direction of truth. Dramatic genius can afford to be unfair to the surface facts, to foreshorten, crowd, and caricature everything. (RB 467)

Santayana then makes an additional observation about dramatic genius that will help us when we get back to the poem:

It is not interested in justice; it is interested only in great issues, and in the secret tendencies that may be making for the ultimate triumph or defeat of one's own soul. (Ibid.)

Santayana's language is intense. The poem by comparison is sedate. Yet, Santayana has put his finger on something lurking in all good poetry: the secret tendencies that underlie any movement toward fulfillment or frustration.

The start of the poem

Stevens's poem begins matter-of-factly:

There it was, word for word,

The poem that took the place of a mountain.

The poem could be one of his own (Steven's sometimes alluded to his previous work), it could be by someone else (perhaps Santayana's poem "Mont Brévent"⁵), or it could be entirely imaginary. The mountain, too, could be one Stevens had actually climbed or one he merely thought about. But there it was—on the page. As Griswold has pointed out, the poet who focuses on the poem rather than the mountain that inspired it is very much like the liberated skeptic in Santayana's chapter who concentrates on the essences present to his consciousness rather than the existing things that made them appear. The poem continues:

⁵ See *Overheard in Seville* 38 (2020):13.

He breathed its oxygen,
Even when the book lay turned in the dust of his table.

“Its oxygen” is that of the poem, not the mountain, for the poem—an imaginative response to the mountain—has taken its place. On an actual mountain you breathe rarefied air. To breathe the oxygen of poem means to take the poem into yourself—to recite its lines in memory even when the book is “turned in the dust of the table” and to absorb its meaning with “sympathetic imagination.”

Finding a direction

The next lines of the poem continue the meditation on the poem of the title:

It reminded him how he had needed
A place to go to in his own direction,

Here the subject of the poem remembers that at some past moment he needed to rethink his life so as to be going in a way that would be true to his fundamental longings—to probe the “secret tendencies” that underlie his overt desires. Griswold uses this stanza to bring out that both Santayana in the chapter and the persona of the poem focus on a change in direction. This insight is noteworthy as it is key to arguing that chapter and the poem have parallel structure. They do, but the difference is that Santayana is turning outward toward the world, whereas Stevens appears to be turning inward in an exercise of self-reflection. If the man in Stevens’s poem is seeking knowledge, then it is self-knowledge.

The pursuit of self-discovery through poetry occurs throughout Stevens’s work. In “Tea at the Palaz of Hoon,” for example, he indulges in an imaginative exercise in which he is the maker of his own experience—“I was the world in which I walked.” Yet in the end, he learns more about who he is, because in that world “I found myself more truly and more strange” (CP 65).

Rendering the mountain poetically

Now the poem makes a turn of its own and refers to the mountain, not the poem of its title. Instead of ‘its’ the poet uses ‘the’:

How he had recomposed the pines,
Shifted the rocks and picked his way among clouds,

Here the suggestion is that the poem under scrutiny is the one the man in the poem had composed himself. The development is similar to the one Santayana described in *The Realm of Truth* where the “surface facts” are foreshortened, crowded, and caricatured. The poet has rendered elements of his experience of the mountain into a form that expresses his inner self. It is like the woman in “The Idea of Order at Key West” who walking by the seashore sang in response to the sound of the wind and the waves. But sea has no emotions to express and so she “sang beyond the genius of the sea.” Two listeners overhear her. One of them, the poet, tells the other and also us the readers, “It was she and not the sea we heard.” The poem in “The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain” becomes the embodiment of the experience of the mountain and therefore more resonant than the mountain itself.

Arriving at completion

In the next stanza Stevens tells us why the poet was “recomposing” the mountain:

For the outlook that would be right,
Where he would be complete in an unexplained completion:

Griswold leads up to these lines in his paraphrase of Santayana’s account of taking signs to stand for things. In his version there is a moment “when the mind feels satisfied that it knows what the unfamiliar is.” It is most interesting that he uses emotional language not found in Santayana’s text. “Sympathetic imagination,” a term not quoted by Griswold, does have an emotional tinge, but Santayana’s point is epistemological, not the arrival of a gratifying moment. The “complete and adequate” knowledge he wrote of is when sympathetic imagination aided by overt signs approximates knowledge that is total. Nevertheless, the notion of completion suggests not just totality, but also the sense of having reached a conclusion that brings with it a measure of contentment. This sense of a satisfying completion comes through clearly in these lines from Stevens’s poem and Dr Griswold may have interpreted Santayana the way he did in order to make the chapter seem to line up with poem.

His reading of Santayana prompts us to think of Griswold’s account as an imaginative fable—a story he has made up about Wallace Stevens that should not have any claim to either biographical truth about Stevens or interpretative accuracy about Santayana. Construing his account as a creative effort makes it more appealing. “The Poem that Took the Place of the Mountain” does have a structure that parallels “The Watershed of Criticism,” whether or not Stevens put it there deliberately. From our participation in the online discussion group, we know that Griswold has found many similar parallels between other poems in the *Rock* and Santayana’s book. If some of them seem to be his own remarkable inventions, they are praiseworthy for their ingenuity and, beyond that, for how they suggest other interpretations that look at Santayana and Stevens differently.

Another example shows how Griswold’s interpretation provides an opportunity to clarify Santayana’s meaning. Consider his reading of Santayana’s assertion that knowledge gives a better report “when it frankly abandons the plane of its object and expresses in symbols what we need to know of it” (SAF 102, p. 146). He takes this to mean, “for the purposes of knowledge, the symbols are sufficient and the objects may largely be forgotten” (p. 146). We have an alternative reading that takes Santayana in precisely the opposite direction. If Griswold means that looking at a poem instead of looking at a mountain is like looking at essences instead of looking at objects, he does have a point, but it contradicts the idea that looking at the poem constitutes a hunt for knowledge, especially knowledge of external objects, like houses and mountains. If you focus only on the symbols, you have not made the turn away from skepticism because you are looking at essences without any concern as to whether those essences inhabit the realm of truth. Abandoning the plane of the object does not mean forgetting it. Santayana means that by recognizing that you are coming to an object with a partial view presented to you as non-existent essence—which is not the plane of the object—you will seek other views along with an imaginative synthesis in order to get to know the object better. The

point is not to lose sight of your object, but to seek out different sights—different appearances. As Santayana says, when you focus on knowing, the understanding can “enlarge knowledge by correcting, combining, and discounting those appearances” (SAF 89). This process is an imaginative one. In science it aims to piece together as much as can be learned about its objects themselves. In the expressive arts, the understanding explores the relationship of objects (including other people) to the person experiencing them.

Griswold follows the Santayana quotation that says knowledge works better by expressing in symbols “what we need to know of” an object with a specific example: “To say it again: word by word, a poem takes the place of a mountain” (p. 147), indicating that the poem is a set of symbols that express what we need to know of the mountain. Yet, if the man in Stevens’s poem abandons the mountain and concentrates on the poem that takes its place, he doesn’t get to understand the literal mountain better. It is important then to ask: What truth comes through poetry? Santayana draws an analogy between everyday knowledge and the way the theatre represents life:

The theatre, for all its artifices, depicts life in a sense more truly than history, because the medium has a kindred movement to that of real life, though an artificial setting and form. (SAF 102)

The theatre doesn’t abandon its object—human life—but adheres to its movement. A poem presents a concentrated distillation of the poet’s experience. When the poem takes the place of the mountain, it synthesizes some truth about the poet’s life and, through it, you can learn not about the mountain itself, but what it meant to the poet. And the poet, looking at the poem, can see what the mountain once meant to him and reflect on what it has come to mean.

The nature of completion

What is the completion Stevens offers to his mountain climber? It is:

The exact rock where his inexactnesses

Would discover, at last, the view toward which they had edged

The “inexactnesses” of the poem’s seeker is his feeling of uncertainty, perhaps about himself. This feeling stems from the “secret tendencies” that Santayana wrote of in that he may not have probed his own inner secrets adequately. The inexactnesses parallel the intellectual doubt of Santayana’s skeptic. In the chapter, Santayana in his role as the skeptic arrives at a vantage point where he says the two habitable regions—essence and existence—“lie spread out before me like opposite valleys” (SAF 99). The man in the poem also comes upon a place to pause and look where the view is clear, or rather, in reflecting on the poem about the mountain, he remembers coming upon such a place. It is the exact rock—the precise point where he can look back on where he came from and see that his life and work may make some sense. So, the poem he made out of his experience of the mountain was a poem that took in his previous life experience and now it fills his imagination. When Stevens wrote this poem—the outer poem—he was in his seventies and had written a lifetime of work. For a moment, he can feel complete.

Is this a moment of knowledge or simply one of self-satisfaction? Does the “completion” felt by the poet have anything to do with the “complete and adequate” knowledge reached by sympathetic imagination, especially its highest achievement in the sphere of literary psychology? The language of the poem is decidedly emotional, yet just as all knowledge is imaginative, so even the most emotional experience has its cognitive components. Literary psychology is not just the imagination of the thoughts and feelings of others. It is also the reconstruction of your own sense of yourself. It is this integrated completeness that the man in the poem achieves. It is more than the knowledge that any feeling whatsoever reports, but something from the center of his being. It is the view toward which his inexactnesses “had edged”—the view from the place where his secret tendencies had guided him.

The view of home

The poem concludes:

Where he could lie and, gazing down at the sea,
Recognize his unique and solitary home.

Santayana's view

In his essay, Griswold has noted numerous places in the chapter where Santayana refers to *home*. The poem ends with this very word. A good part of his argument that Stevens based the poem on the chapter is that both the chapter and the poem incorporate a change in direction and the direction they take is toward home. Fair enough. But his stronger assertion that the poem particularizes the ideas in the chapter loses its force when you consider that ‘home’ means quite different things in the two works. Santayana introduces the idea of home to suggest the sort of things that animal existence requires you to know. Home and how you find your way there it is his simple example. The example is meant to be taken literally: there are things you need to believe in if you are going to get to the place where you sleep at night. But Santayana also means home to suggest the myriad things you need to believe are true just to get by: that you need nourishment, that food exists, that you know where to get it. Beyond these basics, everything your complex life demands fills your mind with things you must believe in: schedules, clocks trains, automobiles, ice cream, and also the facts they involve—that the trains arrive on schedule, that maps tell how to find your way when you don’t know the route, that your favorite flavor is delicious. Home then is what you need to know to find your way through the world and what you might want to know to make life better.

Stevens—three views of home

For Stevens, the view of home is not the literal view of his house from a high place. The poem has him recognizing his home while “gazing down at the sea,” where we presume he did not live. But no one metaphorical meaning is the only meaning. Unlike a philosopher whose aim is to be unambiguous, Stevens is free to let his poem suggest multiple interpretations. Two suggestions of what home is run in opposite directions. One starts with the observation Stevens often made that the imagination draws its sustenance from reality. Home then would be the source—

the reality that is the beginning and not the end.⁶ This notion is one Stevens repeats over and over again. In “Esthétique du Mal” he wrote, “The greatest poverty is not to live / In a physical world” (CP 325). In the *Adagia*, we find: “In poetry at least the imagination must not detach itself from reality” (OP 161). This sense of home is directly in line with Santayana’s. Home is the world. But where was Stevens most at home? In his work at Hartford Insurance? In his marriage and family? Or in the reveries from which his poems emerged? When the poem takes the place of the mountain, then the imagination becomes his abode. This sense of home can also be seen in another short mountain-focused poem from the 1950s, “July Mountain” It begins:

We live in a constellation
Of patches and of pitches.⁷

And then goes on to suggest that music and literature are a kind of home. We dwell

In things said well in music,
On the piano, and in speech,
As in a page of poetry—

If he prefers to live in the poems that his imagination has made out of the world, then those poems, for him, are home.

When Stevens wrote that “God and the imagination are one,” he meant that the things that give life meaning are the constructions that we make “merely living as and where we live” (CP 326). This idea is seen in the title of the poem, “Reality is an Activity of the Most August Imagination.” In that poem, the movement of a car brings about:

a glittering in the veins

As things emerged and moved and were dissolved (OP 396).

Similarly, in “July Mountain” as we experience the world our imagination causes things to appear to come together—to assemble a world—so that we live:

In an always incipient cosmos,
The way, when we climb a mountain,
Vermont throws itself together.

These quotations suggest that, even though Stevens deified the imagination and celebrated its output, he did not prefer to live in a world of fantasy. No, Stevens fused the two opposing tendencies. The home in “The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain” is neither a refuge in fantasy nor a fastening of the feet to a single

⁶ See “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” VI (CP 469).

⁷ JULY MOUNTAIN
We live in a constellation
Of patches and of pitches.
Not in a single world,
In things said well in music,
On the piano, and in speech,
As in a page of poetry—
Thinkers without final thoughts
In an always incipient cosmos,
The way, when we climb a mountain,
Vermont throws itself together.(OP 114).

definition of earth, but an artful compound of the literal and the literary. For Stevens, the works of the human imagination, especially the poetic works, make the world habitable.

Coda

We have great admiration for the imaginative spirit that has prompted Griswold's interpretive inventiveness, a spirit that sings out beyond the genius of the two authors. So, we end by honoring that spirit with a suggestion of our own. Perhaps the man in the poem wasn't thinking of one of his own poems, but of something written by someone else. Perhaps it wasn't even a poem at all, but a work of prose written with poetic intensity. Perhaps the poem that took the place of a mountain was the chapter "The Watershed of Criticism" in *Scepticism and Animal Faith*.

RICHARD M RUBIN AND PHILLIP L BEARD

References with abbreviations

Santayana, George

RB 1942. *Realms of Being*. One-volume edition, with a new introduction by the author. New York: Scribner's.

SAF 1923. *Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Stevens, Wallace.

CP 2015. *The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (Corrected Edition)*. Edited by John N. Serio and Chris Beyers. New York: Vintage Books.

NA 1951. *The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination*. New York: Knopf.

OP 1989. *Opus Posthumous by Wallace Stevens*. Edited by Milton J. Bates. New York: Vintage Books.

Other references

Dilworth, David A. 2017. "Santayana's Anti-Romanticism versus Stevens's New Romanticism." *Overheard in Seville*, 35: 32-49

Rubin, Richard M. 2018. "Character and Philosophic Creativity—the Example of Santayana." *Overheard in Seville*, 36: 89-98.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. [1819, 1844, 1859] 1966. *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. Translated as *The World as Will and Representation* by E. F. J. Payne. Indian Hills, Colorado: The Falcon's Wing Press, 1958. Reprint edition. New York: Dover Publications, 1966. 2 vols.

A Life of Scholarship with Santayana by Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. (Review)

Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. *A Life of Scholarship with Santayana: Essays and Reflections*, eds. Charles Padrón and Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński. Leiden | Boston: Brill Rodopi, 2021

As its title suggests, two separate but intertwined threads wend their way through this book. One is the career of George Santayana. The other is the career of Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Although there is some previously unpublished material here, including the author's introductions and an appended exchange with one of the editors, Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński, most of these essays and reviews have appeared elsewhere in a variety of venues.

The book falls naturally into three parts. Saatkamp told me in an email message that he recommends reading his introduction to each part before deciding to read more.

Santayana and Philosophy

In his introduction to Part 1, "Santayana and Philosophy," Saatkamp looks back over a half-century of scholarly work that, as he puts it, exhibited "development and consistency" but also missing pieces (3). His professional journey included the editorship of the critical edition of *The Works of George Santayana* and an endowed chair, as well as other academic positions including professor of medical genetics, department chair, several dean's positions, and president of a state university. He announces two themes that will recur through the remainder of the book: Santayana's "humorous approach to philosophical discussion," and "that [he] turned philosophy on its head" (4).

Some readers may find it surprising that the first essay in this section, "Animal Faith," was written during Saatkamp's first year as a graduate student. But the choice is strategic. He is keen to demonstrate the origins, continuity, progress, and fulfilment of a lengthy career. He will return repeatedly to the development of themes outlined in this essay and the one that follows: Santayana's unique position both inside classical American philosophy and apart from it; his ironic humor; the influence of his Spanish heritage on his life and work; his deliberate choice of the classical terms of Plato and Aristotle in lieu of those of contemporary philosophy; his naturalism; his skepticism; his emphasis on solitude and individual values; his distaste of academic life; and his distrust of American optimism and pragmatism.

There is another crucial move in the essays in Part 1 that foreshadows what will become clear in Part 3. Saatkamp establishes a predicate for tying his work in genetics to Santayana's notion of animal faith, that is, his rejection of the idea that reason and pragmatism are the guiding forces of human activity. Later essays will flesh out these ideas in discussions of Santayana's materialism, his anti-foundation-alism, and his fallibilism.

Some readers might find Saatkamp's pairing of Santayana and analytic philosopher Peter F. Strawson in the third chapter a bit curious until it is recalled (or

revealed) that Strawson presented a series of lectures at Harvard in 1983 entitled "Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties." Despite differences in style, content, and terminology, Saatkamp argues, the two men were on the same page on a number of issues which he then enumerates. Strawson had discussed relevant aspects of the work of Hume and Wittgenstein, but, Saatkamp argues, Santayana goes beyond Wittgenstein: "Santayana's insight was that neurophysiological approaches to understanding action and behavior are moving in the right direction, and recent work with neurotransmitters and neuropeptides show this" (29). Here is another foreshadowing of the relevance of Saatkamp's work in genetics to his interest in Santayana. These remarks are followed on page 32 and following with a comparison of Santayana's views on relativism with those of Kant, Strawson, and Thomas Nagel. This chapter also contains discussions of Santayana's naturalism and his treatment of moral issues. There is an excellent summary conclusion of the chapter on page 47.

Some readers of Santayana have found his use of Neo-Platonic metaphors curious, and others have been misled by them. Chapter 4 addresses these issues. It is a mistake to take these metaphors too literally, Saatkamp argues, because even though Santayana consciously chose those metaphors, he presents himself as much more tentative and much more fluid than a Neo-Platonic worldview would. Santayana described himself as a traveler (rather than a pilgrim seeking a fixed destination) whose polarity expresses both the "disinterested observer and the vested interests of a particular being" (54). Once again, Saatkamp contrasts Santayana's festive approach to life to what he takes to be the seriousness of the pragmatists and suggests that his non-judgmental approach provides a model for religious criticism.

Santayana's autobiography, published as *Persons and Places*, its problematic publishing history, and certain misconceptions about his life are the subject of the next essay. Saatkamp provides a succinct statement of his understanding of Santayana's philosophy. "For Santayana, philosophy is not a methodology, nor a metaphysics, nor an ideology; it is the expression of the values and beliefs inherent and discoverable in living and acting" (66). He then comments on Santayana's organization of his own life trajectory in three stages: "his materialism, his moral relativism, and his sense of integrity or self definition" (66). This essay is a very fine critical introduction to Santayana's life. Some of this material is repeated in the essays that follow. Saatkamp acknowledges this in his reply to Skowroński in Appendix 2. It is important to know that some of these essays were based on presentations to audiences that knew little or nothing about Santayana's life and work.

Saatkamp's presentation at the 1992 conference on Santayana in Avila, Spain that he organized is reprinted as the next essay. At the meeting he first screened a brief film of Santayana shot following the liberation of Rome in 1944 and commented with an affectionate reference to the "manner and smile" of Santayana. He then touched on the rebirth of Santayana studies and referenced more than a score of recent publications in the field. Although this list is doubtless now out of date, it serves as a record of the state of Santayana scholarship at the time. In the final section of his presentation Saatkamp turned to Santayana's naturalism. "Santayana's naturalism provides a general framework for understanding and living in a complex, contingent, natural world. . . . Santayana's naturalism is not that of the

youthful 'muscular intelligence' of the early pragmatist, not the call to social action of the later pragmatist. His naturalism is a call to understanding one's past and one's place in a coursing, physical environment and to delight in that understanding and its illusions" (81).

The next essay is a brief reply to a presentation by Morris Grossman. He discusses Santayana's relationship to Spinoza, his "master and model concerning the natural basis of morality" (84). But he thinks that Santayana departs from Spinoza on at least one important point. Santayana's fundamental idea is that one must be both a complete naturalist and a humanist. In his view Spinoza was foremost a naturalist, but he was not a complete humanist.

The next essay reprints the "Introduction" to Daniel Cory's book *The Birth of Reason and Other Essays*, published five years after the 100th anniversary of Santayana's birth. Cory was Santayana's literary secretary from 1927 to 1952. This essay presents further details of Santayana's life and celebrates some of his best-known epigrams. There is also further discussion of Santayana's "festive naturalism."

This is followed by a long essay on Santayana as "Hispanic-American, Cosmopolitan, Philosopher, and World Citizen." Once again we are offered details of Santayana's life, but now in the context of his cosmopolitanism. The chapter features an essay within an essay dedicated to the history and challenges of cosmopolitanism. Contributions by Kant, Levinas, and Derrida are considered, and there is an extended section on the work of Kwame Anthony Appiah. Finally, in the last section, Santayana's and Appiah's versions of cosmopolitanism are compared and contrasted.

Saatkamp then takes up the complex matter of how Santayana's naturalism can be squared with creativity. How is creativity possible if all events, including consciousness, are the result of natural causes? First, he offers a tight characterization of Santayana's naturalism in five points, and he admits that Santayana's position raises important questions. It is at this point that he expands on what he wrote earlier, in his introduction to Part 1, when he said that Santayana "turned philosophy on its head." "For many, perhaps most philosophers, consciousness is seen as a driving force in decisions and actions, but for Santayana consciousness or spirit is an offshoot of our psyche (our physical being), and it may provide a practical reflection of what is actually occurring, but it can also be deceptive" (130). For Santayana the thoroughgoing naturalist, consciousness is beyond the natural. "Hence, creativity in life, music, art, and any forms of consciousness is rooted in our physiology and is motivated by actions and celebrated, if at all, in consciousness" (131). This is a celebration of individuality, a celebration of "the eternal" that can be found and cherished, even if in brief, moments.

How are we to reconcile Santayana's individualism with the demands of common action in a complex world? Here is Henry Samuel Levinson:

But now Santayana is suggesting a possible slip betwixt social solidarity and the sort of personal fulfillment people may experience in solitude. . . In this regard, Santayana's thinking continues to be stereoscopic. (Levinson 171)

He thus compares Santayana's thought to a device such as a stereoscope for viewing a pair of flat images, left-eye and right-eye views of the same scene, as a single three-dimensional image. Some readers, of course, may wonder whether these different visions ever do come into sharp focus or whether that might be Levinson's polite way of saying that Santayana's thought suffers from a mild case of split personality. For Saatkamp, the answer is clear. The proper perspective on this apparently dissonant vision comes down to employing what is given to us by our natural inheritance as the background for each individual's search for an environment that fosters his or her particular excellence more than do other environments. To put it another way, Saatkamp appears to read Santayana as saying that it is important to cultivate one's own garden, with the proviso that one's own garden may be common action.

Challenges in Editorship Assorted Pieces

"Introduction to Part 2" is a richly detailed and highly personal account of a journey of a young philosopher finding his way, beginning with not much more than his native abilities and his admiration for the life and work of Santayana, to success as editor of *The Works of George Santayana*. Readers of this narrative will gain insight into the detailed work involved in producing a critical edition. There is a fine-grained discussion of the complexities of grant-writing, preparation of bibliographies and check-lists, subtle negotiations with potential donors and literary executors, selection and development of an editorial staff, locating documents, understanding and applying the technical issues involved in textual editing, and finding a publisher.

Saatkamp's narrative reminds his readers that critical editions, whether they present the work of America's founders and public figures, historians, philosophers, literary figures, or others, are the seedbeds from which grow academic and popular books, as well as documentaries and even historical fiction. Without this basic scholarship (and what Saatkamp describes in his narrative is indeed scholarship), the culture of a nation or the world more generally would be impoverished.

Although he does not mention the matter specifically, as former president of the Association for Documentary Editing, Saatkamp is well aware of the difficulties that editorial staff often face. Although many are technically employees of educational institutions, they in fact tend to be financially dependent on the success of grant proposals that may or may not be funded or renewed depending on which way political winds blow, to say nothing of changing academic fashion. Yet these are the individuals who produce the critical editions that preserve cultural memory, which serve as the basis for the common understanding of ideas and events, and which (allowing a change of metaphor from field to foam) provide the academic "plankton" without which academic fish, from small to large, would starve.

Saatkamp also provides a detailed account of the textual guidelines and practices that have gone into the production of the Santayana Edition. There is much in the way of technical detail here, but the persistent reader will be richly rewarded by gaining an enlarged appreciation of what textual editors do, how their craft has evolved over the years, and by implication, how their work is judged by

professional accrediting committees such as the Committee on Scholarly Editions of the Modern Language Association of America.

He argues that the distinction between "authorial intention" and "social context" is hazy at best, and in need of further examination. He regards social context as an integral part of the author's intention, and the author's intentions are also an integral part of the social context of editing and publishing. (151) Writers submit manuscripts to publishers for all sorts of socially significant reasons, including previous arrangements, type of materials a particular press publishes, economic factors, and so on. Conversely, the social context of publishing involves respect for the author's intention. Publishers employ editors who work with authors to prevent infelicities of style, excise irrelevant or redundant material, and on occasion even to reframe or refocus their project. But publishers who demonstrate repeated insensitivity for authorial intention may find themselves without manuscripts to be published. So how is a balance to be established and maintained?

One way would be to turn to the Greg-Bowers-Tanselle (W. W. Greg-Fredson Bowers-G. Thomas Tanselle) tradition as providing a pragmatic solution, according to which 1) the author's responsibility for the content (the words) of a work is usually more distinct than for its form, and 2) the author's responsibility for the form is normally sharper for accidentals such as spelling and punctuation than it is for the presentational form of the work (such as its binding) (152). Of course the final intentions of the author are important. But social conditions such as prevailing conventions and economic necessity also play a role.

Editing Santayana's correspondence provides a case study of this conflict, since he documented his intentions for his works, including his wish to have British spelling in all his published works. His American publisher, however, altered his spelling to conform to American usage. In the absence of changing his intention, Saatkamp writes, it is difficult to justify social convention taking primacy over authorial intention.

This leads to an extended discussion of what Santayana himself called the "mutilation" of his autobiography and his hope for a better edition. This chapter ends in a summary conclusion and a recommendation that textual societies in conjunction with professional societies consider proposing critical editions for eminent scholars now living. This would go a long way to obviating the complex difficulties of balancing authorial intention and social context.

The next essay continues the discussion of various technical issues associated with textual editing. Whereas the issue in the preceding essay involved authorial intention versus social context, the issue here is a variation on that theme: the "corps-text" versus the "copy-text." Again, Saatkamp turns to the Greg-Bowers-Tanselle tradition for help. The terminology is somewhat confusing, especially as copy-text is also called "core-text," a homophone of its alternative, corps-text. In the copy-text approach the wishes of a (usually) individual author are honored by publishers who advance rather than divert the authorial intention. The copy-text approach is identified with practices in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. The corps-text approach, however, is identified as a late twentieth-

century phenomenon and reflects a growing interest in the many social factors that come together as a result of the work of other individuals who influence a work.

The copy-text approach remains highly appropriate for single-author works. On the other hand, the corps-text approach is more appropriate for performance-oriented works such as operas, for which envioning social conditions play a larger role.

It is at this point that in addition to the text and the textual apparatus of a scholarly edition the editor's textual commentary also comes into play. Saatkamp writes that he was surprised, for example, to learn that Santayana's references to Spinoza had been removed from previous publications of his autobiography. A diligent reader could glean that information, as well as information about where the texts had been restored in the critical edition, from the textual apparatus, but the textual apparatus is generally less accessible than the textual commentary because the textual commentary is a narrative, and thus more reader-friendly.

Saatkamp notes that an electronic text is capable of incorporating all its past and present textual relations, allowing each reader to create their own corps-text by selecting texts and variants as they wish. Will this make the work of the textual editor obsolete? Saatkamp thinks not. For one thing, decisions made by the critical editor can inform judgments by historians, for example, about what to include in their books. Second, the critical editor can provide textual road maps that help the reader navigate complex textual terrain. The role of the critical editor, he argues, will not be diminished, but enhanced with the further development of electronic texts.

The next essay continues Saatkamp's discussion of the editor and technology. This essay, like the previous one, appears here for the first time. It is undated and appears to be the transcription of a lecture. Given the rapidly changing tools that editors have at their disposal, its details may appear to some readers as a bit dated. Nevertheless, the general importance of topics discussed persists. They include text-comparison software, the electronic edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, electronic searches, access to data, copyrights and electronic access, and linear format versus grid structure. He predicts that the notion of authorial intention may undergo significant modification as the tools of electronic publishing are further developed.

There are, of course, moral issues that must be addressed as electronic publishing becomes more complex. The discussion returns to the subject of authorial intention, this time focusing for the most part on the prima facie rights of authors and occasions when those rights may be abridged. In the preparation of the edition of Santayana's letters, for example, it was clear, that his intention was to have an editor with "special tact," who would select only the "right ones," and that any errors or slips would be corrected. Saatkamp says flatly that he cannot approve of this type of editorial approach. His editions will be comprehensive.

I might add that as the editors at the Center for Dewey Studies prepared *The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-2008* for publication, this was also our position: every extant and available letter should be published, *verbatim et literatim*, even if it revealed an awkward or embarrassing event in Dewey's life (including Dewey's sometimes humorous difficulties with spelling), in order to present a

candid account of the life and work one of America's greatest philosophers and public intellectuals. It was not our task to protect him, but to present him.

As Saatkamp points out, however, there are legal issues that must be taken into account. The law clearly dictates that the words of a letter belong to the writer, whereas the physical object (the paper) belongs to the recipient. When authors deny permission to publish, however, editors have at their disposal certain tools of circumlocution such as paraphrase, description, and so on. In sum, the law allows the author a primary right to determine who may use his or her words, but this is a conditional right. In his discussion of the topic, Saatkamp again returns to the pragmatic conditions outlined in the Gregg-Bowers-Tanselle approach.

He then takes up the moral question of whether to publish material that the author has struck out. The Santayana edition (and the Dewey edition and others as well) includes this type of material because it is the task of the editor to "provide a historical record of the text, to treat the document as an object of scholarship rather than to follow the clear intent of the author not to have published and, presumably not to have recorded, these forms" (192). In other words, a textual editor overrules the authorial intention on almost a daily basis. Without this practice, "our knowledge of major figures, of major historical events, would be considerably less than it is" (192). Justification for overriding the authorial intention in publishing the correspondence of historical figures is less fraught than in the case of contemporary figures, since the publication of their letters might in some cases precipitate considerable harm to individuals or institutions. But even in this case there are exceptions. "If some of Richard Nixon's contemporaries had published some of his personal correspondence and internal communiqués, the presidency of the United States might not have suffered such degradation" (194).

In Chapter 15 Saatkamp reviews Henry Samuel Levinson's 1992 book *Santayana: Pragmatism and the Spiritual Life*. It is worth noting that as the participants in the 1992 Avila conference prepared their presentations, this important work was only available, as I recall, in page proofs. But it nevertheless motivated many of the central discussions of the conference. Levinson places Santayana "at the forefront of pragmatism" (196). Saatkamp praises "Levinson's careful and detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between Santayana and his contemporaries (Royce, James, Russell, and Dewey, to mention only four) . . ." (196). He applauds Levinson's analyses of the primary differences between Santayana and what he (Saatkamp) calls "pragmatism's unnecessary narrowness" (197), as well as Santayana's own success in "building on his naturalism, institutional pragmatism, social realism, and poetic religion" (198). He also notes Levinson's discussion of the many difficulties in the relation between Dewey and Santayana. As I have already noted, one of the central themes in Levinson's book is what he calls Santayana's "stereoscopic vision," his attempt to reconcile what some of his critics have tended to view as unresolved tensions in his work.

Some readers may wish that Saatkamp had said more about Santayana's version of pragmatism in this review, or at least in an addendum to it included in this volume, given the well-known debate between Santayana and Dewey regarding their

different versions of naturalism, which would have been a key component of their respective versions of pragmatism.

In Chapter 16 Saatkamp is interviewed by *Kinesis*, a publication of philosophy graduate students at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. This is a far-ranging conversation that covers topics such as Santayana's alleged fascism, his materialism, how to understand his doctrine of essences, and many of the details of his personal life. Saatkamp is forthcoming about how he understands the differences between Santayana and Dewey, suggesting that Santayana thought that Dewey had not taken his naturalism and his materialism far enough, but that if there is common ground it can probably be found in aesthetics. He discusses his own career as a Santayana scholar, and relates interesting details of Santayana's life that he has discovered in the correspondence.

To a great extent, Chapter 17 covers ground already covered in previous essays. There is a discussion of the processes involved in producing a critical edition of Santayana's published work, biographical material, discussion of Santayana's relation to the work of Spinoza, his problematic relationship with Dewey, and his negative vision of democracies, which he thinks most likely turn into dictatorships or monarchies. Once again we see what some critics have suggested is a certain naive strand in Santayana's remarks on social and political matters, especially in his later work *Dominations and Powers*. Levinson himself had applied his "stereoscopic" metaphor to these difficulties, suggesting that on one plane of vision Santayana held a variety of classical liberalism popular in the 19th century, according to which governing institutions are involved in "zookeeping." On the other plane, Santayana lists qualities of "good government," such as the duty of seeing that people have enough to eat.

Genetic Concerns and the Future of Philosophy

In his Introduction to Part 3, Saatkamp again argues that Santayana inverted the foundation of philosophy, dethroning reason as top of the hierarchy of explanations of human activity, and replacing it with "the certainty of a conscious moment which, unfortunately, leads nowhere beyond itself" (231) but that then we can fall back on animal faith in our natural proclivities. So where does this leave philosophy? "So many questions are raised by Santayana's turning philosophy on its head" (233), and they will be the subject of the essays in part 3. Saatkamp rehearses his own political activism, including as a participant in the civil rights movement of the 1960s, his professional work, and his administrative activism. But then, looking at the photo of Santayana above his desk, he says he can hear his mentor whispering "*What are you doing? Why? Do you not realize that from the perspective of the universe, your actions [are] a small speck of dust that will soon be blown away?*" He says he agrees with Santayana. None of this has any lasting meaning, and is but a small speck in time.

But once again we see the stereoscopic vision. It is important to be true to one's nature, and to enjoy one's life as that nature plays its way out. So if one's nature is

to work for social improvement, then a part of the good life is social activism and work within communities.

"Genetics and Pragmatism," begins with an argument that despite appearances, pragmatist and genetic perspectives are compatible aspects of human life that naturally unite one's heritage and one's future. Saatkamp thinks that pragmatism provides 1) the "basis for understanding genetic explanations of human traits and behavior, 2) guidelines for parents making decisions about the future of their children, and 3) a thoughtful assessment of social policies that may be fostered by the new genetics." (237) But he also cautions his readers that the pragmatic position has serious flaws. As Santayana argued, in prioritizing the good over truth, pragmatists are prone to trafficking in fictions that may be productive – at least in the short term – but that may also ignore factors that are crucial to longer-term realities.

After a discussion of the new genetics that has been built on the successes of the human genome project, Saatkamp argues that pragmatism, because of its general view of philosophy, its rejection of ideologies, its common sense, and its pluralism, especially in James and Dewey, and its deep interest in structuring individual and social life, appears to conflict with genetics, which places weight on heritable traits. But this view is too facile. He thinks that the new genetics is pragmatic in that it places more stress on responsibility than freedom, and thus engages complex environmental and cultural forces.

A pragmatic approach to parental decisions about genetic counseling and heritable traits would indicate that they should not be bound by ideological constraints, that they would be wise to get as much genetic information as possible and use it as wisely as possible, and that they are obligated to accept responsibility for not only using the new genetics, but also for shaping their children's social environment.

Saatkamp's recommendation calls for an enlarged pragmatism that "plays down the centrality of human experience and individualism," resulting in both humility and joy. These traits, he argues, which are not common characteristics of pragmatism, can serve as a corrective to the "task-oriented" and sometimes "joyless" pragmatic accounts of the human condition (252). In a subtle shift of tone, Saatkamp here is apparently shifting to the sort of popular pragmatism that is sometimes termed "straight-line instrumentalism." Some readers might, therefore, be confused and think that he had continued to assess the more sophisticated version of pragmatism that was formulated and advanced in its classical period.

Saatkamp's presidential address at a meeting of the Association for Documentary Editing, "Genotypes, Phenotypes, and Complex Behavior Including Scholarly Editing," further consolidates some of the themes that have served to structure the essays and reviews up to this point. In one sense it is a meditation on the implication of Santayana's naturalism. In terms of genetics, genotype stands in for Santayana's view that "all human behavior may be explained adequately through the sciences" (253). Phenotype stands in for his view that nevertheless, "[a]esthetic and imaginative qualities make life worthwhile, and these always will be missing from any consistent scientific account of our behavior" (253).

Saatkamp extends this line of thought to the process of textual editing. He reminds us that geneticists refer to DNA polymerase as the molecular editor, or one can say, a biological scholarly editor. Thus, editing is the basis of all life. In the same vein, textual editing provides a record of the genetic evolution of the edited text. The emphasis in both cases must be on openness of interpretation and pluralism. Early genetic practices tended to be narrow and authoritarian, and sometimes led to social disasters. Likewise, the history of editing includes examples of cases where evidence was suppressed because of social pressure or because it did not fit an accepted theory. (I suppose the term “bowdlerized” would have been appropriate here.)

Coming full circle back to Santayana’s naturalism, Saatkamp pulls these threads together:

Accepting one’s fated predicament (genetic, cultural, environmental) leads to a form of disinterestedness that is imaginative and speculative. Santayana often refers to this perspective as that of a traveler on holiday. The traveler enjoys cultures without being bound by them, delights in the festivities but does not believe in the local myths. In short, one understands and sympathizes with one’s heritage, and that of others, while recognizing that heritable traits are best viewed imaginatively. (259-260)

In the next essay Saatkamp and several of his medical school colleagues present the results of a study of the effectiveness of teaching moral reasoning skills for students bound for health professions. Using Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development theory as a basis, they applied the Defining Issues Test (DIT) in both pre- and post- testing. They conclude that “the teaching of ethical issues in genetics can be rigorously measured and analyzed and that it can have a positive influence on the moral reasoning skill of students.” (269)

The following essay is Saatkamp’s “Introduction to The Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy.” It provides an overview of Richard Rorty’s contribution to philosophy in the 20th century, his complex relation to the work of John Dewey, his responses to his critics, and his views on the future of philosophy. Some readers may wish to examine this essay in considerable detail, since it also provides an overview of remarks by some of Rorty’s critics, including Charles Hartshorne, Richard Bernstein, Susan Haack, and others. Saatkamp reports an interesting complaint by Rorty that some of his critics “stick so closely to the letter that they can make no concessions to current audiences.” (277)

“Is Animal Faith the End of Philosophy?” was presented on 6 January 2017 at the annual meeting of the Santayana Society. Saatkamp begins with a tribute to John Lachs, who encouraged him to begin his study, and then his editorship, of the work of Santayana. This is followed by a discussion of some of the issues raised by the fact that Santayana was “never quite pleased” with the second part of *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. Saatkamp proposes what he calls a “delightful way to view the two parts of the book, and rehearses a theme that we have already seen, that is, Santayana’s view that “[s]keptical doubts taken to the extreme remove the foundation for reason, and, in so doing undermine the basis of skepticism itself.” (281) As we have also seen, Saatkamp offers that Santayana appeals to “animal faith,”

recognizing commonality with other animals who must act and make decisions. This essay thus recapitulates much of what has been said so far regarding Santayana's views of the relation of body and mind, his biography, and his view that we are decision makers and not rational agents. Finally, the question of the title is answered hopefully, if not definitively: animal faith "may well lead us down different exploratory and philosophical paths of discovery."

The final essay in this collection (save two appendices), "We Walk Back in Time to Go Forward," is Saatkamp's brief meditation on the occasion of a visit to Stockton University's Holocaust Resource Center. Yes, our lives are determined in so many ways (including our genotype). But we "can choose to be different even if history is not on our side. . . . Perhaps there is little hope, leaves fall every year, holocausts and genocides are not dead and buried; they rise from the graves within all humans every year, every chance. But it is worth trying. We walk back, in time to go forward. I hope."

In Appendix 1, Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński, who is one of the editors of this volume, reviews Saatkamp's long career as a Santayana scholar and editor and reports that he recognizes a kind of "intellectual kinship between the two." (294) He also discusses Santayana's reception in Spain, moving from those details quickly to ask why we nationalize (or denationalize) philosophy at all. His answer: a living philosophy is linked to a given national culture at a particular stage in its development. And so it is with Santayana's non-American traits as Saatkamp has identified them: "a sense of fate, celebration of life, humor, the imagination, and radical individualism" (298). Skowroński then examines the extent to which Saatkamp is correct regarding Santayana's individualism, Santayana's rejection of what he regarded as the stultifying climate of academic departments, and his decidedly non-American notion of progress: "he truly believed in the Aristotelian 'perfections to be achieved'" in the excellence of each life.

Skowroński addresses what may be one of the most difficult issues in Santayana scholarship: the fact that he never criticized the Nazi atrocities. Skowroński offers a vague criticism of Saatkamp's defense of Santayana on this matter, but then points to what he regards as an unresolved tension in Saatkamp's essay "Santayana: Culture and Creativity" (Chapter 10 of this volume). There Saatkamp

explicitly confirms that Santayana does not have many arguments to convince us to set to work in order to make the world a better place in which to live. He interprets Santayana, again, in fundamentally Stoic terms, suggesting that the most we can do in times of political turmoil is merely to be wise enough to find out our proper place in which we can best realize our interests without, however, entertaining much hope that we can change anything. (307-308)

Skowroński points out that Saatkamp understands what others might describe as a defect in Santayana's response to the Holocaust in terms of his naturalism, according to which it does not diminish the horror of those tragic events to recognize that they were one more instance of the history of social and political horrors, which also includes the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. It is probably fair to say that Skowroński (who may be particularly troubled by Santayana's stance given that he is Polish) finds both Santayana's position, which he terms ambiguous from

the view of moral philosophy, and Saatkamp's explanation of it, somewhat less than satisfactory.

After a lengthy discussion of global citizenship, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism, Skowroński discusses what might be called Santayana's pluralistic perfectionism, that is, his view that "Virtue, like health, has different shades according to race, sex, age, and personal endowment. In each phase of life and art a different perfection may be approached." (315) He contrasts this to meliorism as understood and by the classical pragmatists.

This is a complex, insightful, and carefully crafted essay on Santayana and Saatkamp's understanding of his work. It rewards a careful reading.

In Appendix 2, Saatkamp responds. He first provides a concise explanation of what naturalism and materialism signify in Santayana's work, and why he avoided epiphenomenalism. In a particularly clear and succinct statement that embraces Santayana's understanding of naturalism, spirit, and the eternal, he writes that "Instead of being rational agents, we, like all animals, are decision makers and our decisions are revealed in our actions. These fragmented conscious moments, if cultivated, are a delight. For Santayana, developing a life that fosters such moments is the spiritual life, temporary, non-causal, but eternal in the moment of celebration and delight." (324) Second, he provides evidence of Santayana as both naturalist and humane. But he also distances himself from Santayana's individualism.

Responding more directly to Skowroński, he rejects the claim that he has not successfully differentiated cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and global citizenship by providing concrete examples of each concept. He then responds to Skowroński's remarks about the Santayana editions, rejecting Skowroński's term "re-editions" as misrepresenting the work that goes into a critical edition. Next he acknowledges that Santayana's silence on the Holocaust is difficult to understand, but he counters Skowroński's suggestion that he, Santayana, might have included something on the subject in *Dominations and Powers*, which was published in 1951. This leads to a lengthy discussion of the problems Santayana faced during that period, including his failing health and other matters that influenced the publication of what he terms that "erratic" work. In an affectionate conclusion, he honors Santayana for his view of humanity, and for leading a life that was positive.

Thus the two intertwining strands of this book have been presented: the long and productive careers of two men, George Santayana and Herman Saatkamp, who shared a love of scholarship, beauty, and much else, and whose approach to philosophy honored the festive and the eternal.

LARRY A HICKMAN

References

- Levinson, Henry Samuel. 1992. *Santayana, Pragmatism and the Spiritual Life*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

The Most Extraordinary of Santayana's Friends: Review of Derham's *Bertrand's Brother*

Ruth Derham. *Bertrand's Brother: The Marriages, Morals and Misdemeanours of Frank, 2nd Earl Russell*. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberly Publishing, 2021.

The title of Ruth Derham's intelligent and enjoyable biography of John Francis Stanley Russell, 2nd Earl Russell (1865-1931), *Bertrand's Brother*, marks a shift in name recognition from one exceptional brother to the other. The subject of the biography was commonly known as Frank Russell; and in his lifetime, it was *his* celebrity that was lent to his six-years younger sibling, so that "Frank's brother," or, perhaps, "the brother of Frank," would have been an understandable definite description of the English philosopher and eventual Noble Prize winner. Frank's subsequent decline in popularity is reflected in the lack of a full-length treatment of his life (apart from his 1923 autobiography, *My Life and Adventures*) prior to Derham's publication.

In spite of the dearth of interest in Frank's life, there was one person whom Derham acknowledged as an important source for her work: "the only person to attempt to give a full and honest account of Frank (himself included) was his good friend, the cosmopolitan philosopher George Santayana" who published recollections of Frank's character, their shared experiences, and events that Frank preferred to conceal (see "Russell," "On the South Downs," and "Farewell to England" in *Persons and Places*). Admirers of Santayana's work may be gratified at the recognition of his gifts of observation and critical insight by one seeking honesty and completeness and whose expertise allowed her to discern the limits of Santayana's reliability. But of greater value to a reader of Santayana is the detailed context Derham's work provides for appreciating Santayana's way of interpreting and assessing not only Frank but also their friendship, a singular one in Santayana's life.

Derham wrote of Santayana's importance to her work fully aware that he was, in his words, "a good observer and critic, but a bad historian" (PP 190). Her well researched biography illustrates how Santayana's account, true to his philosophy, can be "more accurate in essence than fact" (18). Santayana provided valuable insight undiminished by his mistakes in chronology—when he met one of Frank's lovers, (142); when he received a gift from Frank (Derham 2018, 15)—and questionable accuracy in describing the young Frank depicted in the biography's cover photograph (77). Santayana had a favorite expression, attributed to Spinoza, describing the limits of interpretation: The idea Paul has of Peter reveals more about Paul than Peter (LGS to Shohig Sherry Terzian, 3 August 1937; LGS to Paul Arthur Schilpp 16 December 1938; WD 77; SAF 247; RB 141). But if Santayana's account of Frank reveals more about Santayana, it still is relevant because it expresses the experience—is true to the essence—of being Frank's friend. And that is valuable for a biography, especially when presented in the context of relevant facts, that is, the results of careful inquiries that actively aim to counter the excesses of subjectivity by consulting diverse sources. Derham's facts, gotten thorough examination

of letters, journals, court records, contemporary news reports and other published sources, help the reader to know Frank and also to clarify an understanding of Santayana and his friendship with Frank in the context of the lives they lived separately and together.

In particular, the biography is helpful in understanding why Santayana described Russell as “the most extraordinary of all my friends” (PP 290). It was an unlikely friendship, and Santayana noted that people were puzzled that it ever came to be (PP 514–15). Present readers of Santayana also may be puzzled because in spite of both the extensiveness of Santayana’s account and the consistent affirmations of his devotion and admiration, his memories of the friendship may inspire a negative view of Frank as a self-centered, heedless, obstinate, volatile, and domineering aristocrat. For example, there was Frank’s public berating of Santayana, when the latter, unable to follow Frank across a narrow pole laid out as a makeshift bridge to a motor boat, fell into the water and pulled in his friend after him. Frank’s obnoxiousness was compounded by his obliviousness to its effect when he could not understand why Santayana, fearing the friendship ended, resolved to leave the next morning (and, according to Santayana, Frank eventually forgot that the incident happened at all) (PP 296–98). Santayana also wrote of Frank’s complicated love life, including the travails of his three marriages, and how he tyrannized his wives, moralizing and imposing on them endless, petty rules (PP 483). And Santayana paid Frank an ambiguous tribute in making him the model for the unrestrained and self-centered, if charismatic and vigorous, character Jim Darnley in his novel *The Last Puritan* (LGS to Boylston Adams Beal, 23 December 1935).

Furthermore, Santayana reported in his autobiography that Frank in later years repeatedly confused him with another friend. Though he qualified his report with the claim that Frank would, on reflection, know that Santayana alone among all his friends had stood by Frank consistently for thirty years; it takes on the character of a wish rather than a confident assertion when set beside a letter in which Santayana reported that Frank “completely forgot that we had been good friends at all” (LGS to Boylston Adams Beal, 23 December 1935). Finally, he summed up Frank’s life and character in stark terms, remarking his squandering of time, energy, and money “on unworthy objects” and “trifles” (PP 440, 518), his ill-directed sympathies in love and politics (PP 475–76), and “his own perverse way of wasting his opportunities” (PP 309). In spite of Santayana’s acknowledgement of Frank’s intelligence, strength of will, and of his gifts as a sailor, engineer, and politician (PP 483); it is not difficult to understand how one might arrive at the judgment of a periodical known for its coarse commentary on lives of rich and famous people, that Frank was “an ass” (229). Such a judgment is, of course, facile and unenlightening, but in the ninety years after his death no one has done much to enlighten readers about Frank’s life—a silent judgment more consequential than a cheap insult in the popular press.

Derham’s biography, without denying Frank’s inconsiderateness, narrowness, and temper, counters the silence and simplistic judgments with a more complex account of Frank’s character, more revealing of both his virtues and his vices. In Derham’s work, Frank’s attachments and disappointments, his stubbornness and sensitivity, take on depth in the context of his early losses and familial conflicts.

What seem to be examples of rashness or self-sabotage begin to appear as expressions of Frank's sincere (if unwisely dogmatic) commitment to integrity. The biography invites a deeper understanding of both Santayana's philosophical ideas about friendship and his recollections of Frank. Learning the details of Frank's life can help in assuming Santayana's larger perspective that could take in the energies, traits, and talents he found admirable without denying what was small-minded, selfish, or deceitful in Frank.

At the least, Derham's biography presents details of Frank's life that tend to make him an interesting specimen of the absolute ego and a source of entertainment, suggesting an aspect of his appeal to Santayana. Derham wrote that Frank

gave Santayana years of entertainment in exchange for his sympathetic friendship. . . . As a collector of experiences, a man who did not want to do great things, but see them, what an opportunity Frank gave [Santayana] through his court-room escapades and turbulent love-life, so delightfully described by Santayana in his memoirs. Santayana acknowledged this to Frank himself: "It seems almost as if I had gathered the fruits of your courage and independence while you have suffered the punishment which the world imposes always on those who refuse to conform to its ways" (LGS 2 January 1912). (Derham 2018, 22)

Derham's biography acknowledges Frank's rebellious temperament, unpromising self-determined values, and an early family environment that encouraged questioning and open conversation. These traits and behaviors would lead Frank increasingly into conflict after tragic changes in his family circumstances: Frank's mother and sister died just before his ninth birthday; and within two years, his father was dead. Frank and Bertrand ended up with their Russell grandparents, including a grandmother who thought Frank "an unwashed, ill-bred, impertinent little child dressed in rags" (quoted on p. 29). The freedom of their parents' home was intentionally countered with a strict religious morality; and, in the summer of his twelfth year, Frank sought to take back his freedom by running away. When he was returned home, he responded to his grandmother's lecture with his lifelong characteristic righteousness and tenacity: He defended his taking money from her purse as a necessity and refused to promise he would not run away again, later recalling his escape as "one of the wisest and happiest actions of my life" (quoted on p. 37). This led his grandparents to send him away to preparatory school, after which he attended Winchester College, and then Oxford University.

Winchester College was, according to Santayana, "the only place [Frank] loved and the only place where he was loved" (quoted on p. 40). Winchester was a saving influence and became a lifelong "spiritual home" for Frank; "[h]ere," wrote Derham, "the insolent child became a moral man" (40). A major factor in Winchester's significance for Frank was Sarah Richardson, wife of the second master Revd George Richardson. The motherly kindness she showed to boys at Winchester was especially needful for Frank, and she became "the first of several mother figures he sought throughout his life" (42).

Winchester was where Frank, in 1883, first met the poet and critic Lionel Johnson, whom he called "my dearest friend and the greatest influence in my life" (PP

307). But his relationship with Johnson would occasion a scandal that would haunt later conflicts and that resulted in a great disappointment aggravated by Frank's willful response. After Frank left Winchester for Oxford, he and the younger Johnson carried on a correspondence about religious ideas (published anonymously by Frank much later as *Some Winchester Letters of Lionel Johnson*), influenced by Frank's new enthusiasm for theosophy and Buddhism. Their exchange led to concern among teachers and family and resulted in Johnson's father prohibiting contact between the boys for several months. When they were allowed to communicate again, Johnson came to visit Frank at Oxford in the spring of 1885. A month later, Frank was called by the master of his college, Benjamin Jowett, and confronted with the charge of having written a scandalous letter to another undergraduate. Jowett recommended that Frank leave for a month for his "disgusting" behavior. Frank demanded to see the letter, but Jowett did not have the letter or know what it contained. Frank's forceful expression of outrage at having been accused and sanctioned in this way earned him a year's suspension, to which Frank responded by leaving Oxford altogether.

Santayana characterized this account, taken from Frank's memoir, as a falsehood that contradicted what Frank personally had reported to Santayana—Frank knew the letter existed because he told Santayana about its discovery by a college head. Derham wrote, "the chief point as far as Santayana was concerned was that when Lionel Johnson visited Oxford in 1885, he had stayed overnight in Frank's rooms, that authorities had seen them together and had declared Johnson too young to be Frank's 'natural friend'" (66). The suspicion, at least for some, was that the two had had sexual relations, the scandal of which was compounded by Johnson's exceptionally young appearance. Jowett recommended to Johnson's father no further contact between his son and Frank (71). Frank was even asked to stay away from Winchester. Jowett thwarted Frank's attempts to return to Oxford that year; and Frank, having come into his inheritance, opted to forego further humiliation and moved to London that fall (73). Soon after, Frank embarked on a tour of the United States and met the Harvard undergraduate George Santayana, who was quite taken with this first Englishman he had ever encountered.

After Frank returned to England in 1886, he bought a steam yacht and spent the next year traveling English waterways. In 1887 Santayana visited and traveled with Frank on his yacht (when Santayana suffered Frank's verbal abuse for dunking him). Santayana's letters record the intensity of his fondness for Frank, admitting to friends his voluntary submission to Frank's domineering ego including accepting without complaint Frank's rudeness toward him. (82). (Derham dismissed "the late 1980s speculation about [Santayana's] sexuality in the 1880s [as] idle and irrelevant" (82); and, indeed, in the present context it is unclear how details about Santayana's sexuality might add to understanding a friendship already characterized by the strong expressions in his letters). Later that summer, after Santayana's departure, Frank set off on a year-long Mediterranean cruise. Santayana joined him for three weeks in June 1888. The next month Frank was back home.

The next year, Frank wrote to Santayana, "soon I shall be a married man. Could a happier eventuality have occurred?" (PP 315). In February 1890, Frank married Mabel Edith Scott, whom he had met after she and her mother had paid a visit to

Frank unannounced, claiming prior acquaintance (89). Frank much later admitted having misgivings from the beginning about the match, but, he explained, he was lonely and she very attractive (90). This was the prelude to a bitter struggle that would occasion much unhappiness, with Frank's enemies recalling both the sending down from Oxford and the Mediterranean cruise to defame him, contributing to a reputation which still overshadows Frank's later and significant efforts toward political reform that Derham's biography documents.

The marriage to Mabel Edith Scott was likely conceived as a way for Frank to maintain a relationship with the mother of the bride, Maria Selina (Lina) Elizabeth, Lady Scott; who was, as Santayana had observed, Frank's actual beloved, with the appeal of providing both wifely and motherly affection (PP 315). But marriage also served the Scotts' desire to improve their financial situation. The union was a disaster from the start. Frank learned the dire state of the Scotts' finances, and his demands for Mabel to take up household responsibilities and her preference for socializing led to conflict exacerbated by a mutually unsatisfying sexual relationship. There were fights, harsh words, and walk outs. Eight months after their wedding Mabel filed for judicial separation.

At this point Frank's story became increasing complicated, frustrating, and absurd. It included two court cases initiated by Mabel—long before no-fault divorce existed—both of which she lost. In 1891, she charged Frank with cruelty and insinuated he had committed sodomy (alluding to a recent event but also recalling the Oxford scandal); Frank was found innocent. In 1895, she claimed abandonment but ended up guilty of not acting in good faith and of cruelty. This granted Frank a legal separation from Mabel, leaving the Scotts in an extremely precarious financial situation and highly motivated to appeal. Later that year, an appellate court upheld the decision but determined Mabel was not guilty of "legal" cruelty. Derham called the result "a legal muddle apparently full of contradiction. In ruling as they did, the appellate judges justified Frank and Mabel's separation but did not sanction it. It left the pair in a worse position than they had been to date: separated, but no longer judicially so; legally, as married as ever" (172). An appeal to the House of Lords in 1897 upheld the 1895 appellate court's decision.

But prior to the 1897 House of Lords decision, things became even worse for the Scotts. After Mabel's court loss in 1895, Lady Scott rounded up members of the yacht crew from Frank's Mediterranean tour in order to prove further charges of sodomy against Frank. She printed up documents with the charges and distributed them to friends and associates of Frank. Frank became aware of the documents in 1896 and correctly determined Lady Scott could be tried for libel; she was charged accordingly in October. The trial began the next month and ended with Lady Scott's conviction and an eight-month prison sentence.

Santayana, who testified at the libel trial, described the Scotts as "wicked and vindictive women" the likes of whom he had "never heard of . . . in life or in fiction" (LGS to Susan Sturgis de Sastre, 14 January 1897). Derham's concluding remarks on the Scotts acknowledge that the situation was the result not only of their characters but also the relations they had entered into: "Mabel and Lina would not be the last to feel Frank's inflexibility and be pushed to extreme measures in the face

of it, but in their case, the task proved greater than their strength. Lina emerged from prison a broken and defeated woman" (210).

The Scotts would not initiate trouble for Frank again, but there still was trouble to come. He remained married to Mabel; and since English law was unaccommodating, he sought a divorce in the United States. He and his married lover, Mollie Sommerville, divorced their spouses (who were in England) in Nevada on 14 April 1900. Mollie became Frank's second wife the next day in Reno. Two months later, Mabel filed for divorce on grounds of bigamy and adultery. Frank eventually was arrested the following June, and in July he was tried by the House of Lords, a procedure established in the sixteenth century as a means to protect aristocrats from those they exploited. The oddities of earlier trials—cruelty but not *legal* cruelty, separation justified but not sanctioned—were joined by the absurdity of "a relic of feudalism" (228). After his counsel's overly clever defense was rejected, Frank pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three months in prison, but Mabel's divorce was granted and he was free of the marriage. (Ten years later Frank was pardoned.) Frank was freed from prison on 17 October 1902; two weeks later he and Mollie were married in accord with English law.

The account of Frank's first marriage, his legal trials, and the aftermath fill the Preface and 12 of the 25 chapters of the biography. An achievement of Derham's biography is conveying a sense of the oppressiveness of the trials without oppressing a reader with obscurities and abstractions. The book distills legal history, court reports, and the muck of the popular press into an informative and engaging account, supplemented by helpful commentary on strategies and motivations of plaintiffs and defendants (as well as judges and political figures). The result is a lively story that illustrates how Frank lived his dominant traits. Derham commented on Frank's steadfastness in response to Lady Scott's libels: "Frank was not afraid to defend himself in public because he gave no credence to the stigma society attached to court actions. He put his faith in the legal system to face down any slur on his character." (209). The trials showed that traits sometimes expressed as moralism, arrogance, and insensitivity also might come out as a faith in justice, self-assurance in the face of libel and coercion, and indifference to public opinion. In his tenacious defense of his self-determined values, he demonstrated intelligence, unconquerable will, and, in Santayana's words, "a most admirable courage" (quoted on p. 209).

Derham noted that the decade after Frank's legal troubles ended was a productive one (248), but in the previous decade he had not been wholly consumed by his legal troubles: he had entered politics in 1894, undertaken formal study of law in 1899 (qualifying to argue cases in 1905), and he had understood his direct experience of unjust laws as indicative of injustices that hit others harder by preserving class and gender hierarchies. By the time he was relieved of the "burden and distraction of costly lawsuits" (248), his varied experiences, including those occasioned by his longstanding interests in things mechanical and motorized, had prepared him for his work on behalf of several social and legal reform campaigns.

In 1902, Frank introduced a divorce bill in the House of Lords. His speech in support of reformed divorce laws, which included the first proposal of no-fault divorce, "was greeted with stony silence" and immediately rejected by the Lord Chancellor with unanimous support (240). Frank's second (1903) and third (1905)

attempts to reform divorce laws were eventually met with less outright hostility but with no more approval than the first attempt. Derham remarked that "All the recommendations Frank made in 1902 eventually became law, but regrettably he did not live to see it" (246). It was 1969 before legislation "effectively introduced the first no-blame divorce" (247).

The other causes Frank took on "were as diverse as they were ambitious, but if they had a common element it was that each raised the hackles of his deeply embedded sense of injustice and involved an underdog" (248). He also tended "always to take 'an independent line on social questions'" and to "become 'that generally unpopular person' who stood apart and pronounced judgement from the side-lines." (274). This meant that in pursuit of justice he might disagree with his initial allies and often with members of his social class. His advocacy for "automobilism" led him away from the upper-class Automobile Club (AC), of which he was a lifetime member, to the middle-class Motor Union, which began as an affiliate of the AC but split when it embraced anti-police tactics in fighting against police harassment of motorists (249–51). He supported women's suffrage (254–55), birth control (293), and Indian nationalism (293); and he declared "himself 'unafraid' of the term socialism" and worked "to disseminate his vision of a socialistic society" including shorter work days and better working conditions, and the abolition of land ownership (274). His socialism marked a reversal from earlier statements made when he had worked for a Portuguese colonial concern exploiting Mozambique (168). However, he had consistently favored weakening the House of Lords: In the 1890s, he had opposed the Lords' veto power over House of Commons' legislation; and in the 1910s he "fervently supported the curbing of the Lords' power" (274). He also was a consistent champion of improved mental health care, introducing bills in support of broader availability of treatment in 1914 and 1929 (275, 297).

Though Frank's career in politics was marked by frustration and legislative failures, there was some posthumous vindication in, as Derham observed, the later adoption of many of Frank's positions. Similarly, though Santayana reflected on the lifetime cost of Frank's plunge "into the troubled waters of unsuccessful business and unsuccessful politics" (PP 515), he also noted that Frank's "real gifts actually came to public notice at the end . . . in politics" (PP 483). Overlapping this realization of political gifts was Frank's final marriage. After 1910, Frank and Mollie had begun to grow apart and by 1912 were plainly unhappy. By the end of 1913, Frank had fallen in love with the novelist Elizabeth von Arnim, and he left Mollie early in 1914. Mollie would not file for divorce (on grounds of desertion) until November when her finances had been provided for.

Frank and Elizabeth married in 1916. The relationship ended bitterly three years later with Elizabeth leaving Frank. Though they never divorced, Frank filed an unsuccessful lawsuit (against the moving company) for the return of property Elizabeth had taken when she left him (285); and each took their literary revenge: The novelist writing a "domestic tragedy"¹ with characters whose traits were "photographic" (Santayana quoted on p. 287); the memoirist omitting any reference to his

¹ The novel was *Vera* (London: Macmillan, 1921).

third wife. After witnessing this, Frank's brother advised "his children, 'Do not marry a novelist'" (288).

Frank felt betrayed and wrote to Santayana that "when Elizabeth left me I went completely dead and have never come alive again" (quoted on p. 289). Santayana responded in his autobiography that "the words about Elizabeth didn't ring true in my ears" (PP 308); he thought that the relationship "had been, for both, a false and hollow revival of youth in old age. (PP 485). In its futile revival of the past, the relationship shared a debilitating trait that Santayana remarked in the secret lovers Paolo and Francesca of Dante's *Inferno*: it was a love without a future, "condemned to be mere possession," and doomed because "Love itself dreams of more than mere possession; to conceive happiness, it must conceive a life to be shared in a varied world, full of events and activities, which shall be new and ideal bonds between the lovers" (TPP 70–71).

Possession seems to have been characteristic of many of Frank's relationships. Lady Scott, Mollie, and Elizabeth exhibited a possessive willfulness in thinking, as Santayana noted, "they could manage [Frank], . . . each [believing] herself predestined to redeem him and anchor him in the safe haven of her arms" (PP 483); yet his wives always became "prisoners" (PP 484). Santayana acknowledged that Frank's

society was charming, his personality dominant, that there was nobody in whose good graces one would rather be, I knew by my own experience. But in friendship liability is limited; each preserves his privacy and freedom, and there is no occasion for jealousy or tyranny. Towards his women, once they were enveigled into an unlimited partnership, Russell was a tyrant. (PP 483).

This distinction between Frank's marriages and how Santayana understood friendship begins to suggest how and why his friendship with Frank meant so much to him. Though Santayana took no pleasure in Frank's impositions on his wives, with whom he often was sympathetic; he found the absurdity of Russell's "petty habits" and moralistic opinions amusing and harmless: "I knew them by heart; they were parts of his imperious personality, which I accepted merrily when I was with him. He never dreamt that I should accept them for myself. He left me abundantly alone" (PP 483–84). In their friendship, as Derham noted, Santayana had leave to observe, think his own thoughts, and grow as he would; and he allowed Frank a corresponding freedom (PP 298, cited in Derham 2018 20). This mutual allowance suggests a shared love of freedom as an ideal, and the friendship then appears as more than a transactional relationship, with Santayana as sympathetic observer and Frank as entertaining actor.

This was a point of Derham's article in which the transactional characterization (quoted above) appeared. The article's title, "Ideal Sympathy? The Unlikely Friendship of George Santayana and Frank, 2nd Early Russell," poses the question of whether there was something more than exchange of sympathy for entertainment; and the article answers with a list of shared ideal interests. On Santayana's view, true friendship requires shared ideal interests beyond a personal attachment that may result from beneficial exchange (LR2 98) or from "physical or vital affinity," like the attraction to Frank's fearless demeanor and physical deftness (PP 515). And,

indeed, Derham noted that in addition to common formative experiences such as loss of home and alienation because of language or unconventional upbringing, and a shared tendency toward aloofness, both Frank and Santayana valued ideals of sincerity, forthrightness, and freedom (Derham 2018, 19).

But Santayana suggested that friendship is not only shared ideal interests but active idealization. In 1896, he speculated about how one comes to identify an individual of note or pick out a distinctive character and claimed that the standard used lies within us. He explained that

A real person seems to us to have character and consistency when his behaviour is such as to impress a definite and simple image upon our mind. In themselves, if we could count all their undiscovered springs of action, all men have character and consistency alike: all are equally fit to be types. But their characters are not equally intelligible to us, their behaviour is not equally deducible, and their motives not equally appreciable. Those who appeal most to us, either in themselves or by the emphasis they borrow from their similarity to other individuals, are those we remember and regard as the centres around which variations oscillate. (SB 113)

The standard is set by us and articulated in terms of one who strikes us as an originating center of human living, whose character is intelligible, whose behavior is consistent with traits that most impress us, and whose motives we find valuable. Such an articulation could take the form of a description of one we find to be "the most interesting of mortals" (PP 479), such as Santayana gave the young Frank visiting Harvard for the first time (the continuation of the physical description that departs from the portrait on the cover of Derham's biography): "There was a precision in his indolence; and mild as he seemed, he suggested a latent capacity to leap, a latent astonishing celerity and strength, that could crush at one blow. Yet his speech was simple and suave, perfectly decided and strangely frank" (quoted on p. 77). Santayana's idealization made intelligible Frank's strength of will and self-determination, deduced behavior from established traits of sincerity and forthrightness, and appreciated a motivating devotion to an ideal of freedom.

To call Santayana's description of Frank an idealization neither assumes that the human creature was ideal in some moral sense nor suggests the description is made up arbitrarily. It describes a character in a way intended to be as compelling as the experience Santayana had of the living person, a sense of which comes through in his letters from his first visit to Frank in England:

Russell is the ablest man, all round, that I have ever met. You have no idea what a splendid creature he is, no more had I till I had seen a great deal of him. He isn't good, that is he is completely selfish and rather cruel, although I fancy I made too much of his heartlessness at first. But then both practically and intellectually he is really brilliant. Leaving the practical side apart in which direction you may say I am easily dazzled, he is up on every subject from Greek tragedy to common law and from smutty stories to Buddhism. I know I am making a fool of myself in writing about him" (LGS 20 May 1887, cited, in part, in Derham 2018, 16)

Frank was not good but brilliant; he shone forth, in Santayana's view, among oscillating variations of a heroic and transcendental spirit (PP 294, 474–75).

Santayana was perhaps most explicit about what he admired when he wrote in his autobiography that Frank's

best side . . . was his intellectual freedom or transcendental detachment. . . . This heroic spirit . . . was proud and brave enough not to be overwhelmed by any folly or any mischance. For this I admired him to the end . . . not for what he did or thought, but for what he was. (PP 474–75)

In Frank, Santayana appreciated “the inner man” with “Transcendental rebellion . . . at the bottom of his heart” (PP 308). Frank himself recognized the transcendental liberty he and Lionel Johnson experience in their youthful spiritual inquiry as “the real part of me” to be distinguished from “my very extensive external activities” (PP 307)—the very entanglements and trifles on which Santayana thought Frank squandered his strength. Santayana wrote that Frank's transcendentalism was not easily discerned, overlooked even by his wives. But it was intelligible to Santayana as an aspect of the “definite and simple image” of the “heroic spirit” impressed on his mind and articulated in his idealization.

The idealization is important for the obvious reason that it identifies who our friends are, making them centers or standards by picking out an essence they embody. Frank too idealized his friends, for example, Lionel Johnson, whom he identified as his dearest friend and greatest influence, and perhaps his wives and lovers. But Santayana remarked that he and Frank understood friendship differently, and Frank was not especially curious about other people or about what they felt and aspired to (PP 313). A resulting problem of this lack of curiosity can be that the idealization may come to stand in for the actual living human; one confuses the essence with the existence.

Santayana, of course, was fully convinced of the importance of distinguishing essence and existence (as Daniel Moreno emphasized), and he became “inured to the cyclical character of all my friendships, that set a period to the best of them, sometimes a very brief one. For me this involved no estrangement, no disillusion; on the contrary, the limits of each friendship perfected that friendship, insured it against disaster, enshrined it in the eternal” (PP 514). Friendship has a necessary material basis, and the realm of matter always is in flux; but the realm of essence, where idealizations are enshrined, is eternal.

Santayana's friendship with Frank Russell is enshrined in his memoir, and its influence can be read in the philosophical account of friendship in *Reason in Society*. The shared youth, sensuous or physical affinity, ideal sympathy, and moral appreciation listed in the work (LR2 96) are, of course, not ingredients one gathers to make a friendship, they are discovered in reflection on experience; and, indeed, Derham found them illustrated in Santayana's experiences with Frank (Derham 2018, 12). That his friendship with Frank strongly influenced Santayana's understanding of friendship can be read in his autobiography; and Derham's biography emphasizes that with context and details that fill out Santayana's judgments of Frank and their friendship: the significance of Johnson's influence on Frank, the

massive burden of the court cases, Frank's quest for a loving home, and his refusal ever to accept convention for its own sake.

Derham's excellent book documents Frank's extraordinary life and complex character and portrays a person who makes sense as the inspiration for the character Santayana admired. Derham's work consults Santayana's recollections but draws its own conclusions. It is not that one account corrects the other or that one reveals a deeper truth regarding the character of Frank; rather, Derham's biography and Santayana's memoir together offer the pleasure and value of conscientious biography and thoughtful reflection on the experience of friendship.

MARTIN COLEMAN

Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis

References

Derham, Ruth. 2018. "Ideal Sympathy? The Unlikely Friendship of George Santayana and Frank, 2nd Early Russell." *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* 36: 12–25.

Santayana, George.

LGS [1868-1952] 2001-2008. *The Letters of George Santayana*. Critical edition.

LR2 *Reason in Society*. Critical edition.

PP *Persons and Places*. Critical edition.

SB *Sense of Beauty*. Critical edition.

TPP *Three Philosophical Poets*. Critical edition.

Review of *Il senso della bellezza*

George Santayana. *Il senso della bellezza* (*The Sense of Beauty*). Italian edition by Giuseppe Patella, Milan: Aesthetica. 2020 (224 pages).

A new Italian edition of Santayana's *The Sense of Beauty* has been recently published by Aesthetica. This edition represents an admirable effort to increase the readership of the works of Santayana, an author relegated to silent oblivion in the Italian philosophical tradition, even though he spent the last twenty-five years of his life in Rome, where he died in 1952. Although he was also an essayist and a poet, Santayana was primarily a philosopher. His major philosophical legacy consists in articulating the materialistic viewpoint with a deep consideration of human spirituality, a position that has been referred to as "critical realism." This position is important because it helps us to rethink aesthetics, to consider the discipline in a broad sense. Aesthetics is not a separate discipline that deals with just the fine arts and nothing else; instead, it is a discipline which has a strong link to human flourishing, harmony in life, and ethical values.

In his preface to the book, Patella shows how the relationship between Santayana and the discipline of aesthetics is highly paradoxical: although Santayana taught a course on aesthetics (at Harvard University from 1892 to 1895), derived the book from his lectures, and "he had always been attracted by the poetical and decorative aspects of art and nature" (12), he did not give the discipline of aesthetics autonomous status. This position could be explained by his denial that art and beauty are experienced in the modernistic and romantic sense as *art pour l'art*—as a dimension of experience apart from the rest of experience. To this viewpoint he opposes a sort of supremacy of aesthetic experience as a whole, which Patella calls "a primacy of the aesthetic" (11). In Santayana's essay "What is Aesthetics?" published in 1904, eight years after *The Sense of Beauty*, he affirmed the intimate connection of the aesthetic sphere with all of life's domains. The group of activities that we define as aesthetics is too heterogeneous to be reduced to one thing; it is impossible to isolate any one field of experience that could completely encompass the field of aesthetics. Aesthetic experience is so variegated and so engrained in every aspect of life that it is as multifaceted and complex as life itself (see WA 322).

Prior to *The Sense of Beauty* (1896), Santayana's first philosophic publication, he was known for his poetry and his interest in the arts. Publishing the book was motivated especially by his need to solidify his position at Harvard University.¹ Santayana defines his point of view on aesthetics as "psychological"—i.e., it is not a treatise on beauty nor a metaphysical inquiry, but a study of human sensibility and feelings about beauty. He believed that perceiving beauty is more important than thinking about it. The experience of beauty is closer to the source of life than any reflective thought. Furthermore, although philosophy, which is a kind of reflection, is a part of life, it is something that always comes after the fact. This placement is represented by Hegel's famous "owl of Minerva", which spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk, meaning that philosophy comes to understand reality just as it fades into the past.

¹ See "Santayana in 1896" p. 7

In the first part of the text, Santayana explores the historical sources of the theory of beauty and discovers two main currents. The first, going back to the nineteenth century, is criticism, in the sense of the evaluation of artworks. *Criticism*, however, is too limited a term, because it could not be applied to nature: we do not criticize a sunset, we just perceive and admire it.

The second current is *aesthetics*. This term is too broad, because it applies to any pleasure or grief and to all perceptions, without any distinction. We need to extend criticism to comprehend the immediate and instinctive judgments of value and we have to reduce the scope of aesthetics so that we can exclude perceptions that are not evaluations. We then find that aesthetics is a perception of values and our objective becomes to understand the meaning and the conditions of those values. In this way of reformulating aesthetics, the awareness of our emotions takes on great importance. This awareness adheres to the Spinozistic tradition in which every perception is the evaluation of something.

Santayana proposes this definition of beauty: Beauty is a “value positive, intrinsic and objectified” (SB 33). Beauty is a value because it implies an act of evaluation; it is positive because it presupposes the perception of something good; and it is intrinsic, because it is self-determined, without reference to any other end. Objectified means the pleasure is “regarded as the quality of a thing” (SB 33). Beauty has an emotional element, a pleasure that resides within us but, despite this, we continue to consider it to be a quality of things. The reason we do this lies in a universal tendency to consider the effect of a thing on ourselves as an element inherent in its nature. Science attempts to overcome this tendency, but art remains anchored to it.

Having established a definition of beauty, Santayana dedicates the rest of the book to what he considers the sources of aesthetic values: matter, form, and expression. In the section dedicated to matter—the materials of beauty, he analyses the elements of our consciousness, the different vital functions, and the senses that contribute to creating aesthetic pleasure. Here, aesthetic experience assumes a naturalistic character, and so its foundations must be found in the psycho-physical processes of our organism.

The next part of the book is dedicated to the topic of form. We can talk about form whenever a set of sensible elements, to which nature is indifferent, arrange themselves so that their combination produces pleasure. Santayana then gives a tripartite classification of forms, based on one originally suggested by Gustav Fechner. This classification depends on the nature of the elements and the possible methods of unifying them. In the first type, the elements are all alike and their diversity is numerical; in the second type, they differ in kind, but do not compel the mind to conceive a particular order that unifies them; in the third type, they are so constituted that they suggest inevitably how they are organized. In this third case, the organization is in the object itself, and “the synthesis of its parts is one and pre-determinate” (SB 64).

The last component of beauty analyzed is expression. It distinguishes itself from the other components because it is a habit rather than an instinctual attitude and because it presupposes the union between two terms (the object that the world

presents and the object that the imagination suggests). Expression, in opposition to Croce's theory, is just a dimension of aesthetics and it cannot replace all the others. Against all reductionist theories, the Santayana tries to develop a theory of beauty that takes in every aspect of experience.

At the same time, he recognizes the effect of variety in the perception of beauty. Different experiences do not have the same value. No one thing can be beautiful at the same time for everyone. For something to be beautiful, a human being must take pleasure in it and that pleasure depends on the varying nature of judgments. Because we each have different innate predispositions and grew up in different circumstances, our judgments and perceptions of beauty and the pleasures we take in it are all different. Different also is the degree of beauty we find in the objects that surround us. Aesthetic pleasure cannot be universal. It makes no sense to pretend that a thing that is beautiful for one person should be the same for another. All beautiful things capture our attention and, therefore, have some beauty in their own right, but they differ in their ability to be objects of pleasure for any given individual. So, the degree of beauty varies from person to person.

At the conclusion of the book, Santayana looks back on his work. He has been using the method of psychology, which earlier in the book he distinguished from both the rendering of aesthetic judgments and the analysis of the historical or cultural circumstances in which aesthetic experience is undergone. The psychological method has enabled him to explain how the human mind perceives beauty. Despite his analysis beauty, as experienced in the momentary act of perception, is something beyond words. From an internal point of view, it justifies itself and it has no concern to look for its causes. However, as we are human beings and we cannot stop asking questions, our investigation of beauty's causes is inevitable. The fact that the book ends with the consideration of the inexpressible character of beauty and the inescapability of examining causes is a paradox. For this reason, G. Boas, in his essay "Santayana and the Arts" (PGS 241-261), has written about the presence of both Platonic and Democritean ideas in the aesthetics of Santayana: Democritus would have described beauty as an objectified pleasure (Santayana's conclusion), Plato asked probing questions about the beauty of actions, laws, and ideas (as did Santayana).

What does Santayana have to teach the contemporary philosopher? He teaches us that beauty is not an ideal detached and remote from the world we live in and that philosophy as a way of life is more important than philosophy as an academic discipline. This translation by Giuseppe Patella, which combines clear expression in the language of Santayana's last home with suggestive insight, provides Italian readers the opportunity to discover these insights again. A biographical-bibliographical appendix closes the volume, and thanks to it, the general reader may learn more about Santayana's life and works and philosophers may draw some fine suggestions for further reading.

ALBA STEFANELLI

References with Abbreviations

- PGS Schilpp, Paul Arthur, editor. 1940. *The Philosophy of George Santayana*. LaSalle IL: Open Court.
- SB Santayana George. [1896] 1988. *The Sense of Beauty*. Critical edition.
- WA Santayana, George (1904). What is Aesthetics? *The Philosophical Review*, 13(3), 320–327, recently translated in Italian by Giuseppe Patella (2019) with the title *Che cos'è l'estetica?*. Mimesis Edizioni: Milano

Other References and Works of Interest

- Bosco, Nynfa (1987). *Invito al pensiero di George Santayana*. Mursia: Milano.
An important book in Italian philosophical tradition about Santayana's thought
- Patella, Giuseppe (2001). *Bellezza, arte, vita. L'estetica mediterranea di Santayana*. Mimesis Edizioni: Milano

In Memoriam

*Two major contributors to Santayana scholarship lost their lives in 2021.
The Founding Editor of the Santayana Edition pays tribute to them both.*

Kristine Frost

On January 27, 1986, Kris Frost began working on the Santayana Edition at Texas A&M University. She retired in 2016 as the person with the longest commitment to the Edition. When she first became an editorial assistant, we were at a crucial turning point. The Edition had moved from the University of Tampa where our first NEH grant was received in 1976 to determine if the project was feasible. The second grant came in 1977 enabling us to begin work on the organization and publication of the Edition and was followed by grants every two years. In Tampa, Shirley Cueto served as my principal administrative assistant to the Edition supported also by John Jones whose background in literary editions was very helpful.

Most of the work on the first volume of the Edition, *Persons and Places*, was completed in Tampa. However, its publication was delayed because of the last-minute discovery of the manuscript for the second book of Santayana's autobiography. Upon arriving in Texas, there was much to be done including completing *Persons and Places*, organizing all the material moved from Tampa, setting up projected publication dates for future volumes, establishing the authors of the introductions, and training staff in the details of editing critical editions.

Donna Hana Calvert became the Associate Editor of the Edition in the summer of 1985. It was clear that we needed another person whose organizational skills, intellect, and the ability to work with a diverse group of individuals would support Donna, the graduate and undergraduate students working on the Edition, and me. Kris Frost more than fit the bill. When she joined the Edition, we were in rather cramped quarters some distance from my administrative offices. I would come to the Edition during the early morning and late afternoon or early evening. Donna and Kris worked with graduate students, faculty, authors of introductions, libraries, rare books and manuscripts holdings, and MIT Press.

Kris was superb in every way. Deadlines and timetables were frustrating in the beginning. I continued to discover material and manuscripts that had not been located before, and with each discovery came more work to compare the documents to the publications and other versions of the manuscripts. Kris's calm manner, astuteness in collating material, ability to document work and notations and supervise the students enabled the Edition to move forward in a steady progressive way. When we moved to much more accommodating space across from my administrative offices at Texas A&M University, Kris's organizational skills and solid approach made for a smooth process and no loss of time in the work of the Edition, while providing private offices for both Donna and Kris as well as a large space for our library, a conference room as well as rooms for both machine and sight collations. *The Sense of Beauty* (1988), *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1989) and *The Last Puritan* (1994) were published with Kris as one of the assistant editors.

Kris Frost became the Associate Editor when Donna Hanna-Calvert left the Edition. Kris and I interviewed several people and agreed to hire Brenda Bridges as Assistant Editor. In the following years, Kris's care and professionalism enabled the Edition to progress in a very positive way. When I moved across campus to be the head of a department in the medical school as well as a professor of pediatrics in our hospital, Kris's role became even more significant. I reserved two mornings a week to work with Kris, and she was remarkably adept at helping at other times depending on my schedule. As my administrative and clinical work became more demanding, I could always, without exception, rely on Kris to maintain the schedule for the Edition and to bring any significant issues to my attention or approval. The Association for Documentary Editing provided guidance and contacts for any significant issues regarding the Santayana Edition. I became the President of ADE (1996-7), and this enabled Kris and other members of the staff to attend meetings and find experts in specific areas that could serve as advisors and resolve editorial issues.

Kris largely managed my travel and hers to university archives and private libraries in order to review manuscripts, and she coordinated this with my administrative executive assistant and staff. Following significant training, she oversaw the creation of annotated versions of the manuscripts and letters, the independent double-sight collations of the many editions of Santayana's works, as well as the machine collations between impressions of the same type setting of Santayana's works.

Through it all, Kris Frost became a remarkable and exceptional editor. She began working on *Overheard in Seville* and help to manage the publication, correspondence with contributors, updates on the bibliography, and contact with my co-editor, Angus Kerr-Lawson.

When I accepted the appointment as Dean of the Indiana University School of Liberal Arts in Indianapolis along with appointments in the IU Medical School and on the IU Bloomington campus, I feared the project would be set back years unless there was continuity between all we had accomplished in Texas and our next steps in Indiana. I was delighted that Kris Frost agreed to move from Texas to Indiana. Without her, we most likely would have gone through a drought of several years trying to move forward with the publication of the Edition. She was the backbone of the Edition while we made this move, and she managed several difficult and intricate details. Because of Texas A&M regulations, we were not able to transfer NEH funds to Indiana University, and Kris worked directly with John McDermott at Texas A&M to make sure NEH payments and salaries were processed correctly and on time, coordinating this activity with my administrative staff and obtaining my approval. There were numerous expenses not supported by the NEH grant including for some travel by Kris and staff, purchase of equipment, and matching funds. Because we were able to transfer donated funds from Texas A&M University Foundation to the Indiana University Foundation these additional expenses were coordinated by Kris in consultation with me and in accord with the IU Foundation regulations. Kris also helped train and coordinate the work of graduate students on the Edition and later to facilitate Marianne Wocke's becoming the Director and Associate Editor of the Edition at Indiana University Indianapolis.

Kris worked remarkably well in the new setting, collaborating and sharing her expertise. The campus also housed the Peirce Edition and the Frederick Douglass Papers. As a result, there was a common sense of preserving some of the best and important works in American thought.

In 2003, I made the most difficult decision of my career. I accepted the presidency of a Stockton University in New Jersey and left what I thought would be a lifelong work on the Edition. At one of my farewells with the executive staff, I surprised myself by openly crying about leaving the Edition. When I regained my composure, I noted how pleased I was that Kris Frost would remain as Associate Editor and work with Marianna Wokeck as the Director and Editor of *The Works of George Santayana*. I was also pleased that we had created the Institute for American Philosophy that brought together several editorial projects including the Peirce Edition, Frederick Douglass Papers, and the Santayana Edition.

I was correct in my assessment. The Edition made considerable progress under the direction of Marianne Wokeck and Kris Frost. NEH funding continued along with the publication of the eight volumes of *Letters* (2001-2008), two volumes of *Marginalia* (2011), and five volumes of *The Life of Reason* (2011-2016). Martin Coleman joined the Edition, enhancing the editorial expertise and is now providing excellent leadership as Director and Editor.

Kris and I stayed in contact and I visited the Edition periodically. Kris's health deteriorated over time, and our last meeting was a lunch with her husband, Sherman, and Dot and me. We met at Shapiro's Delicatessen in Indianapolis, one of my favorite places. Kris was alert but because of her health the luncheon was over in about an hour. When Kris entered the Forest Creek Village, we periodically talked by phone with the assistance of her husband, Sherman. As her condition worsened, Sherman and I exchanged emails and talked by phone. He eventually visited her daily. Sherman died in March 2021, and Kris died in August 2021.

Their children were kind to remain in contact. Gail, Amanda, and Drew lost both parents this year. They, and everyone working in American thought, should know that in Kris we have lost one of the major contributors to preserving the works of George Santayana, and her influence extends well beyond our Edition. On a personal note, Kris you are a blessed memory and your support of me and the Edition will remain with me for as long as I live.

September 4, 2021

Henny Wenkart

Henny Wenkart (1928-2021) was a major figure in Santayana scholarship and in American philosophy. I first met her in 1969 when John Lachs invited me to a meeting to discuss the establishment of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. Henny was integral to the society's beginnings and to its development into a major international organization. In 1977, she joined the Advisory Board for the Santayana Edition, and later the same board served to found and support the George Santayana Society and *Overheard in Seville: The Bulletin of the Santayana Society*.

During my many research trips to Harvard University and New York City, she often hosted me and my family at her homes in Cambridge, Cape Cod, and New York City. Our energetic and insightful discussions and her support played significant roles in the development of the Santayana Edition. She was singularly responsible for introducing me to the editors of MIT Press who became the publishers for the full edition. At one point, she provided financial support for hiring a person to write the film script for *The Last Puritan*. Although the writer was a person suggested by Henny, the script did not meet her expectations, and she spent considerable time trying to make it better. After serious consideration, Merchant Ivory Production decided not to produce the film. We were all disappointed, but true to her nature, Henny never mentioned the loss of funds for this failed venture. She was generous and dedicated to advancing Santayana and his thought. Her unwavering support and scholarly achievements matched the integrity of her personality.

Henny was far more than a philosopher in American thought and her life history is remarkable. She was born in Vienna in 1928 and came to the United States in 1939 as one of fifty children rescued from the Nazis by Gilbert and Eleanor Kraus. She is highlighted in the HBO documentary "50 Children: The Rescue Mission of Mr. and Mrs. Kraus." Fortunately, she was reunited with her parents and sister. She grew up in Providence, RI, earning her BA from Pembroke College (1949) and was a proud member of Phi Beta Kappa. She received her MA in journalism from Columbia University (1950).

In 1951 she married Henry David Epstein and moved to Boston. They moved to Cambridge in 1958, where they had three children, Jonathan, Heitzi and Ari. Henny wrote a series of Phonic Readers to teach children to read which were used in public and private schools around the country. She earned a PhD in philosophy from Harvard University (1973) where she taught writing and philosophy at Harvard College. She served on the boards of many organizations including Brown Hillel, Harvard Hillel and the Jewish Women's Archive.

Her oldest son, Jonathan Epstein, sent me his memories of her philosophical acquaintances along with a humorous recollection from his own education at Harvard.

Her widespread acquaintance included some of the 20th century's most notable thinkers, many of them lifelong friends. These included Harry Austryn Wolfson, William Braude, Yossel Yerushalmi, Roderick Firth, John Lachs, John Rawls, Hilary Putnam, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Herman Saatkamp and dozens

of others. Her children remember gracious tea parties with A.J. (Freddie) Ayer, his kindness and machine-gun speech pattern, and also more contentious afternoons with Susan Sontag—long, bitter disagreements, less kindness and less tea. W.V.O. Quine complained that her son Jonathan had an unfair advantage in Quine's class in Symbolic Logic, because he'd taken the course before—in utero.

Priscilla Balch of the National Council of Jewish Women wrote:

Henny Wenkart was a woman of vitality and passion. She was a profound believer in women's rights and in the importance of the contributions made by Jewish women. These beliefs inspired her to engage in the creation of programs and events sponsored by the Eleanor Leff Jewish Women's Resource Center with great enthusiasm.

She led the Jewish Women's Poetry Workshop for many years, and she established the Jewish Women's Literary Annual, editing ten volumes giving voice to the thoughts and experiences of Jewish women.

I am grateful to Henny's children who provided information for this tribute. Their long-standing friendships are a central part of my life and that of my wife and children.

Henny Wenkart's lifetime achievements will not be forgotten and will live on in her family, friends and the many organizations she led and influenced. Her memory is a blessing.

December 17, 2021

HERMAN J SAATKAMP, JR

Bibliographical Checklist

Thirty-Seventh Update

The items below supplement the references given in *George Santayana: A Bibliographical Checklist, 1880–1980* (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982) prepared by Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. and John Jones. These references are divided into primary and secondary sources. Except for the book reviews and dissertations, the following articles and books are classified according to their years of publication. Readers with additions or corrections are invited to send these by email to bulletin@georgesantayanasociety.org, and to santedit@iupui.edu. The Santayana Edition keeps an online, searchable version of the complete checklist at <http://americanthought.iupui.edu/aib/index.php>.

As in prior years, the editors send a special thank you to Daniel Moreno for his time and effort in researching and compiling most of the entries for this year's update and to Guido Tamponi for several additional entries.

Primary Sources

2021

- Santayana, George. *Egotism in German Philosophy*. 1940. Reprint, Good Press, 2021.
- Santayana, George. *Persons and Places: The Background of My Life*. 1986. Reprint, Good Press, 2021.
- Santayana, George. *Güzellik Duyumu: Estetik Teorisinin Temel Yapısı*. Translated by Özgenur Geris. Istanbul: Corpus Yayinlari, 2021.

2020

- Santayana, George. “Чувството за красота (The Sense of Beauty): Part 1 The Nature of Beauty (an excerpt).” Translated by Silvia Borisova. *Философски алтернативи*, vol. 29, no. 1 (2020): 64-71.
- Santayana, George. “Introduction a *La vida de la razón*: El objecto de esta obra, sus métodos y sus antecedentes.” *Limbo: boletín internacional de estudios sobre Santayana*, no. 40 (2020): 95-118.
- Santayana, George. *The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress*. 1905. Reprint, New Delhi: Prabhat Prakashan, 2020.
- Santayana, George. *Rozum w religii*. Translated by Adam Grzeliński, and Krzysztof Wawrzonkowski. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2020.
- Santayana, George. *Il Senso della Bellezza*. Translated by Giuseppe Patella. 1997. Reprint, Palermo, Italy: Aesthetica Edizioni, 2020.

Secondary Sources

2022

Kremplewska, Katarzyna. *George Santayana's Political Hermeneutics*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2022.

2021

Besong, Brian. "The Debate on Probable Opinions in the Scholastic Tradition." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 95, no. 4 (2021): 739-742.

Haubert, Laura Elizia (2021). "Observações introdutórias sobre a natureza da beleza na filosofia de George Santayana." *Griot: Revista de Filosofia*, vol. 21, no. 1 (2021): 237-249.

LaRocca, David. "George Santayana's Transatlantic Literary Criticism and the Potencies of Aesthetic Judgment." In *Spain, the United States, and Transatlantic Literary Culture throughout the Nineteenth Century*, edited by John C. Havard and Ricardo Miguel-Alfonso, 175-196. New York: Routledge, 2021.

Niblett, Matthew. "Philosophy and Travel: The Meaning of Movement." In *Why Travel?: Understanding Our Need to Move and How it Shapes Our Lives*, edited by Matthew Niblett and Kris Beuret. Bristol, UK: Bristol University Press, 2021.

Saatkamp Jr, Herman J. *A Life of Scholarship with Santayana*. Edited by Charles Padrón and Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Rodopi, 2021.

Tamponi, Guido Karl. *George Santayana. Eine materialistische Philosophie der Vita contemplative*. Würzburg, Deutschland: Königshausen & Neumann, 2021.

2020

Aydin, Aysun. "George Santayana ve Epifenomenal Natüralizmin Olanaklılığı." *Muhakeme Dergisi*, vol. 3, no. 1 (2020): 1-8.

Carlisle, Rodney. "Santayana and the lessons of history." *The Historian*, vol. 82, no. 4 (2020): 420-423.

Galván, Hector. "George Santayana Society International Online Conference: 'Harmony and Well-Being: Reflections about the Pandemic in Light of George Santayana's Philosophy.'" *Limbo: boletín internacional de estudios sobre Santayana* vol. 40 (2020): 157-163.

Grzeliński, Adam. "The Validity of Aesthetic Judgments: George Santayana's Polemics with Tradition." *Truth and Falsehood in Science and the Arts*, edited by Barbara Bokus and Ewa Kowsowska, 101-114. Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2020.

Lachs, John and Michael P. Hodges. *Thinking in the Ruins: Wittgenstein and Santayana on Contingency*. 2000. Reprint, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2020.

- Lachs, Shirley, et al. *Physical Order and Moral Liberty: Previously Unpublished Essays of George Santayana*. 1969. Reprint, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2020.
- Morales, Bernat Torres. "Platonismo y espiritualidad en George Santayana." *Quimera: Revista de literatura*, no. 435 (2020): 32-35.
- Neuber, Matthias. "Two Forms of American Critical Realism: Perception and Reality in Santayana/Strong and Sellars." *HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2020): 76-105.
- Patella, Giuseppe. "Arte, vita, valore. L'estetica vitalistica di George Santayana." *Studi di Estetica*, vol. 4, no. 20 (2020): 73-97.
- Saatkamp Jr, Herman J. "Santayana: Biography and The Future of Philosophy." *Pragmatism Today*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2020): 125-136.
- Wahman, Jessica. "Does Truth Really Matter? Notes on a Crisis of Faith." *Journal of Speculative Philosophy: A Quarterly Journal of History, Criticism, and Imagination*, vol. 34, no. 4 (2020): 491-507.
- Weiss, Robin. "Santayana's Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered." *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2020): 1-19.

Reviews of Santayana Books

2020

- Pinkas, Daniel (2020). "Review of George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe." *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2020).
- Tiller, Glenn (2020). "Katarzyna Krempleska, Life as Insinuation: George Santayana's Hermeneutics." *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2020): 1-5.
- Vaiana, Leonarda. "Santayana's Hermeneutics of Poetry and Philosophy." *Limbo: boletín internacional de estudios sobre Santayana*, vol. 40 (2020): 139-156.
- DiMassa, Daniel. "Review of Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe, by George Santayana." *Goethe Yearbook*, vol. 28 (2021): 373-374.
- Ryder, John (2021). "Naturalism's Philosophy of the Sacred: Justus Buchler, Karl Jaspers, and George Santayana by Martin O. Yalcin." *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, vol. 56, no. 3 (2021): 465-469.

Some Abbreviations for Santayana's Works

Page numbers in articles refer to the critical edition of Santayana's work, if it has been published, unless otherwise specified in the references for a particular article. For a list of the volumes of the critical edition that have been published, see the next page. Authors should refer to the critical editions, when they are available.

These abbreviations should be used for citations only. To refer a work in the text, authors should spell out its name.

AFSL	<i>Animal Faith and Spiritual Life</i> , ed. John Lachs	OiS	<i>Overheard in Seville</i>
BR	<i>Birth of Reason and Other Essays</i>	OS	<i>Obiter Scripta</i>
COUS	<i>Character and Opinion in the United States</i>	PGS	<i>The Philosophy of George Santayana</i> , ed PA Schilpp
POEMS	<i>Complete Poems</i>	POML	<i>Physical Order and Moral Liberty</i> , ed. J and S Lachs
DL	<i>Dialogues in Limbo</i>	PP	<i>Persons and Places</i>
DNM	"Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics"	PP1	<i>The Background of My Life</i>
DP	<i>Dominations and Powers</i>	PP2	<i>The Middle Span</i>
EGP	<i>Egotism in German Philosophy</i>	PP3	<i>My Host the World</i>
GSA	<i>George Santayana's America</i>	PSL	<i>Platonism and the Spiritual Life</i>
GTB	<i>The Genteel Tradition at Bay</i>	RB	<i>Realms of Being</i> (one-volume edition)
ICG	<i>The Idea of Christ in the Gospels</i>	RE	<i>The Realm of Essence</i> (RB Bk. 1)
IPR	<i>Interpretations of Poetry and Religion</i>	RM	<i>The Realm of Matter</i> (RB Bk. 2)
LGS	<i>The Letters of George Santayana</i>	RT	<i>The Realm of Truth</i> (RB Bk. 3)
LP	<i>The Last Puritan</i>	RS	<i>The Realm of Spirit</i> (RB Bk. 4)
LR	<i>The Life of Reason</i>	SAF	<i>Scepticism and Animal Faith</i>
LR1	Bk. 1, <i>Reason in Common Sense</i>	SB	<i>The Sense of Beauty</i>
LR2	Bk. 2, <i>Reason in Society</i>	SE	<i>Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies</i>
LR3	Bk. 3, <i>Reason in Religion</i>	TTMP	<i>Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy</i>
LR4	Bk. 4, <i>Reason in Art</i>	TPP	<i>Three Philosophical Poets</i>
LR5	Bk. 5, <i>Reason in Science</i>	WD	<i>Winds of Doctrine</i>
MARG	<i>Marginalia</i>		

Bibliography of the Critical Editions of Santayana's Works

Listed in order of publication. Citations should refer to these editions.

For the *Letters* and the *Marginalia*, the volume numbers are given below to indicate date of publication, but please note that the preferred method of citation omits the volume number.

For the *Letters*, the preferred citation format is:

LGS to [recipient], [date in dd Month yyyy format]

The recipient or date is omitted if the text explicitly refers to it. In case one or the other is omitted, there is no comma.

For the *Marginalia*, the preferred citation format is:

MARG [author], [work] [page number in the author's work]

The page number may be omitted if Santayana has three or fewer marginalia in the work. The author or work is omitted if the context makes the reference clear.

- PP [1944,1945,1953] 1986. *Persons and Places*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 1 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- SB [1896] 1988. *The Sense of Beauty*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 2 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- IPR [1900] 1990. *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 3 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LP [1935] 1995. *The Last Puritan*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 4 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LGS1 [1868-1909] 2001. *The Letters of George Santayana: Book One, [1868]-1909*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 5 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LGS2 [1910-1920] 2002. *The Letters of George Santayana: Book Two, 1910-1920*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 5 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LGS3 [1921-1927] 2002. *The Letters of George Santayana: Book Three, 1921-1927*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 5 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LGS4 [1928-1932] 2003. *The Letters of George Santayana: Book Four, 1928-1932*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 5 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LGS5 [1933-1936] 2003. *The Letters of George Santayana: Book Five, 1933-1936*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 5 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LGS6 [1937-1940] 2004. *The Letters of George Santayana: Book Six, 1937-1940*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 5 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

- LGS7 [1941-1947] 2006. *The Letters of George Santayana: Book Seven, 1941-1947*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 5 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LGS8 [1948-1952] 2008. *The Letters of George Santayana: Book Eight, 1948-1952*. Eds. William G. Holzberger and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. Vol. 5 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- MARG1 2011. *George Santayana's Marginalia: A Critical Selection: Book One: Abell-Lucretius*. Eds. John McCormick and Kristine Walters Frost. Vol. 6 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- MARG2 2011. *George Santayana's Marginalia: A Critical Selection: Book Two: McCord-Zeller*. Eds. John McCormick and Kristine Walters Frost. Vol. 6 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LR1 [1905] 2011. *Reason in Common Sense*. Book 1 of *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress*. Eds. Marianne S. Wokeck and Martin A. Coleman. Vol. 7 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LR2 [1905] 2013. *Reason in Society*. Book 2 of *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress*. Eds. Marianne S. Wokeck and Martin A. Coleman. Vol. 7 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LR3 [1905] 2014. *Reason in Religion*. Book 3 of *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress*. Eds. Marianne S. Wokeck and Martin A. Coleman. Vol. 7 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LR4 [1905] 2015. *Reason in Art*. Book 4 of *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress*. Eds. Marianne S. Wokeck and Martin A. Coleman. Vol. 7 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LR5 [1906] 2016. *Reason in Science*. Book 5 of *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress*. Eds. Marianne S. Wokeck and Martin A. Coleman. Vol. 7 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- TTP [1910] 2019. *Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe*. Eds. Kellie Dawson and David E. Spiech. Vol. 8 of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge: MIT Press..

Submission Guidelines

The editors of *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society* invite submission of articles and essays about George Santayana from any discipline. Letters to the editors (not exceeding 300 words) are also welcome.

The editors often request revisions before a piece is accepted for publication. Upon acceptance, authors will be expected to approve editorial corrections.

Previously unpublished manuscripts are preferred and simultaneous submission is discouraged. Authors typically may expect notice of the status of their submission within three months of submission. Submissions are accepted all year with a March 1 deadline for inclusion in a particular year's issue.

These guidelines may be updated from time to time. To download the latest guidelines go to <http://georgesantayanasociety.org/submissionguidelines.pdf>.

Manuscript Style

- Manuscripts should be submitted electronically as e-mail attachments to submissions@georgesantayanasociety.org.
- Manuscripts should be double-spaced and in an editable file format such as Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx), Rich Text Format (.rtf), or OpenDocument Text (.odt).
- Manuscripts should be prepared for blind review. Identifying information should not appear in running heads, footnotes, references, or anywhere in the manuscript. Identifying information in footnotes or reference may be replaced with blanks or dashes.
- Manuscripts should be prepared according to *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 17th edition guidelines. See also: [Manuscript Preparation Guidelines](#) and [Preparing Tables, Artwork, and Math](#).
- **Footnotes should be reserved for substantive comments**, clarifications, and ancillary information that would interrupt the flow of the main text. These should be kept to a minimum. Citations go in the body of the text.
- Textual citations should conform to author-date system described in the *Chicago Manual of Style*. The author followed by the date (if the author has more than one work cited) and the page number should appear in parenthesis within the text wherever such a reference is needed. In block quotations, the parenthesis appears at the end just after the last punctuation mark in the block. For citations within the text, the parenthetical citation should be after any closing quotation mark but immediately before the final punctuation mark, unless the final punctuation mark is a question mark or exclamation point that belongs inside the quotation.

Example with date:

(James [1898], 175)

Bracketed date indicates that the reference occurred in the original edition, even though a later edition or reprint is listed in the references.

Example without date (author has only one work cited):

(Royce 144)

Note that the dropping of the date is an exception to the Chicago guidelines.

- In your citation, if you use an edition or version other than the original and the reference is to text as it is found in the original, the year of original publication should be in brackets in your citation. If a passage is different in a later edition or found only there, the date in brackets should be the date that the passage first appeared. If the passage first appeared in the edition you are citing, then the year should be left out if the author has only one work cited or else included but not in brackets.
- A reference list should be provided at the end of the manuscript, specifying which edition is used. Note that in author-date style, the year immediately follows the author's name and is followed by a period. If you use an edition or version other than the original, in the reference list the year of original publication should be in brackets before the year of the edition you are using.
- References to classical writers should use standard page numbers, such as Stephanus numbers for Plato and Bekker numbers for Aristotle.
- References to Santayana's works should use the standard abbreviations found in recent issues of *Overheard in Seville* (e.g., SAF for *Scepticism and Animal Faith*) followed by the page.
- If a quotation from a Santayana work is taken from a critical edition and only critical editions are cited, the work need not be included in the reference list, as long as you use standard abbreviations. If you cite non-critical editions or non-Santayana material, then you should include the abbreviation of the work in your reference list and simply indicate that the critical edition is the one referred to. The reference listing for the critical edition of *Reason in Common Sense* is:

LR1 *Reason in Common Sense* .Critical edition

- An author may use an abbreviation to refer to works by an author other than Santayana by preceding the bibliographical listing of the work with the abbreviation. For example,
 AE Dewey, John. 1934. *Art as Experience*. New York: Minton, Balch and Company.
- References works with abbreviations should go in a separate section that precedes any other referenced works.
- List abbreviations alphabetically by the author's name and then by abbreviation. If there is only one reference with an abbreviation for an author, the author's name should be included in the listing, as in the example. In the case of multiple references with abbreviations for the same author, list the references indented under the author's name and alphabetically by the abbreviation.
- In citing a reference to a work identified by an abbreviation that contains essays by more than one author, if the context does not make clear who the

author is, include the author's name before the abbreviation. For example: (Hartshorne PGS 153).

- If an abbreviation or the author's name alone is used in a citation, do not put comma before the page number. If the date is included, place a comma after the date.
- The preferred way to cite one of Santayana's letters is to use the abbreviation LGS followed by the date and "to [recipient]." If either the recipient or date is given in the text, it may be left out of the citation.
- Wherever possible, references should be to authoritative scholarly editions, such as *The Works of George Santayana* (MIT), *The Collected Works of John Dewey* (SIU), *The Works of William James* (Harvard), *The Jane Addams Papers* (UMI), etc. **An author not in possession of a particular scholarly edition should encourage his or her institution's library to acquire it or borrow the work through interlibrary loan.** Authors should notify the editor if, after such efforts, they still do not have access to a particular authoritative edition. Note that many of the critical editions of Santayana's works are available in modified PDF formats that enable accurate page number citation.
- Articles and essays should be no more than 8,000 words. Check with the editor before sending a longer submission.
- Authors should divide their manuscripts with appropriate section headings. Section headings may use paragraph styles Heading2, Heading3, etc. We do not recommend subsections, unless some obvious contextual reason calls for them.
- Except for block quotes, use a single paragraph style set to double space and to indent 1 inch before the first line. (These settings are for submission. They are not the settings for publication, but following these guidelines simplifies the transition to publishable form.). Do not use tabs to indent the first line of a paragraph.
- For block quotes, either use a paragraph style that has no first line indent and is indented on the left one inch.
- Use block quotes for any quotation longer than three lines (roughly 225 characters including spaces). You may also use block quotes for shorter quotations to make them stand out from the text.
- To indicate that the text following a block quote does not start a new paragraph, either do not indent the first line of the paragraph after the block quote or put "[same paragraph]" at the start of the text following the paragraph.
- Submissions should include in the text of the email or in a separate document a brief description of the author's background and work for use in a contributor's note.
- Any permissions necessary to print any part of a submission are the responsibility of the author to obtain.

- If you refer to a theoretic position with a label (e.g. pragmatism, romanticism, phenomenology), explain the meaning of the term in the context of your article. Do not capitalize such labels.
- To refer to a term instead of using it, put the term in italics. It is an option to use single quotes for this purpose. Use italics the first time an unusual technical term appears (and perhaps is defined). Thereafter, use the term without italics or quotes. You may use double quotes in paraphrasing an author to indicate that you are using a term that is used by the author in a special way. In general, avoid doing this for Santayana's works.
- Avoid scare quotes: quotation marks that indicate others may use the term in the intended sense, but you would prefer not to. Either find the appropriate word or adopt the scary term as your own.

Submitted manuscripts and communication regarding submissions should be addressed to submissions@georgesantayanasociety.org. Correspondence about matters other than submissions may be addressed to bulletin@georgesantayanasociety.org

Angus Kerr-Lawson Prize

The George Santayana Society offers the Angus Kerr-Lawson Prize in tribute to the late Professor Kerr-Lawson's outstanding contributions to Santayana scholarship both as longtime editor of *Overheard in Seville: The Bulletin of the George Santayana Society* and as the author of many articles that appeared in this *Bulletin* and in other publications. Kerr-Lawson was an early participant in the George Santayana Society.

The prize is available to a scholar not more than five years out of graduate school for an essay engaging or rooted in the thought of George Santayana. We encourage applications from graduate students, junior faculty members, and those whose graduate work has been interrupted. Authors may address any aspect of Santayana's life and thought. We welcome essays that relate his thinking to other figures in the American tradition and beyond and to contemporary social, cultural, and philosophic concerns. Relevant themes include materialism and naturalism, realism and Platonism, metaphysics and morals, and issues connected to American culture and intellectual history.

The winner will receive \$700 and be invited to present the winning paper at the Society's annual meeting in early January. The winning essay will be submitted for publication in the edition of *Overheard in Seville* that follows that meeting. In 2022, the winner will be notified by September. Authors should prepare submissions for blind review (no exposing references to the author within the composition) and send electronically in Word, ODT, or PDF format to: submissions@georgesantayanasociety.org. The subject line of the email should read: "Kerr-Lawson Prize Submission, [author's name]." The deadline for submissions is Monday, 2 May 2022. We prefer applicants to send a letter of intent by 2 April 2022.

Contributors

Lydia Amir teaches philosophy at Tufts University. She is Founding-President of the International Association for the Philosophy of Humor, Founding-Editor of the journal *Philosophy of Humor Yearbook* and of three book series. Recent work includes *The Legacy of Nietzsche's Philosophy of Laughter* (Routledge 2021), *Philosophy, Humor, and the Human Condition* (Palgrave 2019), *Taking Philosophy Seriously* (2018) and *Rethinking Philosophers' Responsibility* (2017).

Phillip Beard has an MA from the University of Virginia and a PhD from the University of Maryland and currently teaches in the English Department, and in the Vienna Austria Abroad program, at Auburn University. He has also taught American Literature as a Fulbright Scholar at Friedrich Alexander University in Erlangen, Germany. He has published articles on Santayana as well as articles on modernist and postmodernist American literature.

Martin Coleman is Director and Editor of the Santayana Edition at IUPUI in Indianapolis, Indiana. He is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy.

Larry A Hickman is the Director Emeritus of the Center for Dewey Studies at Southern Illinois University Carbondale.

Charles Padrón is a scholar in Gran Canaria, Spain. He has written widely on Santayana. His latest book co-edited with Kris Skowronski, is a volume of Herman Saatkamp's writings, *A Life of Scholarship of Santayana*.

Nayeli L Riano is a PhD student in political theory at Georgetown University working on 19th-century Latin American political thought.

Eric Craig Sapp is an attorney, political theorist, careful reader of literature, and occasional versifier. He is a once and future doctoral candidate at a university founded by a robber baron's family and located on occupied Ohlone territory in California.

Herman J Saatkamp, Jr is the founder of the Santayana Edition, the George Santayana Society, and *Overheard in Seville*.

Forrest Adam Sopuck was awarded his PhD in philosophy at McMaster University in 2015. His early published work (2016, 2017) interprets Thomas Reid's philosophy of perception. His current work explores how Santayana's philosophical views contribute to contemporary debates in aesthetics and metaphysics. His recently published book, *The Aesthetics of Horror Films: A Santayanan Perspective*, provides a neo-Santayanan treatment of central issues in horror theory.

Alba Sheda Stefanelli holds a Bachelor's Degree (University of Macerata) and a Master's Degree (University of Rome Tor Vergata), both in Philosophy. She wrote her Master's thesis about Santayana's Aesthetics under the supervision of Professor G. Patella.

Glenn Tiller is Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi. His research and publications focus on American Philosophy, especially the philosophies of Charles Peirce and George Santayana. He is past-President of the George Santayana Society and past-editor of *Overheard in Seville: Bulletin of the Santayana Society*.

Jessica Wahman is the author of *Narrative Naturalism* and a member of the *Overheard in Seville* Editorial Board. She teaches at Emory University.



Overheard in Seville



Overheard in Seville: The Bulletin of the George Santayana Society is published and distributed by the George Santayana Society and is archived on the Internet by the School of Liberal Arts at Indiana University—Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI).

General Editor:

Richard Marc Rubin
Matthew Caleb Flamm (2015–2016)
Glenn Tiller (2011–2014)
Angus Kerr-Lawson (1998–2010)
Angus Kerr-Lawson and Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. (1983–1997)

Associate Editor:

Hector Galván (Texas A & M University—Corpus Christi)

Editorial Adviser:

Martin Coleman (Santayana Edition, IUPUI)

Editorial Board:

George Santayana Society Officers

Michael Brodrick (Arkansas Tech University) Vice President
Hector Galván (Texas A & M University—Corpus Christi) Secretary-Treasurer
Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński (Opole University) European Liaison

Additional Board Members

Phillip L. Beard (Auburn University)
Matthew Caleb Flamm (Rockford University)
Katarzyna Krempłewska (Polish Academy of Sciences)
Diana Heney (Vanderbilt University)
Charles Padrón (Gran Canaria, Spain)
Daniel Pinkas (HEAD—Geneva, Switzerland)
Glenn Tiller (Texas A & M University—Corpus Christi)
Jessica Wahman (Emory University)

Honorary Board Members:

David Dilworth
John Lachs
Herman J Saatkamp, Jr.

ISSN 2153-7046 (online) ISSN 0846-8508 (print)

Archived issues are available at <https://santayana.iupui.edu/santayana-society/bulletin/>.

The Philosophy Documentation Center also archives *Overheard in Seville*. Individual articles for any issue are available at <https://www.pdcnet.org/>.

Matters concerning membership in the George Santayana Society, subscriptions to the Bulletin, and the Bibliographic Update may be sent to info@georgesantayanasyociety.org.

To contribute to the Society and subscribe to *Overheard in Seville* go to <http://george-santayanasociety.org/>.

More pages for the George Santayana Society and the Santayana Edition are at <http://santayana.iupui.edu/>

OVERHEARD IN SEVILLE

BULLETIN OF THE GEORGE SANTAYANA SOCIETY

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

<i>Santayana in 1896, 1921, and 1946</i>	7
Glenn Tiller <i>1896 The Sense of Beauty and Studies in England</i>	7
Charles Padrón <i>1921 Madrid, Ávila, Paris, Rome</i>	15
Richard M Rubin <i>1946 Parcels, Family, Visitors, Health, Politic.</i>	18

ARTICLES

Charles Padrón <i>On Dominations and Powers</i>	33
Forrest A Sopuck <i>Santayana On Colour</i>	40
Nayeli L Riano <i>An Aesthetic Arbiter of Politics: Santayana's Concept of the Psyche</i>	71
Jessica Wahman <i>A Response to Nayeli Riano</i>	89
Eric Sapp <i>Imagined Geographies in Santayana and Ibn Sina</i>	98
Lydia Amir <i>The Democrítean Tradition Part II</i>	116
Jerry Griswold <i>Santayana & Stevens: The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain</i>	141
Richard M Rubin & Phillip L Beard <i>The Other Side of the Mountain</i>	150

REVIEWS

Larry A Hickman <i>A Life of Scholarship with Santayana by Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr</i>	161
Martin Coleman <i>Bertrand's Brother by Ruth Derham</i>	173
Alba Stefanelli <i>The Sense of Beauty in Italian</i>	184

IN MEMORIAM

Herman Saatkamp <i>Kristine Frost</i>	188
<i>Henny Wenkart</i>	191

Corrections to the Print Edition

- P. 66 (footnote) “Santayana’s thinks” replaced by “Santayana thinks”
- PP. 116-121 Italicize several book titles
- P. 202 “refer to term” replaced by “refer to a term”
- P. 205 Glenn Tiller added as board member
- P. 205 link to IUPUI library archive dropped